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ABSTRACT 
This study provides evidence on accounting conservatism based on a large 
sample of publicly-quoted UK companies over the period 1969-2001. The effects of 
conservative accounting are studied both indirectly and directly by using earnings 
measures containing varying levels of accruals and by further decomposing earnings 
into its operating cash flows and distinct accruals components. The analyses are also 
separated according to the sign of earnings and earnings components, and account 
for the effects of asset-recognition rules. Even though conservatism is an accruals 
phenomenon, this is the first study to provide direct empirical evidence on the role of 
accruals in accounting conservatism. 
The thesis addresses the following issues. First, under conservative 
accounting, earnings-decreasing changes in performance measures (reflecting 
economic losses) that contain more accruals mean-revert more and earnings- 
increasing changes (reflecting economic gains) are persistent. Working capital 
accruals and special items are particularly strongly mean-reverting when they are 
eamings-decreasing. Depreciation accruals are persistent. 
Second, direct tests by earnings components show that operating cash flows 
exhibit low timeliness overall and, given that they contain no accruals, no asymmetry 
in reflecting bad news. Earnings figures with more accruals exhibit more asymmetry 
in reflecting bad news. Working capital accruals and special items are important in 
this asymmetry, but depreciation is not. Interestingly, good news results in a small 
eamings-decreasing charge, consistent with smoothing. Lagged tests on accruals 
reveal that bad news from as much as three previous periods is reflected in current 
ii 
earnings through special items, -; inconsistent with conservatism. Evidence indicates 
that conservatism is increasing through time. The sensitivity to good news has 
decreased over time. To capture these changes, higher-moments measures are 
developed. 
Third, the analysis by the sign of "bottom-line" earnings does not reveal any 
differences in reflecting good/bad news for the profit/loss finns. Separating earnings 
observations by sign of cash flow also reveals no differences. In contrast, separating 
observations by the sign of accruals (other than depreciation) reliably shows that the 
asymmetric timeliness is significantly higher in the negative-accruals groups, as 
expected. The accruals components determine this asymmetry, rather than the 
operating cash flow (or, earnings by itselo. 
Finally, less conservative recognition rules lead to stronger responsiveness of 
earnings to bad news, as reflected in working capital accruals and special items. 
Asset-specific measures of conservative recognition rules reinforce these findings. A 
puzzling result is that operating cash flows reveal a significant asymmetric response 
to bad news in the group of observations where it is least-likely to be observed (low 
book to market). 
A selection of other results by size, industry, extremity of news, methods, 
accounting year-ends, market-wide returns, yields, method of estimation, ctc., not 
only corroborates, but generally strengthens the results obtained. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In almost forty years of capital market-based empirical accounting research 
since the seminal Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) studies, accounting 
conservatism has emerged as a dominant explanation of observed differences 
between share prices and accounting figures, in particular accounting earnings. The 
essence of conservatism is often referred to by the phrase "anticipate all losses, but 
recognise only realised profits". While accounting conservatism has been discussed 
occasionally in early papers (e. g., Scott, 1926; Brock, 1958; Devine, 1963; Sterling, 
1967) and historical reviews (e. g., Edwards, pp. 109-110) and proposed as an 
alternative explanation of observed results (e. g., Hayn, 1995), it was not until the 
important empirical paper by Basu (1997) that it has become a central issue in the 
capital market-based research. ' Basu's (1997) paper has been "amended" by a 
theoretical model two years later by Pope and Walker (1999) and its analyses 
extended both in time and in an international context. Both these two influential 
papers, along with several other papers that followed later, define accounting 
conservatism in terms of the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Good economic 
news, as evidenced in an efficient capital market by increases in share prices 
(positive returns in period), is recognised in earnings only when the good news is 
realised. This would generally happen gradually over a number of accounting 
periods. On the other hand, bad economic news, as evidenced by decreases in share 
prices (negative periodic returns), should be immediately and fully recognised in 
1 Nobes (1981) cautions that there are two very different types of conservatism: 
"... German or French conservatism is of a wholly different order than Anglo-Saxon 
prudence. " (p. 268) 
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earnings in the period it becomes known, in some instances already at the time it is 
only anticipated and thus before it is realised. 
In the period 1999-2004, several papers have explored Basu's (1997) 
intuition and Pope and Walker's (1999) theoretical model to study either the 
accounting conservatism itself in various settings, or have used this model to infer 
properties of/variations in accounting rules across time, regulatory regimes and 
influences of conservatism on other (contractual) questions. For example, variants of 
the model have been used to infer the changing value-relevance of financial 
statements over time (e. g., Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Klein and Marquardt, 2002; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). The model has been used to 
study international variation in accounting rules. Besides Pope and Walker's (1999) 
empirical UK/US comparison, some of the related studies include Raonic, McLeay 
and Asimakopoulos (2004) who study the effects of cross-listings on conservatism, 
and Giner and Rees (2001) who study conservatism in four European countries 
characterised by different institutional properties. Ball, Kothari and Wu (2000) study 
four Asian countries and the interaction of accounting standards and managers' and 
auditors' incentives on conservatism. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) study 
influences resulting from institutional differences between code-law and common 
law countries. Beekes, Pope and Young (2003) study the influence of board 
composition - in particular, the number of outside directors - on the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings, while Bushman et aL (2004) study the influence of earnings 
timeliness on ownership concentration, directors' incentives and executives' 
incentives. Other issues studied in this context include quarterly-eamings 
conservatism and auditors' incentives (Basu, Hwang and Jan, 2001), type of auditor 
2 
(Basu, Hwang, Jan, 2000), cost of equity issues (Francis et al. 2003, who show that 
timeliness and conservatism - they distinguish between the two terms - have 
relatively small influences on the cost of capital), emerging market issues (e. g., 
Jindrichovska and Kuo, 2002), issues regarding dividend policies and debt costs 
(e. g., Ahmed et al., 2002) - albeit not directly in the Basu (1997) sense, and others 
(general review papers include Watts, 2003 and 2003b; Kothari, 2001; Holthausen 
and Watts, 2001). The list of topics researched is not exhaustive, but at best 
indicative on the richness of the research area. Moreover, the list of topics related to 
accounting conservatism is likely to increase in the future. Beginning in 2005, the 
European Union is introducing the International Financial Reporting Standards, an 
important feature of which is expected to be high(er) timeliness. High timeliness is a 
characteristic of accounting being conservative in respect to treatment of economic 
losses but not economic gains and is one of the two important or desired properties 
or determinants of quality of accounting earnings (European Commission, 2002; 
Levitt, 1998), the other "desirable" property being the comparability of financial 
statements. 
Surprisingly, although accounting conservatism is by definition an accruals 
phenomenon, existing empirical studies have not explored the details regarding the 
particular ways in which accounting conservatism manifests itself in the relation 
between accounting earnings (and, more generally, other performance measures) and 
share prices through accruals in these contexts. While the central role of accruals is 
stressed and commented upon in a large number of research papers cited elsewhere 
in this chapter, the actual inferences regarding the precise role(s) of accruals in the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings to good and bad news have been made only 
3 
indirectly and using "aggregated" measures. For example, Basu (1997) regresses two 
cash flows figures (from operations and from operating and financial activities) 
presumably containing increasingly "less accruals" on goodibad economic news and 
compares these results with results obtained byý regressing earnings before 
extraordinary items on news. The cash flow and earnings figures contain different 
amounts of accruals. By comparing the results from one set of figures relative to the 
other, he is able to comment upon the relative merits of accruals in the observed 
asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings and good and bad economic news. A 
similar approach is taken in other existing studies as well: Pope and Walker (1999) 
compare ordinary earnings and earnings after extraordinary items and Ball, Kothari 
and Robin (2000) compare operating cash flows with earnings before extraordinary 
items. They also explore dividends as an alternative measure of company 
perfonnance. 
Most visible applications of accounting conservatism that result in large, 
transitory one-time items include, for example, large losses on disposals and 
restructuring costs and it is thus not surprising that the primary focus of the studies 
quoted above has been on accruals items that fall under the general descriptive term 
d6special items" (e. g., Kinney and Trezevant, 1997). However, literature related to, 
but not directly concerned with, accounting conservatism has shown that the links 
between other types of more "ordinary" accruals, examples of which include 
working capital accruals'and the depreciation charge, and future cash flows are 
(potentially) important. One question that emerges is whether these "ordinary" types 
of accruals have an important role in the observed asymmetric timeliness of 
4 
accounting earnings. Moreover, the precise nature of "special items" has often not 
been clarified in (non-US) empirical literature. 
If the application of accounting conservatism does cause large one-time 
transitory items to appear in accounting earnings, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
at least in some cases these items would cause (one-time) bottom-line accounting 
losses, a decrease in accounting earnings or accounting earnings that are lower than 
they would otherwise be. Empirical literature has shown that both losses and 
earnings decreases mean-revert fast and are thus by and large transitory (e. g., Das 
and Lev, 1994; Freeman and Tse, 1992), which is consistent with predictions under 
accounting conservatism. Moreover, there is a notable body of empirical literature 
that shows from several different aspects that the relation between share prices and 
accounting earnings (and book values of equity) relate in ways that are not 
characteristic of "normal" firms (e. g., Donnelly, 2002; Collins, Pincus and Xie, 
1999; Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998; Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1997; Beaver, 
McAnally and Stinson, 1997; Ali and Pope, 1995; Jan and Ou, 1995; Hayn, 1995; 
Martikainen, 1997). In relating these findings to the accounting conservatism 
literature, an important question emerges. Are these "different" relations a result of 
differences in applications of the conservatism principle? Or, for example, can the 
application of conservative accounting practises that results in an accounting loss be 
treated as a mere manifestation of the appearance of (extreme) bad news that must 
then be recognised in financial statement immediately due - to accounting 
conservatism? 
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Finally, Pope and Walker (2003), building on Feltharn and OhIson (1995, 
1996) and other (e. g., Beaver and Ryan, 1996) literature, place an asset-recognition 
restriction on these relations. Firms that write-off as an expense the entire amount 
invested in an asset at the time the investment expenditure occurs, should not exhibit 
asymmetric timeliness in accounting earnings in reflecting bad news in later 
accounting periods, given that the assets to which the investment expenditures relate, 
would not have been recorded as an asset in the balance sheet. However, analogously 
to the literature on conservative treatment of economic gains and economic losses, 
no distinction is made about the precise sources of these restrictions. For example, 
firms that exhibit relatively large amounts of net working capital are more likely to 
recognise the effects of conservative treatment of economic gains and losses through 
changes in net working capital accounts than through other accounting items. 
This thesis empirically explores these research issues. It uses a large and 
comprehensive UK sample of publicly-quoted companies in a contextually very long 
time-series spanning firms with financial year-ends ending in years 1969-2001. The 
sample includes failed companies, but excludes, as is conventional, financial and 
related firms - see, e. g., Danbolt and Rees (2001). The thesis starts with a general 
observation resulting from different treatment of economic gains (increases in 
market value) and economic losses (decreases in market value) under conservative 
accounting - namely, that economic gains are recognised in financial statements 
gradually, as they are realised and the realisation can be appropriately verified, while 
economic losses are recognised in financial statements immediately and fully in the 
period they are realised (or, anticipated, specifically in the case of decreases in 
market value). In other words, gains tend to persist in different performance 
6 
measures affected, while losses tend to be transitory. While either empirical results 
or theoretical predictions for some accounting figures - in a great majority of cases 
this would be the earnings figure - have already been shown in other related studies 
(e. g., Barth, Cram and Nelson, 2001; Fama and French, 2000; Dechow, Kothari and 
Watts, 1998; Basu, 1997; Sloan, 1996; Dechow, 1994; Albrecht, Lookabill and 
McKeown, 1977; Ball and Watts, 1972; Beaver, 1970), this study extends the 
literature in the UK context and construct and study the persistence behaviour of 
three earnings figures, designed to be comparable, to the maximum extent possible, 
across the entire time-period studied. Moreover, the existing literature is extended, in 
particular the Basu (1997) results by examining relative persistence properties of 
some of the main components of earnings - operating cash flows and accruals, of 
which the main components are working capital accruals (and its components), the 
depreciation and amortisation charge and "special items" (appendices contain 
additional accounting figures) under conservative accounting. The distinction 
between earnings-increasing and eamings-decreasing changes in these figures is 
made, as well as an allowance for any possible differences between profit firms and 
accounting loss firms as well as firms affected by bad and good news. Apart from 
providing some additional insights related to consequences of conservative treatment 
of economic gains/losses on time-series properties of these "performance" measures, 
the analysis also helps in fonning expectations about direct relations between various 
accounting performance measures and share prices as well as indications regarding 
any differential effects between accounting-profit and accounting-loss firms. 
Next, using Pope and Walker (1999) models, direct tests of accounting 
conservatism are performed separately by various accounting earnings measures and 
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the aforementioned main earnings components. The role of accruals in the 
asymmetric relation can be infer-red in two ways: indirectly, via a comparison of 
accounting earnings and operating cash flow regressions, and directly, by perfonning 
direct conservatism tests on the main accruals components. The study allows for the 
different roles working capital accruals, its components, the depreciation and 
amortisation charge and special items might have in the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings reflecting the application of accounting conservatism to treatment of 
economic gains and losses. All accounting measures containing accruals components 
should exhibit asymmetric timeliness in reflecting bad economic news (economic 
losses) albeit not in a uniform way. Economic gains, on the other hand, should be 
reflected in accounting figures only gradually, i. e., not the entire capitalised amount 
of an economic gain would usually be recognised within the same accounting period. 
To study these relations, both the contemporaneous (i. e., current-period accounting 
figure regressed on current-period returns inferring the general relation) and the 
lagged (i. e., current-period accounting figure regressed on current and previous- 
period(s) returns reflecting the speed of recognition of news) are employed. Given 
that several US-based research papers indicate that the nature of the relation between 
financial statements relative to market values might have changed over the last few 
decades (e. g., Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Francis and 
Schipper, 1999; Collins, Maydew and Weiss, 1997), \a time-series analysis of 
changes in accounting conservatism is provided as well. Regarding the UK context 
and regarding the methods used in this research to make inferences, a time-series 
analysis requires the use of some complementary measures of the time-series 
changes in accounting conservatism that differ from those employed in the existing 
literature. 
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Following the indications that accounting-conservatism and accounting- 
losses phenomena are related, descriptive properties of accounting loss and profit 
observations are provided separately in addition to the accounting loss and profit 
distinction in terms of time-series properties of earnings and its main components. 
The descriptive statistics and correlations between pairs of accounting variables are 
very different for the two groups of firms. However, in terms of accounting 
regulation and in particular the application of accounting conservatism, differences 
between the two groups of observations are not expected. Accounting conservatism 
should be applied equally in all firins regardless of the sign (of the 
contemporaneous) "bottom-line" earnings. In an attempt to capture any potential 
differences in asymmetric timeliness of earnings, an absolute-value model is 
constructed and an attempt to empirically estimate it provided. Further, an 
interaction with persistence properties is attempted via Giner and Rees's (2001) 
augmented model where lagged accounting-performance measures are used as 
models of the effects of previous periods' conservatism both generally via earnings 
and specifically via earnings component-specific measures as an extension of their 
models. 
Finally, the ex-ante restriction is placed on these relations using Pope and 
Walker's (2003) model as well as expanding on these relations to accommodate 
asset-specific controls of sources of ex-ante conservatism. 
A particular set of challenges originates from the empirical context in which 
the study is made. First, from a time-series perspective, the data on companies 
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operating in the United Kingdom is -much more scarce than the data on US 
companies, to which results from this study would often be compared to. - Issues 
regarding the construction of the sample are challenging and are described in detail 
in the appropriate section. On the other hand, the time-series required to apply the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure in comparable research must be relatively 
long. In this study a sample that includes 33 yearly cross-sections is constructed, a 
number deemed to be large for statistical purposes. Thus, such long time-series of 
accounting figures immediately raises issues regarding the comparability of these 
figure§ across time. Important issues emerge already at the earnings level, the 
accounting figure most thoroughly researched. For example, a clear switch from 
extraordinary to exceptional items is apparent after the introduction of FRS 3- 
Reporting Financial Performance effective for financial year ends on or after 22 nd 
June 1993. Issues related to other accounting figures pose similar challenges. 
Moreover, as new (changing) regulatory requirements have produced conceptually 
different numbers, questions regarding the "representativeness" of these constructed 
figures emerge. In terms of the inference methods used, a particularly challenging 
factor is a large proportion (approximately two thirds) of UK companies with non- 
December 3l't fiscal year-end balance sheet dates. This implies some correlation of 
results across adjacent years is to be expected and the yields from Fama-MacBeth 
(1973) method decrease. 
The thesis is formally organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a selection of 
important elements of capital market-based accounting research, including the 
seminal studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), that have served as 
important precursors to accounting-conservatism explanations of low 
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contemporaneous relation between share prices and accounting figures (most 
notably, earnings). It also presents two crucial econometric problems that have 
affected early studies (i. e., studies preceding Basu, 1997, and Pope and Walker, 
1999), but that are, to the extent discussed in the related literature, solved by the 
method of empirical estimation used in this thesis. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of various regulatory, legislative and academic definitions of accounting 
conservatism, including the distinctions between two different fon-ns of accounting 
conservatism, and discusses the relative importance of these definitions that form the 
basis for empirical models and appropriate constraints. 
Chapter 3 presents theoretical models used later in the empirical part of the 
thesis. In particular, it formalises the persistence property of accounting figures and 
determines the form of study, provides a slightly modified derivation and a summary 
of Pope and Walker's (1999) contemporaneous and lagged models. It also presents 
certain augmentations/additional explanations of these models. The chapter 
concludes with a formulation of the main hypotheses (other, less crucial or additional 
hypotheses are relegated to appropriate sections in the empirical part). 
Chapter 4 represents the main part of this thesis. First, it presents in detail the 
data collection, sample-selection procedures and descriptive properties of the 
sample. Included is a summary of the econometric procedures followed in the thesis, 
namely the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure, and the way the results are 
presented. It is then followed by persistence tests, direct contemporaneous tests, 
direct lagged tests, time-series analysis of results, expansions of the models and 
results affected by ex-ante conservative restrictions. Finally, a separate section shows 
it 
in detail both the properties and direct tests on loss observations and discusses a 
serious limitation of such an analysis. 
Chapter 5 deals with the main sensitivity-analyses issues. The influence of 
size, industry groups, the issue of non-December fiscal-year ends, proxies for bad 
news, methods of estimation, outliers-removal procedures and some issues regarding 
the use of published versus constructed figures are presented. All are given particular 
attention in terms of the UK context in which the methods are applied. Some 
additional issues and analyses are relegated to the Appendices. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 XNTRODUCTXON 
This chapter presents an overview of existing literature on capital market- 
based accounting research that preceded the development of fonnal models of 
accounting conservatism. It thus represents the literature that preceded Basu (1997), 
Pope and Walker (1999), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Giner and Rees (2001), 
Pope and Walker (2003) and others. The chapter is divided into three broad sections. 
The first section presents the foundations of capital market-based accounting 
research: the early findings that accounting numbers contain value-relevant 
information and therefore set the motivation to study the link between accounting 
and market values, the economic nature of this information and an overview of 
explanations as to why do accounting values differ from market values. From this 
presentation, transitory components caused by accounting conservatism emerge as 
one of the possible explanations of these differences. 
To account for the econometric consequences of transitory earnings, the 
errors-in-variables problem is described in detail. This presentation is important in 
that it represents the technical reason why the models of accounting conservatism are 
estimated in the so-called "reverse" form. Another concept that influences the 
particular ways of empirically estimating models of conservatism is the concept of s 
scale or size. The particular forms of the models used in the empirical part of the 
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thesis are, at least in part, a consequence of dealing with these two econometric 
problems. 
Finally, the last section 'presents a comprehensive review of existing 
definitions of accounting conservatism. These definitions fall into two broad groups: 
regulatory texts (standards, frameworks, legal sources, etc. ) and academic 
definitions. These definitions are necessary to distinguish between two types of 
conservatism: the news-related conservatism, which is studied in this thesis, and 
pervasive conservatism, which places a limit on the main results on, news-related 
conservatism. As an additional motivation to research these definitions thoroughly, it 
must be noted that from various texts it is not always clear to which of the two forins 
the use of the term "conservatism" relates to. 
2.2 CAPXTAL-MARKET BASED'EMPXRXCAL ACCOUNTXNG 
RESEARCH AND LINKS WITH CONSERVATISM 
2.2.1 Information content of accounting numbers 
The research presented in this thesis is part of the capital market-based 
empirical accounting research. The capital market-based empirical accounting 
research examines the relations between financial statements and share prices (and 
other market-based metrics) (Kothari 2001; Lev and OhIson, 1982). The discipline 
has evolved from two seminal studies that examined these relations (Ball and Brown, 
1968; Beaver, 1968). They demonstrated for the first time that accounting numbers 
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have information content, i. e., that they are associated with market values of owners' 
equity. 
The following discussion presents a comprehensive general framework that 
can be used to illustrate the link between financial statements - in particular 
accounting earnings - and share prices. The link can be described in the following 
manner (e. g., Pope and Inyangete, 1992, in surnmarising Beaver, Lambert and 
Morse, 1980). Three assumptions are necessary to establish the link between 
accounting earnings and market values. The first assumption is that price equals the 
present value of future cash flows. For example, the dividend discount model 
provides one such model that links future cash flows (dividends) with the current 
share price. An equivalent "accounting"-based model is the residual income model 
(Preinreich, 1937; Peasnell, 1982) reintroduced and extended in the accounting 
literature by OhIson (1995) (Lo and Lys, 2000). The second assumption is that there 
is a link between future earnings and future dividends. For example, this assumption 
is met if some fixed proportion of earnings is paid out as dividends every year. The 
third assumption is that current accounting earnings are linked with future 
accounting earnings. Thus, unexpected revisions of current earnings should influence 
investors' assessment of future earnings, which are then directly linked with future 
cash flows (dividends) and, by discounting these future dividends with some known 
(fixed, non-stochastic) discount rate, with current share prices. 2 It is assumed here 
that the accounting figures in general are represented by accounting earnings. 
However, this assumption is not necessary and other accounting measures may be 
2 The role of risk and stochastic interest rates is presented in Feltham and OhIson (1999). 
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(and are) used instead of earnings and some studies have attempted to establish 
precisely this link (e. g., Ou, 1990). 
3 
A generic empirical formulation of this link between accounting earnings and 
share prices may be the following (e. g., Joos, 2000; Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998; 
Collins and Kothari, 1989; Brown et aL, 1987 and several other papers): 
CARit =a+ ßUXI, + e (2-1) 
where CARit is a measure of the risk-adjusted return for security i cumulated over the 
period (t, t-1) (i. e., unexpected or abnormal or above-average return), UXil is a 
measure of unexpected earnings for firm i over the period (t, t-1) and eit is a 
disturbance term assumed to be distributed normally with parameters eit-N(O, 4) 
and cov(eit, ejt+k)= 0 for all k and iýj. The calculation of both CARit and UXj, requires 
a method of calculating the expected components of returns and earnings 
respectively. 4 Various methods of specifying unexpected earnings (UX) are 
presented in a number of papers. For example, Beaver and Dukes (1972) derive 
expected earnings by five different models: by forming a model analogous to the 
market model in market returns, by assuming earnings follow a random walk, by 
assuming current earnings are a simple average of a limited number of past earnings, 
and two more complex models involving moving averages of pure mean-reverting 
5 
processes. A further paper is Beaver, Clarke and Wright (1979), who use, inter alia, 
a relatively complex model of market-adjusted earnings, a concept related later to 
3 Historically, however, earnings were the first accounting figure explored in this context. 4 The econometric consequences of misspecifying either of the two metrics/expectations as used in 
equation (2- 1) are, however, significantly different, as is shown later in section 2.3.1. 5 The framework that includes some of these processes is formally presented later in section 3.2. 
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adjustments in Basu (1997). Unexpected returns (CAR) would usually be estimated 
by employing some form of the market model (e. g., Parkash, 1995; Pope and 
Inyangete, 1992; Mendenhall and Nichols, 1988) or by directly subtracting the return 
on a well-diversified index from the firm-specific return in the same time-period, as 
for example in Lipe, Bryant and Widener (1998). 
The expected value of the estimated regression constant in model (2-1) is 
zero, E [a]= 0. The constant would, however, usually be included in empirical 
estimations to account for any systematic influences not accounted for by the 
unexpected earnings variable. The estimated regression parameter ft is the estimated 
earnings response coefficient. The earnings response coefficient represents the 
magnitude of share price reaction due to a one unit of unexpected earnings in current 
earnings. If the earnings number contains an earnings innovation, a surprise for the 
investors (i. e., when unexpected earnings are not zero [UX14 0]), then the expected 
value of the coefficient is E[, 8 ]>O. The absence of any annotation of the estimated 
regression coefficient 8 in equation (2-1) suggests that the earnings response 
coefficient is assumed to be a temporal and cross-sectional constant. The reaction to 
unexpected earnings is thus assumed to be constant through time and equal across 
firms at any given point in time. 
The generic relationship in equation (2-1) serves to investigate two related, 
but conceptually different questions about the relationship between financial 
statements and market values (Kothari, 2001). The first question is whether an 
eamings announcement per se has any infonnation content - i. e., if the 
announcement per se causes investors to revise their expectations about future 
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benefits. If they do, the revision will be observed as a change in some market metric 
(price level, price variability and/or trading volume (Lev and OhIson, 1982) in the 
short period of time surrounding the announcement - typically, but not necessarily, a 
few days (Biddle and Seow, 1991). These studies are performed with an event study 
(e. g., Farna et al., 1969). The internal validity of this type of studies depends on the 
existence of any confounding events surrounding the earnings announcement (e. g., 
dividend changes) and the ability of the researcher to disentangle the effects of these 
other events from the earnings announcement itself The second question is whether 
accounting earnings are consistent with the infonnation about -underlying value- 
generating events as reflected in share prices. These issues are studied with an 
association study. Unexpected returns are accumulated over long periods of time - 
typically a year or a quarter that correspond, to the fiscal period over which 
unexpected earnings are accumulated. Causality is -not inferred in this type of studies 
and they do not assume that accounting earnings are the only source of information 
to market participants. The only relevant question is the existence of association 
6 (correlation). The early infonnation content studies cited above typically belong in* 
the first group, i. e., causality is assumed from unexpected earnings to changes in 
share prices. 
Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), provide early evidence that the 
earnings numbers provide a source of value-relevant information to financial 
markets. The key finding by Ball and Brown (1968) is that the earnings number is 
useful to investors in that it conveys new, economically significant information 
"U "'Out future cash flows. If actual eamings are higher (lower) than expected earnings 
6 In this respect, see Muller and Riedl (2001) critique. 
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- the expected earnings being measured with three different models in their study - 
the share price will increase (decrease), on average. Moreover, accounting earnings 
do not represent a very timely source of information. Ball and Brown estimate that 
most (85%-90%) of the information content of earnings is already captured by other, 
more timely sources, including interim reports, by the month of publication of the 
earnings figure. 7 
Beaver's (1968) study takes an altemative approach and avoids the exact 
specification of expected earnings by correlating trading volume rather than 
abnormal returns with earnings announcements. The basic idea is that at the time of 
the announcement of earnings, investors will re-assess their estimates of future 
returns or prices and act on the basis of this assessment. While it is not possible to 
predict the direction and/or magnitude of investors' reaction without an expectations' 
model, the variability of price changes will be higher during these periods of 
"adjustments" relative to periods when no such announcements occur (Kwon and 
Wild, 1994). Beaver finds significantly higher trading volume in the week of 
earnings announcement compared to ±8 weeks prior to/after the announcement, re- 
confirming Ball and Brown's (1968) finding that earnings announcements convey 
economically significant information about future cash flows. A necessary condition 
for Beaver's (1968) approach is that the changes in the present value of the changes 
in expected future cash flows must be sufficiently large to compensate for 
transaction costs (Lev, 1989). - 
7 In an UK contextý Opong (1995) shows that that interim financial reports contain value-relevant 
information as evidenced by increased variability of share prices on the release day. 
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Subsequent studies have re-confirmed these findings in a number of different 
settings and time periods. For example, May (1971) finds that price changes are 
larger in the week of quarterly earnings announcements relative to average price 
changes during the year, but that quarterly earnings are treated equivalently to annual 
earnings. Beaver and Dukes (1972) examine the influences of various specifications 
of expected earnings and different measures of perforinance, including the operating 
cash flow. Jordan (1973) further reports that the market values the, first and fourth 
quarter earnings differently from third quarter and final earnings. Other extensions 
include Smith-Bamber (1986) who finds that the greater the unexpected quarterly 
earnings, the greater the magnitude and the longer the duration of investors' 
adjustments to infori-nation in quarterly earnings announcements. Moreover, she 
hypothesizes and finds that the smaller the firm, the more pronounced are these two 
effects, since for smaller firms, the earnings announcements are expected to 
constitute a more important source of information to the capital markets than for 
larger firms. Kross and Schroeder (1989) 'extend these findings further to 
differentiate between "Prominenf' and "obscure" firms as measured by colunin- 
inches in the Wall Street Journal. They hypothesise that earnings disclosure is a 
more important source of information for smaller than for larger firms, given that the 
former receive less coverage in the financial -press and less information is thus 
available -for them. The expected reaction to earnings announcement is thus expected 
to be larger for smaller firms. There are many other empirical studies in this area. 
The example of Kross and Schroeder (1989) might perhaps be taken as indicative of 
the thoroughness with which this area has been researched. 
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While this body of literature studied the response of returns to earnings in 
some detail and a number of those studies cited above presented alternative sets of 
results for operating cash flow figures as well, none of them considered explicitly the 
role of accruals in these relations. There were three important studies published in 
the mid-eighties that specifically examined the role of accruals. Using a long 
window (12 months) event study, Rayburn (1986) finds that both the cash flow and 
total and current accruals arc associated with information impounded in market 
values. The association of particular components of accruals is less strong and 
sensitive to the specification of expected values of these components. While working 
capital accruals are associated with returns in all specifications, there is some doubt 
regarding the depreciation charge and deferred taxes. Wilson (1987) finds that cash 
from operations and the total accruals components of earnings, when taken together, 
have incremental infonnation content over earnings. Additionally, Wilson (1986) 
finds that accruals have incremental information content over funds from operations. 
Taken together, these studies have demonstrated that (some oo the accrual 
components also have information content. 
Firth (1976) conducted the first study employing these techniques using UK 
data. In addition to re-confirming the Ball and Brown (1968) results in the UK 
context, he also finds that investors evaluate future prospects not only of the 
announcing firm itself, but also of "similar-type" companies (i. e., competitors). Firth 
(1981) later extends the study to different events and finds that preliminary 
announcements, earnings announcements and interim reports convey information to 
markets, while annual general meetings do not. A similar study is by Brookfield and 
Morris (1992) using daily data. In contrast to annual and interim earnings 
announcements, they find that announcements of items like new contracts, 
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management changes and even publications of earnings forecasts are largely pre- 
empted by the time they are published. Pope and Inyangete (1992) find that the 
variability of stock returns increases sharply in the week of the annual earnings 
announcement compared to pre-announcement periods (and post-announcement 
periods, although slightly less pronounced). This increase is more pronounced for 
small firms and less pronounced for larger firms, consistent with Smith-Barnber 
(1986). There is also some indication of importance of the frequencies of news and 
comments appearing in the databases, consistent with Kross and Schroeder (1989). 
Taken collectively, these studies have shown that accounting numbers in 
general contain information that is useful to investors to assess the size and/or the 
timing and/or the riskiness of future cash flows. In particular, if accounting earnings 
differ from expected values, the share prices adjust accordingly in the same 
direction. Both of the main components of earnings, (operating) cash flows and 
accruals, have been found, or at least indicated, to contain value-relevant 
information. 
2.2.2 Economic determinants of the link between 
financial statements and market values 
Empirical evidence presented in the previous section is consistent with 
accounting earnings containing information that is useful to capital markets in that 
this information is able to influence investors' expectations (assessments) of future 
cash flows. Also, these studies have shown at least some accounting numbers other 
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than earnings (i. e., operating cash flows and certain types of accruals) convey value- 
relevant information to capital markets. However, while demonstrating the 
information content of various accounting numbers, these studies did not explore the 
nature of accounting numbers and their relation to the market value of the firm 
(Mande, 1994; Kormendi and Lipe, 1987). Research that studies the economic 
determinants of earnings response coefficients followed. 
An early comprehensive study of economic determinants of earnings 
response coefficients is Collins and Kothari (1989). They hypothesize and find 
empirical support for four economic determinants of earnings response coefficients: 
persistence of earnings, risk, growth and the risk-free rate of return. In the general 
equation (2-1) in the preceding section, the estimated regression coefficient 
represents the estimated earnings response coefficient. Formally, the earnings 
response coefficient can be defined as 
"... the present value of the perpetuity of the earnings innovation calculated by discounting 
the perpetuity at the risk-adj usted rate of return on equity. " (Kothari, 200 1, p. 124) 
The expected theoretical value of the earnings response coefficient is 
fi =1 (1 / E[ri, b where E [ril] is the expected rate of return on equity. The earnings 
response coefficient thus equals the one unit change in current period's earnings plus 
the present value of all expected future changes in dividends resulting from this 
innovation (Kothari, 2001; Kothari and Sloan, 1992; Collins and Kothari, 1989). 
The first economic determinant of earnings response coefficients is earnings 
persistence. Highly persistent earnings mean that a change in current period's 
earnings will repeat itself in future reporting periods thereby affecting future 
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earnings (the third assumption from the previous section). Under the second 
assumption from above - that there is a known link between future earnings and 
future dividends -a change in earnings today will affect expectations about future 
dividends. If today's change is likely to repeat itself, this will affect today's 
expectations about future dividends more and the earnings response coefficient will 
be large (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Using an inverse 
regression approach, Collins and Kothari (1989) find empirical support for this 
hypothesis. O'Hanlon, Poon and Yaansah (1992) find empirical support for this 
hypothesis in an UK context. Donnelly and Walker (1995), also using a UK sample, 
also report that the higher the earnings persistence, the higher the estimated earnings 
response coefficient after controlling for firm size and alternative time-series 
estimators of earnings response coefficients. Donnelly (2002) is a recent study that 
re-confirms these findings by estimating earnings response coefficients separately 
for profit and loss firms. 8 Harikumar and Harter (1995), also using the reverse- 
regression technique, show that firms with higher Tobin's q ratios exhibit higher 
persistence of earnings. Persistence itself is a function of economic factors. For 
example, Baginski et al. (1999) find that persistence is positively related to barriers 
to entry, negatively to capital intensity and is higher for durable goods versus non- 
durable goods. 
Second, the higher the systematic risk of a firm, the lower the earnings 
response coefficient. As discussed above, to estimate the present value of expected 
future benefits, shareholders must discount these future benefits to present time in 
order to evaluate them. One way to calculate the expected rate of return on an 
8 Section 4.8.1 contains a more complete presentation of the literature that distinguishes these 
properties between profit and loss observations. 
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investment is to use the CAPM model (summarised in, for example, Bodie, Kane 
and Marcus, 1999, pp. 250-280; and different variants in Elton and Gruber, 1995, pp. 
294-340): -- 
E[r,, r + (E[r (2-2) 
. ft 
is the risk- where E[rj, ] is the expected return on share i over the period (t, t-1), r 
free rate of return allowed to vary through time, but not, by definition, cross- 
sectionally, r,,, is the return on market in period t andflit is the firm-specific measure 
of that firm's equity exposure to market risk, assumed to be constant or highly 
autocorrelated for any particular firm - i. e., the process generating 8j, is known. 
Other things equal, the higher the systematic risk, the higher the discount rate and the 
lower the present value of expected future benefits accruing to shareholders. More 
recently, the Farna and French (1993,1995) three-factor model is used (e. g., Farna 
and French, 1997). In the UK, the three-factor model is used recently by Liu, Strong 
and Xu (2003) in their study of the post-eamings announcement drift. 
Third, Collins and Kothari (1989) hypothesize that the higher the present 
value of growth opportunities, the higher the earnings response coefficient. Higher 
growth opportunities imply higher future earnings, higher future dividends and a 
higher value of the firm. All other things equal, a revision in earnings for a firm with 
more growth options will affeci market values more compared to a firm with less 
growth options. Martikainen (1997) finds that the earnings response coefficient of 
firms in the portfolio of firms with the lowest growth opportunities measured by the 
industry-relative market-to-book ratio is 0.473 (with a statistically insignificant 
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White (1980)-adjusted t-statistic of 1.790), while for the portfolio of firms with the 
highest growth opportunities the earnings response coefficient is 6.605 and highly 
statistically significant. The analysis controls for differences in growth opportunities 
that might result from any systematic differences between profit and loss firms. 
Finally, given a model of expected returns like, for example, the CAPM 
model in equation (2-2), the expected rate of return depends on the risk-free rate of 
return, the expected return on the market and the firm's exposure to market risk, 
measured by the P-coefficient. The risk-free rate of return cannot, by definition, vary 
cross-sectionally, but it does vary through time. Therefore, through time, the higher 
the general level of interest rates and thus the higher the risk-free rate of return, the 
lower the earnings response coefficient. Similarly, the expected rate of return on the 
market, r,,, cannot explain cross-sectional variation in earnings response coefficients, 
given that it only varies through time but again not cross-sectionally. This variation 
through time of r,,, (or perhaps more precisely the market risk premium rnr-rf) might 
in itself constitute another deten-ninant of the average earnings response coefficient 
in an economy. 
Taken together, the four determinants of the earnings response coefficients 
studied by Collins and Kothari (1989) indicate that'the generic form of the 
relationship between earnings and returns presented in equation (2-1) is very general. 
A more complete analysis of the returns-earnings relationship should thus take into 
account the fact that the earnings response coefficient (the estimated parameter in 
equation (2-1)), is not a cross-sectional and/or an inter-temporal constant. This 
conclusion also implies that the method of estimation of models derived from 
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equation (2-1) becomes important. Teets and Wasley (1996) show that short-window 
earnings response coefficients are significantly higher if estimated separately for 
each firm as a time-series average rather than cross-sectionally or pooled. More 
recently, Lipe, Bryant and Widener (1998) re-confinn that allowing cross-sectional 
variation in earnings response coefficients provides an important improvement of the 
estimation of the returti-earnings relation. For example, in one of their tests they find 
that the median earnings response coefficient of 30 random sub-samples is only 
1.253 if cross-sectional estimation is used, but the median more than doubles to 
2.735 if firm-specific estimation is used (ibid., p. 208, Table 2). 
There are several other economic determinants of , earnings response 
coefficients. These either result from decompositions of the above factors into more 
elementary factors or represent new, distinct determinants derived from economic 
analysis. For example, the influence of systematic risk can be decomposed into 
operating risk and additional financial risk resulting from leverage (Hamada, 1972). 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984) develop further this concept and introduce directly the 
degree of operating leverage and the degree of financial leverage as determinants of 
systematic risk in the returns-earnings relationship. Martikainen (1997) shows that 
the earnings response coefficient decreases monotonically from low-debt to high- 
debt portfolios after controlling for the sign of earnings. Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and 
Noreen (1989) find that the a priori probability of bankruptcy is negatively related to 
the earnings response coefficients. Teets (1992) finds that the earnings response 
coefficient is smaller for regulated electric utilities than for non-regulated industries. 
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Dividend payout policy also affects the'eamings response coefficient. The 
theoretical upper limit is reduced by the proportion of earnings not reinvested and 
therefore unable to earn future dividends, so that the theoretical upper limit becomes 
P=I-d+ (I / E[r,, b where d is the dividend payout ratio (Kothari and Sloan, 1992). 
Biddle and Seow (1991) find that earnings response coefficients vary across 
industries and in particular that they are lower in industries characterised by a higher 
degree of operating and financial leverage and are higher in industries characterised 
by higher growth, higher barriers to entry and higher growth opportunities. 9 
Billings (1999) re-confirms the previously observed negative relation 
between earnings response coefficients and debt to equity ratios, but remains 
inconclusive about whether the default risk proxied for by bond ratings has an 
incremental impact over the impact of systematic risk or not. He also indicates that 
expected growth should be'included in empirical studies of this relationship. The 
length of the time-series of previous earnings also affects the earnings response 
coefficients. Lang (199 1) finds that the more quarterly earnings announcements have 
been issued since the initial public offering, the smaller the earnings response 
coefficient. Thus the length of the "public-quotation period" may also be viewed as a 
determinant of the earnings response coefficient, similarly to the importance of firm 
age in survival studies (e. g.,, Altman, 1993; also Anthony and Ramesh, 1992) 
The list of determinants of earnings response coefficients is not exhaustive. It 
is, however, indicative of the richness of studies developed in this area of capital 
market based accounting research. They constitute the body of knowledge that has 
9 They measure growth opportunities essentially with the book-to-market ratio. This impacts some of 
the results presented in this thesis. 
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led to later, more economics-based models of the link between financial statements 
and market values. These models include models that capture the effects of two 
different forms of accounting conservatism. 
2.2.3 Variability in earnings versus 
variability in returns 
Early empirical studies of earnings response coefficients have found that 
accounting earnings (levels or changes) explain only a small proportion of the total 
variability in returns. Moreover, the observed relation between returns and earnings 
reported in these studies is often not in line with theoretical expectations. Several 
studies have shown that the R 2S in empirical applications of the model in (2-1) above 
are low and the values of the estimated earnings response coefficients (ft) are very 
low (close to zero) compared to values predicted theoretically, or even negative (e. g., 
Collins, Pincus and Xie, 1999; Jan and Ou, 1995; Schroeder, 1995). Moreover, some 
studies find that the value-relevance of accounting numbers is declining over time 
(e. g., Francis and Schipper, 1999; Ryan and Zarowin, 2003). As a retrospective 
illustration, Ryan and Zarowin (2003) show in their basic models, where returns are 
regressed on deflated earnings, that from the period 1966-1970 to 1996-2000, the 
2f OM earnings response coefficient has decreased from 2.816 to 0.563 and the Rr 
0.13 to 0.05. Somewhat contrary, Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) find that the 
combined value-relevance of both earnings and book values has not changed in the 
period 1953-1993. They do, however, find that the value-relevance of earnings alone 
has decreased almost monotonically in this period. Several hypotheses that attempt 
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to explain why this occurs have been proposed in the literature. These hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive and in certain cases partially overlap with one another. The 
following presentation of these hypotheses is based on Kothari's (2001) review 
article and the framework developed there, although it is modified to accommodate 
in more detail the parts relevant to this study and to omit parts that are less 
immediately relevant to models used later in this thesis. 
Generally, the findings that empirical estimates of earnings response 
coefficients and/or R2s are low compared to expected values can result from either 
side of equation (2-1). Starting on the left-hand side of equation (2-1), errors in 
measurement of the dependent variable and/or misspecification of the expected part 
of CAR would result in low R 2S -but would not affect the earnings response 
coefficient. Notwithstanding the problems in estimating the expected part of total 
returns o. na secunty, the reliance on the concept of market efficiency is I emphasiozed 
(e. g., Fama, 1970). The efficient markets hypothesis is a maintained hypothesis of 
this type of accounting research and a number of metrics used to make inferences 
rely on it. However, this assumption could, in principle, be violated - Capital markets 
might in reality not be efficient. Thus, share prices would not reflect the underlying 
economic reality of the firm fully and in a timely manner'. There are a number of 
studies that conclude that in some aspects capital markets are not efficient. For 
example, several studies suggest that the stock market does not incorporate 
immediately/fully the information contained in accounting earnings and that it 
recognises the full impact of earnings only gradually over time. This notion is known 
under the term'post-eamings announcement drift, documented as early as in Ball and 
Brown's (1968) study. A recent example of a study that concludes in favour of 
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violations of market efficiency is Collins and Hribar (2000). However, other recent 
studies ascribe the existence of this "anomaly" to econometric problems related to 
methods used in previous research (e. g., Jacob, Lys and Sabino, 2000) or find that 
observed violations are too small to be profitable after transaction costs (e. g., Choi, 
2000). However, in an UK context, Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) make a particularly 
strong conclusion regarding the existence of one such violation of market efficiency 
- the post-earnings announcement drift: 
"The fact that the evidence of post-eamings announcement drift reported in this paper for the 
UK ... reinforces the view that the PAD phenomenon constitutes a clear rejection of the 
efficient markets hypothesis. " (p. 23, emphasis added) 
Given the voluminous body of research that concludes in favour of market 
efficiency (reviewed at two time periods relatively distant from one another in Fama, 
1991 and 1970), the assumption of (semi-strong) market efficiency is maintained 
throughout the empirical part of this thesis. Given the models employed, the 
consequence of severe violations of this assumption would be that it would no longer 
be possible to use the change in market value as a valid indicator of the impact of 
economic news. Given the form of these models, violations of market efficiency 
would cause the errors-in-variables problem in the independent variable (discussed 
below in detail in section 2.3.1) and the resulting attenuation bias of the main 
accounting conservatism measures. ' 0 
On the other hand, assuming that capital markets are reasonably efficient, the 
second group of reasons for the low observed adjusted R2s and empirical estimates of 
earnings response coefficients must lie in the issues surrounding the measurement of 
'0 This observation follows, conceptually, from models that are "reverse" compared to models such as 
in equation (2-1). All models presented in sections 3.3 and 3.4 are of the "reverse" type compared to 
(2-1). 
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unexpected earnings (UX). If this is the 'case, the independent variable that 
determines the earnings response coefficient is measured with error (e. g., Machuga, 
2000). Econometrically, this causes the attenuation bias in the value of the 
coefficient on earnings (explained in detail in section 2.3.1). Possible causes for the 
errors in variables problem in the UX variable are the following: i) prices lead 
earnings, ii) earnings containing a value-irrelevant component, iii) (value-)deficiency 
of accounting measures and iv) earnings persistence/existence of transitory 
components of earnings. This last explanation includes both the effects of accounting 
conservatism and the effects described in the literature on losses, and it is suggested 
that the latter might be a consequence of the former. 
The first cause of the errors in variables problem in the independent (UX) 
variable is the prices lead earnings hypothesis. If earnings do not reflect underlying 
economic events in a timely manner, as opposed to (changes in) market values, then 
market prices will reflect a larger information set than earnings. This notion is 
termed'as prices lead earnings (Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980). The "lack" of 
earnings timeliness originates from at least two sources (Collins et A, 1994). First, 
delayed accounting recognition of events affecting the value of net assets of a firm 
that do not meet the criteria for accounting recognition in the current period, but that 
alter investors' current expectations about future cash flows and hence bear on the 
share price. The second source is the tendency of accrual accounting to delay the 
recognition of future benefits originating from currently recognised cash outlays - 
e. g., research and development expenses and advertising expenses (Kothari and 
Sloan, 1992). Consequently, the effects of value-relevant events are not fully 
recognised in current financial statements (or, more specifically, in the UX variable), 
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but, again, are fully reflected in current prices, assuming market - efficiency. - Hence 
the low observed strength of relationship between current earnings and current share 
prices. Since both types of events eventually meet the criteria necessary for their 
inclusion in financial statements, a strong relationship between current share prices 
andfuture earnings is to be expected., This also'suggests that the generic form of the 
returns-on-earnings regression is misspecified - at least one variable containing 
relevant available information -- the current share price -ý is not included 
in the 
generic model in equation (2-1) above. Econometrically, this is an occurrence of the 
correlated omitted variable problem (e. g., Greene, 2000, pp. 334-337), discussed 
below in section 2.3.2. 'Empirical studies find support for this hypothesis. For 
example, apart from Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980), Kothari and Sloan (1992) 
among others find that prices lead earnings by about three accounting periods. They 
consider up to nine years' leading earnings, but conclude that the gains from these 
inclusions are small (and possibly counter-productiVe). In the UK context, Donnelly 
and Walker (1995) find that prices lead earnings less in the UK than in the US. 
These finding directly bear upon the way in which models used in'this thesis are 
constructed. 
The second reason for the low observed adjusted R2s and empirical estimates 
of earnings response coefficients related to the right-hand side of equation (2-1) is 
that earnings contain a value-irrelevant component. This value-irrelevant component 
(6 garbles" what would otherwise be a value-relevant or "true" accounting earnings 
figure. Beaver, Lambert and Morse (1980) view the accounting earnings-generating 
process as a mixture of the two processes. The first is a "true" earnings series that 
affects price - i. e., a value-relevant process, while the second process represents 
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events that have no impact on security prices and can be econometrically treated as 
noise. Since noise is by definition uncorrelated with past, current or future earnings 
(Collins et al., 1994) the actual (observed or reported) earnings are garbled, i. e., they 
contain measurement error. It is this definition that separates this explanation of low 
observed earnings response coefficients from the prices-lead-earnings explanation. 
There, current market price is related to future earnings. Econometrically, value- 
irrelevant noise induces the errors-in-variables problem in the independent variable, 
attenuating empirical estimates of the earnings response coefficient. 
The third explanation of low observed earnings response coefficients and R 
2S 
is termed by Kothari (2001) as the "deficient GAAP argurnent! ': if the generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) were to be designed with the major 
objective of providing equity investors with information relevant in estimating the 
present value of future cash flows, then there should be a strong relationship between 
market values and accounting earnings (and possibly other accounting figures). 
Indeed, the strength and nature of these relationships themselves could be used as a 
criterion to judge the efficiency of the GAAP in providing value-relevant 
information to investors (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). If, however, as stated above, this 
was not the case and the observed relationship was weak, this would be treated as an 
indication of the "inappropriateness" of accounting figures to provide investors with 
value-relevant information (e. g., in the case of software capitalisation - Aboody and 
Lev, 1998) and treated as a deficiency of GAAP. Lev (1989) specifically states that: 
if price revisions are found to be largely unrelated to earnings, the information 
contribution (usefulness) of earnings to investors cannot be large. " (p. 156) 
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Lev also emphasises the importance of metrics such as the R 2S rather than just the 
earnings response coefficients (i. e., estimated regression coefficients). parts of the 
evidence consistent with this argument appear also in other studies, in particular 
regarding the decline in value-relevance. However, the decline, if present, relates 
more to the earnings figure itself than to the general concept of financial statements. 
Once certain balance-sheet items are included in the relation, the R2s do not appear 
to decline unequivocally (e. g., Francis and Schipper, 1999). 
The fourth explanation of low observed earnings response coefficients is the 
existence of transitory earnings. Given the generic model presented in equation'(2-1) 
above, the long-term effect of an earnings change depends on the persistence of 
earnings. Ahmed (1994), among several other studies presented/mentioned- earlier, 
defines persistence of earnings as the magnitude of revisions in current expectations 
of future earnings that result from a cuffent earnings innovation (change). If earnings 
changes were purely permanent, the full value of this change would be capitalised to 
infinity and reflected in current market values. Simplifying earlier definitions of the 
earnings response coefficient and annotation, the effect of one unit of change in 
earnings on market values would equal the earnings response coefficient, i. e., 
(1+1/r)-units, where r is an inter-temporally and cross-sectionally constant discount 
rate (the required return on equity). Econometrically, purely pen-nanent earnings can 
be described by a random walk'process (see section 3.2.1). A number of empirical 
studies show that (positive) earnings and earnings changes have properties broadly 
consistent with an underlying random walk process, albeit it must be noted that with 
some deviations from it, depending on industry, the precise type of estimation, 
undeflated versus deflated variables and similar issues (e. g. Dechow, Kothari and 
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Watts, 1998; Albrecht, Lookabill and McKeown, 1977; Lookabill, 1976; Beaver, 
1970). 
On the other hand, earnings might contain components that are transitory in 
nature - i. e., they are not expected to persist into the indefinite future, in which case 
the strength of the response to earnings announcements is expected to be small(er). 
Indeed, in the case of purely transitory earnings, the earnings response coefficient 
would equal unity. A unit of unexpected earnings would affect the share price by just 
that one unit. Empirical research shows that negative earnings and earnings changes 
are transitory, i. e., they reverse in a major part within one accounting period. For 
example, Basu (1997, Table 3) reports a regression coefficient on negative earnings- 
levels close to -0.500, which implies that negative earnings mean-revert to the non'n 
within two accounting periods. 
There are several possible explanations for the transitory nature of earnings 
and negative earnings in particular. First, exogenous one-time activities such as 
disposals of assets, restructurings, write-offs and similar activities result in one-time, 
I 
transitory gains or losses. " These events are, almost-by definition, not expected to 
recur, assuming a going-concem firm in either direction. Furthermore, the limited 
liability of public companies and possible existence of abandonment options (Berger, 
Ofek and Swary, 4996; Hayn 1995; also see section 4.8.1) limit the time and/or the 
extent to which substantial losses can be incurred. The presence of gains or losses 
" Exogenuous activities are activities triggered or caused by the economic environment which is 
external to the fmiL Endogenous activities result from activities induced by managers' incentives. The 
difference between exogenuous and endogenouos activities is econometrically important. In the case 
of endogenous activities, the incentive will likely represent an omitted variable and thus produce an 
upward bias in the estimated earnings response coefficient (see section 2.3.2 and Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995, Appendix). 
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resulting from such activities is thus only temporary and earnings containing these 
elements are transitory. 
Second, these transitory elements might be induced ý endogenously for 
contractual reasons - managers might have their own incentives to create transitory 
earnings components. For example, they can influence earnings either by selling 
assets to realise gains or by delaying, to -the extent possible, the recognition of 
unrealised losses (Black, Sellers and Manly, 1998). Poitras, Wilkins and Kwan 
(2002) find that asset sales are determined jointly by the economic environment of 
the firm as well as managerial incentives, i. e., that asset sales are a result of a 
mixture of exogenous and endogenous factors. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), 
using longitudinal data, are unable, to rule out discretionary value-reducing asset 
sales. Earlier, Bartov (1993) describes and finds evidence consistent with two 
discretionary types of managerial behaviour - earnings smoothing and debt to equity 
ratio manipulation by means of timing of long-term fixed assets sales to confon'n to 
debt covenants. If managers attempt to time asset sales to manipulate earnings or the 
debt-to-equity ratios, they must perceive frictions in some information markets, and 
whether or not these activities are successful depends on the existence of such 
frictions (Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2000). In a capital market that processes 
infonnation efficiently, investors are, expected to see through such endogenous 
attempts to increase or decrease earnings and treat these activities as transitory. The 
components of earnings that reflect these activities are therefore also expected to be 
transitory. 
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The third possible explanation for the existence of transitory items is that 
there is demand for conservative accounting numbers. Some groups of financial 
statements' users will, at least in some circumstances, prefer understated assets 
and/or revenue figures (e. g., Anwer et A 2002). For example, creditors might view 
understated assets as giving, them a greater margin when setting debt covenants 
(Cotter, 1999). - If the accounting system induces such a property on accounting 
figures, then upward adjustments must be made to reconcile accounting estimates of 
value and market values. For example, the Feltham and OhIson (1995,1996) include 
such adjustments in their model to reconcile market and book values of operating 
assets. Pope and Walker (2003) present a model that captures this type of accounting 
conservatism. Basu (1997), on the other hand, defines conservatism as a tendency of 
accountants to require a higher degree of verification for recognising gains than 
losses in financial statements. Therefore, in order to record a gain, accountants 
require a greater degree of certainty than they do for losses. The traditional view is 
(was) that acCOuntants should, when in doubt, tend to understate 'assets and revenue 
and overstate liabilities and expenses (Lewis and Pendrill, 1996, pp. 17-18; see'also 
SFAC 2 and SSAP 2 pronouncements and Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 1999, pp. 
64-70). ' 
Conservative accounting as described above thus represents one possible 
cause of low observed on-average relationships (earnings response -coefficients and 
R2 s) between market values and accounting earnings. Regardless of the 'precise 
definition of this type of accounting' conservatism, one of the consequences is that 
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market values relate to accounting earnings in an asymmetric manner. 12 Anticipated 
losses are recognised both more often and more quickly than anticipated gains 
(Kothari, 2001) and increased frequency or probability of litigation in some 
jurisdictions contribute and strengthen this tendency (e. g., Ball, Kothari, Robin, 
2000; Pope and Walker, 1999; Basu, 1997). They result in transitory components of 
earnings and/or other performance measures that are used as explanatory variables in 
models such as the model in equation (2-1). These transitory components then cause 
low response coefficients and low R 2S. 
2.2.4 Other properties of the earnings-return 
relationship 
Hayn (1995) introduces the notion that losses are transitory because investors 
have an abandonment option to discontinue operations in a firm that generates 
negative returns or returns that are not commensurate to the riskiness of the firm. 
Losses cannot persist indefinitely - they are either reversed, in which case they were 
by definition transitory, or the shareholders exercise their put option to discontinue 
firm operations. This discontinuation of operations may take the form of liquidation 
of assets, reorganisation of the firm, assets can be sold or merged with another firm 
or group of assets (Jan and Ou, 1995). A further exploration of the abandomnent 
option is presented in detail in Berger of, ek and Swary (1996). The concept of 
transitory negative earnings also applies in cases where accounting earnings are 
positive at face value, but are either low enough to cause the abandonment option to 
12 This presentation relates principally to ex-post accounting conservatism. More exact definitions of 
accounting conservatism are presented below in section 2.4. Precise definitions are required to 
differentiate between the effects of different types of conservatism. 
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become "in the money"13 or are essentially negative, but the management has 
adopted some eamings-increasing accounting policies (Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; also see Easton, 1999). These earnings are not expected to persist indefinitely 
but rather to reverse toward normal levels. The existence of abandonment options 
introduces non-linearity in the return-earnings relation in the same manner as payoffs 
are defined asymmetrically for a financial option. Further research in this area 
includes Chambers (1996) who distinguishes between one-time losses and 
66persistenf' losses. 14 He finds that losses that extend beyond the current accounting 
period convey significantly less information to the market than the initial loss for 
firms where the accounting losses extend over a number of subsequent accounting 
periods. The implication is that investors - gain -most information about future 
accounting prospects of the firm from the initial loss. Martikainen (1998) makes 
similar distinctions between temporary and "permanent' 'losses. 15 
Most empirical literature employs linear regression models -as the method to 
study empirically the relationship between earnings and - returns. -Imposing the 
linearity assumption on an essentially non-linear relationship might account in part 
for the observed low strength of relationship between earnings and returns in that the 
functional form might be inadequate. Existing research shows that extreme earnings 
changes, both positive and negative, are more likely to contain more transitory items. 
Freeman and Tse (1992) as well as Ali and Pope (1995) on UK data use an arctan 
transfonnation that produces an S-shaped curve description of the relationship 
13 Hayn terms such earnings as "temporarily depressed earnings", defined as earnings that, when 
capitalisid appropriately, are lower than the liquidation value. 14 The term "persistent losses" is included in inverted commas to diffrentiate the use of the term from 
other uses in this thesis. Losses by the very same reasons described earlier in this section cannot 
Ve t indefinitely. 
term "Permanent" is included in inverted commas again for the same reasons as in footnote 14. 
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between returns and earnings - convex for bad news and concave for good news. 
Therefore, the marginal response of prices to earnings is allowed to vary with the 
magnitude of the earnings measure. The earnings response coefficient is smaller 
when earnings changes are extreme and more likely contain more transitory 
components and is bigger when earnings changes are smaller and contain more 
permanent (less transitory) components. Das and Lev (1994) report similar findings 
for a more general class of transformations and involving alternative non-parametric 
methods of estimation (locally weighted regression). They also find that special 
items increase non-linearity in their returns-earnings relationship, that the 
relationship is non-linear even when one adjusts -for the levels of cash flow or 
accruals contained in earnings and that the returns-cash flow relation itself is also 
non-linear. These are all findings that bear upon the findings presented later in this 
thesis. However, Beneish and Harvey (1998) caution that the non-linearities 
observed in previous research are, at least in part, due to measurement errors rather 
than to a non-linear relationship between (abnormal) returns and (unexpected) 
earnings and that the gains of accounting for potential non-linearities are likely to be 
small. Lipe, Bryant and Widener. (1998) use an absolute-value quadratic 
transfomiation that allows preserving the sign of earnings surprise. They find that 
non-linearity, losses and firm-specific factors are economically distinct factors 
affecting the returns-earnings relationship. Cheng, Hopwood and McKeown (1992) 
observe that the effects of non-linearity may be severe. The R 2S in their empirical 
estimations increase by a factor of two to three when they control for non-linear 
relationships between cumulative abnormal returns and unexpected earnings. 
Subramanyarn (1996) provides a theoretical framework for the observed non- 
linearities. There are other factors that might affect the retums-eamings relationship. 
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For example, Choi and Jeter (1992) find that the earnings response coefficients 
decrease in the period after the issuance of a qualified audit opinion. They ascribe 
this finding either to* increasing noise in earnings or to the changes in earnings 
persistence or both. 
The empirical research presented in this thesis expands upon the transitory- 
earnings explanation, in particular the effects of accounting conservatism. To the 
extent possible, it conditions some of the results on the sign of accounting earnings 
and its two main components (cash flows and, accruals) with the observation that 
negative earnings in particular are transitory. The particular methods used later in 
this thesis are a result, at least in part, of different resolutions of,, the main 
econometric problems presented below in section 2.3. These problems prevent 
correct inferences regarding the nature of the relation between market values and 
accounting numbers to be made. They are presented next. 
2.3 MAIN ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
2.3.1 The errors-in-variables problem 
The presentation of econometric problems resulting from transitory earnings 
is based on Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) and Kothari (2001), while, the 
econometric derivations are combined from Greene (2000, pp. 375-380) and 
Johnston and DiNardo (1997, pp. 153-156). Reported accounting earnings At can be 
viewed, in general, as a linear combination of two components: a permanent, value- 
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relevant component (i. e., a component perfectly positively correlated with the market 
values), x,, and a transitory, value-irrelevant component, ul, which has no impact on 
the share price (Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980): 
xt =X t+U t (2-3) 
Econometrically, xt is represented by a random walk model: ' xi= xj-j+cj and 
E[xt]= xt-1, where el is a random, normally-distributed error term with parameters 
N-(O, cý,, ). Also, el and ul are assumed to be uncorrelated, cov(et, ut)= 0. If the two 
components of the earnings process in equation (2-3) could be identified, they could 
be used as separate independent variables in a regression model, two separate 
estimated regression coefficients and thus two "partial" earnings response 
coefficients would result. The theoretical earnings response coefficient on the 
transitory component u, equals unity - the transitory component affects reported 
accounting earnings only in the period in which it occurs and does not occur again. 
On the other hand, as shown earlier, the theoretical earnings response coefficient on 
the permanent 'component x, is (1+11r) - the permanent component of 
reported earnings repeats itself in all future accounting periods and is capitalised into 
the current market value. The earnings response coefficient on the permanent 
component therefore represents one plus the average price-earnings, ratio, or the 
earnings multiplier. To obtain the "total" earnings response coefficient, these two 
estimated regression coefficients would have to be summed. In terms of estimating 
some particular form of the model in equation 
(2-1), the following limits on the value of the estimated earnings coefficients would 
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thus be expected: 1: 5 ft: 5 (, 8,,. =(I+Ilr)) if accounting earnings comprise of the two 
separately-identifiable components. 
If, however, the two components of reported accounting earnings Xj, were not 
separately identifiable, then the transitory, value-irrelevant component u, would act 
as a measurement error in the independent variable. The consequences of the errors- 
in-variables problem are illustrated below. 
One specific empirical model derived from the generic model in (2-1) is the 
deflated price-levels model (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995): 16 
P't 
a+p 
Xt 
+ co,, Pi'l-I Pi't-I 
(2-4) 
In terms of the notation presented above and equation (2-3), the estimated 
value of ft will fall in the interval between 1, if observed accounting earnings X, is 
constituted of purely transitory earnings ui,, and (1+11r) if observed accounting 
earnings Xit is constituted of entirely permanent earnings xii, given that 8 is a sum of 
two independent variables with their own "true" regression coefficients. In an 
alternative nomenclature, Xil may be termed as observed earnings, xi, "true" earnings 
and uit the measurement error. 
16 This particular form has been selected to separate out the second serious problem of empirical 
versions of equation (1), namely the scale effects. Also, under the assumption that earnings consitute 
the only value-relevant information to the market, deflated-eamings (i. e., earnings yield) models are 
equivalent to deflated-eamings changes models (Donnelly and Walker, 1995). Thus, this particular 
form is not limiting. Some variants of this model are also used in an emerging-market context 
Pindrichovska, 1995). 
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However, in the earnings response coefficient/permanent-transitory earnings 
context, the interest lies not in the relationship between published earnings measures 
that include transitory (i. e., value-irrelevant) items, as in equation (2-4), but rather in 
the relationship between prices and earnings measures that contain only those 
components that are value-relevant: 
P't 
=a +, B 
'it + 
1. R pla-1 It 
Substituting (2-4) into (2-5) yields: 
(2-5) 
P't 
a+p 
Xit u,, +a+, 8 
X" u,, + Pi't-I pla-I Pi. t-I pla-I Pi't-I (2-6) 
a +, B 
Xit 
+ o),, u,, Pi't-I Pi, l-l 
The estimate of the true regression coefficient, ft, equals: 
xi, juý-it 
'6 =, B + xilt 
and 
22 
plim 
cr x 
or2 + a. 2 #6 +2 
x 
or 
u 
(2-7) 
(2-8) 
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Equations (2-6) to (2-8) show that when the true underlying relationship 
between market value and accounting earnings is represented by equation (2-5), but 
one attempts in practice to estimate model (2-4) because the only available earnings 
figure is the published or the observed accounting earnings rather than permanent 
earnings, the error term in such a regression is not independent of the regressor (the 
A independent variable). The consequence is that the estimator 8 of the true 8 is 
biased downwards. If the variable of interest - in this case permanent earnings, was 
measured without error (or, equivalently, the earnings figure used was entirely value- 
relevant) so that Xjj= xit, the second tenn in equation (2-7) would equal zero, since 
the measurement error ul, would equal uji= 0 for all firms i and time periods t. 
Alternatively, the variance of such a (non-existent) error tenn would equal o2u= 0 
and the term in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (2-8) would thus equal 
o2., I( cý, +o2,, )= 1. In other words, had the reported accounting earnings figure 
consisted only of the value-relevant permanent earnings component, the empirical 
earnings response coefficient would equal the theoretically-expected earnings 
response coefficient, that is ft = (I +I 1r). " 
At the other extreme, if the reported earnings figure consisted only of a 
transitory element so that Xji= ui,, the term in brackets in equation (2-8) would equal 
zero, since the numerator cý., = 0 and the denominator strictly cý,, >O. The empirical 
estimate of the earnings response cocfficient would then equal 1 +0= I- 
17 In this exposition, the cross-sectional and intertemporal independence of all observations, as shown 
by the absence of either index i or I in regression coefficients, is assumed. 
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At any point in the interval between these two extremes the empirical 
estimate of the earnings response coefficient will be biased. It follows from equation 
(2-8) that regardless of the sign of the observed relation between market value and 
accounting earnings, the estimated regression coefficient will be biased towards zero. 
This bias is termed the attenuation bias. The magnitude of the bias depends on the 
term in brackets in equation (2-8) - i. e., on the relative sizes of the variances of 
permanent earnings and transitory earnings that act as the measurement error. It must 
be noted that the magnitude of this bias is not observable, since neither the variance 
of the value-relevant portion (4) nor the variance of the value-irrelevant portion 
(o2,, ) is in practice observable to the researcher. 
Moreover, such estimates of the earnings response coefficient will be 
inconsistent. A consistent estimator should approach the true value of the 
parameter plim 0. =0 as the sample size n increases indefinitely. From equation 
(2-8) above it is apparent that in the case of the errors-in-variables problem, the 
estimated earnings response coefficient will not only be biased, but that this bias will 
not tend to zero as the sainple size increases indefinitely. Thus, in the presence of 
transitory earnings, the estimated earnings response coefficient is inconsistent as 
well as attenuated. 
In cases when only one regressor is measured with error, a relatively simple 
solution to the errors-in-variables problem is available. For example, in accounting 
contexts, the "reverse" regression is often applied (e. g., Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 
1980; Collins and Kothari, 1992; Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999): the 
accounting earnings variable measured with error serves as the dependent variable, 
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while the market value variable, assumed to be measured without error in an efficient 
capital market, serves as the independent variable. When the dependent variable is 
measured with error, but (all of) the independent variables are effor-free, the 
regression coefficient is unbiased. However, since the random measurement error 
and the true regression errors are merged in the empirical error estimate, the usual 
consequence is a lower explanatory power of such regressions evidenced by lower 
R 2S (Greene, 2000, p. 376). In terms of the generic model, represented in equation 
(2-1), a simple generic reverse regression model designated to deal with the 
measurement error might be the following: 
UXi, =y+ 5CARj, + vi, (2-9) 
where 8 is the return response coefficient. The return response coefficient is the 
inverse of the earnings response coefficient (&IIA and this inverse represents the 
theoretical upper limit of the return response coefficient. All interpretations of 
economic determinants, discussed above, must therefore be inverted when the 
subject of interpretation is the return response coefficient. Collins and Kothari (1989) 
employ just such a model to study the economic determinants of the earnings 
(return) response coefficients. 
However, the solution to the effors-in-variables problem is not readily 
available in cases where there are more regressors measured with error. One such 
context is in the Feltham and OhIson's (1996) linear-dynarnics model in a multiple- 
equation setting (e. g. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999; Barth et aL, 1999). Another 
setting represents cases where reported accounting earnings are negative. In the case 
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of loss firms the need is often to include additional variables in regressions that 
attempt to measure the underlying -true value-relevant variables with error. 
For 
example, Collins, Pincus and Me (1999) find that including the book value serves as 
a proxy for i) future normal earnings, ii) the value of the abandonment option if a 
firm is to be liquidated, and iii) as a proxy for scale. The book value included in 
these regressions almost inevitably measures these three constructs with error. 
Another application where this problem might arise is the use of the deflated book 
value (the book-to-market ratio) or any other "stock" variable as a control for the 
level of pervasive conservatism in accounting (e. g., Pope and Walker, 2003). While 
Pope and Walker (2003) avoid including the book-to-market ratio directly in their 
regressions and re-estimate their models by book-to-market deciles instead, 
including the ratio directly would represent an alternative effors-in-variables method 
of estimation. 
While no general solution to the problem of measurement error in multiple 
independent variables is available, some special cases have been solved with 
different approaches. Black, Berger and Scott (2000) relax the assumption that the 
true independent variable and the measurement error ten'n are un-correlated; Klepper 
(1994), develops regression diagnostics when all independent variables might be 
measured with error and assuming the error is not correlated with the true variable of 
interest. Other approaches have been developed (e. g., Machuga, 2000; Dagenais and 
Dagenais, 1997; Lewbell, 1997; Dagenais; 1994; Klepper, 1988; Klepper and 
Leamer, 1984). Some of these have been applied specifically. in the capital market- 
based accounting research context in estimating the earnings response coefficient. 
For example, Cready, Hurtt and Seida (2000) apply the method developed in Klepper 
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and Leamer (1984). The technique essentially involves regressing every variable 
entering the model (both dependent and independent) on all other variables and 
establishing bounds on the estimated regression coefficients. 
None of the works cited above have been used explicitly in this thesis, given 
that the "reverse" form of empirical models "automatically" precludes (pre-empts) 
the errors-in-variables problem to affect the main conservatism measures that are 
based on estimated regression coefficients. However, the acknowledgement of the 
errors-in-variables has directly contributed to the development of the "reverse" 
regression technique generally used in the ex-post conservatism literature as well as 
in this thesis and is presented here accordingly. 
2.3.2 Scale (size) effects 
The second principal econometric problem that affects the models used in 
related literature as well as in this study is related to scale effects. Empirical 
estimations of the generic model in the form of price-level regressions, such as the 
undeflated version of the model presented in (2-5) above, as set out in equation (2- 
10) below, with or without book value often yield models with high R2s. For 
example, Garrod and Valentincic (2005) report A resulting from estimations of 
their valuation models on a long UK sample (196-2001) to be in the range from 41% 
to 56% which is much higher than the more common range 5%-15% in such 
empirical investigations (e. g., Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998). Although Garrod 
and Valentincic (2005) deflate their variant of the residual income model with three 
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different deflators (i. e., scale measures) - book value, earnings and sales, some scale 
effects might still be present because they do not deflate the accounting variables 
with lagged price (Easton, 1999; also 1998), thus causing higher A than they would 
otherwise be. The following illustration represents an attempt to illustrate the effects 
of scale following the exposition in Barth and Kallapur (1996). 
Assume, first, that the true relationship between price (Pit) and reported 
accounting earnings (Xi, ) is described by the following undeflated levels-model 
(Kothari and Zimmennan, 1995): 
Pit =a+ I At (2-10) 
where gi, is a random error distributed normally N-(O, cý, ). Note that the distribution 
of this error term ej, is homoscedastic, i. e., its value does not increase with the value 
of the independent variable Xit. In practice, however, because scale effects are 
present in accounting and/or possibly in the market variables, the observed (as 
opposed to the underlying or "true") relationship between price and accounting 
eamings is: 
(aSi, ) + (, 6XiSi, ) + (e,, Si, ) (2-11) 
where SI, is a measure of scale for a particular firm i in period t. Several empirical 
measures of scale (S) have been proposed in the literature. The most common 
measures of size include the opening market capitalisation (share price) (e. g., Easton, 
1999) and accounting earnings, book values or sales (e. g., Garrod and Valentincic, 
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2004). Less-often used measures used in empirical applications include the amount 
originally invested in the firm (Barth and Kallapur, 1996) and the amount of the 
depreciation charge (Christie, 1987). Both of these measures are expected to be large 
for large firms while at the same time bearing no relationship with the determinants 
of the current value of the firm. 18 The underlying assumption is that scale, Sit, is not 
correlated with either Pit or Xt. 
In empirical applications, models based on equation (2-10) would generally 
take the following form: 
(Pit Sit) =r+ 8(xilsil) + wit (2-12) 
Assuming (2-12) could be estimated (which would require the knowledge of the 
scale factor S), the estimated regression coefficient 8 will generally differ from the 4 
A 
estimated regression coefficient 6 from equations (2-10) and (2-11) because: 
- the model in equation (2-12) omits the scale factor S11, an independent variable 
correlated with the independent variable (XjSjj) included in the regression; 
- the model in equation (2-12) has an intercept, while the equation (2-11) does not; 
- since the error term is defined as cA., == Silgil, the model in (2-12) violates the 
contemporaneous ordinary least squares assumption of homoscedasticitiy (Le, 
the error term w is a function of the scale factor S and thus varies with S). 
18 This study shows explicitly the properties of the depreciation expense regarding the prediction of 
future cash flows. 
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Barth and Kallapur (1996) show that under the assumptions and 
circumstances presented above, the estimated coefficient S in equation (2-12) - the 
estimated earnings response coefficient - will be biased in the following manner: 
E((5) =, 8 + 
alaX2 
1+ 
E2 Y2 
-j +- 
s 
ýX-2 
(2-13) 
where the second term on the right hand side of equation (2-13) represents the bias 
term. Since the denominator of the bias term is always positive (only squared terms 
are included), and since negative intercepts (a) are not common in accounting 
models such as (2-10) (however, see, for example, Collins, Pincus and Xie, 1999), 
the direction of the bias will depend on the sign of the mean of the variable X11, T. 
Generally, one would expect the mean of accounting earnings T to be positive on 
average, since there are usually many more profitable than loss-making firms. 19 
Alternatively, negative book values as a stock variable are sometimes observed, 
however such cases are almost always excluded from empirical analyses. 20 
Generally, the observed earnings response coefficients in the presence of scale 
effects should thus be biased upwards. In other words, the estimated earnings 
response coefficients from such regressions without appropriate controls for scale 
will be overstated - the effect of a unit change in (unexpected) earnings will 
overestimate the significance of this change for future earnings and thus for future 
cash flows and, consequently, their present value and thus the market values. 
19 For example, there are 12,5% loss observations (firm-years) in the main contemporaneous sample 
used in in this research. 20 This study too excludes firms with non-positive book values (see section 4.2 for details on sample 
selection). 
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If a relevant variable that is correlated with the variable included in the model 
is excluded from the model, this results in the correlated omitted variables problem. 
The consequences of this problem are that both the estimated regression constant and 
the estimated regression coefficient in models like (2-10) are biased and inconsistent 
and, moreover, the disturbance term is estimated incorrectly - it is biased upwardly 
(Gujarati, 2003, pp. 510-513; Greene, 2000, pp. 334-337). This last property is less 
problematic in the present context given that it reduces only the explanatory power 
of models. Even if an omitted variable is orthogonal on the included variable, the 
error term is still biased and correct inferences based on the estimated R2 are difficult 
(albeit, again, in a direction that is usually not an issUe'in capital market-based 
accounting research). 
Easton and Sommers (2003,2000) emphasize that scale effects are more than 
just the notion that large firms will have large values of accounting variables. The 
relationship between market and accounting variables might be different for smaller 
than for large firms, inducing a non-linear relationship analogous'to, for example, 
Freeman and Tse's (1992) differences in earnings response coefficients for large and 
small unexpected earnings. 
There are two possible approaches to solve the scale effects - deflation'of 
variables affected by scale and the direct inclusion of a scale proxy as an 
independent variable. Barth and Kallapur (1996) advocate the latter approach and 
argue that deflation may have unpredictable effects on coefficient bias, 
heteroscedasticity and efficiency of estimation. Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) also 
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include market capitalisation as an independent variable in their sensitivity analyses. 
Scale proxies used in the empirical literature include: total sales, book value and 
market value of equity, total assets, net income, number of shares and lagged 
(opening) price, effectively changing the modelling, to returns-earnings, yield 
formulation of the generic model'in (2-1) (Easton, 1999) of the type presented above 
in equation (2-5). The inclusion of scale directly as a proxy may have other roles - 
e. g., in examinations of the effects of political costs (Christie,, 1987). Also, Garrod 
and Valentincic (2005), among others, caution that deflation by the number of shares 
does not eliminate the scale effect, given that the number of shares is a variable at 
the discretion of managers. A small number of shares will result in large per share 
values while a large number of shares will result in smaller per share values for an 
otherwise economically identical firm. Recent papers that explore further the effect 
of scale on price-level models include Barth and Clinch (1999), Easton and Sommers 
(2003) and Akbar and Stark (2003). 
In this research, Easton's (1999) recommendation is followed 
"automatically" given that deflation by lagged price follows from Pope and Walker 
(1999). Accounting variables and current prices are deflated by opening prices P1,1-i 
(or Pi,, -4in lagged models) thus eliminating, to a large extent, the effects of scale. 
If, 
however, opening prices were only an imperfect measure of scale, the problems 
described above would arise. Also, note that apart from the errors-in-variables 
problem, correlated omitted variables and scale effects, there are other possible 
methodological issues in estimating the earnings response coefficients. For example, 
a series of studies discuss the eamings-levels versus earnings-changes form of 
models such as (2-4) and (2-10) above (e. g., Easton and Harris, 1991; Kothari, 1992; 
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Ali and Zarowin, 1992; OhIson and Shroff, 1992; Watts and Zimmerman, 1995). 
The precise mechanics of these various forms of models are not explored here 
in 
detail, given that they are not directly used in this study. However, it must be noted 
that authors reduce the econometric consequences of various specifications of these 
models either to the errors-in-variables problem (e. g., Ali and Zarowin, 1992) or to a 
correlated omitted variables problem (Brown, Lo and Lys, 1999). Thus the above 
presentation represents a framework to consider other possible problems that arise in 
studies such as the present study. 
2.4 ACCOUNTXNG CONSERVATXSM 
Definitions of accounting conservatism originate from two broad sources: 
accounting standards/legal framework literature and academic literature. In this 
section the various definitions of accounting conservatism are presented, starting by 
presenting the relevant "official" definitions from regulatory texts in a way similar to 
Giner and Rees (2001) and Givoly and Hayn (2000). 21 These definitions are then 
followed by definitions used in academic empirical research, where certain conflicts 
and interactions between two different types of accounting conservatism are exposed 
and linked to regulatory definitions. 
There are three important regulatory definitions of conservatism from three 
major regulatory bodies. First, in the Accounting Standards Board's Statement of 
21 The term "official" is in inverted commas already in Givoly and Hayn (2000). 
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Principles for Financial Reporting (ICAEW, 2001) issued in December, 1999, the 
term "prudence" is defined as: 
"... the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgements needed in making 
the estimates required under conditions of uncertainty, such that gains and assets are not 
overstated and losses and liabilities are not understated. In particular, under such conditions 
it requires more confin-matory evidence about the existence of, and a greater reliability of 
measurement for, assets and gains than is required for liabilities and losses. " (quoted in 
ICAEW, 2001, p. 35, para. 3.19) 
Thus, the recognition of liabilities and losses requires less verifiability than 
22 the recognition of assets and gains (Watts, 2003). It also specifies that prudence is 
only necessary in conditions of uncertainty, which is stressed again in para. 3.20 
(ibid., p. 35). Also, further explanation is given that prudence may interfere with 
unbiasedness and warning is given that the application of prudence should not result 
in deliberate understatement of assets and gains and overstatement of liabilities and 
losses (ibid., p. 89, para. 21-23). Already as early as in Scott (1926) and Devine 
(1963) the case is put forward against a deliberate understatement of assets 
(inventory, in this case). Sterling (1967) provides several examples of the different 
views on accounting conservatism prevalent at the time. 
The second regulatory source is the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 
the US, which refers to prudence at several points in different documents. First, both 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5- Accounting for 
Contingencies and the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2- 
22 Verifiability implies that a number of measurers are likely to obtain the same (accounting) measure 
(Delaney et aL, 2003, p. 26; FASB, 1980, p. 33). 
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Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, refer to the APB Statement 
No. 4, para. 171, where conservatism is referred to in the following manner: 
23 
"Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant uncertainties. 
Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred that possible 
errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net 
income and net assets. This has led to the convention of conservatism... " (FASB, 1975, p. 
22, para. 83; FASB, 1980, p. 35, para. 91) 
This statement would represent a scaled-down version of a more extreme 
stance compared to the one in Ball and Shivakurnar (2004). They quote Watts and 
Zimmerman's (1983, pp. 205-206) definition of conservatism that states assets 
should be reported at the lowest value available, liabilities at the highest, revenue 
recognised later and expenses sooner. Thus, at the extreme, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2004, p. 9) comment that: 
46 ... accounting is conservative if it simply delays revenue recognition'by one period, or 
subtracts a constant from earnings every period independent of current economic gains and 
losses. " 
However, the following quote from SFAS 5 (FASB, 1975) again quoting the 
APB Statement No. 4, para. 35, is similar and yet it represents an important concept 
that relates conservatism to economic events: 
"The uncertainties that surround the preparation of financial statements are reflected in a 
general tendency toward early recognition of unfavourable events and minimization of the 
amount of net assets and net income. " (FASB, 1975, p. 22) 
Following the first part of this statement, "unfavourable [economic] events" 
must happen first, then it is decided when to include them in financial statements 
23 The terms "prudence" and "conservatisrre' are intended to mean the same phenomenon. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board explicitly acknowledges this in SFAC 2 (1980): 
"There is a place for a convention such as conservatism - meaning prudence - in financial 
accounting and reporting... " (p. 35, para. 92, emphasis added). 
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(Elliott and Shaw, 1988), and, finally, the preference or tendency is for an early 
recognition. This may be taken as an indication of the asymmetric timeliness concept 
introduced later by Basu (1997) that bad economic news are recognised more timely 
than good economic news. This also differs from the extreme stance presented in 
(criticised by) Ball and Shivakumar (2004) that relates to mere minimisation of 
assets/maximisation of liabilities and delayed recognition of revenue/earlier 
recognition of expenses. The increased timeliness referred to above cannot be 
achieved by expensing early, because there must first be an unfavourable economic 
event and only then it is being recognised in financial statements (i. e., causality is 
implied). However, the ending of this statement again returns to Ball and 
Shivakumar (2004) example of "subtracting a constant". 
Further, conservatism is also defined by FASB (1980) explicitly in para. 95: 
"Conservatism is a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and risks 
inherent in business situations are adequately considered. " (FASB, 1980, p. 36, para. 95) 
This does not imply deliberate and consistent understatement of net assets and 
profits and this is explicitly acknowledged in para. 93 (ibid. ). Conservatism 
introduces bias in financial reporting and as such it conflicts with a number of 
qualitative characteristics of financial reporting (e. g., neutrality, comparability, etc. ). 
Moreover, the Financial Accounting Standards Board notes that understated assets 
often lead to overstated net income in subsequent years (ibid., para. 94), so the bias 
introduced by conservative accounting will more likely influence the timing, rather 
than the amounts of income over the lifetime of an economic asset (ibid., para. 96). 
This position remains unchanged to date (e. g., Delaney et aL, 2003, p. 27). Also, 
Givoly and Hayn (2000) cite several sources that emphasise that minimisation of 
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assets, maximisation of liabilities, delaying revenue and recognising expenses early 
should be viewed cumulatively through time rather than only within one accounting 
period. 
At the limiting point, the following statement from SFAS No. '5 -Accounting 
for Contingencies (FASB, 1975) that discusses comments received from an earlier 
Exposure draft and Discussion memorandum is interesting: 
"On the grounds of conservatism, some respondents supported accrual of estimated losses 
from loss contingencies before available information indicates that it is probable that an asset 
has been impaired or a liability incurred. " (p. 22, para. 82). 
Therefore, there might be situations where losses are accrued, but as time passes, 
some conditions that had originally lead to the accrual of losses might not materialise 
and so the original accrual would represent an "overreaction". This is an extremely 
important point in that it facilitates the explanation of a part of the Pope and Walker 
(1999) modelling of asymmetric timeliness - they explicitly allow in their model for 
overreaction to bad news, not just the mere reaction. 
The third source of "official" definitions of prudence can be found in the 4h 
EEC Directive (1978) and subsequent amendments (CONSLEG 1978LO660 - 
17/07/2003) in Section 7 (Valuation rules), Article 3 1: 
"... items shown in the annual accounts are valued in accordance with the following general 
principles... 
(c) valuation must be made on a prudent basis, and in particular: 
(aa) only profits made at the balance sheet date may be included, 
(bb) account must be taken of all liabilities arising in the course of the financial year 
concerned or of a previous one, even if such liabilities become apparent only between the 
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date of the balance sheet and the date on which it is drawn up... " (CONSLEG, 2003, PP- 18- 
19) 
Giner and Rees (2001) observe that there is no explicit distinction between the 
balance-sheet conservatism and income statement conservatism in the definition of 
prudence in the 4h EEC Directive, but that the two types of conservatism are related 
if clean surplus accounting is used. Even when there are no specific requirements 
from either an International Accounting Standard (now termed International 
Financial Reporting Standard) or interpretations from the Standing Interpretations 
Committee (SIC), management should, according to IAS I- Presentation of 
Financial Statements (Revised 1997), produce financial statements that include 
infonnation that is: 
24 
"... (b) reliable in that they [the information]... (iv) are prudent. ... " (EC, 2003, 
IAS 1, para. 
20) 
To sum up this presentation of "official" references: the concept of prudence 
or conservatism is included in several regulatory statements, albeit not in a consistent 
manner. There are two broad groups of conservatism that are apparent from these 
definitions. Using the first definition based on the statements above, a firm would be 
considered conservative if it tended to show assets in the balance sheet at lower 
rather than at higher valuations, show liabilities at higher rather than at lower 
valuations, recognise revenue later rather than sooner and recognise expenses sooner 
rather than later. These decisions are not related to economic news. 
24 International accounting standards (with the exception of IAS 32 - Financial instruments: disclosure and presentation and IAS 39 - Financial instruments: recognition and measurement) were 
endorsed by the European Commission on the 29h September 2003 in Commission Regulation (EQ 
No. 1727/2003 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2003) in accordance with an earlier 
regulation (EQ 1606/2002. International accounting standards are now termed International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
61 
Giner and Rees (2001) present the case of a zero net present value project 
that is expected to generate profits over the years and where'the firm has to make 
choices regarding the recognition of these profits. The firm can be more or less 
conservative (or prudent) in this recognition of profits. However, given that the 
project is a zero net present value project, there is no change in market value of 
equity that is precisely the proxy that Giner and Rees (2001) and most other 
conservatism studies cited below use to infer the arrival of and the effect of 
economic news. Therefore, by definition, the conservatism of this type is not related 
to economic news. Second, there is reference at some points in these statements that 
bad economic events should be recognised earlier rather than later. This implies that 
economic events trigger decisions related to this second type of conservatism. 
Therefore, if a firm recognises a bad economic event sooner rather than later, it is 
considered to be more conservative. 
-, These two types of conservatism are connected with two distinct types 
of theoretical and empirical research in this area. Regarding the latter type of 
conservatism, the influential empirical paper by Basu. (1997) and subsequent 
theoretical work/explanation of his results by Pope and Walker (1999) as well as 
other empirical applications (e. g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2004; Beekes, Pope and 
Young; 2003; Giner and Rees, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; 
Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Basu, Hwang and Jan, 2000) define accounting 
conservatism in terms of asymmetric earnings timeliness. Earnings timeliness is the 
degree to which current-period accounting earnings reflect current-period value- 
relevant information - economic income. Economic income is proxied for by the 
changes in market value of the firm (i. e., returns, usually excluding dividends). 
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Positive changes in the market value of the firm are termed "good news" and 
negative (non-positive) changes in market value are termed "bad news". Easton 
(1999) denotes this definition of timeliness as the timeliness of the accounting 
summary and he distinguishes it from timeliness of accounting information that 
focuses on investors' use of accounting information in decision-making. - 
: Based on this concept, accounting conservatism is then defined to be the 
degree of asymmetry with which current-period accounting earnings respond 
asymmetrically to good and bad economic news. Stated somewhat differently, 
conservatism requires a higher degree of verification to recognise good economic 
news than to recognise bad economic news in financial statements or, alternatively, 
the probability of timely recognition of bad news in accounting earnings is higher 
than for good news (Basu, 1997). Similarly, Holthausen and Watts'(2001) define 
"conservatism of the earnings number" as a form of conservatism that anticipates 
losses but not gains so that market values reflect gains earlier than accounting 
earnings, while losses are incorporated contemporaneously in both market values 
and accounting earnings. This definition also rests on the premise of asymmetric 
recognition of good and bad news. Also, the changes in the market value of equity 
and accounting income are viewed as two distinct measures of performance. Kothari 
(2001) adds that economic losses are recognised not only more quickly, but also 
more often. At the extreme, Watts (2003) defines this type of conservatism as 
"the degree to which profits are not anticipated. " (p. 10) 
This type of conservatism is termed differently in the literature. Some 
examples are: ex-post conservatism (indicating that economic events must Occur 
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first), news-related conservatism, income statement conservatism (a consequence of 
the fact that the primary focus of existing research is the different earnings figures) 
(e. g., Pope and Walker, 2003) and conditional conservatism. This latter term is due 
to -Ball and Shivakumar (2004) and Beaver and Ryan (2004) who explicitly define 
conservatism as the asymmetric reaction to good and bad economic news, i. e., a 
reaction conditional on the arrival of news. Finally, Pope and Walker (2003) indicate 
an alternative term - event-driven conservatism. Thus, these alternative terms stress 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings relative to (conditional on) good and bad 
economic news. 
The other type of conservatism is defined in, or is the focus of, or is used in 
papers by Pope and Walker (2003), Watts (2003), Penman and Zhang (2002), Zhang 
(2000), Beaver and Ryan (2004,2000), Hayn and Givoly (2000), Myers (1999), 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Feltham and Ohlson (1995,1996). Following the 
exposition in Pope and Walker (2003), accounting is conservative if the applied 
accounting depreciation rate is higher than the economic rate of depreciation, the 
economic rate of depreciation being the rate at which operating cash flows resulting 
from investment decay through time. If the accounting depreciation rate is higher 
than the economic rate of depreciation, this indicates that operating cash flows 
resulting from a particular asset decay less quickly (i. e., they are more persistent) 
than the accounting process records the decay of the originating operating asset. This 
results in the market value of shareholders' equity being on average higher than the 
book value of equity. Equivalently, unrecorded goodwill does not, on average (i. e., 
over sufficiently lo ng periods of time), equal zero. 
64 
This kind of accounting conservatism is not related to economic news. On a 
time-line, it is applied earlier than ex-post conservatism and is related to the upfront 
choices among different accounting (asset-recognition) methods (Basu, 2001). At the 
time the firm makes an investment and before any economic event affects the asset, 
the finn: 
"... pre-commits the firm to accounting for the asset on the basis of a pessimistic prognosis of 
future cash flows that the asset is expected to generate. " (Pope and Walker, 2003, p. 2) 
- 
Only later may (or, indeed, may not) economic events arise and their 
economic effects be recognised in financial statements in general and in accounting 
earnings and components in particular. Because varying degrees of conservatism do 
not depend on (are not conditional on) economic news, it is also termed 
unconditional conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar, 2004; Beaver and Ryan, 2004). 
Another term used is pervasive conservatism (e. g., Giner and Rees, 2001). 
Different assumptions about the ability of an asset to generate future cash 
flows denote varying levels of ex-ante conservatism. Two limiting points can be 
identified. On the one side, an extremely pessimistic expectation of the ability of the 
asset to generate future cash flows would lead the firm to completely expense an 
investment in an operating asset through the profit and loss account, rather than 
capitalise it. 25 The amount invested would thus never appear on the balance sheet. 
This is equivalent to applying immediately an accounting depreciation rate of 100%. 
This also implies that the accounting depreciation charge would be fully transitory 
and evolve entirely within the current accounting period. Thus, unless the asset does 
" Zhang (2000) notes that accounting conservatism relates primarily to operating assets, and less (or 
not at all) to financial assets, following Modigliani and Miller (1961) assumption that borrowing and lending are zero net present value activities. 
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not generate a single monetary unit of cash flows, the accounting depreciation rate 
would exceed the economic rate of depreciation. Such an accounting policy is 
denoted as extremely ex-ante conservative in that this is the most "pessimistic 
prognosis" of future cash flows a firm can make. 26 Nevertheless, Zhang (2000) notes 
that if a particular investment - he uses the example of R&D - does in fact not 
produce any future cash flows, the accounting policy is, in that particular case, 
unbiased and not conservative. These relations must thus be considered on average 
(asymptotically). 
On the other side, in an extremely ex-ante aggressive, un-conservative or 
imprudent, as termed in SFAC No. 2 (FASB, 1980, p. 37) or liberal accounting 
system, as termed in Penman (2003, pp. 562-581), the firm would capitalise an 
investment on the balance sheet as an operating asset and then, at the extreme, - never 
depreciate it at all. In less extreme versions, the accounting depreciation rate would 
merely not exceed the rate of decay of operating cash flows the asset is expected to 
generate (i. e., the economic rate of depreciation). In the extreme case, the investment 
would always be shown on the balance sheet as an asset at its original (historic cost) 
value. 27 With the passage of time, the asset would be economically consumed - the 
sum of cash flows still expected to be generated by the asset would diminish. It is 
likely that the market value of such an asset would tend toward zero over time as the 
asset is economically depreciated while its book value would remain unchanged at 
26 It is assumed firms would not invest in projects expected to generate no cash inflows but that would 
create only liabilities for the firm. The term "pessimistic prognosir is due to Pope and Walker 
(2003). 
2' The literature does not discuss the case of a liberal accounting system where, in addition to keeping 
the assets in the balance sheet at historic cost with upward revaluations would be allowed or even 
required. 
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the historic cost or at least decrease at a slower rate than the rate of decay of cash 
flows. 
Somewhat differently, Watts (2003) states that if a firm is ex-ante 
conservative, asset increases (gains) that are not verifiable are not recorded in 
financial statements, while decreases of a similar degree of verifiability are. This 
results in net assets being "understated", i. e., recorded in financial statements at 
below their market value and the book-to-market ratio will be above zero. Penman 
and Zhang (2002) define accounting to be conservative if firms choose: 
"... accounting methods that keep the book values of net assets relatively low. " (p. 238) 
They also provide a few typical examples of (US) conservative practices: LIFO 
rather than FIFO inventory valuation method in circumstances of rising inventory 
costs, expensing R&D expenditures instead of capitalising them in the balance sheet 
and amortise them later, using "too short" estimates of assets lives and 
overestimation of bad debtors' accounts, warranty liabilities and other. 
A final important point emphasised in Pope and Walker (2003) as well as 
Beaver and Ryan (2004) is the interaction between ex-ante and ex-post accounting 
conservatism. The likelihood of observing an asymmetric relation of earnings to the 
arrival of bad news decreases with increasing levels of ex-ante conservatism applied 
to investment projects in a firm. At the extreme, if a firm has already written-off the 
entire amount of an investment at the time the investmentwas made, the arrival of 
bad news will not be recognised in financial statements, given that there is no asset 
recorded in the balance sheet to which this bad news relate. Moving away from the 
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extreme, the more un-recognised assets a firm has, the less likely it is to observe 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings with respect to bad news. 
2.5 CONCLUDXNG REMARKS 
Early studies in the capital market-based accounting research have 
established that accounting numbers convey value-relevant information to investors 
regarding the present value of future cash flows. Share prices tend to move in the 
same direction as the unexpected earnings - if they are positive, prices increase 
(returns are positive) and if they are negative prices decrease (returns are negative). 
Moreover, there is significant volatility price and trade volume in days surrounding 
the earnings announcements, consistent with the arrival of new information. 
Importantly, several studies have also shown that 'changes in share prices are 
(incrementally) associated with operating cash flow 'and accruals components of 
earnings. The economic nature of this response is determined by factors such as 
persistence of accounting numbers, risk, growth and general level of interest rates. 
Despite strong evidence of the ability of accounting figures to influence 
investors' estimates of the present value of future cash flows, the empirical estimates 
of this response have been fount too small and only explained a small fraction of the 
variability in share prices. This has been ascribed to prices containing a richer 
information set than accounting numbers (prices-lead-earning's hypothesis), earnings 
containing a value-irrelevant component, deficiency of accounting measures and 
existence of transitory items. Conservative accounting has been identified as a 
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possible source of transitory items in earnings, (and, by extension, in other 
accounting measures, too). 
The existence of these differences between market and accounting values 
created a demand for econometric model that would be able to account for these 
explanations. In particular, this has to the development of the "reverse" regression, 
whereby earnings act as a dependent, rather than an independent variable, thus 
forcing the errors-in-variables into the error term rather than in the coefficient. 
Moreover, there has been a need to control the results for scale, as the relationship 
has been hypothesized to be different for small and for large firms. 
Defining the term of conservative accounting is also not a clear-cut problem. 
This chapter shows that there are two different types of conservatism: the ex-post 
conservatism, where economic news originate first and their effect is then reflected 
in accounting earnings (or, in principle, any other accounting measure), and the ex- 
ante conservatism, whereby a firm decides up-front on the degree of conservatism in 
recognising the assets in the balance sheet. The literature also indicates that any 
model of the link between market values and financial statements would have to 
account for the asymmetric treatment of good and bad news in financial statements: 
bad economic news are recognised more often and in large, capitalised amounts 
compared to good economic news, which are only recognised when they are (close 
to being) realised. Existing theoretical models of this asymmetric relationship are 
presented in the next chapter together with their extension, limits, interpretations and 
the main research hypotheses studied in the empirical part of this thesis. 
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THEORETICAL MODELS OF ACCOUNTING 
CONSERVATISM 
3.1 XNTRODUCTXON 
This chapter presents the main theoretical models of accounting 
conservatism. There are two principal ways in which the effects of ex-post 
accounting conservatism can be modelled. First, the effects of conservatism 
influence the time-series properties of various accounting figures. Therefore, by 
properly modelling the time-series of various accounting figures, the effect of 
conservative accounting can be observed. Second, the effects of conservatism on 
financial statements can be observed directly by using the Pope and Walker (1999) 
model where the original dependent variable (accounting earnings) is substituted 
with operating cash flow, various earnings and various accruals measures. These two 
models that capture the accounting conservatism are presented first in the chapter. 
Because one of the effects of conservative accounting is to extend the 
recognition of good news over a number of accounting periods, an extended, version 
of the Pope and Walker (1999) model covering any number of periods is presented. 
This generalisation, while retaining the same basic properties as the basic model, is 
shown separately. An alternative interpretation of Pope and Walker's (1999) 
theoretical model is also presented. 
The decomposition of earnings into its main components is crucial. in 
studying the effects of conservative accounting both by observing the time-series 
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properties of these components and in using them directly as dependent variables 
in 
the Pope and Walker (1999) models of conservatism. Moreover, the effects of 
conservative accounting may be inferred by comparing direct tests on various 
accounting measures among themselves. 28 
Ex-ante conservatism represents a limit on studying the effects of ex-post 
conservatism. If all firms were ex-ante extremely conservative, the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings and the relevant components would not be observed. 
Therefore, the ex-ante conservatism interacts with and represents a limiting factor in 
this study. Accordingly, the main conclusions of Pope and Walker's (2003) 
modelling of this type of accounting conservatism that affect this study is presented 
in a separate section. 
Giner and Rees (2001) model the effects of conservative accounting 
originating from previous' accounting periods. At least two aspects motivate the 
inclusion of the their model in this study. First, they incorporate lagged earnings, 
which had been subjected to conservative accounting practices in previous 
accounting periods. This model thus represents an alternative to lagged models of 
conservatism and complements other results in the study. Second, the model 
differentiates between profit and loss firms, an issue that is explored further Chapter 
2' This would represent a similar interpretation as in Basu (1997) and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), 
where the role of accruals is inferred indirectly by comparing direct tests using the (operating) cash 
flow and earnings figures. 
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4. In combining the two motives, the difference between profit and loss firms may be 
due to (past) stock of conservative accounting. 29 
The chapter concludes with the formulation of hypotheses to be tested using 
the models of conservatism, their extension and construction of variables. 
3.2 THE PERSISTENCE PROPERTY OF EARNINGS AND 
EARNXNGS COMPONENTS 
3.2.1 Persistence of generic accounting earnings 
Timeliness of accounting earnings can be defined as the extent to which 
current period accounting earnings reflect current period value-relevant information 
(Beekes, Pope and Young, 2003). Under conservative (ex-post) accounting, bad 
economic news is recognised in accounting earnings more timely than good 
economic news. Increases in market value of assets (economic gains) are typically 
not recognised fully in the period they occur. In part, current period increases in 
market value are included in future periods' earnings as the underlying events that 
have lead to these gains are gradually realised or at least when they can be 
reasonably verified (Watts, 2003; Basu, 1997). This implies that the effects of gains 
tend to persist e'repeat" itself) in the earnings figure. At the extreme earnings 
permanently increase to a higher level as a result of a current period gain. 
29 The actual differentiation of profit and loss firms is not presented in this chapter, but in Chapter 4 as 
part of empirical analyses. The reason for this is that, theoretically, in terms of conservative 
accounting there should be no differences between the two groups of firms. Moreover, there are no 
existing models of conservatism that would allow for the differences. 
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On the other hand, decreases in market value (economic losses) should be 
recognised entirely in the period they occur, even if these decreases have not yet 
been actually realised. In other words, the degree of verifiability required is less for 
the recognition of economic losses than for the recognition of economic gains in 
financial statements. Losses tend to be recognised in large, complete and capitalised 
amounts of future expected cash flow decreases rather than gradually over time. The 
recognition of losses in earnings leads to a temporary decrease in earnings level and 
a reversal in the subsequent period of this decrease (Watts, 2003; Basu, 1997). 
Econometrically, these two differential treatments of gains and losses can'be 
modelled on a continuum defined by two limiting processes. A persistent change in a 
time-series of earnings levels, denoted as y, reflecting gains can be described by a 
random-walk (R-NY) process. 30 A temporary change in a time-series of earnings 
levels yj reflecting economic losses can be described by a first-order (ARM) 
autoregressive process. A general AR(l) process is defined as (e. g., DeFusco et al., 
2001, pp. 498-500; Greene, 2000, pp. 530-533; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, pp. 
207-209): 31 
bo + bly, -, + e, 
(3-1) 
30 The term earnings relates to generic earnings figures and does not relate exclusively to any of the 
emprical alternatives used in this study nor does it exclude specifically any other performance 
measure. 
31 Given the method of estimation used in this study (i. e., using yearly cross-sections), this section 
attempts only to provide a theoretical framework for the empirical model used in several sections 
within Chapter 4 and does not necessarily imply a time-series estimation. 
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where el is a disturbance term with the following properties: E[e, 1= 0, var(ei)= cý and 
cov(e,, e, )= 0 for any two different time periods t and s, t#s. The series yt itself has the 
following properties: E[yt]= bol(l-bi)= g, varLvtl= o2l(l-b 2 1) and cov(ytys)= 0 if t*s. 
To derive these results, the assumption that Jbil< is necessary or the series would be 
explosive. The mean, variance and covariances are all time-invariant constants and 
the time series of yt is weakly stationary. Such a series will tend to revert to its mean 
g and fluctuations around this mean will be broadly of the same amplitude (Gujarati, 
p. 798). The expected mean-reversion level is bol(l-bi) (DeFusco et aL, p. 487). 
At the other end of the continuum, the R-W process (generally with drift) can 
be viewed as a special case of the AR(l) process in (3-1) where bl= I (Johnston and 
DiNardo, p. 59): 
b,, + y, -, 
(3-2) 
where et has the saine properties as the error term e in (3- 1). However, the variable yt 
itself now has the following properties: E[ytýo]= bot+yo and var(ytý@= ch. The mean 
and variance of such a time-series is not constant through time and the variable yj 
follows a non-stationary stochastic process. In time-series estimations, non- 
stationarity may result in a rejection of the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between the two variables even when they are in reality truly independent (Greene, 
2000, p. 780; Finger, 1994) thus causing a severe error in inference. 32 Some other 
32 In this study, a cross-sectional, rather than a time-series, approach is generally employed to make 
inferences based on the results of estimated empirical verisons of these models presented below 
(Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Fama and French, 2000; also see bottom of section 4.2). 
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more advanced processes, including the exponentially-weighted moving average, are 
presented and used in McLeay, Kassab and Helan (1997). 
In this study, first differences Ayi= yr-yi-i will be employed as variables rather 
than the levels as in several recent studies (e. g., Basu, 1997, in additional analyses). 
In principle, using first differences rather than levels solves the problem of non- 
stationarity if the original series yt is non-stationary in time-series estimations. If the 
underlying series y, follows an AR(l) process, then corr(Ayl, Ayi-i)= -0.5 and if it 
follows an R-W process corr(Ays, Ayt-, )= 0 (e. g., Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998; 
Lookabill, 1976; Hagerman and Richmond, 1973; Beaver, 1970). 
Generally, to distinguish between the general AR(l)- process and an R-W 
with- drift process in changes in any variable y,, Ay, , the following 
first-differences 
modification of the model in equation (3-1) can be estimated: 
Ayt ý ir, + o7lAyt-I + ilt (3-3) 
It follows from the introduction to this section that this model likely would not be a 
complete description of the properties of an earnings variable. Earnings and earnings 
changes as well as changes in other variables are likely to be a mixture of both the 
AR(l) and R-W processes (e. g., Freeman, OhIson and Penman, 1992; also see 
Bleaney and Mizen, 1995) because of different accounting rules that relate to the 
treatment of economic gains and economic losses. To allow for the asymmetric 
persistence in earnings-increases and earnings-decreases within the same regression 
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model, the model must allow for both an AR(l) and a general R-W processes in 
changes of a variable Ayt. The following model could be employed: 
AYt rl + 7r2 Ct-I + r'7, Ay, 
-, 
+ 472Ct-lAyt-I + 17t (3-4) 
If a time-series inAyt follows an R-W process then E[Ql= 0.33 if a time- 
series in Ayt follows a mean-reverting (AR) process, then -0.50: 5E[ctý]<O. An 
indicator variable Ct-I is employed that serves to differentiate between positive and 
negative changes in earnings (yj): Ct-, = 11 if Ayj: 50 and 0 otherwise). The parameter 
c92 captures the differential persistence of negative lagged changes Ays-I and the total 
persistence of negative lagged changes is given by the sum of the two slope 
coefficients (co, +cv-2). Expected values of parameters r, and m are E[ml= E[; r2l= 0 
for both processes. Elgers and Lo (1994) estimate a restricted version (; r2= at= 0) of 
the model in (3-4) for positive and negative earnings changes separately (i. e., they 
estimate (3-3)). For both sub-samples, the two estimated ;r parameters corresponding 
here to ; r2and w2are statistically insignificantly different from zero. Finn subscripts 
in (3-4) are omitted for parsimony. Also, the model in equation (3-4) can be 
estimated, provided the variables are properly operationalised. The operationalisation 
has to, at the very least, resolve econometric issues like the scale effect (see section 
2.3.2). 
The characterisation of the processes in accounting earnings yj presented 
alk , bove are of a general nature and apply to any variable, accounting or otherwise. 
33 If the levels model such as the model in equation (3-2) was employed, then E[ah]= I (e. g., Caird 
and Emanuel, 198 1). This also implies that the best forecast of next period's level in variable yt+l is 
the current period's level in y, 
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This brings at least two important benefits. 'First, the AR(l) and R-W represent two 
limiting processes of a continuum (Beaver, 1970). In the former, innovations el in the 
time series have no implications for the values of yt in future periods, while in the 
latter innovations fully determine the future values of the underlying series yj. This 
latter property of an R-W is frequently termed the "infinite memory""of an R-W 
process (e. g., Gujarati, 2003, p. 799). Second, given that these characterizations can 
be extended to other accounting items, they can be used to form limiting 
expectations of the behaviour of these items. Thus, the change in an accounting item 
that reflects bad news is expected to be large, more eamings-reducing and more 
transitory than an accounting item that reflects good news gradually over time in 
small increments and tends to be more permanent. These predictions are used in 
empirical parts of this thesis. 
3.2.2 Persistence of the main earnings 
components 
On a generic and simplified level, accounting earnings (E) can be 
decomposed into (operating) accruals (A) and (operating) cash flows (CF). Given the 
model in (3-4) is of a very general nature, it can be employed to study time-series 
behaviour of these components as well. Regardless of the difficulties associated with 
actual definitions of these variables, some existing predictions about the values of 
the parameters in (3-4) are the following. 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) construct a simplified accounting system 
starting from the assumption that sales-levels follow an R-W process as described 
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above in (3-2). Modelling the operating cash flows, major components of working 
capital accruals (debtors, stock and work in process and creditors) and earnings 
allows them to make predictions about the time-series properties of changes in these 
accounting variables. At least three of their predictions serve as initial benchmarks in 
the empirical counterpart of this section (see section 4.4). Under certain additional 
assumptions, the preliminary expectations are as follows (Dechow, Kothari and 
Watts, 1998, Table 1, p. 143): 
- corr(Mt, AAt-, )= -0.500, i. e., (working capital) accruals overall are expected to 
fully mean-revert within one accounting period; 34 
- -0.500<corr(, dCFt,, dCFj-j)<O and, based on the average values of parameters of 
this correlation in their paper, it is predicted to be corr(, dCF,, dCFt-l)= -0.3 5 0. It 
does not equal to -0.500 as would be expected if cash inflows were being 
followed directly by cash outflows and vice versa. Countering this process is the 
"profit-spread effect" -a portion of current-period shock to sales will be realised 
in cash in the current period and the rest in future period(s), which would induce 
positiveserial coffelation in successive cash flow changes - high cash inflow in 
the current period implies a higher-than-Otherwise cash inflow in the following 
period; 
for completeness, they predict that corr(AEI, AEI-, )= 0, i. e., earnings overall 
35 follow a random walk process. 
34 The term "working capitar' is included in brackets because in Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) 
these are the only type of accruals allowed in the model. 33 This expecation would hold under ex-post unbiased accounting. 
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Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) do not model the (time-series) behaviour 
of other types of accruals. In terms of operations of a firm, at least one more type of 
the accruals component of earnings is important. Barth, Cram and Nelson (2001), 
Sloan (1996) and Dechow (1994) include the depreciation and/or amortisation 
expense as a separate variable in their research, but do not discuss explicitly its 
properties. Barth, Cram and Nelson (2001) find that both depreciation and 
amortisation. expenses are useful in predicting future cash flows. One way of 
interpreting the importance of the depreciation expense is that it represents a measure 
of the value of services the fixed assets provide in an average accounting period 
given the current stock of fixed assets. Therefore, if the composition of fixed assets 
does not change over time, the value of future fixed assets' services can be inferred 
from the current depreciation expense (Chambers, Jennings and Thompson 11,1999). 
In addition, Sloan (1996) reports that the depreciation charge is much less variable 
than the current asset accruals, underscoring, the reliability of this measure. 
Furthermore, assuming a firm with no net growth in fixed tangible and intangible 
assets, where all investments are replacement investments financed by these funds, 
then the expected value of changes in depreciation and amortisation charges equal 
zero. One-time new net investment or disinvestment opportunities cause one-time 
shifts in the level of the charge. The lagged life example in Basu (1997) also means a 
one-time increase in the level of depreciation charge. Therefore, from both these 
statements, a time-series of changes in depreciation and amortisation charge is 
expected to follow an R-W process. 0 
In this research, several empirical measures of the variables discussed in the 
abbove two subsections are used. Additional (empirical) expectations are formed in 
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the empirical part as well as certain additional explanations'of observed results. 
However, the concepts presented here serve as useful reference points to empirical 
results obtained later and represent part of the theoretical modelling of the concepts 
presented in earlier section 2.4. 
3.3 THE POPE AND WALKER (1999) CONTEMPORANEOUS 
MODEL OF ACCOEWTXNG CONSERVATXSM 
To generate the theoretical model of accounting conservatism, Pope and 
36 
Walker (1999) assume that the capital markets are informationally efficient. Share 
prices on such markets reflect the expectations of market participants and thus of all 
(publicly) available information. On such markets share prices follow a random walk 
(R-W) process. Pennanent earnings xt in time period t are derived from the current 
share price pt by reversing the discounting process that assumes constant and full 
(100%) payouts in every future time period: x, = (Ilk)pl, where (Ilk) is the cost of 
equity capital. Hence, dividends equal permanent earnings. Alternatively, permanent 
earnings equal the maximum dividend that can be paid out of the firm without 
lowering the market value of equity (Pope and Walker, 2003). 
If share prices in xj= (Ilk)-pt follow a R-W process, then any linear 
combination of that R-W process also follows a R-W process (e. g., Ramakrishnan 
and Thomas, 1992). Permanent earnings x, follow a random walk process: 
x, = xt-, +et. The expected value at time t-I of next period's permanent earnings is 
36The term "informationally efficient markef' is distinct from an allocationally efficient market 
(Pareto efficient) (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 20). 
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EI-1 [xj= x1-1. Permanent earnings x, in time period t would equal permanent earnings 
at time t-1, except for the random shock ej to permanent earnings during the time 
period from t-1 to t. The random shock represents the effects of (or, is a 
consequence of) the arrival of economic news on the market. Economic news is 
information that affects the present value of future expected cash flows: the size of 
future expected cash flows and/or the distribution of these cash flows in time and/or 
the riskiness of these cash flows. 37 By definition of news, E[el]= 0. If the shock to 
permanent earnings is positive, then the economic news is assumed to be good, i. e., 
the expected size of future cash flows has increased and/or the cash flows are 
expected to occur earlier and/or the riskiness of these cash flows has decreased. If 
the shock to permanent earnings is negative, the economic news is assumed to be 
bad, i. e., the expected size of future cash flows has decreased and/or the cash flows 
are expected to occur later in time and/or the riskiness of these cash flows has 
increased. 
Reported earnings Xt are assumed to differ from permanent earnings x, due to 
two and only two factors: 
1. the effects of conservative accounting in the current period t, allowing for 
differences in good news (et>O or e, * =max[O, e, ]) and bad news (et: 50 or 
e, = min[e,, 01); 
2. the cumulative effects of past conservative accounting 
V, = V, Vr H) , where H denotes the maximum 
length of lagged 
3' This assumes that the risk adjustment is passed into the relation via the required rate of return in the 
denominator. Feltham and OhIson (1999) adjust the expected cash flows for risk (i. e., they adjust the 
nominator) and discount these adjusted cash flows at the risk-free rate of return. 
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time period from which economic news still flows through to current period's 
earnings (financial statements). 
The reported or accounting earnings can thus be defined as in the following 
equation: 
x, + 
[- 0,, e, " + y,, e, - 
] (3-5) 
where the parameter 6b captures the under-recognition of contemporaneous good 
news in current period t and parameter ;t captures the over-recognition of 
contemporaneous bad news in current period t. k is the earnings multiple and (Ilk) is 
the cost of equity capital. In this model, there are no other deviations of reported 
earnings m permanent earnings. 
In a neutral (unbiased) and perfectly timely accounting system (GAAP 
regime), a random shock in the current period that caused permanent earnings to 
depart from previous period's permanent earnings xi-I would be fully impounded 
into current reported earnings X,. Assuming the accounting regime has not changed 
at any point in time the firm was operating, the ten'n that, captures the cumulative 
effect of past conservative accounting would also be Vi= 0. Reported earnings would 
then equal permanent earnings Xj= xs at any time period t. If an accounting system is 
conservative, however, then a positive shock to pennanent earnings is not fully 
incorporated in current reported earnings - i. e., reported earnings are lower than 
permanent earnings. Accounting rules prevent the incorporation of these shocks until 
they are realised. Permanent earnings must thus be reduced by the part of the random 
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shock, -Ooe,, that does not yet meet the criteria for recognition. The part that 
is 
recognised in current reported earnings equals (1-0o)e, ' - Negative shocks 
to 
peimanent earnings in a conservative accounting system should be at least, fully 
(A= 0) and possibly over-recognised (; t>O) in current period reported earnings. 
Generally, a negative random shock is incorporated in current period earnings with a 
multiple (I+A)'2: 1. Previous period permanent earnings xj-1 are reduced by a multiple 
of the contemporaneous random shock (I+A)e, -: 50 to arrive at the current period 
reported earnings Xt. Current period reported earnings are lower than or (at most) 
equal to permanent earnings in the same period Xt:! ý xt. 
The term V, captures cumulatively the yet-unrecognised proportions of past 
positive random shocks to permanent earnings e, *-,; Vr=l ... H and possible 
reversals of over-recognised proportions of past negative random shocks to 
permanent earnings e, --,; Vr=I... H. Pope and Walker (1999) assume, reasonably, 
that cov(ej, ej)=O Vij =0... H. By definition, the shocks (news) et in every time period 
is random and as such uncorrelated across different time periods, earlier or later, If 
the assumption cov(ej, ej)= 0 Vij did not hold, past values of shocks could be used to 
predict current shocks and thus partially the values of earnings xt (Beaver, 1970). In 
other words, part of the current-period change in permanent earnings would not be 
due to current-period news. 
To arrive at an empirical version of the model, equation (3-5) is deflated by 
lagged market price ps-1: 
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Xt 
= 
xt y,, - et- v +++ (3-6) 
I- 
PI-I pt-I pl-I ps-I pt-I 
Defining Ri= (P-Pt-i)lPt-1, noting that the definition of permanent earnings 
and the random walk assumption about permanent earnings imply the following 
relation (shown in deflated fonn): 
e, 
=, .(P, -, 
) 
(3-7) 
pl-I k p, -, 
and expanding equation (3-6) yields: 
x11v t=+ (-O(,. max[O, R, ]+yo-min[R,, O]+R, )+ 1 (3-8) 
pt-I kk pt-I 
The model in equation (3-8) can be empirically estimated via a dummy 
variable Dt defined as Di= (I if Rj: S 0 and 0 otherwise) that allows the asymmetric 
response of contemporaneous reported earnings to good and bad news: 
xt 1 1-00 +. Rt + ro + 00 - R, D, + 
Vt (3-9) 
kkk Pt-I 
Simplifying the annotation, (3-9) reduces to the following model: 
Xt 
=al+a2D, +AR, + yRD, + (3-10) PI-I 
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The coefficient A= (1-0o)lk captures the proportion of current-period good 
economic news captured by current-period accounting earnings Xt. Under 
conservative accounting that delays the recognition of good news, this coefficient is 
expected to be less than the cost of equity capital (1'-Oo)lk < (Ilk). The incremental 
coefficient Yi= (Yo+Oo)/k captures the incremental proportion of current-period bad 
economic news captured by current period accounting earnings. Under conservative 
accounting, the incremental yj coefficient is expected to be greater than 0. The 
magnitude of the incremental ij coefficient represents a primary indicator of 
asymmetric timeliness in deflated earnings (XilPt. 1) and thus of ex-post accounting 
conservatism. 
The term Vilp, j is a function of past shocks to permanent earnings, 
themselves by definition random. Therefore, it is unlikely that they will be correlated 
with current period's news ct effect on current earnings. The term is assumed to be a 
part of the regression constant ao in any regression analysis employing equation 
(3-9). The coefficient al is expected not to differ significantly from zero. 
The model in equation (3-10) can be, in principle, empirically estimated, as 
soon as the returns Rt and the indicator Dt variables are operationalised. There are 
several ways in which this operationalisation can be done. A detailed explanation of 
the method used in this thesis is presented below in section 4.2. Regarding the form 
of the model and the form of the independent variable, note that the model is a 
levels-model (Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995) and several studies conclude that the 
appropriate deflator is the lagged market value (e. g. Christie, 1987, Easton, 1999 and 
others). In the models used in this study and regardless of the definition of Rt (i. e., 
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cum- or ex-dividend), lagged market value (P,., ) appears in the models as a deflator 
and thus mitigates the scale problem. 
For completeness of the presentation of the Pope and Walker (1999) 
contemporaneous model, note that an aggressive accounting system might also be 
characterised by an immediate and full recognition or even over-recognition of 
current period good news in accounting earnings such that (1-66)lk exceeds the cost 
of equity (1-66)lk ý-- (Ilk) and/or under-recognition of contemporaneous bad news 
such that (I+A)lk < (Ilk). The properties of aggressive or liberal accounting are 
discussed briefly in Penman (2001, pp. 561-562) and, for example, as early as in 
Bernstein and Siegel (1979), but the empirical research is scarce in this area. The 
issue is not explored further theoretically or empirically in this study. 
3.4 LAGGED MODEL OF ACCOETNTXNG CONSERVATXSM 
There are at least two reasons that motivate the development of the lagged 
version of the Pope and Walker (1999) model of accounting conservatism in 
equations (3-8) and (3-9) above. First, extending the model with lagged news can be 
used to study the speed with which previous periods' economic news flow through to 
reported earnings (or any other accounting variable that may serve as a proxy for 
permanent earnings). Second, Pope and Walker (1999) assume in the derivation of 
the contemporaneous model that cov(ej, ei)= 0 Vij =0... H, i. e., they assume that 
news is uncorrelated across past, present or future time periods. This assumption is 
reasonable, since news from different time periods cannot be correlated across time 
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by definition. However, extending the contemporaneous model by incorporating the 
current period accounting effects of economic news originating from previous 
periods might help to control for any effects that might arise should, for any reason, 
the correlations cov(ej, ei)= 0 Vij =0... H not all be equal to zero at any point in time. 
If this were the case, the correlated omitted variable problem in (3-8) would arise, 
attenuating the coefficients on all variables included in the model. 
The theoretical model in equation (3-6) can be expanded by any number H of 
time periods for which it is reasonable to expect that economic news originating 
from those periods will affect the contemporaneous reported earnings. The time 
period therefore spans the interval Q, t-H) as follows: 
H-1 H-1 
(1-0, ). e+, +E(I+y) - e- 
T-o T. 0 
(3-11) 
Defining further a series of price-relative variables Qj_,. j_r_i= (Pt-r-pt-r-01A-u 
where r-- 0,..., (H-1), that separate good and bad news in different time periods, and 
then substituting these definitions into (3-11), expanding and rearranging yields the 
following lagged model: 
xt I 
p, -,, 
k 
I (H-I(, H-1 
-0 r. max1o, D+ min[Q, -,,, -, -, 90D +I+ 
(3-12) 
k T-0 r-O r. 0 
+ 
Vt 
PI-H 
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Empirically, the model in equation (3-12) can be estimated via a set of 
't 
dummy variables Dl-,. t-, l defined as Dt-, _,, = 
(I if (p t-,, -pt-,, ): 50 and 0 otherwise) 
that allow for the asymmetric recognition of good and bad news in each time period 
(t--r, 1--r-1) where r-- 0,..., (H-1): 
xt 
=1+ 
H-1 1- o H-1 y -0 
-v (3-13) 1-, Qt-T, t-t-, +1f'ý"--+ Pt-H k r-o k T-o k 
Pt-H 
The coefficients (1-0, )Ik show the proportion of period Q-r, t--r-1) good 
economic news captured by current period accounting earnings Xt. Under 
conservative accounting, these coefficients are expected to be less than the cost of 
equity capital (1-0, )Ik<(Ilk). The effect of good economic news from periods farther 
back in time is more likely to be already captured by accounting earnings. Therefore, 
the coefficients (1-0, )Ik are expected to monotonically increase until the full effect 
recognised by the capital market in the past is incorporated in accounting earnings. 
Under the assumptions of the Pope and Walker (1999) model, this implies that the 
total good news coefficients have to approach the cost of equity capital Ilk as the lag 
is increased further back in time. The total coefficients (I+y, )Ik capture the multiples 
of (t-r, t-r-1) period bad economic news captured by current period accounting 
earnings. Under conservative accounting, only the first coefficient (1+; t)lk is 
expected to be greater than or equal to the cost of equity (I+A)lk>-(Ilk). The 
conservatism property of accounting earnings implies that bad economic news 
should have been immediately incorporated in accounting earnings in the period it 
has occurred. There sho I uld not be any incremental relation between current 
accounting earnings and past economic news and the incremental coefficients should 
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all equal zero as a consequence of the fact that everything the market has anticipated 
should already have been incorporated in accounting earnings as well. 
Assuming prices lead earnings by up to three periods (e. g., Donnelly and 
Walker, 1995), allowing a further lag so that H= 4 and simplifying the annotation in 
(3-13), the model reduces to: 
33 Xt 
=a, +a2D, -,,, -, -, + 
1)6r+, Q, 
-rj-r-l + 
2ý; + e, (3-14) PI-4 
r-O r. 0 
In the case of reported accounting earnings, the coefficients on good news are 
expected to increase monotonically towards the cost of equity capital 
j8j<fl2<fl3<, 
84<-<(l/k), the incremental coefficient on current period bad news ýj is 
expected to be greater than 0, and the lagged coefficients on bad news are all 
expected to equal zero ; t=7t=y4= 0, given that under conservative accounting bad 
news is expected to be impounded immediately in accounting earnings. The term 
Vt1p, -4 is a function of past shocks to permanent earnings resulting from periods prior 
to (t-3, t-4). It is unlikely that they will be correlated with current period's news r, 
effect on current earnings. The term is assumed to be a part of the regression 
constant a,. The coefficient q2 is expected not to differ significantly from zero - if 
equations (3-13) and (3-14) are compared, it can be seen that the term does not 
follow frorn'the theoretical derivations, but is included in practice to avoid potential 
correlated omitted variables problem and the resulting biases. As with the 
contemporaneous versions, the model in equation (3-14) could be, in principle, 
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empirically estimated, provided retums and the dummy variables Dt-,, t-, l are 
operationalised. 
3.5 BALL, KOTHARX AND ROBIN (2000) 
XNTERPRETATXON OF BASU (1997) 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000,2000b) note three contemporaneous 
properties of accounting earnings. First, the recognition principle causes economic 
income to be incorporated in accounting earnings with a lag, generally close to the 
point when actual cash flows are realised. This property implies that accounting 
earnings are a weighted average of past economic earnings. The second property is 
that accruals are constructed so that they remove the negative serial correlation in 
operating cash flows, i. e., they smooth the time-series of operating cash flows 
through time. Third, while the recognition principle generally causes economic gains 
to be incorporated in accounting earnings at points close to cash flow realisations, 
expectations about lower future cash flows lead to some economic income to be 
incorporated in accounting earnings immediately rather than when these (lower) cash 
flows are realised. This is a consequence of the conservatism property of accounting 
eamings. 
Based on these properties, they define accounting earnings X1, of firm i in 
period t as a function of current period economic income AVj, and a "disturbance" 
tenn qij: 
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Xit =9 (A Vit, 17it) (3-15) 
The difference (the "disturbance) Uft =A Vil-I 0& Vit-2 AV,, -3,..., a,, 
between 
current period accounting earnings and current period economic earnings is due, 
first, to the effects of the recognition principle being applied on previous periods' 
economic earnings AVil-1, dVit-2, ... ' and, as in Pope and Walker 
(1999), 
cov(AVit-,, AVj, -, n)= 0 for all m; &n and m, n >1. Rules regarding the recognition 
prevent the full amount of economic income being immediately incorporated in 
accounting earnings. The second part of the difference between accounting and 
economic earnings is due to imperfect removal of negative serial correlation from the 
time-series of operating cash flows, ail. 
Empirically, the measure of economic income employed by Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) follows the Hicksian theoretical definition of economic income. 38 
Economic income is defined as the cum-dividend fiscal-year return, adjusted for 
capital splits and capital contributions. By allowing for the difference between 
positive and negative returns (economic income) via a dummy variable, they 
incorporate the third contemporaneous property of accounting earnings - the 
accounting conservatism in their model. This yields the same empirical model as in 
Pope and Walker (1999), shown in equation (3-10) in section 3.3 above. Although 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) do not provide explicitly a theoretical structure of 
these coefficients, the empirical interpretation of the expected values of the 
coefficients is the same as in Pope and Walker (1999) model. 
38 An early discussion regarding different concepts of income in accounting is Bangs (1940). 
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There are at least two other important points to note. First, Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000), view operating cash flows as an alternative measure of firm 
performance. This measure is less timely and noisier than accounting earnings itself 
It is less timely because operating cash flows do not anticipate (contain, incorporate) 
any cash flows before they occur. The anticipation of some of the cash flows is a 
feature of accounting earnings attributable to accruals. Operating cash flow is a 
noisier measure of performance because, absent any accruals, the disturbance term 
i7j, in equation (3-15) above would be relatively high due to the component all. This 
component is higher when less negative serial correlation is being removed from the 
performance number (e. g., the operating cash flow). The view that operating cash 
flows are a less timely and noisier measure of performance is consistent with studies 
as early as Ball and Brown (1968) who re-estimate their basic set of results using an 
approximation of the operating cash flow figure and conclude that this measure is 
not as successful as the (bottom-line) net income in predicting the signs of 
unexpected returns. Beaver and Dukes (1972) is an example of an early study that 
finds the cash flow figure to be less associated with returns than earnings. Finger 
(1994, p. 210) also takes a consistent view that operating cash flows and earnings 
represent two "future benefits of equity investment", i. e., that both figures represent 
a measure of (future) performance. 
These observations are important to the research in this thesis in that to study 
the impact of accounting conservatism on the relationship between permanent 
earnings and accounting earnings, different proxies for permanent earnings may be 
employed. Basu (1997) has in fact used this approach to indirectly observe the 
effects of conservatism on the link between market values and financial statements 
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by comparing the coefficients resulting from the estimation of different earnings and 
operating cash flows regressions. The difference is ascribed to the accruals 
component of earnings. 
Second, given the structure of the disturbance term i7it in equation (3-15) 
above, the model explicitly shows the underlying logic of incorporating lagged 
periods' economic news to determine current period accounting earnings - that is to 
model the effects of recognition rules applied in previous accounting periods. 
3.6 THE EFFECT OF ASSET RECOGNXTXON RULES 
As presented in section 2.4 above, the effects of asset recognition rules on the 
link between financial statements and market values is the subject of several papers, 
among them in Pope and Walker (2003), Watts (2003), Zhang (2000), Beaver and 
Ryan (2000), Hayn and Givoly (2000), Ahmed, Morton and Schaefer (2000) Myers 
(1999), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Feltharn and Ohlson (1995,1996). In 
variants, ese papers define a firm to be ex-ante conservative if the applied 
accounting depreciation rate is higher than the economic rate of depreciation. This 
results in market value of shareholders' equity being on average higher than the book 
value of equity. Therefore, one possible measure of the level of ex-ante conservatism 
is the book-to-market ratio. 
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Pope and Walker (2003) provide a framework using a downward revaluation 
charge in which they relate this ex-ante form of conservatism with the ex-post 
conservatism. In their Proposition I they state that: 
"Given the assumptions of the Feltharn and OhIson (1996) model, and assuming all the 
parameters except 8 are constant the difference between market value and book value is 
strictly negatively related to the accounting parameter A" (p. 6) 
The level of ex-ante conservatism is determined by the accounting policy 
parameter 15 such that (1-6) is the accounting rate of depreciation. The higher the 
accounting rate of depreciation, the higher the proportion of the initial investment 
that is treated as an expense instead ofbeing capitalised as an asset, and the lower is 
the probability that the book value will exceed market value. Typically, this would, 
in turn, trigger a downward revaluation charge in the full, capitalised amount through 
income. These requirements are part of national and international standards. For 
example, FRS II- Impaiment offixed Assets and Goodwill deals with this issue in 
the UK and generally the International accounting standard IAS 36 - Impairment of 
assets (European Commission, 2003). 
Typically, the converse will not apply - if market value exceeds book value 
the difference will increase reserves and will not be treated as income until 
realised . 
39Therefore, the probability of observing an asymmetric relation between 
accounting income and market values decreases with the depreciation rate (1-6) 
(Pope and Walker, 2003). In other words, the more ex-ante conservative the firm is, 
39 Some of the different issues regarding the revaluation of fixed assets are presented in Easton, Eddey 
and Harris (1993); Ghicas, Hevas and Papadaki (1996); Barth and Clinch (1998), Cotter (1999), Lin 
and Peasnell (2000) among others. 
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the smaller the probability of observing an asymmetric relationship between earnings 
and retums. 
In this research, the intuition presented above is further extended. First, 
accounting earnings are decomposed into its operating cash flows and accruals 
components. The book-to-market ratio should reflect the on-average ex-ante 
conservative accounting policy for all operating assets. However, the ex-ante 
conservative policy might be applied differently to different classes of assets such 
that there would be a class of accounting depreciation (1-b) parameters, one for each 
different type of operating assets, based on differential expectations about future 
cash flows resulting from investments in these assets. Therefore, the many different 
downward revaluation charges (irrespective of their actual accounting forni) are 
correlated to the type of asset they originate from: the more ex-ante conservative the 
firm is regarding a particular asset, the smaller the amount of this particular asset on 
the balance sheet and the smaller the probability of observing an asymmetric 
relationship between the accruals originating from this particular asset and returns. 
The term "accruals" is used here explicitly to stress that downward asset revaluations 
relate only to the accruals component of earnings. Any such revaluation is due in 
large part to accounting rules, not to realised cash flows, so it must be reflected in 
earnings via accruals. 
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3.7 THE DECOMPOSXTXON OF EARNXNGS 
In this study, current period accounting earnings X, is decomposed in a 
number of different accounting flow variables. Conceptually, and also by the way it 
is constructed, it is possible to divide accounting earnings in its two main constituent 
parts: (operating) cash flows and accruals . 
40 The relative scarceness of clear 
guidelines, either theoretical or empirical, as to the precise way of this 
decomposition, following conceptual decomposition is proposed: 
EARNINGS CASH FLOWS + ACCRUALS 
OPERATING CASH FLOWS + WORKING CAPITAL ACCRUALS 
DEPRECIATION AND AMORTISATION + SPECIAL ITEMS 
(OTHER CASH FLOWS + OTHER ACCRUALS) 
The motivation to decompose accounting earnings into its main components 
stems from at least three sources. First, accounting conservatism is an accruals, 
rather than a purely earnings or even a cash flow phenomenon. Accruals are 
essentially all adjustments to operating cash flows to arrive at the earnings figure 
(Barth, Cram and Nelson, 2001). Therefore, the effects of accounting conservatism 
should be most apparent in analyses where accounting measures containing more 
accruals are used as dependent variables, whether different types of earnings or 
otherwise. This compares with measures containing little or no accruals (e. g., 
operating cash flows). Basu (1997) and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) employ both 
operating cash flow and earnings variables to analyse the effects of conservatism. By 
40 The term "earnings component" is used in this study to denote any component of earnings: cash 
flows, accruals or any particular form of accruals (e. g., depreciation expense, change in stock and 
work in process, etc. ). 
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comparing the regression coefficients and adjusted R 2S from, for example, pairs of 
regressions using either cash flows or earnings as dependent variables, inferences are 
drawn about the role of different earnings components - accruals in particular - in 
reflecting economic news. Similarly, Pope and Walker (1999) employ two different 
measures of earnings containing different "amounts" of accruals to infer the 
properties of the accruals components. The idea of comparing the relative roles of 
various performance measures containing different -levels of accruals has been 
employed already as early as in Ball and Brown (1968). They used bottom-line net 
income as the main variable, but also re-estimated their basic results using two 
additional performance measures containing less accruals (net income before non- 
recurring items and operating cash flow approximated by operating income). Garrod, 
Giner and Larran (2003) disaggregate earnings into cash flows and several (detailed) 
accruals components and study the value-relevance of these items. McLeay, Kassab 
and Helan (1997) disaggregate cash flow into earnings, current accruals and non- 
current accruals (the latter represents a counterpart to "other accruals" in the above 
decomposition). 
Second, separating regressions with earnings and operating cash flows as 
dependent variables should help to distinguish between factors that can be attributed 
to changes in the accounting regime (i. e., the accruals component of earnings) and 
factors that reflect changes in the economic situation of the firm (i. e., the cash flow 
component of earnings) (Ryan and Zarowin, 2003). 
Third, the properties of these groups of accounting numbers within the 
conservatism framework are not thoroughly researched, either theoretically or 
97 
empirically. For example, as noted in section 3.2.2, the accounting literature does 
generally not deal in detail empirically with the time-series behaviour of accounting 
depreciation charge so these properties must be inferred directly from accounting 
standards or assumed properties - the depreciation charge represents a reversal of a 
positive accrual in the period when an asset is acquired and recorded on the balance 
sheet; in this period, net income will on average exceed (net) cash flows (Ahmed et 
aL, 2002). Existing literature suggests that the components of earnings presented in 
the conceptual decomposition above may have different properties. For example, in 
the context of this study, Basu (1997) predicts and finds current-period operating 
cash flows are weakly correlated with both good and bad news, while earnings are 
strongly correlated with bad news and weakly correlated with good news. Dechow, 
Kothari and Watts (1998) model theoretically the time-series behaviour of different 
components and show that these components are indeed expected to exhibit different 
time-series properties at the theoretical level. 
This conceptual decomposition is followed in the main empirical analysis in 
this study in some cases by several empirical counterparts of these groups of 
variables, such as different measures of earnings and cash flows. In part, this 
represents an attempt to capture fully any additional insights that might arise due to 
the discrepancy between the conceptual decomposition and the empirical measures 
that attempt to follow it. 41 At the same time such an approach also ensures a high 
degree of comparability with the existing literature. Moreover, in the Appendices, 
some of these empirical measures are extended even further to gain additional insight 
or to enhance comparability with existing literature. 
41 Empirical measures of these "conceptual" variables are described in detail in section 4.2 below. 
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3.8 PERSXSTENCE WXTHXN THE GXNER AND REES 
(2 001) MODEL OF THE VT TERM 
Giner and Rees (2001) extend the contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) 
model of accounting conservatism with regression terms that capture the persistence 
of the dependent variable (reported accounting earnings in their case). In the 
empirical version of the contemporaneous model presented in equation (3-10), they 
introduce, empirically, additional regression terms that control for the persistence of 
the dependent variable (earnings in their case) so that the resulting model is te 
following extension of Pope and Walker (1999): 
Xt 
=al+a2D+AR, + yR, D, + 8, L, -, + 
82 Lt-I + i53L, -, 
1--l 
+ el (3-16) Pt-I Pt-I Pt-I 
where Xt is the generic reported accounting earnings for the accounting period t, Lt-I 
is a dummy variable defined as Lt-, = (I if X-1: 50 and 0 otherwise). The regression 
coefficient (ý captures the reversal of deviations from above the normal earnings-to- 
price ratio and J3 captures the incremental/differential reversal of deviations from 
below the normal earnings-to-price ratio. These two controls represent an attempt to 
model the effects of previous' periods conservative accounting on current reported 
earnings, which is captured by the VlPt-, tenn in equation (3-9) above. It is worth 
noting that the deviation of reported earnings Xt from permanent earnings x, within 
the Pope and Walker (1999) model is allowed to originate from two sources only: a) 
current conservative accounting (captured in parameters 61 and yj in the equation (3- 
10) above) and b) past accounting conservative practices (captured in the regression 
constant a, together with the cost of capital and any other on-average effects not 
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captured by the independent variables in equation (3-16)). Because Giner and Rees's 
(2001) model includes lag-one earnings XI-I that was also subject to effects of 
conservative accounting in previous periods (in this case up to lag one relative to the 
current period), the regression constant in a, should be cleaned of this effect and is 
thus expected to be lower than in the basic contemporaneous model in (3-10). 
Therefore, as Giner and Rees (2001) note, their extension should represent an 
alternative modelling of the VIP, -, term that captures the effects of past conservative 
accounting on current reported earnings. This is because the terms 81, J2 and 53 
capture the deviation from the average eamings-to-priCe ratio in the previous 
accounting period (t-1, t-2). The separation by the sign of earnings proxies for 
whether the term is more likely to reflect past economic gains (and thus persist) or 
past economic losses (and thus reverse fast to the norm). The other method of 
modelling the VýPj-j term is by introducing previous' periods news into the 
contemporaneous models (Giner and Rees, 2001), as presented above in section 3.4. 
Their study is extended in two ways. First, earnings are decomposed into its 
operating cash flow and various accruals components as presented above in section 
3.7. Second, the generic earnings are substituted empirically with three different 
empirical earnings measures as presented in section 4.2. 
However, unlike in the Giner and Rees (2001) paper, thereýare now at least 
two different possibilities regarding the definition of the L1.1 dummy variable as well 
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as the definition of the persistence variables Xt-, on the right hand side of equation 
(3-16): 42 
- L,, -, takes the value of 
I if reported accounting earnings X, -, are negative. 
The 
indicator variable Lt-I is thus independent of the actual accounting variable used 
as the dependent variable Xt in the model in equation-(3-16). This definition of 
the indicator variable appears to be more consistent with Pope and Walker (1999) 
and Giner and Rees (2001) and with other existing literature in that positive 
earnings are generally more likely to reflect persistent economic gains, while 
negative earnings are more likely to reflect economic losses. This definition 
would also be in line with one of the proxy indicators of good and bad news in 
section 4.4 that studies the persistence property of various accounting items 
where one of the indicator variables is the sign of bottom-line earnings in all 
models regardless of which accounting variable is used as the dependent variable 
in the model. In this variant, the independent variable X1.1 associated with terms 
52 and (ý would thus be the smne earnings variable used to define the Lt-i 
indicator (i. e., earnings); 
- LI-I takes the value of I if the lagged values XI-I of the actual accounting 
variables used as the dependent variables Xt in models of conservative accounting 
are negative (the variable X can, conceptually, be earnings or operating cash 
flows or any of the accruals). According to the conceptual division of earnings 
into its two main components (operating cash flows and accruals) and the sign 
42 Given the other models employed in this thesis, there are in fact several possibilites, most obvious 
by positive/negative operating cash flows or by positive/negative types of accruals, apart from those 
presented here. 
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convention employed in this study, a negative variable XI-1 indicates an earnings- 
decreasing value. It is thus more likely to reflect an economic loss than an 
economic gain and, accordingly, revert faster to the norm. This definition of the 
indicator variable is also consistent (although not equivalent to) with sections 
studying the persistence property of various accounting items, where one of the 
indicator variables for bad news is, defined in terms of the earnings-decreasing 
changes of various accounting items rather than earnings as a composite figure 
(issues regarding differences in empirical estimations due to different deflators 
are assumed away in this theoretical section). In this variant, the independent 
variable Xj., associated with terms 82and 93would thus be the same accounting 
variable used to define the Ll-I indicator as well as the variable used as the 
dependent variable Xt. 
Both variations are interesting within the context of this study. The first 
variation allows differentiating between the asymmetric incorporation of good and 
bad news into various current accounting measures conditional on whether the firm 
shows a (lagged) bottom-line profit or a loss. Earnings of firms showing a profit are 
more likely to reflect economic gains, while earnings of firms showing a loss are 
more likely to reflect (current) economic losses. The second variant allows studying 
the incorporation of good and bad news into various earnings components given the 
(lagged) sign of these components and thus their direct role in forming current 
reported earnings, either by increasing it or by decreasing it. " As generally with 
earnings, earnings-increasing changes in earnings components are more likely to 
reflect economic gains than economic losses. This second variant might also be 
43 There are some accounting items that by definition cannot be conditioned on their sign in this 
manner - sales and depreciation expense, for example, represent two such items. 
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viewed as a refinement of the first variant in that it allows for the role of specific 
earnings components that revert the departure from the normal eamings-to-price 
ratio back to the norm (rather than the "all-inclusive" earnings figure). Moreover, 
such a division allows a comparison of empirical results with the results on time- 
series properties of different accounting variables. Because of these two 
complementary views of the Giner and Rees (2001) model, both variants will be 
explored in the empirical part of this thesis. Moreover, both variants tie in with the 
distinction between profit and loss firms made in section 4.8 below. 
If 
3 0'9 HYPOTHESES FORMULATXON 
In this thesis several hypotheses based on the above theoretical 
models/constructs are formed and empirically tested using different methods, 
whether unconditional or conditional on certain cross-sectional properties of the 
firms studied. Whilst some of these hypotheses have been the subject of earlier 
studies, they are reproduced here as such earlier studies have not been undertaken 
using UK data, extending over such a long time series and/or with the . supporting 
sensitivity analyses that are reported below in a separate chapter. The main 
hypotheses are summarised below in alternative forms. 
The order in which the hypotheses are presented, is the following. 
Hypotheses are grouped by the four main research issues: the persistence property, 
direct tests based on Pope and Walker (1999), separation of profit and loss firms and, 
finally, the effects of asset-recognition rules. Within these groups, sub-divisions 
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relate to the operating cash flow component of earnings, earnings themselves and, 
finally, the accruals component. The order of these sub-divisions follows stems from 
the expectation that accounting conservatism is not reflected in the operating cash 
flow figure, but that it is reflected in the earnings figures and the specific component 
that reflects conservatism is the accruals component. Therefore, the order serves to 
highlight the relative roles of the cash flow and accruals components. Because the 
accruals component is a collection of potentially very different types of accruals, the 
accruals component is further sub-divided, where necessary. ý Finally, because 
conservatism is defined above in terms of asymmetric timeliness of accounting 
performance measures in respect to good and bad economic news, different 
expectations about the reflection of good and bad are made. 
The time-series behaviour of earnings, operating cash flows and accruals (and 
its components) is studied first. Under conservative accounting, earnings-increasing 
changes (a consequence of gains) in accounting variables that are affected by 
conservatism are expected to persist, while earnings-decreasing changes (a 
consequence of losses - decreases in market value) are expected to mean-revert. 
Stated in alternative form, the persistence hypothesis HI, broken down by operating 
cash flows, earnings and accruals subsections, is: 
H'4i, a: i. Operating cash flows mean-revert. 
ii. There is no asymmetric persistence between earnings-increasing and 
earnings-decreasing operating cashflow changes. , 
Ib: i. Earnings-increases are permanea 
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ii. Earn ings-decreases are transitory. 
iii. The higher the content of accruals, the greater the asymmetric persistence 
exhibited between earnings-increases and earnings-decreases. 
HAix: i. Accruals, overall, mean-revert. 
ii. The rate of mean-reversion is smaller for earnings-increasing accruals 
than for earnings-decreasing accruals. 
Different types of accruals exhibit differential time-series behaviour: 
iii. Working capital accruals mean-revert. 
iv. The rate of reversal is higherfor earn ings-decreasing changes. 
v. Depreciation and amortisation charge is persistent. 
vi. There is no asymmetry between earnings-increasing and earnings- 
decreasing changes in the depreciation charge. 
vii. Special items mean-revert. 
viii. The rate of reversal is higherfor earnings-decreasing changes. 
The expectations regarding hypotheses H01,, i. to H01,, viii. are that they will 
be rejected in favour of the alternative hypotheses stated above. These expectations 
are all expected to be observed empirically under conservative accounting. - Note that 
the operating cash flows do not, theoretically, contain any accruals and, therefore, 
cannot be affected by accounting conservatism. In existing literature, the time-series 
properties of operating cash flow, earnings and accruals have been explored with 
varying degrees of detail, but there is no comparable UK literature. Moreover, the 
time-series properties of the depreciation charge have not been explored, and, if only 
because the definition is new, neither have the properties of special items in the UK 
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context. Varying time-series properties of earnings with different levels of accruals 
(and some other components) have also not been explored empirically. 
Next, regarding direct tests of ex-post accounting conservatism based Pope 
and Walker's (1999) tests of asymmetric timeliness of accounting earnings and its 
operating cash flows and accruals components, the direct-test hypothesis is fonned, 
with four subsections. Stated in alternative form, the hypothesis H2 is: 
IT42, a: Operating cashflows reflect contemporaneous good and bad economic news 
symmetrically. 
H42, b: i. Earnings reflect contemporaneous good and bad economic news 
as metrically. YM 
ii. The incorporation of bad news is more timely than the incorporation of 
good news. 
HL The higher the level of accruals in earnings, the higher the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings in incorporating bad news. 
H'12, c: i. Accruals, overall, reflect contemporaneous good and bad economic news 
asymmetrically. 
ii. Vie incorporation of bad news is more timely than the incorporation of 
good news. 
Different types of accruals exhibit different properties regarding the asymmetric 
recognition of good and bad news: 
iii. Working capital accruals are more timely in reflecting bad news. 
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iv. Depreciation and amortisation charge exhibit no asymmetric timeliness in 
incorporating bad news. 
v. Special items are more timely in rej7ecting bad news. 
H42, d: As a time-series result, ex-post conservatism is increasing through time. 
The expectations regarding hypotheses H02,, i- to H02, c v. are that they will be 
rejected in favour of alternative hypotheses stated above. The expectations resulting 
from the above hypotheses should all be observed under conservative accounting. 
Note that the operating cash flows does not, theoretically, contain any accruals and, 
therefore, it cannot be affected by accounting conservatism. In the existing literature, 
the direct tests have been made on the operating cash flow figure and various 
earnings figures. However, direct tests on various types of accruals have not been 
made thus far. Moreover, there is no UK evidence on any of these figures covering 
such a long time period and time series properties have only been shown for earnings 
figures. Evidence on increases (or otherwise) of accounting conservatism over time 
in the UK has also not been shown. 
Regarding the properties of loss-firms in particular, the following hypotheses 
are formulated in alternative form: 
H'43: i. The differences between profit and lossfirms relate more strongly to the 
accruals component of earnings than to the cashflow component. 
ii. The asymmetric timeliness of earnings should be higher in cases where 
earnings reflect bad news. 
107 
iii. This is particularly likely in cases where the accruals component of 
earnings is negative. 
The expectations regarding hypotheses H03 i- to H02, W. are that they will be 
rejected in favour of alternative hypotheses stated above. None of the hypotheses 
H03 i- to H02, M has been explored in the existing literature yet. 
The effects of the rules of ex-ante recognition of assets (or news unrelated 
conservatism, pervasive conservatism) affect the relations hypothesised in H2,,,, H2, b 
and H2, in particular and, indirectly, the other hypotheses stated, too. Combining the 
decomposition of earnings into operating cash flows and accruals' components and 
following Pope and Walker (2003) produces the following extension of their main 
hypothesis stated in alternative fonn: 
H44: The more ex-ante conservative afirm is regarding the recognition of assets, the 
smaller the probability of observing an asymmetric relationship between 
operating cash flows, earnings and accruals on the one hand and returns on 
the other using both the general measure of ex-ante conservatism and asset- 
specific measures of ex-ante conservatism. 
The expectation regarding this hypothesis is that the null version of the 
hypothesis (HO4) of no difference in asymmetric timeliness of earnings, operating 
cash flows and different types of accruals between highly ex-ante conservative and 
highly aggressive ex-ante firms will be rejected. Asset-specific measures of ex-ante 
conservatism represent a refinement of the results obtained by using an overall, 
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general measure of ex-ante conservatism. In the existing literature, the effect of the 
general ex-ante conservatism on earnings only has been shown. This work adds to 
existing literature both by decomposing earnings into its main constituents and by 
refining the general measure of ex-ante conservatism. 
3.10 CONCLUDXNG RFJMKS 
This chapter has presented the main blocks underpinning the empirical part of 
this thesis. There are two main types of models of conservatism - the persistence 
models and Pope and Walker (1999)-type models. This study adds the 
decomposition of earnings into its main components: operating cash flows and three 
main types of accruals (working capital accruals, depreciation and special items) into 
both the persistence models as well as in the Pope and Walker (1999) models. This 
latter model is also used to study other aspects of accounting conservatism, e. g., 
changes through time, in the empirical part. The importance of combining the Pope 
and Walker (1999) models with the earnings decomposition is particularly important 
in studying the losses and profit observations. The chapter also shows that certain 
limits must be taken into account when studying the effects of ex-post conservatism 
and that the same empirical model can result from different theoretical explanations 
and/or derivations. The specific hypotheses regarding the persistence tests, direct 
tests, profit. and loss separation and ex-ante limitations are also presented. These 
hypotheses are empirically tested in the next chapter. 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTXON TO EMPXRXCAL ANALYSES 
This chapter represents the main part of the thesis. It presents relevant aspects 
regarding the empirical study of accounting conservatism and the main empirical 
results. The chapter is organised as follows. In section two, variables' definitions are 
presented by main groups: earnings, accruals, operating cash flows, market variables 
and other variables. The sample selection procedure is also described in detail in the 
first section. This is particularly important given that the sample-formation 
procedure includes some aspects not generally used in existing literature. Moreover, 
the sign convention used for variables' definitions is described. This is important, as 
the sign convention used in papers in the area of capital market-based accounting 
research is not unifonn. 
In section three general properties of the sample in terms of distributions of 
variables' values and correlations between pairs of variables are presented, and, 
where appropriate, formally tested for differences. A number of properties of 
distributions, correlations and differences are commented upon in term of accounting 
conservatism. Some of the more important aspects include: skewness measures of 
earnings" variables, correlations between accruals and operating cash flows, 
correlations between returns and accruals, variability of returns and variabilities and 
correlations of operating cash flows and accruals. 
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The fourth section presents the results of the first of the two ways of 
capturing the effects of conservative accounting - i. e., the time-series properties of 
operating cash flows, earnings and accruals on average and separately according to 
the sign of these changes. The empirical results are formed in a way that enhances 
comparability with existing literature (in particular with Basu, 1997). 
Section five presents the second method of capturing the effects of 
accounting conservatism - direct tests using Pope and Walker (1999) model. It 
presents the results as cross-sectional averages, but also makes inferences regarding 
conservatism through time by using different measures of conservatism. Moreover, 
the section provides a theoretical explanation of low observed R 2S in some of the 
results and shows that these are in fact to be expected if accounting is conservative. 
Section six expands these results by capturing the effects of previous' periods 
conservative accounting. Complementarily, section seven builds upon and expands 
alternative measures of the effects of previous periods' conservative accounting. 
Section eight attempts to capture the differences between profit and loss firms 
regarding the differences in application of conservative accounting. The section first 
presents a motivation for studying profit and loss firms separately. This is important, 
as there is no unifonn "theory of losses". This is followed by observing differences 
between profit and loss firms in terms of distributional properties and differing 
correlations between pairs of variables. In the absence of a clear theory of losses, the 
following sub-section expands the Pope and Walker (1999) model by allowing for 
(but not requiring) differences between good and bad economic news as well as for 
differences between profit and loss observations. However, there are econometric 
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difficulties associated with estimation of such a model. They are briefly presented at 
the end of the section. 
Finally, the last section refines further the results obtained by estimating the 
Pope and Walker (1999) model by operating cash flow, earnings and accruals 
variables by placing a general and an asset-specific ex-ante limit on these relations, 
following derivations from the Pope and Walker (2003) modelling of ex-ante 
conservatism. 
4.2 DEFXNXTXONS OF VARXABLES AND SAMPLE 
SELECTXON 
In this section, the details of the main empirical variables used in this study 
are provided by groups of variables: accounting variables (earnings, accruals, 
operating cash flows and other accounting variables), market variables and 
additional economic variables. For each definition of a variable, the relevant 
DataStream codes are provided in parentheses to ensure full transparency and 
maximise the external validity of this research (Gill and Johnson, 1991, pp. 121- 
122). Moreover, a reference table, inclusive of definitions and Datastream codes, is 
provided in Appendix A given the relatively large number of variables employed in 
this study. Details on sample selection and outliers' removal are also presented. 
Accounting variables - earnings. Operating profit (OP) is adjusted 
operating profit (DataStream item #137). Ordinary earnings per share (ORD) are 
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dcfined as net earnings after tax, minority interest and preference dividend on a fully 
deferred tax basis and adjusted for the effect of extraordinary and exceptional items, 
non-operating provisions and foreign currency exchange profit/losses (DataStream 
item #182). Earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) are ordinary 
earnings ORD plus extraordinary items (DataStrearn item #193) plus exceptional 
items (DataStrearn item #194). 
Given that extraordinary and exceptional items constitute an important 
component of earnings in terms of reflecting asymmetric timeliness of earnings to 
bad economic news, the two items must be clearly defined. The FRS 3 -Reporting 
Financial Performance defines extraordinary items as (FRS 3, quoted in Davies, 
Paterson and Wilson, 1999): 
I- 
46 ... material items possessing a high degree of abnormality which arise from events or 
transactions that fall outside the ordinary activities of the reporting entity and which are not 
expected to recur. They do not include exceptional items nor do they include prior period 
items merely because they relate to a prior period" (p. 1506) 
and exceptional items as: 
, 6... material items which derive from events or transactions that fall within ordinary 
activities of the reporting entity and which individually or, if of a similar type, in aggregate, 
need to be disclosed by virtue of their size or incidence if the financial statements are to give 
a true and fair view. " (p. 15 07) 
The definition of earnings EARN was chosen on the basis that exceptional 
items appear to have absorbed, on average, most of the items that were classified as 
extraordinary in the period before the introduction of FRS 3- Reporting Financial 
Performance became effective for financial year ends on or after 22nd June 1993. 
Figure 4-1 shows that extraordinary items have effectively disappeared in the post- 
FRS 3 period, while exceptional items have become both more frequent (88.9% of 
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firms report non-zero exceptional items in 2001 as compared to 72.1% in 1969) and 
more negative on average (-1.910% of lagged price in 2001), as compared with 
positive values, on average, of these items in the years in the pre-FRS 3 period (for 
example, +0.044% in 1969). In the pre-1993 period the effect of exceptional items is 
in 19 out of 24 years to reverse, on average (as opposed to pre-FRS 3 years), the 
losses passed through extraordinary items. After the 1990 and especially after the 
introduction of FRS 3 firms appear to pass losses through exceptional items. Also, in 
none of the FRS 3-years are exceptional items positive on average, suggesting that 
firms include most gains in ordinary earnings. This finding is consistent also with 
Strong and Walker (1993), who find that for a sample of UK firms in the period 
1971-1986 (i. e., well pre-FRS 3), exceptional items have a positive skew and 
extraordinary items have a negative skew. This is consistent with passing large one- 
time gains as part of ordinary earnings (through exceptional items) and large 
negative items through extraordinary items. Related to this, Kinney and Trezevant 
(1997) find that income-decreasing special items in the US tend to be displayed as 
separate line items while income-increasing special items are included in the main 
figures in financial statements and the effect of these items noted only in a footnote. 
Allowing for information inefficiencies, the former presumably emphasises the 
transitory nature of these items, while the latter leads investors to believe that 
income-increasing special items are permanent. These tendencies persist even after 
controlling for the average level of special items that might reflect different 
economic conditions (i. e., in some years it is to be expected that special items will be 
negative on average). Complementary data on the percentages of firms reporting 
negative and positive special items in sample years as well as the time-trend analysis 
is provided in Appendix B (Elliott and Hanna, 1996). 
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To surnmarise this discussion, Guntert (1995) reports that Sir David Tweedie, 
the then-chairman of the Accounting Standards Board, observed that: 
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*'... material one-off items were exceptional if they were credits and extraordinary if they 
were debits. " 
The pattern of the magnitude of extraordinary items by year is also similar to 
the pattern in Figure 3 in Pope and Walker's (1999) study, although the two figures 
are not strictly comparable due to different deflators (ending versus opening share 
pnce used in this study, following Easton, 1999). 
Figure 4-1: Average magnitudes and frequencies of extraordinary and exceptional items for the 
contemporaneous sample (1969-2001) 
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Notes to Figure 4-1: Extraordinary items (DataStream item #193) and exceptional items (DataStrcam item #194) are per share 
and deflated by the opening share price P, 1. Magnitudes and frequencies are for the contemporaneous sample as defined below. 
Several other definitions of earnings have been formulated and tested, given 
that Pope and Walker (1999) show the comparativel y- strong impact different 
44 This article is originally referred by Basu (1999) in his discussion of Pope and Walker (1999). 
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definitions of earnings in an UK context may have on the results and interpretations 
of those results. In preliminary phases of this research, some additional definitions 
have been used and tested: 45 
- earnings after extraordinary items, exceptional items (EARN) and exchange rate 
adjustments; 
- retained earnings plus gross/net dividends less transfers to/from reserves; 
- pre-tax earnings less tax paid less minority interests and other adjustments less 
preference dividends; 
- retentions plus dividends (gross or net, whichever is applicable in a particular 
time period) less transfers to/from reserves; 
- earned for ordinary. 
Some of these and other adjustments were dropped from further analyses 
subsequently either because the preliminary results relative to the EARN variable 
were affected only very marginally, if at all, or because some data items used to 
calculate these earnings figures are not available throughout the entire period 
covered in this study. It is acknowledged, however, that different (or additional) 
earnings definitions could have been used. 
Accounting variables - accruals. Change in working capital accruals 
(hereafter working capital accruals), AWCAP, is defined as the change in accounts 
receivables (ADebtors, DataStream item #448) plus change in stock and work in 
45 During the initial phases of the research the DataStrearn help line was contacted several times and 
consulted as to what earnings figure to use so that it would ensure maximum comparability through 
such a long time span covered in this study. Some of these definitions result from such 
discussions/suggestions. 
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progress (AStock, DataStream item #445) minus change in accounts payables 
(dCreditors, DataStream item #417). All components of working capital accruals are 
taken directly from the cash flow statement, if available, or funds flow statement in 
the pre-original FRS I- Cash flow statements period, rather than calculated as 
balance sheet differences. However, before the introduction of SSAP 10 - 
Statements of source and application offunds in July 1975, it would appear that the 
amounts shown are calculated as balance-sheet differences (e. g., Cadbury 
Schweppes, 1970, p. 19 and p. 25 - footnote 15). Using cash flow/funds flow 
statements helps avoiding the effects of the errors-in-variables problem as described 
by Hribar and Collins (2001), although in the main results of this study the 
components of working capital accruals are used as dependent (rather than 
independent) variables, which in itself mitigates the errors in variables problem (see 
section 2.3 above). Depreciation and amortisation, DEP, is defined as total 
depreciation (DataStream item #402) plus amortisation (DataStrearn item #562; 
assumed to be zero where missing). 
Special items, SPEC, are calculated as operating profit (OP) less earnings 
after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN), adjusted for preference dividends 
from the profit and loss statement (DataStream item #181), net interest payable 
(notes to the financial statements, DataStream item #153 minus #143) and taxation 
(profit and loss statement and notes to the financial statements, DataStream item 
#160 minus #162 plus #169 plus #161 plus #164). Special items thus defined 
correspond to a greater extent to the sum of exceptional and extraordinary items 
(Pearson's bivariate correlation coefficient for available observations pooled within 
the contemporaneous sample, as defined in a later section, is 0.861 and is higher for 
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non-positive returns finns, 0.927, and lower for positive returns firms, 0.804). The 
single most important potential problem that arises from this definition of SPEC is 
that the difference between OP and EARN likely contains both a cash and an accruals 
component. Ideally, SPEC would only consist of -accruals, without any cash 
components. An attempt has been made to eliminate some of the (potentially) cash 
component by deducting preference dividends, net interest payable and taxation, 
items that are part of the difference between OP and EARN but are likely to be cash- 
related. However, the adjustments represent only a partial solution, given that they 
are taken from the profit and loss statement and not the cash flow statement. Given 
the time period covered in this study and regulation regime changes in this period 
this measure of special items this was a feasible solution. It is acknowledged that this 
is a discretionary decision and that other measures of different types of "special" 
accruals might have been constructed and might have yielded different results. On 
the other hand, available data precludes the construction of very detailed types of 
special items (e. g., Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996). 
Accounting variables - cash flows and other accounting Items. Operating 
cash flows, OCF, are calculated as adjusted operating profit (DataStream item #137) 
plus depreciation and amortisation (DEP) less working capital accruals (AWCAP) 
plus an item described by DataStream as "Other adjustments" (DataStream item 
#404). The operating cash flows calculated in this way are very similar to report6d 
net cash inflows from operating activities. Reported figures are generally available 
only for fiscal years ending in or after 1992, after the original FRS 1- Cash flow 
statements was adopted. -Pearson bivariate correlation coefficient for available 
observations within the contemporaneous sample, as defined in a later section, is 
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0.948. Cash flows other than operating cash flows are disregarded in this study as 
they cannot be reliably approximated using available data over. the time period 
covered by the sample in this study. Following the procedure employed by Garrod 
and Hadi (1998) and Hadi (1995, p. 72-76) for investment, financing and taxation 
cash flows produces estimates whose correlations with actual published post-FRS I 
figures are much lower than those reported by Hadi (1995, p. 72-76) over the time 
period covered by my contemporaneous sample. A measure of total cash flows, 
defined as the net change in cash, ACASH, as in Dechow (1994), is however 
available (DataStream items #457 before or #1134 after FRS I (Revised 1996) 
become mandatory for fiscal periods ending on or after 23d March 1997). This 
measure of total cash flows is used to shed more light on some of the issues explored 
in this study. 
For similar illustrational reasons, a measure of total accruals, defined as Total 
Accruals =A WCAP+DEP+SPEC, is also computed. Other accounting variables used 
in this study are: book value of ordinary (i. e., excluding preference capital) 
shareholders' equity (BV, DataStream item #305) and turnover, S, defined as total 
sales (DataStream item #104). The dummy variable Lt assumes the value of one if 
EARNt is non-positive and, zero, otherwise and, similarly, the Lt., indicator variable 
assumes the value of one if EARNp, is non-positive and zero otherwise. 46 
46 Note that these definitions of dummy variables L, and L, j are different from the corresponding 
variable in, for example, Giner and Rees (2001) that would be analogous to L,, where dummies are 
defined as taking the value of one if the value of the underlying variable is strictly less than zero. 
However, the difference between this definition and definition used in this study affects 9 firm-years 
in the contemporaneous sample after the removal of outliers. 
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All accounting variables are per share and deflated by the opening price per 
share (Pt-1) in contemporaneous (one fiscal period) models and (P, 4) in lagged (four 
fiscal periods) models. Exceptions to this general deflation rule are explicitly stated 
in relevant sections. 
Market data - prices, indices and other economic variables. Share prices 
and other market values are stored in different sections of the DataStream. database. 
The share price, P,, is the price at the accounting period-end adjusted for capital 
changes and stock splits/reverse splits (DataStream item P) so that the prices used 
throughout the sample are comparable with the latest figure (Donnelly and Walker, 
1995) as well as that they allow a consistent calculation of returns. If the accounting 
period end does not coincide with a trading day, the value on the trading day 
immediately preceding the respective balance sheet date is taken. Corresponding to 
the theoretical models presented in Chapter 3, the return variable(s) RETIj-1 is 
defined as ex-dividend fiscal-period return (price relative) RETl., -I= (Pr-Pj_j)1Pj_j 
in 
the contemporaneous sample and PET, -, (P, -, -P, -, -, 
)IP, 
-4 where r= 
0 ... 3, in 
the lagged sample. 
Dummy variables Dt-,, t-, -l assume the value of one if PETt-, , t-, -, -<O, and zero 
otherwise (in contemporaneous versions only one dummy variable is used and thus 
denoted as D1.1-1). Note that the choice of deflator does not influence the value the 
dummy variables take. This definition of the negative returns dummy differs from 
definitions employed by, for example, Pope and Walker (1999) and Basu (1997), 
where strict inequality is employed. This affects 357 observations in the 
contemporaneous sample (after the removal of outliers) that have PETj-, , j-, - -I= 
0, a 
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number perhaps unexpectedly high. Excluding these observations from the sample in 
the preliminary stages of research did not alter any of the conclusions and affected 
quantitative results only very marginally. For reasons of parsimony, these results are 
not reported in the thesis. 
There are at least two more important issues in calculating the return 
The first issue is whether to use cum-dividend or ex-dividend variables PET, -, 
returns (capital gains). This study evolves from the work of Basu, (1997) and Pope 
and Walker (1999), who argue that where the dependent variable is accounting 
variables should also include earnings that includes dividends, then the PET, -, 
dividends (Basu, 2001). Basu (2001) also provides a short overview of differences in 
using cum-/ex-dividend returns as the dividend variable. However, using cum- 
dividend rates of return over the sample window used in this study is not possible 
due to the lack of data on dividends (or total returns) data. Databases that would 
allow using such definitions of returns were not available. 47 Consequently, the data 
sample employed in this study does not allow an empirical test that would indicate 
whether this difference is important. The assumption is made that the results would 
be unaffected by this choice. However, consistent with this, Giner and Rees (2001) 
report that their results are essentially the same regardless of whether cum- or ex- 
dividend returns are employed. Other related studies in the UK context also exclude 
dividends (e. g., Donnelly and Walker, 1995), albeit the econometric consequences 
may be different in other contexts. 
47 DataStream provides a cum-dividend Return Index variable (item RI), but this is only available for 
years 1988 and onwards. Using this variable the period 1969-1987 would have to be omitted. 
121 
The second important issue is whether to compound returns or capital gains 
over the fiscal or over the inter-announcement period. Again, 'the sample employed 
in this study does not allow constructing an empirical test that would show whether 
this difference is important . 
48 Regarding this issue it is again assumed that the results 
would be unaffected by this choice. Consistent with this, Basu, Hwang and Jan 
(2000) report that using fiscal year accumulation period produced "almost identical" 
results to those of the inter-announcement period running from 3 months after the 
previous fiscal year-end to three months after the current fiscal year-end (differences 
are not tabulated in their paper). Also, their sample covers a relatively long time- 
period, from 1975-1998, which might highlight the importance of their statement for 
this research. It appears that more recent applications use fiscal year-periods (e. g., 
Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). In the UK, the inter- 
announcement period would have to be from six months after the prior fiscal year- 
end to six months after the current fiscal period, since UK fin-ns have 6 months to 
prepare and publish annual accounts (Stark and Thomas, 1998), although Donnelly 
and Walker (1995) and Clubb (1995) use cumulation through end of April for their 
sample of December year-end firms (i. e., 4 months). 
Lagged values of share prices, Pt-1, are recorded at the previous balance sheet 
date, if known. If the previous balance sheet date is not known, it is assumed to be at 
the current balance sheet date minus 365 days (or 366 days in leap years). This rule 
is applied also when share prices beyond one lag are recorded (e. g., Ps-4). The effect 
of this rule is that the number of observations in the two samples is maximised. In 
48 The difficulty in creating tests that would show potential differences resulting from different 
compounding time intervals is (was) of technical rather than substantive nature. The procedure used 
in an attempt to calculate the exact limiting dates of the inter-announcement interval yielded too many 
missing or erratic values. If these technical issues were solved, a direct comparison would indeed be 
possible. 
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the absence of this rule, a finn would have to be included in the DataStrearn database 
at least for two consecutive financial years (so that both opening and closing balance 
sheet dates would be known) rather than just one financial year using this method. At 
the same time, this method mitigates potential effects of survivorship bias. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are no comparable studies that have employed this 
method. It results from a careful scrutiny of the structure of the DataStream database 
(also see discussion on potential effects of survivorship bias below). 
To control for market-wide effects three control variables are also used: the 
FTSE All share index (DataStream item FTALLSH), the 91-day UK Treasury bill 
discount (DataStream item UKTRSBLYo) and the average gross redemption yield on 
10-year UK gilts (DataStream item UKMEDYLD). The data on the FTSE All share 
index is available for all trading days. If the accounting period end does not coincide 
with a trading day the last value known on the trading day immediately preceding the 
balance sheet date is taken. The data on government securities is available for the 
last day of the month and on the 15'h in each month for the two types of securities 
respectively. If the accounting period end does not coincide with a trading day the 
value immediately preceding the balance sheet date is taken. The differences in 
recording date might affect the results presented in this study. However, the choice 
of government securities' yields is conditional on the length of time series of interest 
rates' data and the corresponding database coverage. Yearly inflation rates are also 
collected from DataStream (DataStream code UKRPANNL) and used for 
comparative purposes. 
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Data collection and samples formation. Financial statement data, share 
price data and other market data used in this study are collected from Thompson 
Financial DataStream as per 21/01/2002. Finns with double class securities and/or 
quoted preference shares were eliminated. Double-class securities and preference 
shares have different rights attached to them and the pricing of these securities may 
differ. Using large samples effectively prevents the inclusion of these securities, as 
their properties cannot be inferred automatically from the database. Even if they 
were, the nature of the link between market values of these securities and accounting 
data would be different compared to ordinary shares. Financial companies were also 
excluded. Both the multiple-class and financial-companies restrictions are still 
applied in recent research in both finance (e. g., Gregory, Harris and Michou, 2001) 
and accounting literature (e. g., Rees, 1997), although Danbolt and Rees (2002) show 
that for certain classes of financial firms the relationships between financial 
statements and market values are similar to non-financial firms. However, a 
motivation to exclude financial firms is that one of the central variables studied in 
this thesis is the working capital accruals (Gore, Pope and Singh, 2001). The 
downloaded sample consisted of 35,319 non-financial firm-years with financial 
statement data from 31/12/1964 to 30/10/2001, already excluding finns with 
multiple-class securities (e. g., firm-years with voting and non-voting shares). This 
sample was then reduced considerably due to (number of observations deleted in 
parenthesis): missing, negative or zero book value (584), missing ordinary earnings 
data (1,674), missing average number of shares (8 1), duplicate firm-years (1,873) 
and missing lagged price (1,933). As there were only 32 observations with the 
required contemporaneous set of data in the period from 1964 to 1967 these 
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observations were dropped, leaving thus 29,142 firm-years in the sample at this 
stage. 
The accounting period ends are not restricted to December 31" calendar year- 
end date, as this would reduce the sample considerably. Only 33.5% (9,763) of 
observations in the sample at this stage had a December 3 I't accounting period end. 
A similar percentage of non-December year-end firms for the UK sample is reported 
by Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). There are no UK studies that would indicate any 
systematic differences between December 31" and non-December 31" accounting 
period ends firms. However, Smith and Pourciau (1994) show that there are 
systematic differences between December 31" and non-December 31" US firms in 
terms of size and market risk. Specifically, they find that December 31"-year end 
firms are larger and have smaller systematic risk. More generally, the accounting 
year-ends might be set by firms in low-season periods. Firms within the same 
industry would thus tend to have similar year-ends. Simth and Pourciau (1994) find 
that retail firms tend to have non-December year ends. Industry differences might 
thus be mirrored by their choice of accounting year end . 
49 To the extent that these 
differences may exist in the UK, my study produces more general results relative to 
studies that use only December 31't firms. On the other hand, one consequence of 
this decision is that it is not possible to control for market-wide effects in accounting 
variables by deducting a market-wide average level of accounting earnings (or 
earnings components) from firm-year specific earnings (or earnings component), 
analogously to sensitivity analyses in Basu (1997). 
49 To check for possible industry differences, section 5.3 shows the main results for five different 
industries. 
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Accounting period length is, however, restricted to 365±92 days (±3 months). 
This is less restrictive than in recent research - for example, Giner and Rees (2001) 
restrict their sample to within 365±30 days. However, a detailed inspection of the 
data reveals that a significant number of firms in the initial sample that have 
switched accounting year-ends have done so within the period of 365±92 days. In 
some cases, the switches involved even longer periods. The method of data 
collection ensures that all switches are genuine and not a result of errors in data 
downloading. It is assumed, however, that there are no errors in the way DataStream 
collects the data. In cases where the accounting period exceeds the 365±92 days 
limits, the observations are not deleted, but the method of extracting lagged share 
prices changes. In these cases, the lagged price Pj-j is defined as the price at the 
balance sheet date minus 365 days (or 366 days so that leap years are accounted for). 
An equivalent procedure is applied in recording lagged share prices beyond one lag. 
This procedure of determining the date at which the lagged price is recorded is an 
alternative to deleting observations due to too wide time intervals where general 
economic conditions might have changed significantly and confound the results 
obtained. Again, it is acknowledged that this is a discretionary decision that results in 
a larger sample. On the other hand, this should reduce the survivorship bias. 
The data was downloaded from the active research list and all dead UK 
equities' lists to minimise the effects of survivorship bias. Survivorship bias may 
play an important part in estimations that require lagged share price data by up to 
four years. This effect is partially offset by the way DataStream. collects financial 
statements and share prices data (these are held in separate parts of the database). 
Historically, in the contemporaneous sample used in this study, DataStream database 
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starts recording market values 554.8 days (or 1.52 years) (medians: 272 days or 9 
months) before the first balance sheet date. This further supports the decision not to 
exclude observations with missing lagged balance sheet dates - these exclusions 
50 
would tend to increase any potential effects of survivorship bias. 
Outliers removal. To control for outliers, top and bottom one percent of 
observations on each of the main accounting and market variables of the pooled 
samples (i. e., outliers' removal is not performed on an annual basis) are eliminated. 
The first main sample, which termed the contemporaneous sample, excludes all 
observations on deflated, per share accounting variables, OCF, OP, ORD, EARN, 
A WCAP, DEP, SPEC and market variable RETIj-1 that are bigger (smaller) than the 
top (bottom) one percentile of each pooled distribution simultaneously. The 
contemporaneous sample covers the period 1969-2001 inclusive and contains 25,888 
firm-years after eliminating the outliers. To arrive at the second main sample, tenned 
the lagged sample, all observations on deflated, per share accounting variables OCF, 
OP, ORD, EARN, AWCAP, DEP, SPEC and market variables 
where r-- 0 ... 3 that are bigger (smaller) than the top (bottom) one 
percentile simultaneously are eliminated. Note that the deflators are different in the 
contemporaneous and lagged samples (P, -, and Pj-4 respectively). Thus the 
observations in the lagged sample are not, strictly speaking, a sub-sample of the 
contemporaneous sample, although the firm has to survive for at least four periods to 
be included in the lagged sample and would usually, but not necessarily, be included 
in the contemporaneous sample. There are 20,536 firm-years in the lagged sample. 
50 It is an (open) empirical question wheter these effects would be significant. This question is left to further research. 
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It is acknowledge that this method of outliers' removal is discretionary. First, 
outliers based on individual components of working capital accruals are not 
removed, but only on the aggregate variable AWCAP. Second, outliers based on the 
variable ACASH are also not removed. Third, some analyses are also conducted and 
shown for illustrative purposes on total accruals, and again, outliers based on the 
Accruals (tot. ) variable are not'removed. These decisions affect the sample 
composition, (some oo the results presented and their interpretation. On the other 
hand, both the contemporaneous and lagged samples used in this study appear to be 
more restrictive (i. e., including less extreme values and exhibiting less variability) 
than samples used in studies in the comparable literature. The issue of comparability 
of samples with existing literature is described in section 4.3. 
Sign convention. Throughout this study, the sign convention employed by 
most contemporary papers is used (e. g., Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 
1998; Garrod and Hadi, 1998; Barth, Cram and Nelson, 2001): a negative sign of an 
accounting variable denotes an earnings-decreasing item (cash flow-increasing item) 
and a positive sip indicates an eamings-increasing item (cash flow-decreasing 
item). For example, positive AWCAP, ADebtors and AStock indicate higher ending 
values of respective balance sheet accounts, higher earnings and, ceteris paribus, 
lower operating cash flows. The converse applies for the Wreditors variable - more 
negative values indicate higher ending value of creditors' accounts in the balance 
sheet, lower earnings and higher operating cash flows. More negative values of the 
depreciation and amortisation expense DEP indicate a higher (i. e., more earnings- 
reducing) depreciation charge. 
11) 5z 
This sign convention is often expressed conceptually with the decomposition 
of earnings into its constituent parts as presented above in section 3.7: 
EARNINGS = CASH FLOWS + ACCRUALS 
Note that the opposite convention is applied in, for example, Rayburn (1986) 
and McLeay, Kassab and Helan (1997). Also, this "opposite" sign convention is 
employed in the theoretical analyses of the Feltharn and OhIson (1996) framework 
(see discussion of the clean surplus relation, ! bid., p. 215). 
A note on presentational formats of data and method of Inferences. 
Throughout this study, cross-sectional averages following Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) are employed to present regression results and make inferences except where 
explicitly noted (also see Kothari, 2001; Fama and French, 2000; Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay, 1995, pp. 215-217; Christie, 1987). This type of estimation involves the 
following procedure. First, annual regressions are estimated and estimated 
parameters and R 2S collected. Given the sarnple, there are generally T individual year 
regressions for each dependent variable (the actual number of individual-year 
regressions may be lower in some cases in this thesis due to data requirements). 
Next, an equally-weighted average of these estimated regression coefficients is 
calculated so that a time-series of estimated parameters is studied. It is this number 
that is presented in the tables and commented upon in the text. For example, 
denoting a general true regression coefficient for a given year t as yl, t--l ... T, then, 
first, the T coefficients j, ... 
P,. are estimated, and, second, the average of these 
coefficients is calculated as: 
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The test hypothesis regarding this coefficient stated inalternative forM'is: 
114: The cross-sectional average of the P ... 
P, does not equal zero (or, 
equivalently, P#0). 
The corresponding test statistic is: 
r 
s. e. (P) / \rT- 
(4-2) 
distributed with (T-1) degrees of freedom. In this study, the values are 7- 33 years 
and the corresponding degrees of freedom (T-I)= 32. This number is sufficiently 
large for the corresponding sample of cross-sectional estimates of parameters vt to be 
deemed large (e. g., Anderson, Sweeney and Williams, 1993, pp. 308-313). Critical 
values of the test statistic are ItJ= 2.7385 at the 1% significance level, It, J= 2.0369 at 
the 5% and it,, I= 1.6939 at the 10% signific ance level. In this research, inferences 
based on the Faina-MacBeth (1973) procedure are based on the 5% level. The 
corresponding t-statistics are always shown when applicable. Based on (4-2), the 
standard errors can be calculated. The t-statistics are not shown in cases where cross- 
sectional averages of estimated regression coefficients are summed or used in ratios, 
as is the case with total and relative total bad news coefficients. The t-statistics is 
however shown for the cross-sectional average of estimated R2S. 
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Both the sample-selection procedure and the method of estimation and 
inference used minimise the effects of survivorship bias. This is particularly 
important in terms of tests in section 4.4. There, survivorship bias would imply more 
earnings-increasing changes in most of the variables than expected by chance 
(Kothari, 2001), which would work against finding mean-reversion in earnings and 
some components (i. e., a random-walk process would be more likely to be 
observed). 
All other presentations are generally for various pooled samples and, where 
applicable, significance detennined at the 1% level (ItJ= 1.960). In particular, all 
descriptive statistics' tables and correlations matrices are for the pooled sample (also 
see the outliers' removal procedure above). This is a discretionary decision and the 
effects of some of these procedures are presented in the sensitivity analyses section. 
4.3 GENERAL PROPERTXES OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS 
AND LAGGED SAMPLES 
Table 4-1 provides the contemporaneous overall descriptive statistics for the 
contemporaneous and lagged samples covering the period 1969-2001. The statistics 
are for the pooled sample, rather than cross-sectional averages, and correspond to the 
applied method of outliers' removal (outliers are removed on a pooled-sample basis 
rather than on a year-by-year basis). 
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The descriptives show that both the contemporaneous and lagged samples are 
generally comparable to UK samples used in recent similar literature (Pope and 
Walker, 1996; Ball Kothari and Robin, 2000; Giner and Rees, 2001), at least to the 
extent that variables' definitions may be assumed comparable and the importance of 
different time periods assumed away. One of the important differences with the 
samples in these studies are narrower ranges of variables EARN and ORD, i. e., the 
sample in this study is less extreme in respect to these two variables. Both earnings 
measures' means and medians are, as expected, lower than the OCF mean and 
median, since OCF does not include a charge for capital investments and EARN and 
ORD include a weighted average of past investment in the form of depreciation and 
amortisation charge DEP (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). 
Third and second moments of distributions of variables also provide an 
indirect indication of accounting conservatism. Consistent with conservative 
accounting is the negative skewness (median is higher than the mean) of the EARN 
variable. Conservative accounting results in a timely recognition of large, complete, 
capitalised amounts of bad economic news. This results in a reduction of the mean of 
the EARN-distribution, but a lesser change in the median. Good economic news is, 
on the other hand, recognised only gradually in small, but persistent amounts as they 
flow through to financial statements (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Consistent with the 
notion that accounting conservatism is an accruals phenomenon, any accounting item 
that is constructed with accruals (i. e., earnings and accruals themselves) should be 
negatively skewed (Watts, 2003). In this research, the variable EARN is the earnings 
variable which includes the highest level of accruals. Those accounting items that are 
most likely to reflect the application of ex-post conservatism should exhibit the 
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highest asymmetry. Special items (SPEC) in fact do exhibit a- highly negatively 
skewed distribution, as do depreciation DEP and ACreditors. Against negative 
skewness of the EARN variable, is the (unusual or unexpected) positive skewness of 
the ORD (and OP) variable (the median is lower than the mean). These findings are 
consistent with economic gains being incorporated in ordinary income as "regular" 
items and economic losses as exceptional or extraordinary items ("special items" in 
this study). Similar UK descriptives are also reported by Charitou, Clubb and 
Andreou (2001) and Charitou and Clubb (1999) for their equivalent of ordinary 
earnings (the statistics differ slightly because they include only the period 1985-1993 
and 1985-1992 respectively and may differ because of possible differences in the 
databases employed). 
Similarly, the variable RET exhibits a narrower range, a standard deviation 
close to Pope and Walker's (1999), and lower mean and median. There are, however, 
significantly more observations with non-positive returns (44.2% versus 37.6% in 
their study, but note differences in definition of Dll-l). Skewness of RET is 
positiveand since there is no asymmetry in incorporating expected economic 
gains/losses but firms in general are expected to incur, on average, more economic 
gains than losses. Since RET is not bounded by any rules regarding the incorporation 
of expected economic gains/losses, its variability is predicted and found to be the 
highest. 
Similar conclusions can also be reached in respect of comparisons to Giner 
and Rees' (2001) and Ball, Kothari and Robin's (2000) UK samples, 
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Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics for the contemporaneous and lagged samples, 1969-2001 
PANEL A: Contempo- 
raneous sample (n=25,888) Mean St Dev Min Q25 Med. Q75 Max Skew 
Cash flows 
OCF 0.227 0.243 -0.393 0.091 0.174 0.303 1.895 1.820 
Eamings 
Op 0.197 0.188 -0.304 0.095 0.154 0.256 1.439 1.683 
ORD 0.091 0.097 -0.422 0.053 0.084 0.128 0.615 0.220 
EARN 0.083 0.122 -0.740 0.046 0.083 0.131 0.717 -0.783 
Accmals 
, dWCAP 0.043 0.172 -0.780 -0.018 0.021 0.094 1.010 0.545 
- of which ADeblors 0.055 0.178 -3.545 -0.004 0.025 0.093 4.766 2.243 
- of whichdStock 0.048 0.171 -3.184 -0.003 0.013 0.079 2.890 1.148 
- of whichdCreditors -0.060 0.206 -5.863 -0.096 -0.024 0.007 3.164 -2.652 
DEP -0.077 0.076 -0.602 -0.097 -0.054 -0.029 -0.002 -2.572 
SPEC -0.011 0.074 -0.567 -0.020 0.000 0.010 0.314 -1.824 
Retums 
RETI., -, 0.129 0.466 -0.735 -0.176 0.058 0.347 2.422 
1.217 
D 
.,, 
0.442 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.235 
PANEL B: Lagged sample 
(n=20,536) Mean St Dev Min Q25 Med. Q73 Max Skew 
Cash flows 
0CF 0.313 0.328 -0.518 0.122 0.231 0.421 2.771 1.934 
Eamings; 
OP 0.290 0.292 -0.287 0.114 0.211 0.380 2.432 2.104 
ORD 0.141 0.148 -0.355 0.060 0.112 0.190 1.137 1.571 
EARN 0.133 0.172 -0.621 0.051 0.110 0.194 1.270 0.873 
Accruals 
, dWCAP 0.074 0.241 -0.865 -0.022 0.026 0.127 1.737 1.646 
- of which ADebtors 0.086 0.253 -2.734 -0.006 0.032 0.125 4.815 3.326 
- of whichdStock 0.078 0.254 -2.570 -0.006 0.017 0.108 4.706 3.169 
- of whichdCreditors -0.090 0.304 -8.000 -0.128 -0.030 0.010 3.548 -5.094 
DEP -0.102 0.100 -0.830 -0.128 -0.072 -0.041 -0.003 -2.692 
SPEC -0.013 0.095 -0.626 -0.027 0.000 0.014 0.436 -1.246 
Retums 
PET,., 
-, 0.172 0.706 -2.283 -0.177 0.066 0.400 4.542 1.621 PETt-I. t-2 0.178 0.610 -1.473 -0.161 0.078 0.400 3.950 1.603 
PETt-Zt-3 0.158 0.501 -0.941 -0.162 0.077 0.382 3.028 1.357 
PETf-3, " 0.125 0.426 -0.698 -0.159 0.065 0.342 2.259 1.053 
D,,,, 0.431 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.277 
D t-I. t-2 0.420 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.323 
D 
t-2. t--3 0.423 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.313 
Dt-3 
t-4 0.430 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.283 
Variables are defined as follows: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is earnings before 
extraordinary and exceptional items (ordinary earnings), EARN is earnings after extraordinary an d exceptional items, 
AWCAP is working capital accruals, ADeblors is the change in creditors, ASIock is the change in stock and work in 
progress, Wreditors is the change in creditors, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items. All variables arc per share and scaled by P, -I in the contemporaneous and P, 4 in the lagged sample, RET,.,.., is defined as RET,., 
-, - (Pr-PIYPI in the contemporaneous and PET#.,, -,, - (P, 4--P,.,, YP" in the lagged sample and D#.,, -,, are dummy variables defined as D,,,.,, - II if PET#.,, -, 1: S0; 0 otherwise ). Ile defi nitions of d ummy variables are independent of deflators. 
134 
notwithstanding the differences in databases used and in some of the definitions of 
variables (in particular, Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000, use cum-dividend returns 
rather than price relatives). 
Overall, the two main samples used in this study are generally less extreme 
than, but otherwise generally comparable with, the samples used in related literature. 
On the one hand, this might imply that the results are potentially less driven by 
influential observations, but on the other hand potentially informative observations 
that would convey significant economic conclusions (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000) 
might have been removed. To account for these influences, Appendix C, Appendix 
D and section 5.7.3 show in full how the inclusion of outliers affects the main results 
and some additional analyses. 
Table 4-2 shows descriptive statistics for the contemporaneous sample split 
by good news (Panel A) and bad news (Panel B). Good news observations exhibit 
higher deflated operating cash flows and lower aggregate accruals (-0.036 for good 
news versus -0.056 for bad news; not shown in table). Average aggregate accruals 
represent 30.4% of operating cash flows for bad news observations and only 13.7% 
for good news firms. Of the accruals components, SPEC for bad news observations 
is more than twice as large as for good news observations. 
Formal tests of the differences in mean values of earnings and earnings 
components are summarised below in Table 4-3. For each deflated accounting item 
in the two panels of Table 4-2, the following hypothesis in alternative form is made: 
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Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics for the contemporaneous sample split by good news (positive 
returns) and bad news (non-positive returns), 1969-2001 
PANEL A: Good news 
only(n=14,445) 
Mean St Dev Min Q25 Med Q75 Max Skew 
Cash flows 
OCF 0.261 0.260 -0.391 0.113 0.201 0.347 1.895 1.711 
Earnings 
Op 0.238 0.200 -0.304 0.119 0.184 0.304 1.430 1.689 
ORD 0.117 0.096 -0.420 0.071 0.102 0.153 0.611 0.645 
EARN 0.113 0.114 -0.735 0.067 0.101 0.156 0.673 -0.268 
Accmals 
AWCAP 0.055 0.181 -0.779 -0.015 0.026 0.109 1.010 0.758 
- of which ADebtors 0.070 0.189 -1.877 0.001 0.033 0.111 4.766 3.288 
- of which AStocks 0.061 0.181 -3.184 -0.001 0.017 0.092 2.890 1.362 
- of which ACreditors -0.076 0.224 -5.863 -0.114 -0.031 0.002 3.164 -3.253 
DEP -0.082 0.080 -0.602 -0.103 -0.057 -0.031 -0.002 -2.436 
SPEC -0.009 0.073 -0.562 -0.020 0.000 0.011 0.314 -1.580 
Returns 
RETI., 
-, 0.425 0.407 0.000 0.136 0.303 0.574 2.422 1.808 
PANEL B: Bad news only Mean St Dev Min Q25 Med. Q75 Max Skew (n=11,433) 
Cash flows 
OCF 0.184 0.212 -0.393 0.070 0.144 0.250 1.882 1.918 
Earnings 
OP 0.144 0.156 -0.304 0.068 0.120 0.195 1.439 1.521 
ORD 0.058 0.089 -0.422 0.032 0.063 0.095 0.615 -0.538 
EARN 0.044 0.121 -0.740 0.018 0.061 0.097 OJI7 -1.419 
Accruals 
AWCAP 0.028 0.159 -0.780 -0.021 0.016 0.078 1.009 0.062 
- of which ADebtors 0.035 0.161 -3.545 -0.011 0.017 0.071 2.096 -0.006 
- of which AStocks 0.033 0.156 -1.655 -0.007 0.008 0.063 1.509 0.637 
- of whichdCreditors -0.040 0.180 -2.170 -0.075 -0.016 0.014 2.159 -0.989 
DEP -0.070 0.070 -0.583 -0.089 -0.049 -0.027 -0.002 -2.759 
SPEC -0.013 0.074 -0.567 -0.021 0.000 0.008 0.314 -2.119 
Returns 
_RETI. (-, -0.245 
0.181 -0.735 -0.364 -0.209 -0.095 0.000 . 0.669 
Variables are defined as follows: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating prof it, ORD is earnings before 
extraordinary and exceptional items (ordinary earnings), EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, 
AWCAP is working capital accruals, Meblors is the change in creditors, &Iock is the change in stock and work in 
progress, Wreditors is the change in creditors, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items. 
All variables are per share and scaled by &I in the contemporaneous and P,. 4 in the lagged sample. RET,.,,, is defined as RET4, 
-i=(Pr-A.. IYP,. I and D,.,., are dummy variables defined as D,.,, -(I if RET,.,. 150; 0 otherwise). The definitions of dummy variables are independent of deflators. 
HA- : YGN - YBN #0 
where YGN and Y,, represent mean values of deflated accounting variables listed in 
the leftmost column of Table 4-2. Thus, the alternative form of the hypothesis 
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indicates that differences in average values of accounting variables between the good 
news and the bad news sample are to be expected. The independent-samples version 
of the test of differences of means that assumes the two groups of observations 
separated by good and bad economic news are independent, but have equal 
variances, is employed. The test statistic under these assumptions is (Anderson, 
Sweeney and Williams, 1993, pp. 347-352): 
(YGN - YRN) 
22 1)(ay, + (n,, - I)a YON 
GH 
(4-3) 
distributed at (nGA+nBN- 2) degrees of freedom, where, additionally, nGNand nBNare 
the numbers of observations affected by good and bad news respectively and ay',,, 
and a' are the variances of deflated accounting variables for the two groups. YDN 
Additionally, the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric test is employed 
(Anderson, Sweeney, Williams, 1993, pp. 721-727; Stata Corporation, 2001, pp. 
213-220). The hypothesis stated in alternative from is: 
A: Two populations are not identical. 
and the test statistics is: 
T-EfTj 
(4-4) 4v -ar (-T) 
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nr, v 
where T RGN, l 
is the sum of ranks RGN, I in the good news sample, E[71= 
nGN(nGN + nBN +1)/2 and var(T) = (nGNnBN a2) 
1(nGN + nBm) and cý is the variance of 
nGN+NBM 
the combined ranks ri of the total contemporaneous sample a' =Z (r, - F), 
n- 1-1 
The results of both fonnal tests are shown below in Table 4-3. Using both 
tests, the good news and bad news sub-samples differ. Compared to the bad news 
sample, good news firms have larger values of deflated accounting items in the 
ab. solute sense. The only difference is the special items SPEC, which are on average 
more eamings-reducing in the case of bad news firms. 51 This is consistent with (an 
important part oo bad news being passed through special items and with accounting 
conservatism. 
Table 4-3: Formal tests of differences in means and medians between good and bad 
economic news firms, pooled sample, 1969-2001 
Variables Mean diff. (YGN - 
YBN) t-stat MWW z-stat. 
- Cash flows 
Eamings , 
Accruals 
OCF 0.078 25.939 29.705 
OP 0.094 41.481 46.550 
ORD 0.059 50.909 58.370 
EARN 0.069 47.189 54.750 
AWCAP 0.028 12.959 11.468 
- of which ADeblors 0.035 15.855 19.737 
- of which ASýocks 0.028 13.294 14.506 
- of which ACreditors -0.036 -13.879 -18.380 
DEP -0.012 -12.944 -13.723 
SPEC 0.004 4.752 4.629 
Accruals (total) 0.020 7.762 6.263 
Notes. Variables are defined as follows: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items (ordinary earnings), EARN is earnings after extraordinary and 
exceptional items, AWCAP is working capital accruals, ADeblors is the change in creditors, AStock is the change in 
stock . ACreditors is the change in creditors, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items. All variables are per share and scaled by P,. I. MWW z-stat. is the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxson z-statistic. See 
Table 4-2 for a full set of descriptives by the sign of the economic news. 
51 Compare Table 4-2 and Table 4-3. 
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Table 4-4 reports Pearson's bivariate correlation coefficient (Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient) below (above) the diagonal. Correlations between pairs 
of variables are generally signed as expected given the underlying economic 
relations between the two variables in a pair. Current-period returns are positively 
associated with operating cash flows and all earnings measures. The correlation 
between returns and earnings is stronger than between returns and operating cash 
flows (Charitou, Clubb and Andreou, 2001). Current-period returns are only weakly 
positively correlated with aggregate accruals (Accruals (tot. )). They are, however, 
positively correlated with eamings-increasing accruals measures and negatively with 
earnings-decreasing accruals. However, all individual accruals' components exhibit 
statistically (and presumably economically) significant correlations with returns, 
which suggests that accruals have an important role in reflecting economic news. An 
exception to this is the special items (SPEC). Assuming that current bad news is 
written-off through special items (SPEC) (constituting mostly of 
extraordinary/exceptional items), a weak positive correlation with current-period 
returns is surprising at this stage. This suggests that bad news, reflected in returns, is 
passed through other accruals' components. 
All individual working capital accruals' components are strongly negatively 
correlated with operating cash flows. This is consistent with operating accruals being 
used to smooth temporary changes in operating cash flows to produce a less variable 
time-series of earnings (Dechow, 1994), or, in other words, to remove negative serial 
correlation in operating cash flows (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). 
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The accruals components ADebtors and AStock on the one hand and 
ACreditors on the other are strongly negatively correlated. This is likely due to 
growing firms where the requirements for both the current asset components and the 
current liability component are likely to be increasing (Sloan, 1996). By expanding 
operations, firms sell more and have more debtors and buy more from suppliers and 
thus have more creditors. To support higher sales it is likely that firms will also have 
higher stock and work in progress. 
Splitting the correlation matrix by good/bad news (Table 4-5) reveals some 
additional interesting points. In the bad news sub-swnple, current returns are 
positively correlated with aggregate accruals, but slightly negatively (Pearson's 
correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level) in the good news 
sub-sample. Therefore, in the good news sub-sample, the higher the returns (RE7), 
the more negative (i. e., more earnings-decreasing) the aggregate accruals. 
Conversely, in the bad news sub-sample, the lower the returns (i. e., more away from 
zero), the lower (i. e., more eamings-decreasing) the aggregate accruals. This result is 
likely due to the difference in special items (SPEC). The more positive the returns, 
the lower (i. e., more earnings decreasing) the special items (SPEC) in the good news 
sub-sample and, similarly, the more negative the returns the lower (i. e., again more 
earnings decreasing) the special items (SPEC) in the bad news sub-sample. Such 
behaviour of aggregate accruals in general and SPEC in particular is consistent with 
the idea of earnings management, whereby accruals show the tendency to (slightly) 
decrease earnings in the good news sub-sample, presumably to smooth earnings over 
the years. 
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The difference in the role accruals have in earnings formation for good/bad 
news firms can also be seen from the following relations: EARN is more strongly 
correlated with OCF than with Accruals (tot. ) for the good news sub-sample. This 
relation holds for every component of aggregate accruals. Conversely, for the bad 
news sub-sample, EARN is more strongly correlated with Accruals (tot. ) than with 
OCF. Again, this relation holds for every component of aggregate accruals except 
the depreciation charge (DEP). This is consistent with bad news being reflected in 
accruals and with the notion that accounting conservatism is an accruals 
phenomenon. 
4.4 PERSXSTENCE OF EARNXNGS AND EARNXNGS 
COMPONENTS 
Under ex-post conservative accounting, bad news must be recognised. in 
earnings immediately and completely in capitalised amounts. The particular 
accounting item (an earnings figure or an earnings component item) that reflects a 
given bad news is expected to be large and transitory - i. e., less persistent. The 
converse holds for good news. The accounting item that reflects a given good news 
is expected to be relatively small and permanent - i. e., more persistent. Since only a 
fraction of current good news will be recognised in current earnings or earnings' 
components, the rest will be gradually (and in relatively small amounts) recognised 
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in future periods' earnings (or earnings component), making current earnings less 
timely. 52 
Due to the problems related to scale presented in section 2.3.2, the 
persistence of earnings and main earnings components is empirically tested by 
estimating the following empirical equivalent of the model presented in section 3.2. 
This empirical form has been used, among others, by Basu (1997) and Penman 
(1992): 
AXI 
Ir -1 +C -1 + 17t 1 +; r, 
C, 
-, 
+ 0)1 
AXt 
02Ct-I 
AXI 
PI-I pt-2 Pt-2 
(4-5) 
where X is, generally, an undeflated per share accounting figure (earnings, operating 
cash flows or accruals and accruals' components) and Cl-I is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if AXt_j:! ý-O and zero otherwise. If a time-series of a deflated, 
per share accounting item (AXIlPt-1) follows a random walk, then E[6, ]= 0-a 
positive change in X is expected to repeat itself in future periods. If, on the other 
hand, a time-series of a deflated, per share accounting item (AXIlPt-1) mean-reverts, 
then the expected value of the estimated iA coefficient is expected to be in the 
interval -0.50: 5E[61]<O. Expected values of estimated parameters ir, and ir2 are 
both zero E[ ir, ]= E[ 
'r2 Iý0. The estimated parameter 
62 
captures the differential 
persistence of negative lagged changes (AXI-IIPI-2) and the total persistence of 
negative lagged changes is given by the sum of the two slope coefficients (A + 62). 
52 Recall that timeliness of earnings relates to the extent that current earnings reflect value-relevant 
information (e. g., Beekes, Pope and Young, 2003). 
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Given the sign convention described in section 4.2, negative values of AXI-I (or, 
equally, AXI) indicate an earnings-decreasing change and positive values an 
eamings-increasing change in X. Firm-specific subscripts in equation (4-5) are 
omitted for parsimony. 
Based on Section 3.2.2 and existing literature, the following total and partial 
coefficient values on empirical variables X, presented in Table 4-6 are expected. The 
table shows a summary of the predictions of the persistence hypothesis (HI). The 
expected values in Table 4-6 may also serve as hypothesized figures against which 
the estimated coefficients are tested. Given that for each of the main accounting 
(dependent) variables used in this study, there are four panels and for each panel 
there are 33 yearly cross sections and for each of these cross sections A, ctý and the 
total coefficient on bad news ((ý + 4), a large number of estimated regression 
coefficients must be evaluated against the null hypothesis presented above in Table 
4-6. While these test results are omitted from the main results table below for 
reasons of tractability of exposition, they are presented in full in Appendix E, Table 
E-1. The table shows the number of times (years) within each dependent variable, 
each partition and each year the estimated regression coefficient or their linear 
combination equals to the expected value. 53 Some of the more interesting results are 
commented below in appropriate sections. 
53 Unfortunately, the available test from the econometric package used only allows testing for strict 
equalities. Testing for inequaltities would provide more helpful for certain accruals components, but 
would be very challenging in terms of collecting such a large number of estimated regression 
coefficients. This also represents an additional reason why the tests are not presented in the main body 
of this thesis but in the appendix. The weakness of such a test or rather a presentation of a large 
number of tests are acknowledged. 
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Table 4-6: Expected values of the coefficients based on estimated persistence models 
Empirical variable X, 
LI A1 '4621 
44+621 
_ 
OCF No Partition -0.50 (-0.35) 
All partitions -0.50 (-0.35) 0.00 -0.50 (-0.35) 
OP. ORD, EARN No Partition 0.00 
All partitions 0.00 -0.50 -0.50 
, dWCAP, ADebtors, dStock dCreditors No Partition -0.50 
All partitions > -0.50 < 0.00 -0.50 
DEP No Partition 0.00 
All partitions 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SPEC No Partition -0.50 
All partitions > -0.50 < 0.00 -0.50 
Notes. OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional 
items (ordinary earnings), EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, AWCAP is working capital accruals. 
ADeblors is the change in creditors, AStock is the change in stock, Wreditors is the change in creditors, DEP is 
depreciation and amortisation expense, SPEC is special items. 
Sources: Dechow, Kothad and Watts, 1998; Lo and Elgers, 1994. 
Each panel within Table 4-7 shows the results of estimating regression in 
equation (4-5) using one of the earnings or eamings-component variables. Within 
each panel, four partitions are shown, with the purpose of showing differential 
behaviour of positive and negative changes in deflated, per share accounting 
variables. Moreover, these partitions provide comparability with Basu's (1997, Table 
3) and other results. The partitions are the following: 54 
no partition (restricted versions of (4-5)), 
- results partitioned by the sign of the lagged change in each accounting item 
AXt-l= Xt-I-Xt-2and the dummy defined as Ct-, = 11 if AXt-1: 50; zero otherwise), 
54 Other partitions are possible. For example, Freeman (1987) separates good and bad news firms by 
the change in the return on equity (AROE). 
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results partitioned by the sign of the lagged level of earnings after extraordinary 
and exceptional items (EARN) and the dummy defined as Ct-I= (I if EARN, -I! -<O; 
zero otherwise} (also see Hayn, 1995; Jan and Ou, 1995); 
results partitioned by the sign of lagged returns RETf-j, j-2 and the dummy defined 
as C, -, = 
(I if RETI-It-2: 50; zero otherwise). It must be noted that the returns 
variable is defined differently for the use in this section compared to the rest of 
the text to maintain deflator comparability with other partitions: 
RET, 
-I, t-2-'2 
(Pt-l-Pt-2)lPt-2- 
All variables used are per share and scaled by opening price (either by Pi-I or 
by PI-2). All results are cross-sectional averages of parameters estimated for year t, 
t-- 1969 ... 2001, and associated t-statistics are calculated according to the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) procedure: for each year, each dependent variables' changes and 
each partition, the regressions are estimated annually and inferences are made on the 
basis of the time series of parameters resulting from the cross-sectional regressions 
(Kothari, 2001). It is acknowledged that other deflators in 
(4-5) instead of the opening prices might be used - for example, Fama and French 
(2000) use current period book value of total assets, rather than the lagged value and 
the open question remains as to whether the entire regression equation should be 
deflated by the same variable. 
The samples used in analyses in this section are sub-samples of the main 
contemporaneous sample. In addition to restrictions placed on the data to arrive at 
the contemporaneous sample, two additional restrictions are placed on the values the 
two deflated variables (AXt1Pj-j) and (A41/P, -2) can take by removing the top and 
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bottom one percentile on individual distributions of (AXtIPt-1) and (&Xj-j1Pt-2)- It was 
decided to place these additional restrictions after detailed inspection of the data 
revealed a significant number of observations that were clearly outliers even after the 
restrictions applied in forming the contemporaneous sample were used. These 
additional restrictions are, however, done on a variable-by-variable case and not 
simultaneously. While this is a discretionary decision, removing outliers 
simultaneously would mean excluding too many observations and there was concern 
about the effects such restrictions might have on the overall conclusionS. 
55 In 
particular, applying too severe restrictions might result in significant survivorship- 
bias issues. 
The empirical results are presented in Table 4-7. Each panel in the table 
corresponds to an accounting figure and within each panel four partitions described 
above are presented. The discussion is by main groups of earnings and earnings 
components. 
Operating cash flows. Panel A of shows that, on average, operating cash 
flows (OC. F) are strongly mean-reverting - i. e., cash outflows are followed by cash 
inflows and vice versa. For example, increased sales increase the need for additional 
net working capital investment, thereby causing cash outflows that are followed in 
the next accounting period by cash inflows as receivables are collected, inventories 
liquidated and creditors repaid (Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998). The converse 
55 For example, in the case of changes in earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items AEARN, 
different outliers-removal rules would mean: without individual top/bottom one percentile filters on 
(AEARNIP, j) and (AEARN,. IIP, -2) the average number of observations per year would 
have been 
784.5; by applying individual filters on AEARN, and AEAR&I as well as the main (pooled) filter 
695.5 (as is); by applying the main (pooled) as well as all individual filters on (WP, -I) and (A4, /P, 2) 524.1. There would also have been significant effects on the descriptives of (AX/PI) and 
(" 
-1/pi-2). 
in particular the dispersion measures. 
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holds for sales decreases. Therefore, both OCF increases and decreases should not 
persist. In the dOCFt_j -partition, s expected, the estimated parameter w, indicates 
that the time series of earnings-increasing AOCF, >O is mean-reverting, on average. 
Moreover, there is no asymmetry in operating cash flow reversals - the estimated 
parameter 6 is statistically insignificant, indicating that both positive and negative W2 
AOCFj mean-revert equally quickly. An exception is a mild asymmetric speed with 
which eamings-decreasing changes in AOCF mean-revert (lagged returns partition) 
when the observations are partitioned by lagged returns (economic news) (RETt. jý-2)- 
The parameter 6), and, in partitioned results, the SUM (4+ W^ 2 ), is analogous to 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) average of first-order autocorrelation coefficients 
corr(AOCF,, AOCFI-I). The results presented here show that they are close to their 
theoretical prediction (-0.350), given their assumptions and the role the accruals 
have in their model. Details of the test of this expectation presented in Table C-1 
show that, on average, the 6A = -0.350 in 22 out of 33 individual years. When 
partitioning by the sign of news, the number falls to approximately half of the years 
(either 15 or 18), which is expected given the magnitudes of these estimated 
regression coefficients. However, when the total persistence of negative OCF is 
considered, in 20/33 years the estimated regression coefficient (A + 6ý2 ) equals - 
0.350. The other two partitions give similar results. 
To check further the results on (operating) cash flows, Appendix F (Table F- 
2) shows the results of estimating (4-5) using an accounting variable that is 
presumably least "affected" by accruals components. Because the net change in cash 
(ACASH) is affected less by the "profit-spread effecf' given that the item is affected 
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by all other segments of a firm's operations and finances (e. g., loan repayments), it 
should revert even faster, as is indicated above in Table 4-6. As the table in the 
appendices shows, using either partition to separate good and bad news, the 
estimated ctý coefficient is reliably higher than for the operating cash flows (OCF). 
Moreover, there is no asymmetry in reversals for eamings-increasing changes in 
ACASH compared to earnings-decreasing changes in the variable. The exception is, 
as with the operating cash flows, the partition by RETI. 1,1-2. which indicates that for 
bad news firins, cash flows revert faster to the nonn than for good news firins. 
Perhaps the fact that the estimated incremental coefficients OJ2 in all three partitions 
for both the OCF and ACASH regressions are negative (albeit in two out of three 
cases insignificant) can be taken as a mild indication bad news firms must revert 
operations and financing activities back to the nonn faster than would otherwise be 
required or expected. This might be due to "loss factors" presented in sections 2.2.4 
and 4.8.1. 
Table 4-7: Persistence of earnings and earnings components, 1969-2001 
PANEL A: Operating cash flows (OCF) avg. n jr, ; r, clý 
62 R2 
No partition 565.2 0.042 -0.345 0.5-3 
3.182 . 12.046 10-819 
, dOCF,, partition 
565.2 0.014 0.075 -0.305 -0.001 0.182 
2.096 1.458 -9.145 -0.013 7.099 
EARN-, -level partition 565.2 0.043 0.033 -0-332 . 0.107 0.164 
3.299 1.585 -12.660 -1.074 11.854 
RET, 
-1.1-2 partition 
565.2 0.061 -0.230 -0.260 -0.230 0.168 
3.324 -6.353 -11.318 -6.353 10.812 
PANEL B: Operating profit (OP) avg. n 
irl ir2 
OA 62 R2 
No partition 695.5 0.021 -0.058 0.025 4A81 -2.594 2.427 
, dOP,., partition 695.5 0.013 -0.013 0.063 -0.503 0.073 3.619 4.489 2.996 -9.711 5.626 
EARN, 
-, -level partition 695.5 0.012 0.064 0.033 -0.271 0.088 2.602 7.839 1.822 -6.226 7.259 
RETI-1.1-2 partition 695.5 0.020 0.002 0.009 -0.183 0.042 4.751 0.341 0.400 -6.139 3.795 
Cont. 
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PANEL C: Ordinarv earninjzs (ORD) avg. n 
irl ; r2 4 62 R2 
No partition 696.3 0.011 -0.067 0.026 3.981 -2.925 2S89 
AORA, partition 696.3 0.005 -0.013 0.101 -0.690 0.103 
2.063 -5.655 4.613 -11.750 8.593 
EARN, 
-, -level partition 
696.3 0.004 0.054 0.046 -0.312 0.113 
1.409 9.036 2.294 -4.972 9.152 
RET, 
-I,, -2 partition 
696.3 0.010 0.004 0.029 -0.233 0.050 
3.594 0.991 1.347 -7.103 4.146 
PANEL D: Earnings after extraordinary 
and exceptional items (EARN) avg. n 
irl ir, eO2 R2 
No partition 695.5 0.013 -0.234 0.077 3AO9 
-7.307 
8.571 
AEARNt-i partition 695.5 0.002 -0.020 -0.054 -0.696 0.177 0.717 -7.002 . 1.529 -9.681 11.641 
EARN., -level partition 695.5 -0.003 0.094 -0.069 -0.397 0.215 
-0.895 
4.162 . 2.739 -3.460 
13.474 
RET, 
_U-2 partition 695.5 0.013 0.001 -0.121 -0.300 0.112 
3.977 0.137 4.003 -6.521 9.454 
PANEL E: Working capital accruals r 6 2 R (AWCAP) avg. n 
Irl ; 2 OA 2 
No partition 695.3 0.007 -0.407 0.178 0.833 -20.117 19.800 
A(AWCAP,., )-partition 695.3 -0.015 0.027 -0.296 -0.147 0.196 
-2.183 5.790 -6.964 -2.362 20.270 
EARN,., -level partition 695.3 0.002 0.015 -0.390 -0.118 0.194 0.279 0.814 -19.190 -2.206 19.249 
RET, 
-1.1-2 partition 695.3 0.018 -0.020 -0.337 -0.204 0.205 2.955 -1.912 . 19.212 -8.873 15.002 
PANEL E-1: A WCAP component - a ir 
'r c 6 R2 ADebtors vg. n l 2 lý 2 
No partition 692.6 0.011 -0.423 0.199 1.550 -17.369 9.635 
AADebtors,., )-partition 692.6 -0.007 0.022 -0.344 -0.117 0.215 
-0.881 4.989 -9.498 . 2.969 10.833 
EARN., -level partition 692.6 0.008 0.003 -0.417 -0-099 0.210 
1.182 0.175 -17.444 . 1.167 10.429 
RET,. 1,1-2 partition 692.6 0.019 -0.007 -0353 -0.220 0.229 3.502 -0.475 -16.240 -7.081 9.650 
PANEL E-2:, dWCAP component- AStock avg. n 
ir, ir, 62 R2 
No partition 693.3 0.010 -0.392 0.174 
1.318 -11.608 6.633 
AAStock, )-partition 693.3 -0.004 0.003 -0.334 -0.152 0.199 
-0.643 0.222 . 6.986 -1.847 7.293 
EARN-, -level partition 693.3 0.008 0.014 --0.380 -0.151 0.187 
1.075 1.184 -10.567 -1.234 7.010 
RET. 1,1-2 partition 693.3 0.021 -0.023 -0.339 -0.181 0.196 3.630 -2.993 -9.429 -6.403 7A93 
Cont. 
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PANEL E-3: A WCAP component - 
ACreditors avg. n 
; rI ; r2 ctý eO2 
2 R 
No partition 692.5 -0.015 -0.451 0.203 
-2.108 -15.981 14.101 
A(Wreditors., )-partition 692.5 -0.036 0.034 -0.415 -0.002 , 0.222 
-2.626 2.956 -14.515 -0.039 11.812 
EARN-, -level partition 692.5 -0.015 0.017 -0.440 -0.061 0.213 
-2.090 1.067 -15.206 -1.211 14.952 
RETI. I, t-2 partition 692.5 -0.024 0.009 -0.405 -0.153 0.225 
-3.965 0.743 -14.078 -5.288 12.548 
PANEL F: Depreciation and amortisation 
(DEP) avg. n x, 
; r2 
A 
OA 62 
2 R 
No partition 701.8 -0.006 0.001 0.005 
-8.230 0.031 3.406 
ADEP,, partition 701.8 -0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.490 0.009 
-9.320 0.137 -0.038 0.274 6.146 
EARN, 
_, -level partition 
701.8 -0.007 0.012 -0.036. -0.452 0.055 
-11.118 7A85 -1.424 -1.086 8.612 
RET, 
-I, t-2 partition 701.8 -0.006 0.002 -0.024 -0.080 0.019 
-10.664 2.993 -0.945 -0.344 5.273 
PANEL G: Special items (SPEC) avg. n ir, 2 4 62 R2 
No partition 690.4 -0.002 -0.413 0.168 
-0.839 -12.246 14.450 
ASPEC,., partition 690.4 -0.007 0.001 -0.288 -0.292 0.219 
-3.492 0.733 -7.178 -3.544 13.602 
EARN-, -level partition 690.4 -0.008 0.035 -0.271 -0.422 0.251 
4.219 3.336 -9.501 4.536 12.065 
RET, 
-I,, -2 partition 
690.4 -0.003 0.004 -0.256 -0.337 0.200 
-1.475 2.193 -10.310 -6.262 14.450 
Cont. 
Notes. Estimated regressions are: (AXIPI., )- where A. X, -XrX,. l and 
". 1=4-141.2 and X is an undeflated, per share dependent variable listed at the top of each panel. Dummy variables C., are 
defined as follows: partitioning by AX,.,: C, -, -(I 
if AX,., <-*; 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged level of earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items EARN,., - Ci. 1-11 if EARN,., <-O; 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged returns 
RET,. i.,. 2: C, -i-jI 
if RET, 
-U-2550; 
0 otherwise). All variables are deflated either by &I or by P,.:. All estimates are cross- 
sectional averages fortheperiod t=1969-2001 and associated t- statistics are calculated accordingto the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 33-1 - 32 d. f. Values are restricted to top/bottom 
1% of distribution of variables used in the contemporaneous sample as well as to top/bottom 1% of distribution of relevant 
deflated change variables AXIP,., and AX,. IIP,. 2 (i. e., the samples used in this table are sub-samples of the contemporaneous 
sample). 
Earnings. Operating profit OP (Panel B), ordinary earnings ORD (Panel 
and earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items EARN (Panel D) appear to 
deviate, on average, from the expected random walk (i. e., they mildly mean-revert) 
(e. g., Brooks and Buckmaster, 1976), since in all three cases the estimated regression 
coefficient 6ý is below zero when the regressions are not partitioned according to 
different measures of bad news. The coefficient equals zero in 31 out of 33 years 
(see Table E-I in appendices). However, this deviation from the expected random 
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walk is mostly due to negative changes in the three earnings figures, consistent with 
negative earnings changes and levels being transitory and reversed in the next (or 
next few) accounting period(s). Separating the change in EARN by the sign of the 
change, reveals that positive EARN-changes follow the random walk overall and that 
the total coefficient on negative changes (^+^) equals -0.500 in 27 out of 33 0ý OJ2 
years, i. e., earnings-decreases fully mean-revert within one accounting period in 
27/33 years, consistent with expectations. 
Changes in the earnings variables OP and ORD, show a slight tendency to 
mean-revert on average. The estimated coefficient in the "No partition" section is 
slightly below zero cA <0. In both cases the coefficient is statistically significant. 
However in 18 and 20 out of 33 years in the OP and ORD sections respectively the 
coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. As for the EARN figure, once the 
changes in EARN are partitioned by the sign of the change, OA becomes statistically 
insignificantly different from zero - the time-series of positive changes in operating 
profit and ordinary earnings follow a random walk (albeit there are some unexpected 
deviations), while negative changes exhibit, depending on the partition, relatively 
high mean-reverting rates, given the magnitude and high statistical significance of 
the 62coefficients in all three partitions within both panels. This finding is 
consistent with expectations under ex-post conservative accounting, where earnings 
decreases are predicted to be (more) transitory, while earnings increases are 
predicted to be (more) permanent. 
Also, the more extraordinary/exceptional items earnings contain, the more 
mean-reverting the time series of earnings should be by definition of these items: on 
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average therefore (i. e., without partitioning), EARN should reverse fastest, given that 
it presumably contains the most transitory items of all earnings figures, followed by 
ORD and by OP. The estimated coefficients 6ý are in fact increasing in magnitude 
across the tbree earnings definitions Ct)1,01 < W1, ORD < O)LEARIV *In particular, the 
magnitude of the coefficientWI, EARN is almost four times theWI, ORD'Partitions 
by the 
sign of the changes in these variables again show that, in absolute value, 
W2, OP `Cý W2, ORD *'ý W2, EARM $which is to be expected if EARN contain most one-off 
items 
of the three earnings figures. In total terms, the coefficients of the three earnings 
variables increase in the absolute sense from OP to ORD to EARN (-0.440, -0.589 
and -0.750 respectively). Also, this is consistent with the presence of transitory 
items at both extremes of earnings figures, not just the negative side. Finally, 
partitioning by lagged EARNt-l-level or lagged RETI. 1.1-2 produces qualitatively 
similar, but weaker results, indicating a random walk behaviour of earnings for the 
good news firms and mean-reversion of earnings for bad news firms. In terms of 
differences regarding the three measures that are used to separate good and bad news 
firms, it must be noted that similar differences in partitions are reported already by 
Basu (1997). 
Albeit these results are somewhat different, the essential findings are very 
similar to Fama, and French (2000). They find that a) book profitability (return on 
assets) is mean-reverting; b) the rate of reversal is 38% per year; c) the rate of 
reversion is higher when profitability is farther away from the mean; and d) that the 
reversal is faster when profitability is below the mean rather than above the mean. 
This evidence is in major part consistent with the findings presented in this study in 
Table 4-7 above, albeit the method differs somewhat from theirs. 
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Figure 4-2 depicts a simplified version Of these findings, both in the levels 
specification, and, as presented above in Table 4-7, in the corresponding changes 
specification. In the figure, it is assumed that a random walk series of permanent 
earnings (dark blue line) is occasionally interrupted by a purely mean-reverting 
series of "special items" (red line) to obtain the published earnings figure (green 
line), which may either be a profit or a loss. 56 The (positive) permanent earnings 
itself may fluctuate for reasons other than "special items" - for example, the 
underlying operating cash flows might fluctuate. Accordingly, the representation of 
(positive) permanent earnings is not a straight line, but it fluctuates randomly. 
However, the line is constructed so that it follows a random walk over time (i. e., the 
parameter Q= I in the levels specification, and Q= 0 in the changes specification 
of, for example, equation (3-4) from section 3.2.1). 57 
On the contrary, the "special items" figure is constructed so that it is 
completely mean-reverting (i. e., the parameter coj= 0 in the levels specification, and 
o. ý= -0.5 in the changes specification). Note that, consistent with the presentation in 
section 4.3 and in particular Figure 4-1, the "special items" are allowed to be 
positive, on occasion. In most years, however, they equal zero, as would be expected 
under their theoretical definition. Moreover, the estimated parameter A for the 
SPEC variable equals -0.50 in the changes specification in 22 out of 33 individual 
years. The two figures combine to obtain published accounting earnings figure. 
56 The term "special items" is in inverted quotes to distinguish it from the actual definiton, albeit it 
resembles closely the empirical findings. 57 Also, such a graphical representation shows that earnings-levels is clearly a non-stationary series, 
providing a motivation to empirically estimate the these processes in the changes specification (also 
see section 3.2.1) 
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Figure 4-2: Eamings-levels and earnings-changes in a time-series perspective - an idealised 
representation 
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Notes to Figure 4-2: In Panel B, the published accounting earnings (corresponding to the green line in Panel A) is not shown 
for clarity of representation. Dark blue line represents (positive) permanent earnings, red line the mean-reverting "special 
items" and the green line the published accounting earnings. 
Also important for the discussion on losses in section 4.8, is the observation 
that extreme negative "special items" may, but not necessarily will, cause a firm to 
report an accounting loss. Moreover, reported losses can vary in magnitude 
depending on the relative sizes of permanent earnings and "special items". Thus, a 
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theory of losses that would encompass both underlying processes as well as positive 
and negative accounting earnings would be required. 
Accruals. The difference in (asymmetric) persistence between operating cash 
flows and earnings is attributed to accruals. For example, working capital accruals 
smooth changes in operating cash flows due to net investment in receivables, 
inventory and payables. Since these are expected to reverse within the next 
accounting period, the time series of changes in working capital accruals should 
reverse strongly. The reversion of working capital accruals then offsets negative 
serial correlation in operating cash flows to produce smoother earnings. The results 
shown in Panels E-G (with the exception of Panel F- DEP) are consistent with these 
expectations. Given their assumptions, these rates of reversals are also very close to 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts' (1998) theoretical prediction for total operating 
accruals, where the expected value of the coefficient on earnings-increasing changes 
in this type of accruals is E[ Oý ]= -0.500. Since accruals are expected to fully mean- 
revert within one period, the first-order correlation of the first differences should 
equal -0.500 (Beaver, 1970). 
On average, AWCAP and its three main components reverse quickly. 
Earnings-decreasing changes in AWCAP and dDebtors reverse quicker than 
earnings-increasing changes in these variables, i. e., bad news finns' accruals revert 
faster to the mean. This is consistent with conservative accounting. It is also 
consistent with a result presented later in section 4.5 - that some of the bad news is 
capitalised in working capital accruals more timely than good news, making them 
less persistent than good news. It is, however, inconsistent with Basu's (1997) notion 
157 
that working capital accruals should reflect good and bad news equally timely. 
Earnings-increasing and eamings-decreasing changes AStock and ACreditors reverse 
equally quickly, in statistical terms, but there is some indication that in both cases 
eamings-decreasing changes reverse quicker: the partition by the sign of news (RETj- 
W-2) is statistically significant and in the case of AStock partitioning by the sign of 
AýtOck is significant at the 10% level. A degree of asymmetry in A(AStock) is to be 
expected, given that assets should generally not be shown at amounts higher than the 
recoverable atnount. In the case of stock, SSAP 9 (Revised): Stocks and Long-term 
Contracts be shown at: 
"... the total of the lower of cost and net realisable value of the separate items of stock or of 
groups of similar items. " (quoted in Davies, Patersonand Wilson, 1999, p. 978). 
Results for depreciation and amortisation expense (Panel F) are consistent 
with DEP following a random walk, regardless of the sign of the change in DEP, i. e., 
the change is symmetric - both increases in depreciation charge and decreases are 
permanent. Assuming a firm in a steady state with no net growth in fixed assets, 
where all investment are replacement investments financed by depreciation and 
amortisation funds, then E[ADEP]= 0. 
Given the scarcity of empirical guidance to the time-series behaviour of 
depreciation and amortisation charge and the importance of limited useful economic 
lives of fixed assets in practice, it is useful to compare the results obtained in this 
research with expectations resulting from application of accounting standards. 
Depreciation is defined in FRS 15: Tangible Fixed Assets as 
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11 ... the measure of the cost or revalued amount of the economic 
benefits of the tangible fixed 
assets that have been consumed during the period. " (quoted in Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 
1999, p. 747; and Robins, 1999, p. 3) 
Amortisation is the equivalent term of depreciation for intangible assets, but it is not 
explicitly defined in the appropriate standard - FRS 10: Goodwill and intangible 
assets (Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 1999). 
Regarding the time-series properties of depreciation, the following points are 
important. First, the standard notes that the straight line method should be adopted in 
cases where the pattern of consumption of economic benefits in uncertain (Robins, 
1999). This indicates that over the life of a fixed asset and other things being equal, 
the same charge will be applied in all accounting periods and the depreciation charge 
will not change in subsequent periods so that E[ADEP]= 0. Second, the depreciation 
is calculated on the carrying value that depends on three factors: cost (or re-valued 
amount), estimated economic life and residual value (Elliott and Elliott, 2004). If any 
of these factors change, then the depreciation charge will also change in that 
particular year, but it will remain at the same level in subsequent accounting periods 
so that again E[ADEP]= 0.58 Third, and related, even before the introduction of 
FRS 11: Impairment of Fixed Assets and Goodwill companies were carrying fixed 
assets at no more than their recoverable amounts. If an asset is impaired, its carrying 
value is to be written down to net recoverable amount, which is the higher of net 
realisable value and the value in use. Further, the impairment loss is to be measured 
and recognised on a consistent basis (Davies, Paterson and Wilson, 1999, pp. 784- 
812). Therefore, once an impairment loss is recognised, the carrying value is 
58 The exact timing of these effects showing up in the accounts may differ from this perhaps 
oversimplified, example. Robins (1999, p. 4) provides some illustrations of these cases. 
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reduced, followed by a reduction in the depreciation charge. Once this reduction is 
accounted for, there are no further adjustments and again E[ADEP]= 0. A final point 
potentially important for subsequent sections of this research is that at least two 
imPairment indicators are directly related to changes in market values which are used 
as a proxy for economic news: a significant decline in fixed asset's market value and 
a significant increase of market rates of return (effectively the discount rates) that are 
likely to affect the asset's recoverable amount. Moreover, the importance of (the 
growth oo the depreciation charge has been shown to be negatively correlated with 
one period ahead earnings (Ou, 1990). This might be important in that via the 
theoretical links between future earnings and future dividends, the depreciation 
charge may be infon-native about future cash flows. 
While it is difficult to form exact expectations about the time-series 
behaviour of special items SPEC (Panel G) nonetheless because, as follows from its 
definition, it is a collection of potentially very dissimilar items (see, for example, 
Elliott and Shaw, 1988, p. 94, possibly including some non-operating cash flow 
components), empirical literature (e. g., Das and Lev, 1994) suggest that these items 
should be the most transitory type of accruals or the most transitory earnings 
component (Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin, 2002; Elliott and Hanna, 1996; 
Elliott and Shaw, 1988). Since the definition of SPEC used in this study ensures that 
any tax, interest, minorities and preference dividends' accruals as well as cash flows 
resu fing from these items are excluded, to the extent possible, from SPEC, these 
items should contain mostly one-time items like losses and profits on disposals, 
losses and profits on termination of operations, costs of restructurings and 
reorganisations (e. g., Gore, Pope and Singh, 2001, endnote 10), i. e., items that are 
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expected to appear in financial statements only once and in one accounting period. 
Their effects should then reverse. Note that the median of deflated special items in 
the contemporaneous sample is exactly 0.000 and the mean -0.011 (also see other 
descriptive data in Table 4-1), suggesting that inclusions of one-time gains, not only 
one-time losses, are also relatively frequent. Also, these results are somewhat in 
contrast to Elliott and Hanna (1996) who report that 27% of US firms reporting a 
large write-off in one period will report another large write-off in the following 
period, while the results obtained here for the eamings-decreasing changes in SPEC 
suggest almost a full reversal within one period. The results taken as a whole show 
that special items reverse quickly, similar to reversals of working capital accruals. 
The estimated coefficient 4 is reliably negative in 22 out of 33 years. Partitioning 
by sign of ASPEC reveals that positive (eamings-increasing) ASPEC persist much 
longer than negative (earnings-decreasing) ASPEC and about the same as positive 
A(AWCAP). It is also interesting to note that eamings-decreasing ASPEC reverse 
much quicker if the firm has shown a loss after extraordinary and exceptional items 
and/or has been hit by bad economic news as proxied for by returns in the previous 
accounting period t-I . 
59 
In additional analyses shown separately in Appendix F (Table F-2), the 
results for total accruals (Accruals (tot. )) are presented. As the preceding analysis 
shows, the persistence behaviour of the three components of Accruals (tot. ) is quite 
different, especially in terms of asymmetric persistence of eamings-decreasing 
changes of these components. Thus, on average, total accruals reverse quickly to the 
59 Caution needs to be exercised when studying the tests presented in Appendix C. The theoretical 
expectations are not in terms of strict equalities, but inequalities, in particular what regards the 
incremental coefficient A. 
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norm as evidenced by a highly negative 4 coefficient. The estimated incremental 
regression coefficients ^ in all three partitions reveal that eamings-decreasing C02 
changes mean-revert quickly. A comparison of the behaviour of individual 
components with the results on aggregate accruals (Accruals (tot. )) highlights the 
need to study the behaviour of these variables separately. Also, accruals in general 
mean-revert faster (i. e., are less persistent) than operating cash flows (Barth et aL, 
1999). 
As a final note to the persistence models, the results presented above in Table 
4-7 might be useful in forming expectations about contemporaneous models of ex- 
post accounting conservatism. One way of interpreting the decomposition of 
reported accounting earnings into: a) different earnings measures, b) operating cash 
flows and c) accruals, is that these variables all represent empirical measures of 
permanent earnings. Permanent earnings are the theoretical construct modelled in 
Pope and Walker (1999) and are assumed to follow a random walk. Evidence 
presented above - in particular, the "No partition" sections - might be viewed as an 
indicator of the degree to which empirical measures of permanent earnings violate 
the assumption of random walk within each regression by a different accounting 
variable presented in subsequent sections. 
To summarise, operating cash flows are strongly, but not completely mean- 
reverting, and there is no asymmetry in reversals of earnings-increasing and 
decreasing changes. Earnings-decreases overall are strongly mean-reverting, while 
eamings-increases are permanent. The asymmetry is more pronounced for earnings 
figures containing more accruals. While accruals on average mean-revert, the rate of 
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reversal is stronger for eamings-decreasing accruals. This holds particularly for 
working capital accruals and special items, while changes in the depreciation charge 
are permanent. These results are generally as expected under conservative 
accounting. There are, however, some interesting deviations from expectations. 
4.5 CONTEMPORANEOUS POPE AND WALKER (1999) 
MODELS OF EX-POST ACCOUNTXNG CONSERVATXSM 
4.5.1 Inferences from cross-sectional averages 
The results of direct tests of the contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) 
model of ex-post conservatism by different accounting variables are presented in 
Table 4-8. The leftmost column in the table lists the main components of earnings 
and different definitions of earnings used. All coefficients' estimates are cross- 
sectional averages of the estimates of 33 yearly regressions. The t-statistics are 
calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The second column 
in Table 4-8 shows the average number of observations. Given the outlier-removal 
criteria (see section 4.2) the average number of observations is always 784.5 firms 
per year. The actual number of observations ranges from a minimum of 305 firms in 
1969 to a maximum of 1,048 firms in 1998 and 827 firms in year 2001. 
The following model is the operationalised version of the general empirical 
contemporaneous model presented in section 3.3 above: 
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Xf 
=al+a2D,,, -l +A 
PETtj-I + YD,., -, 
RET,, 
-, + el Pt-I 
(4-6) 
The main parameters that reflect the effects of accounting conservatism in 
equation (4-6) are the estimated coefficients on good news (A) and, in particular, 
the incremental response of an accounting item to bad news (; ). Given that the Y, 
definitions in terms of the sign of dependent variables varies across different 
dependent variables, the expected values of the three measures of accounting 
conservatism that can be derived from the model in equation (4-6) must be 
considered in absolute values when comparing the magnitudes of these coefficients. 
Thus, under conservative accounting and assuming a particular accounting variable 
(earnings, operating cash flow or accruals components) reflects bad news, the 
expected values of the parameters are as follows: abs(ý )>O for the incremental bad 71 
news coefficient, abs(A+A)>abs(A)>O for the total bad news coefficient and 
A 
abs((A+YXA))>I for the relative total bad news coefficient. For each dependent 
variable, the models where the q2 and yj coefficients are restricted to zero are also 
presented. They represent a base-case scenario to which it is then possible to 
compare the unrestricted versions of the models (e. g., Giner and Rees, 2001), i. e., 
analyse the effects of the non-linearity in the accounting figure-returns models 
introduced in this relation by conservative accounting. If asymmetric timeliness is an 
important feature of a given accounting figure, then the differences between the R 2s 
from restricted and unrestricted versions of the model should be significant. 
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Formally, the test hypothesis of no difference between the restricted and 
unrestricted versions of contemporaneous models can be stated in the following 
alternative form (e. g., Baltagi, 1998, pp. 78-81; Gujarati, pp. 266-273): 
114: At least one of the coejficients a and P is differentfrom zero. 2 ri 
The test statistic is 
( J? 2 2 
F. = . uR-R,, 
)Im 
, n-k 2 (I - Rý. ) 1(n - k) 
(4-7) 
where R2 uR and R2 Rdenote the R 
2S from unrestricted and restricted versions of the 
models respectively, m is the degrees of freedom in the restricted model and equals 
to the number of linear restrictions imposed on the unrestricted model, and (n-k) is 
the number of degrees of freedom in the unrestricted version (the difference between 
the number of observations in each cross-section for each accounting variable n and 
the number of independent variables, including the constant, k). 60 The tests for 
lagged models are straightforward extensions of the above test. 
The results of estimation of contemporaneous models are presented in Table 
4-8 and are discussed below by groups of dependent variables, operating cash flows, 
earnings and accruals. For reasons of tractability of presentation, the aggregate 
results of the formal tests of significance of differences between the restricted and 
60 Alternative test of differences between restricted and unrestricted versions of the models include the 
LR, Wald and LM tests. A summary is presented in, for example, Maddala (2001, pp. 116-122 and 
pp. 176-177). Given that these issues, while yielding important additional insights, are not critical to 
these tests are not used. 
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unrestricted versions are presented separately in Appendix G, but are commented on 
below when deemed necessary. 
Operating cash flows. The estimated coefficient on good news (ft, ) in the 
operating cash flows (OCT) equation is positive as expected, indicating that part of 
the current-period good news is settled (realised) in cash and captured by the 
operating cash flows figure in the current accounting period. Operating cash flows 
incorporate only current realised economic gains and realised economic losses. They 
do not incorporate either future (unrealised or anticipated) economic gains or losses. 
Therefore, asymmetric timeliness should not be observed in operating cash flows in 
respect to bad news. As either good or bad news is gradually realised over time, its 
effect is incorporated in operating cash flows on an equally timely basis. The first 
rows in Table 4-8 confirm this expectation. The incremental coefficient on bad news 
(P, ) is not statistically different from zero. Also, there is little difference between the 
R 2S for the restricted and unrestricted versions of the models. In statistical terms, the 
difference is significant in II out of 33 individual cross-sections, but even where the 
differences are statistically significant, they appear to be economically marginal. 
This is taken as yet another indication that asymmetric timeliness does not play an 
important role in the relation between operating cash flows and returns. 
A measure of total cash flows, defined as the net change in cash (ACASH) 
was also used as the dependent variable to provide some comparatives with existing 
literature. For example, Dechow (1994) uses a measure of total cash flows and Basu, 
(1997) attempts to construct a measure of cash flow from operating and investment 
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Table 4-8: Contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models of ex-post accounting conservatism, 
1969-2001 
Dependent variables avg. n et, et2 R2 - 
ft, 
+ it (ft, +, v A 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 784.5 0.222 0.108 0.051 
14.811 10.871 6.973 
784.5 0.227 0.002 0.101 0.046 0.057 0.147 1.459 
14.920 0.248 8A33 1.724 8.000 
Earnings 
OP 784.5 0.192 0.135 0.147 
10.921 13.621 11.725 
784.5 0.209 -0.001 0.100 0.139 0.163 0.239 2.381 
11.208 -0.147 8.169 7.157 14.430 
ORD 784.5 0.086 0.086 0.172 
12.329 17.510 13.259 
784.5 0.099 0.002 0.058 0.120 0.199 0.178 3.051 
15.072 0.638 9.637 11.194 16.295 
EARN 784.5 0.078 0.097 0.140 
9.843 17.820 13.048 
784.5 0.095 0.004 0.058 0.174 0.171 0.232 3.980 
13.836 1.370 10.327 11.958 16.426 
Accruals 
, dWCAP 784.5 0.044 0.041 
0.012 
4.633 8.177 6.367 
784.5 0.054 -0.001 0.017 0.084 0.018 0.100 6.065 
5.891 -0.233 2.140 4.090 7.642 
AWCAP components: 
- of which ADebtors 784.5 0.055 0.051 0.018 
7.057 11.629 10.135 
784.5 0.061 0.003 0.034 0.082 0.023 0.117 3.410 
8.172 0.813 6.321 3.214 10.679 
- of which AStock 784.5 0.049 0.044 0.016 
4.671 8.486 6.924 
784.5 0.056 -0.001 0.029 0.056 0.020 0.085 2.937 
5.335 -0.317 4.746 3.281 8.087 
- of which ACreditors 784.5 -0.060 -0.054 0.018 
-6.850 -10.459 8.094 
784.5 -0.063 -0.003 -0.046 -0.055 0.021 -0.101 2.173 
-7.281 -0.813 -7.754 -2.310 9.360 
DEP 784.5 -0.077 -0.015 0.016 
-17.798 -6.231 4.963 
784.5 -0.076 -0.002 -0.017 0.008 0.020 -0-010 0.563 
-17.657 -0.795 -5.548 1.011 5.813 
SPEC 784.5 -0.009 0.004 0.012 
-3.843 1136 4.913 
784.5 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 0.056 0.024 0.049 -6.914 
-1.913 1.853 -2.107 6.957 6.182 
Notes. Estimated models are: XWP,. i- at+a2D,.,. i+ARET,,. i+, *ID,,. IRET,,,,, +Q where X, is an undefiated, per share dependent 
variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARIV is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, JWCAP is 
working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, AStock is change in stock, Xreditors is change in creditors 
accounts, DEP is depreciation and arnortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RET,.,., - (Pr-P#-iYP,, i and D,,., - It if 
RET,., 
-i: 50; 0 otherwise), All variables are deflated 
by opening share price P,.,. Avg. n is the average number of observations 
per year. All coefficients' estimates and Jes are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and associated t-statistics are 
calculated according to the Farna and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 33-1- 
_32 
d. f., i. e., ltl>2.0369. 
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activities. Both of these two cash flow measures provide a measure of firm 
performance that does not contain accruals. Assuming possible empirical 
"contaminations" of the cash flows figure with accruals in constructing the OCF 
figure either for the purposes of this research or at, the finn level, the ACASH 
variable should exhibit even less asymmetry than the OCF measure. Results indicate 
that the bad news incremental coefficient (ý ) is in fact not statistically different Y, 
from zero and of the wrong sign (p = -0.049) and the total coefficient on bad news Y, 
is +ý=0.037 as compared to 0.147 for the OCF measure. Also, the average R2 71 
from these cross-sectional regressions is very low (R2= 0.025), lower than the 
average R2s in OCF regressions (R 2= 0.057) and much lower than for any of the 
earnings measures employed in this analysis (minimum R 2= 0.163). Moreover, as 
expected, the differences between the restricted and unrestricted versions of the 
models are significant in only 5 individual years. 
Earnings. All three earnings' measures capture a part of current-period good 
news, as indicated by positive A, coefficients in regressions employing the three 
earnings measures as dependent variables. The responsiveness of earnings to good 
news is highest for the OP measure, which is consistent with firms' tendency to pass 
as many of what would otherwise be extraordinary/exceptional gains as possible 
through "ordinary" earnings figures (i. e., "above the line"). Earnings do not 
incorporate 
I 
unrealised (anticipated) economic gains, but they do incorporate 
unrealised economic losses, resulting thus in a more timely performance measure 
than cash flows. Much higher average R 2S compared with R 2S from OCF (and 
WASH) regressions confirm this. The asymmetric timeliness in respect to bad news 
I leo 00 
should increase from OP to ORD to EARN as progressively more accruals are added 
to the operating cash flows to arrive at the earnings figures. Presumably, the accruals 
added from OP to EARN are increasingly of the more non-operating type and are on 
average income reducing, reflecting items like write-offS. 61 This is also evidenced 
from Figure 4-1. This process should also increase the timeliness of various earnings 
figures and be observed by increasing P, coefficients across the three earnings 
variables. Consistent with this expectation, the P coefficient on the EARN variable 71 
is highest, followed, unexpectedly, by the P, coefficient on OP and ORD. The 
relative measures of accounting conservatism (A + PI) /A do, however, increase 
from OP to ORD to EARN as expected under conservative accounting (2.381,3.051 
and 3.980 respectively). Also consistent with expectations is the value of the relative 
conservatism measure for the OCF variable compared to the three values on the 
eamings measures (ft, +P, )/ft, =l. 459, which is sizeably lower than the 
corresponding measures for the three earnings variables. The average adjusted R2s 
drop from ORD to EARN, consistent with exccptionaVextraordinary items being 
transitory in nature (Pope and Walker, 1999) thus causing a less-strong 
contemporaneous association between market and accounting values. Finally, to 
confirm these observed relations, the importance of allowing differences between the 
restricted and unrestricted versions should increase from OP to ORD to EARN as the 
asymmetric recognition becomes more and more important. This appears in fact the 
case (see Appendix G). The numbers of times the differences in R2s between 
rcstnctc and unrestricted versions are significant increase across the three measures 
(23,27 and 28 of the 33 years in the sample). 
61 These accruals should be captured by the special items variable SPEC by definition. See section 4.2 for the definition of special items SPEC and a discussion of the components of these items. 
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Taking the ORD and EARN variables from this study, the estimates of the 
ft, 
and P coefficients in this study are generally lower than in Pope and Walker (1999) 71 
both overall and when relevant sub-periods from their sample are considered (1976- 
1996,1976-1992 and 1993-1996) using the sub-sets of data from present samples. 
One of the possible explanations for these differences is the smaller ranges of both 
dependent and independent variables used in this study (see the descriptives in 
section 4.3 and Table C-1 in Appendix Q reflecting thus less extreme economic 
events, but may also be due to the composition of the sample. In particular, any 
systematic differences between -December and non-December fiscal year ends 
(section 5.4 presents evidence on these differences), differences in some variable 
definitions (most notably the earnings figure EARN) and others. The tenor of the 
results and the conclusions remain, however, comparable and essentially convey 
equal conclusions. Interestingly, for both earnings measures and all three sub- 
periods, the average R 2S for the relevant sub-period in this study are marginally 
lower than in Pope and Walker's (1999) study, even though this sample is less 
extreme than theirs. 
Similar conclusions can also be made in respect to Giner and Rees (2001) 
paper using EARN figure for earnings and the 1990-1998 sup-period and the Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000) study using ORD earnings figure and the 1985-1995 sub- 
period. Both good and bad news coefficients are lower, but the average adjusted R' is 
higher in this study. Again, this is likely due to narrower ranges of data used in this 
study and possibly to systematic differences between December and non-December 
fiscal-year-end fin-as. 
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Accruals. Of the three main groups of accruals used in this study, working 
capital accruals, A WCAP, exhibit the highest - asymmetric sensitivity to bad news, 
followed by special items SPEC and the depreciation charge DEP that is 
symmetrically sensitive to bad and good news. Overall, AWCAP capture a higher 
proportion of bad news than SPEC. This is an interesting finding, given that SPEC- 
like variables would usually be discussed in greater detail in related research. 
The sign of the bad news coefficient P, in the AWCAP equation is positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that bad news (negative returns) is partially 
reflected in a reduction of net working capital (either debtors and stock accounts 
decrease or creditors accounts in the balance sheet increase or a combination of both 
A 
applies). This in turn reduces earnings. The estimated good news coefficientAin 
the A WCAP equation is also positive - good news causes stock and debtors accounts 
to increase and/or creditors' accounts in the balance sheet to decrease resulting in an 
increase in earnings. This is in contrast with Basu (1997) who argues that 
"... both increases and decreases in gross accounts receivable are reflected quickly in 
earnings" (p. 16) 
and that all such accruals should attenuate (bias towards zero) the asymmetric 
timeliness observed in the earnings figure. Contrary to this expectation, the results in 
Table 4-8 show that a significant proportion of the asymmetric sensitivity of 
earnings to contemporaneous bad news is due to working capital accruals. The high 
value of the relative measure of accounting conservatism highlights the asymmetric 
timeliness of working capital accruals (ftj+, vP, )/ft, =6.065 compared with the 
coefficient from the EARN regression of 3.980. 
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To investigate this issue further, the aggregate net working capital accruals is 
decomposed 'into its main operating constituents: debtors, stock and work in 
progress, and creditors so that AWCAP-- ADebtors+AStock-Wreditors- 
62 As 
expected, all three working capital components exhibit a strong asymmetric 
sensitivity to contemporaneous bad news. The change in debtors accounts Mebtors 
exhibits the highest asymmetry (both incrementally and in total), followed by the 
change in stock and work in process AStock and the change in creditors accounts 
(ACreditors). Note that the sign of the J in the regression of returns on dCreditors Y, 
variable should be inverted to interpret and compare the results with the other two 
AWCAP components. This relative "ranking" of the AWCAP components is 
somewhat unexpected given that Thomas and Zhang (2002) find that inventory 
changes exhibit a "consistent and substantial relation with future returne' (also, 
Bernard and Noel, 1991, find that some components of the aggregate stock and work 
in process variable are useful in predicting future sales, another possible measure of 
perfonnance). This finding does not bear on the overall results for these earnings 
components. The results regarding working capital accruals thus indicate that both 
aggregate working capital accruals (AWCAP) and its three main individual 
components have an important role in the observed asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings between good and bad economic news. 
The depreciation and amortisation charge (DEP) exhibits no asymmetry in 
response to current bad news and an economically weak, albeit statistically 
significant, response to current period's good news. This suggests that both increases 
62 A very early discussion of the lower-cost-or-market inventory valuation associated explicitly with 
conservatism is Scott (1926). 
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and decreases in fixed assets take some time to be realised and captured by financial 
statements. Good news in respect to fixed assets and depreciation charge can take on 
two forms. On the one hand, the negative sign of the good news coefficient 
ft, 
suggests that good news is associated with increased asset base, which in turn 
increases the depreciation expense, and not with extended life of fixed assets. The 
extended life of existing fixed assets would result in a decrease, rather than an 
increase, in the depreciation expense DEP since the remaining book value of the 
asset would be spread over a larger number of years (Elliott and Elliott, 2004). New 
net investment would, on the other hand, increase the amount of depreciable assets, 
increase the depreciation expense and lower current and future earnings more. That 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings is not due to the depreciation expense is also 
evidenced by a very low absolute value of the total coefficient on bad news 
abs(A+p )=0.010, a very low relative total coefficient (A +P )/A= 0.563, and by 71 Y, 
the fact that the restricted and unrestricted versions of the regressions produce almost 
identical results - the differences are significant in only 6 cases, but again these 
differences appear to be more in statistical rather than economic tenns. 
Special items (SPEC) as an accrual component should capture an important 
part of the observed asymmetric timeliness in earnings. While the results in Table 
4-8 show that SPEC indeed captures a significant proportion of the observed 
asymmetric sensitivity of earnings to current-period bad news, the coefficient is 
lower than the corresponding coefficient on A WCAP and the ADebtors component. 
The sign of the P, coefficient in the SPEC-equation is positive, indicating that more 
bad news is associated with higher (i. e., more negative) SPEC that in turn reduces 
earnings more. This is consistent with bad news being passed in a significant part 
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through extraordinary and/or exceptional items within the current accounting period. 
The sign of the good news coefficient A is, on the other hand, negative. This would 
suggest that good news results in an economically small, albeit statistically 
significant reduction of earnings. This conclusion is consistent with the results 
presented in Table 4-5, where differences in bivariate correlations among RET and 
accruals split by good/bad news suggested different roles for accruals for good/bad 
news observations. Both the total and the relative bad news coefficient are consistent 
with predictions under conservative accounting. High asymmetric timeliness of 
SPEC is also evidenced by a comparison of the restricted and unrestricted versions 
of regressions. In particular, the average R2 almost doubles from one version to the 
other and the increase is statistically significant in 15 individual cross-sections. 63 
As a final check of the relations described above, regressions are also run on 
total accruals as the dependent variable (Accruals (tot. )) (results are shown in 
Appendix F, Table F-3). The results indicate that the asymmetric timeliness is 
highest if all accruals components are merged into one variable. This is to -be 
expected, given that the aggregate measure likely captures different aspects of 
accounting conservatism. This is directly consistent with the differences between 
cash flow and eamings measures. 
To sum up, the results in this sections show and reconfinn that accounting 
conservatism is an important feature of the accounting earnings figures. The more 
accruals an earnings measure contains, the more asymmetric timeliness with respect 
to incorporation of bad news it exhibits. The results highlight the important role 
63 See, however, section 4.5.2 for a discussion of the size of R 2S compared to R2 in earnings 
regressions. 
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working capital accruals and special items in this asymmetric timeliness. (Operating) 
cash flow measures are not affected by this phenomenon, as expected, given that this 
accounting measure contains no accruals. 
4.5.2 Accruals and low 
R2s 
If accruals make earnings more timely in reflecting value-relevant 
information, this should be reflected in increasing R2s as more accruals are added to 
I operating cash flows to arrive at accounting earnings and the timeliness increases. 
64 
For example, in Table 4-8, the R 2S for the ordinary earnings and earnings after 
exceptional and extraordinary items (EARN) are more than three times higher than 
2f 2S in accruals' regressions the average R rom the OCF regression. However, the R 
are very low, too, ranging from 0.018 to a maximum of 0.024. This appears to be 
inconsistent with accruals making earnings more timely than cash flows, since more 
timeliness by definition implies more economic news in accounting earnings, a 
greater correspondence between returns and earnings and thus a higher R2. 
One possible explanation of low observed R 2S in accruals' regressions is the 
measurement error in dependent variables. In this study, measurement error might be 
introduced in dependent variables in the case of working capital accruals variables 
had these variables been calculated as balance-sheet differences (Hribar and Collins, 
2002). This would have the effect of lowering the R2s and leaving the estimated 
64 Counter to the increasing R 2S is the presence of "transitory items" which lower the R2 (Pope and 
Walker, 1999). 
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ft, and P, coefficients in models in equation (4-6) above unbiased (unattenuated). 
However, balance-sheet differences are not employed in the regressions in this thesis 
to calculate accruals. The data on accruals is taken directly from cash flow or funds 
flow statements. Even in the early sample years, there are some weak indications that 
the accruals data was not simple balance sheet differences (e. g.,, Cadbury 
Schweppes, 1969), 
The second, incomplete, partial and only conceptual explanation might be the 
following. The unrestricted (piece-wise) linear regressions whose results are 
presented in Table 4-8 are derived from the respective restricted versions by 
allowing the incremental response for non-positive returns. The restricted "reverse" 
models in Table 4-8 are derived by reversing what would be the equivalent of 
traditional returns-on-earnings models (or, generally, returns on any accounting 
performance measure) to arrive at these "reverse" models where accruals are 
regressed on returns, disregarding the sign of returns. 65 In these reverse bivariate 
models, the R2s are functionally related to the estimated regression coefficient and 
the variance ratio (VR). 66 
To derive this explanation, assume the following general simple (bivariate) 
regression model, where an accounting performance measure (1) is regressed on 
returns: 
63 Note, however, that these simple "unreversed" bivariate regressions can always be estimated 
separately for two sub-samples, the good news and bad news sub-samples. The term "simple" relates 
merely to the fact that the models themselves do not allow for this asymmetry by incorporating a 
dummy variable indicating the two (or more) sections. 
"These models are then augmented to allow for the asymmetric responsiveness of various accounting 
measures to good/bad news. 
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y VI + V2RETj + u, (4-8) 
In this regression, the R2 is a function of the estimated regression coefficient 02 and 
the variance ratio, defined as the ratio between the variance of the independent 
variable (returns, RET) and the variance of the dependent variable (1), 
var(REY)/var(l): 
R2^2 var(RET) V2 ' 
var(Y) 
(4-9) 
For a more timely accounting performance measure Y, the variance ratio 
should be lower, which would lead, other things being equal, to a lower, rather than 
to a higher R2. This is because more timeliness implies a greater proportion of 
variability in economic news (var(RET)) must be explained by the variability of the 
accounting measure (var(l)). Therefore, if the accounting system is conservative, 
then the variability of the accounting performance measure should increase towards 
the variability of returns (var(Y)-war(RE7)) as the measure Y becomes more timely 
and the variance ratio towards unity (VR->I) as the timeliness property of Y 
increases. Note that in Pope and Walker's (1999) model this would imply that news 
is recognised without a lag and the 02 coefficient would equal (Ilk), the cost of 
capital. 
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Replacing the accounting measure Y with a generic version of accounting 
eamings (E): 
67 
Ei = y, + y2RET, + u, (4-10) 
the R2 in such a regression is a function of the estimated regression coefficient PY2 
and the variance ratio, defined here as the ratio between the variance of returns and 
the variance of earnings, var(RED/var(E): 
var(RET) 
var(E) 
(4-11) 
This variance ratio can be decomposed further. Assuming accounting 
earnings has two main components, the operating cash flow and accruals so that E= 
OCF + A, the variance of earnings var(E) in equation (4-11) consequently depends 
on the variance of the earnings' two constituent parts, namely the variance of 
accruals var(A) and the variance of operating cash flows var(OCF), as well as the 
covariance between accruals and operating cash flow cov(EOCF). Thus the variance 
ratio in equation (4-11) can be decomposed into: 
var(RET) 
- 
var(RET) var(RET) (4-12) 
var(E) var(OCF + A) var(OCF) + var(A) + 
2roCF. 
A CrOCF 6A 
6' The terms accruals, earnings, operating cash flows and returns are used here in generic terms and 
they are not following the empirical definitions from section 4.2. The assumption that E=A+ OCF is 
however maintained. 
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where aOcF and aA are the standard deviations of OCF and A and rOCFA denotes the 
simple bivariate correlation coefficient between OCF and A. Ball, Kothari and Robin 
(2000) view OCF as a noisier measure of performance than earnings and thus 
GOCF>CFE and var(OCF)>var(E). Also, by definition, var(A)>O. If the denominators 
on the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) of equation (4-12) are to be 
equal, the variability of operating cash flows, var(OCF), and the additional 
variability of accruals, var(A)>O, must be reduced by the strong negative 
contemporaneous correlation between accruals and operating cash flows rocF. A<O. 
This requirement follows from the relation var(E)<var(OCF). If there were no other 
terms apart from those related to OCF, the equality between the LHS and RHS of (4- 
12) would have been violated. Since var(A) itself only further increases this 
difference, the term (2-rOCF. A'aOCrCTA)must be the component of the denominator on 
the RHS of (4-12) that causes earnings to be less variable than cash flows and in 
particular the correlation coefficient roCFA (the other two tenns in the third factor in 
the denominator on the RHS of (4-12) are positive). This leads to a lower 
denominator, a higher variance ratio and a higher R2. In other words, earnings are 
more timely than cash flows, because accruals anticipate a part of future cash flows. 
By definition, they offset the negative autocorrelation in operating cash flows and 
I 
this result in a smoother time-series of earnings. 68 
The strong and negative correlation between operating cash flows and 
accruals is well established theoretically and empirically (e. g., Dechow, 1994, 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998). That rOCF. A << 0 can also be observed from the 
68 The term autocorrelation is used to indicate lagged correlation of a variable with itself as opposed 
to the term serial correlation to indicate lagged correlation between two different time series (eg. 
between variables At and OCF$., ). This distinction is often not rnade (Gujarati, 2003, p. 443), but it 
might be useful to make this distinction within this explanation. 
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descriptives of the empirical variables in this study. Simple bivariate correlations are 
presented in Table 4-4 and standard deviations in Table 4-1 (Panel A). 
Turning next to the model where accruals are regressed on returns and where 
the accruals are defined by the identity A=E- OCF: 
a, + a2RET+ w (4-13) 
Decomposition of the R2 in this regression in a way similar to the decomposition of 
the R2 in the earnings regression above, rearranging the order of the tenns in the 
denominator, yields the following expression for the variance ratio: 
var(RET) var(RET) 
= 
var(RET) (4-14) 
var(A) var(E-OCF) var(OCF)+var(E)-2rocF, EaocFaE 
Comparing first the LHSs of (4-14) and (4-12), assume first that var(E) is 
lower than var(A), leading to a higher VR and a celeris paribus higher R2. Next, note 
that the denominators in both equations start with the variance of operating cash 
flows, var(OCF). To this variance, var(A) is added in (4-12) and var(E) in (4-14). If 
there were no further terms in the denominators of both equations, the denominator 
in (4-14) would be lower than the denominator in (4-12), leading to a higher VR and 
a higher R2s, reasonably assuming that var(E)<var(A) (given the observation that 
earnings is a smoother performance measure due to accruals that offset variability in 
operating cash-flow time-series (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000), it is to be expected 
that var(E)<var(A)). If, however, this is not the case - in fact, the observed empirical 
R2 show quite the opposite - this must be a result of the third terms in both 
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equations, and in particular the respective correlation coefficients. In (4-12) the 
correlation coefficient rOCF. A is expected to be very high in absolute terms and 
negative, thus more than offsetting the sum var(OCF)+var(A) to arrive finally at the 
relatively low var(E), high VR and high R2 in eamings-on-returns regressions. This is 
because accruals offset negative serial correlation in operating cash flows to produce 
a smoother earnings figure (Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998; Dechow, 1994). In 
(4-14), on the other hand, while starting with a comparably lower sum of variances 
var(OC, F)+var(E) due to the assumption that var(E)<var(A) compared to (4-12), the 
third term (particularly due to the correlation coefficient rOCFE), subtracts relatively 
little from the sum var(OCF)+var(E), thus leaving the denominator relatively high, 
the VR relatively low and, consequently, leading ceteris paribus to a relatively low 
R2, too. Therefore, because of the nature of accounting numbers, the (relatively) low 
R2S in regressions where accruals act as dependent variables are to be expected if 
accruals have the role of making earnings more timely than cash flows 
The empirical observations in, this research (see Table 4-4 and Table 4-1) 
regarding the magnitudes of the variabilities and correlations of (between pairs oO 
operating cash flow, earnings and accruals support the assumptions used above. For 
example, the empirical values of the correlation coefficients among some of the 
vanables used in this study are rOCF. Accruals (tot. ýý -0.628 and rocF., dwcAp; -- -0.422 
compared to the rocpEARN= +0.333 (note that only the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are important, because the correlation terms in equations (4-12) and 
(4-14) are of opposite signs). On the other hand, aEARN= +0.122, and 
aAccruals (tol. ýý +0.205 and adwcAp= +0.172. 
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Finally, the empirical results in the preceding section 4.5.1 indicate that the 
R 2S in accruals regressions are only half the R 2S in operating cash flow regressions 
and even slightly lower than in the corresponding net change in cash (, dCASH)- 
regression shown in Appendix F (Table F-3). Using the same analysis, an attempt to 
explain this observation is provided below. 
Starting with the operating cash flow regression where operating cash flows 
are defined by the identity OCF =E-A: 
OCF, =A+fl2RET, + v, (4-15) 
and decomposing the R2 resulting irom this regression similarly to the decomposition 
of the earnings and accruals regressions above, rearranging the order of the tenns in 
the denominator, yields the following expression for the variance ratio: 
var(RET) var(RET) 
= 
var(RET) (4-16) 
var(OCF) var(E-A) var(E)+var(A)-2rE. ACrECrA 
By comparing the accruals-regression's VR in equation (4-14) and the above 
operating cash flow-regression's VR in equation (4-16), it can bebbserved that the 
difference between the two VRs depends on the relative variances of accruals and 
operating cash flows, var(A) and var(OCF), as well as the relative sizes of the 
correlation coefficients rEA and rEocF. While it would be difficult to specify any 
differences in the variability of the two earnings components, there is some evidence 
in the existing literature that var(A)>var(OCF) (e. g., Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 
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1998, Barth and Clinch, 1999, Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 69 Other things being 
equal, these variances would imply a higher denominator on the RHS of (4-16) 
compared to the denominator on the RHS in (4-14). This would lead to a lower VR 
and a lower R2 in operating cash flow regression. Apart from the LHSs of respective 
decompositions, empirical observations are not consistent with this. The second 
important factor must thus be the respective correlation coefficients. Existing 
empirical evidence shows that the correlation of earning with its operating cash flow 
component is generally stronger than the correlation of earnings with its accruals 
component, rE, 0CF>r&A (e. g., Barth, Cram and Nelson, 2001), leading to a higher 
reduction of the sum var(E)+var(OC. F) in (4-14) compared to the reduction of the 
sum var(E)+var(A) in (4-16). Thus, a relatively high denominator on the RHS of (4- 
16) is subject to a relatively lower reduction by the correlations term, which would 
lead to a higher denominator, to a lower VR and a lower R2 compared to the accruals 
regressions. Based on this illustration, it is to be expected that estimation of the 
operating cash flow regressions will lead to lower (not higher) A relative to 
accruals' regressions, but because the the differences between var (OCF) and var (A) 
do not appear very large, the net result of the OCF-regressions is questionable. 
The descriptive data in this study (see Table 4-4 and Table 4-1) shows that 
the expectations depend on the specific type of accruals with which to substitute the 
generic accruals A. For example, rEARN. OCF= +0.333, and rEARN. Accruals +0.405 
69 Caution needs to be exercised when comparing the values of these parameters in this study with 
existing literature. The definitions of variables, deflators, time periods covered and methods of 
calculation (pooled, cross-sectional averages, time-series averages) differ from study to study, in 
some cases significantly. Even within this study, different types of earnings exhibit quite significant 
properties. 
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while rEAw. dwc. 4p= +0.33 1.70 A higher correlation coefficient implies a smaller 
denominator on the RHS of VR in (4-16) and a higher VR, which leads, ceteris 
paribus, to a higher R2. This part of the analysis thus does 'not'provide clear 
predictions regarding relative sizes of R 2S from accruals and operating cash flow 
regressions. 
For completeness, note that the R2 in the operating cash flow regressions, 
given the discussion above, must result in R 2S that are on average lower than the R 2S 
in earnings' regressions. 
Regardless of the explanation provided in this section, Chambers, Jennings 
and Thompson 11,1999) provide an alternative explanation that might be related to 
the observed low R 2S for the equations using DEP as the dependent variable. They 
state that current depreciation expense may not be a good predictor of future fixed 
assets services for several reasons. Among them, they note that the depreciation 
charge depends on estimates of useful life and salvage value of the fixed asset and 
are therefore subject to considerable measurement error. Assuming the error is 
random and noting that the measurement error is in the dependent (not the 
independent) variable, this would result in higher error terms and lower R2S in those 
regressions. 
The relations presented above may help to explain why the R2S in the accruals 
regressions are much lower than in either operating cash flow regressions or earnings 
regressions. The property of accruals to increase the timeliness of cash flows to 
70 It is interesting that rEA)w. ocF= +0.333 and the rEARN. dwcAp= +0.331 coefficients are very close, 
possibly suggesting that both components have equal weighting in arriving at the earnings figure. 
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generate a more timely earnings measure itself causes the accruals regressions to 
have low explanatory power. The fact that a complete discussion of the problem of 
low R 2S in accruals regressions would have to deal with the question of estimated 
regression coefficients 629 Y2 and 62, given that these are likely to differ from one 
regression to the other, is acknowledged. 
4.5.3 Time series of ex-post conservatism 
measures 
Several recent papers report that conservatism has increased over time (e. g., 
Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Klein and Marquardt, 2002; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). To 
study possible changes in accounting conservatism over time in the United 
Kingdom, the following analysis is performed. First, the estimated regression 
coefficients on good news A, estimated incremental coefficients on bad news P,, the 
total coefficient on bad news +P) and the R 2S from the 33 cross-sectional Y, 
regressions on each earnings and earnings component figures used to produce the 
contemporaneous set of results are recovered. These parameters are then used in 
simple linear time-trend regressions of the following type (e. g., Brown, Lo and Lys, 
1999): 
est(parameter. ) = rig + r29 ,+ ýgt (4-17) 
where parameterut is an estimated regression parameter from the contemporaneous 
model in equation (4-6) in section 4.5.1 for year t, i denotes one of the ten dependent 
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variables (earnings, operating cash flows and accruals) in contemporaneous models 
listed in the leftmost column of the results' table below, j denotes the parameter 
(good news, incremental bad news, total bad news and R 2S) used as the dependent 
variable in time-trend regressions and T denotes technical time 
T= (-16,..., 0,..., +16) corresponding to the time interval 1969-2001. This 
definition of technical time ensures that in time-trend regressions the parameter rly 
measures the equally-weighted cross-sectional average of the estimated parameter 
est(parametery) and the parameter r2ij shows the periodical increases in the value of 
est(parameteru). If conservatism is increasing through time, the estimated ý2, 
parameters of regressions (4-17) using estimated parameters from regressions on 
dependent variables that reflect the asymmetric timeliness property (principally the 
estimated P and R2 statistics) should be increasing through time. Y, 
The results of estimating the model in equation (4-17) for all ten dependent 
variables and all three main conservatism measures are presented in Table 4-9. The 
estimated time-trend slope coefficient f2 is increasing through time only for the 
time-series of incremental bad news coefficients P,, from the regressions where 
earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) are employed as the 
dependent variable. The time-trend resulting from the time-series of total coefficients 
on bad news (A+ PI) in EARN-regressions is not statistically significant. Note that 
the EARN figure is the most comprehensive earnings measure employed in this study 
and should therefore reflect all accruals, operating as well as non-operating. 
Consequently, the effects of increasing conservatism through time should be most 
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apparent when evaluating the time-senes of cross-sectional regression coefficients 
on EARN, followed by ORD and OP. Consistent with increasing conservatism 
through time as captured by the movements in j, for the EARN figure, the 
incremental and total coefficients on special items (SPEC) are also increasing 
through time. The R 2S from aforementioned time-trend regressions are high in value 
and highly statistically significant. The time senes of estimated coefficientsA, jjý 
(ft, + ý, ) and the R2 from the 33 cross-sectional regressions of EARN on returns 
andthe time series of total bad news coefficient (ft, + ý, ) of SPEC on returns, are 
plotted in Figure 4-3 to provide an alternative presentation of the movements of 
these parameters through time. 
Figure 4-3: Time-series of estimated good news, incremental bad news, total bad news and R2 from 
earnings (EARN) regressions and total bad news from special items (SPEO regressions, 
1969-2001 
0.45 
0.40 
0.35 
0.30 
0.25 
cl 0.20 
0.15 
0.05 
0. (X) 
-0.05 
--*- (; N (EARN, total) 
Notes to Figure 4-3: BN (EARN, total) is the time series of estimated total parameters on good news, incremental parameters 
on bad news, total parameters on bad news and R' from cross-sectional regressions on earnings after extraordinary and 
exceptional items (EARN) and special items (SPEC). 
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Figure 4-3 further emphasises that the sensitivity of earnings (EARN) to good 
news is declining over time (dark blue line). A statistically significant decline in 
sensitivity to good news can also be observed in Table 4-9 for the operating cash 
flows (OCF) figure, other measures of earnings (OP and, ORD) and some of the 
accruals components (AStock), while for other accruals measures the sensitivity does 
not change over time (it does not increase, though). These findings are consistent 
with recent US literature concerned with declining value relevance of financial 
statements and in particular the profit and loss account (e. g., Ryan and Zarowin, 
2003; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Collins, Maydew and 
Weiss, 1997). 
Conservative accounting should result in large, one-time, transitory items that 
lower the means of earnings variables, but affect the medians only by a very small 
amount, thereby inducing negative skewness of earnings variables (Ball, Kothari and 
Robin, 2000; Givoly and Hayn, 2000). Moreover, the capitalisation of current and/or 
expected economic losses under conservative accounting should result in greater 
variability of the earnings figures. Therefore, if ex-post conservatism is increasing 
through time, this should result in increasing negative skewness of the earnings 
figure relative to the operating cash flow figure and increasing variability of earnings 
relative to operating cash flows throug time. 71 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 present the time-series of cross-sectional skewness 
and standard deviation parameters respectively of operating cash flows (OCF) and 
earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN). Given that conservatism 
71 The cross-sectional characteristics of these accounting items are presented and discussed in section 
4.3. 
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is an accruals phenomenon, the results for the OCF figure should provide a base-case 
scenario of the behaviour through time of accounting figures that is not due to 
accounting conservatism (e. g., varying general economic conditions over the 33 
years). Both figures include a time-series of yearly relative measures for skewness 
and standard deviation statistics respectively. Yearly relatives are defined as: 
Relative(skew)= skew(EARN)Iskew(OC. F) (4-18a) 
and 
Relative(st. dev. )= crmRNIaocF (4-18b) 
If accounting conservatism is increasing through time, the first relative measure 
should decrease over time (i. e., skew(EARN) should become more and more 
negative) and the second measure increase over time (i. e., qEARN should become 
higher and higher, while aoushould not change materially). To assess the statistical 
significance of the time-series movements in cross-sectional estimates of skewness 
and standard deviations, the time-trend model in equation (4-17) above is employed 
analogously by substituting estimated cross-sectional regression coefficients with 
cross-sectional skewness and standard deviations and corresponding relative 
measures defined in (4-18a) and (4-18b). 
Consistent with increasing conservatism through time, the skewness of earnings 
is ncreasing in magnitude - i. e., it is becoming more negative, both in the 
absolute sense and relative to the skewness of the operating cash flow figure. Both 
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trends are statistically significant (see also Table 4-10). The skewness of EARN is 
negative on average and is generally negative in every year after 1974 (except -in 
1979), consistent with the introduction of SSAP 6 Extraordinary items and prior 
year adjustments for fiscal years ending on or after I't January 1974 that required 
extraordinary items to be passed through the profit and loss account rather than 
through reserves (ASC ED, 1985, p. 4) which should induce negative skewness in 
the earnings distribution. The positive skewness of operating cash flows is not 
statistically significantly increasing through time (t-statistics= 1.399), as expected if 
conservatism does not affect this figure . 
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Figure 4-4: Time-series movements of cross-sectional estimates of skewness of operating cash flows 
(OCF) and earnings (EARN) and cross-sectional relative of skewness of Off and 
EARN, 1969-2001 
3.0 
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Notes to Figure 44. OCF (skew) is the time series of cross-sectional skewness measure of the operating cash flow, EARN 
(skew) is the time series of cross-sectional skewness measure of earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items and 
Relative(skew) is defined as skew(EARN)1skewjOCF) for each cross-section. 
72 For completeness, note that an alternative explanation of no change through time might be that even 
though conservatism would be reflected in the OCF figure it would not increase through time. Under 
conservative accounting, this explanation is not likely. 
191 
Ol Q- C4 rn 'IT w% 10 r- 00 0ý 0- (N r) ýt wi 0 r- oC 0, <ý -" ") ýt v% o t- oo r- r- r. - r- r- r- r- r- r- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
Za ZE: ZZ2: 2: aZ2: Z 2: a 2: aZZ a&& 
The absolute variability of earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items 
(CEARN) does not, on average, increase through time. Whilst the time-trend coefficient 
is positive, it is economically marginal and statistically insignificantly different from 
0. This finding is not consistent with accounting conservatism increasing through 
time. It is in contrast with indications presented above (see Table 4-9, Figure 4-3 and 
Figure 4-4). It also contrasts Givoly and Hayn (2000) findings for the US. However, 
strictly speaking, Givoly and Hayn (2000, p. 294) postulate that the variability of 
earnings should increase relative to the variability of operating cash flows rather than 
just increase in the absolute sense. The increases of relative measures of variability 
of earnings versus operating cash flows CEARN 1UOCF 
is consistent with increasing 
conservatism through time in the UK. 
Figure 4-5: Time-series movements of cross-sectional estimates standard deviations of operating cash 
flows OCF and earnings EARN and the cross-sectional relative of standard deviation of 
OCF and EARN, 1969-2001 
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Notes to Figure 4-5: OCF (std. Dev. ) is the time series of cross-sectional standard deviations of operating cash flow from the 
cross-sectional means, EARN(std. Dev. ) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of earnings after extraordinary and exceptional 
items and Relalive(std. Dev) is defined as skeMEARN) / skew(Off) for each cross-section. 
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The time-series movements of cross-sectional estimates of skewness and 
standard deviations of other accounting variables used in this study are presented in 
Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10: Time-series of skewness and standard deviations of earnings and earnings components, 
1969-2001 
Skewness Standard deviation 
Skewness (std. dev. ) of variable: 
fly f2y R2 fIq 
f2U R2 
t-stat. t-stat. F-stat. t-stat. t-stat. F-stat. 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 1.495 0.011 0.059 0.223 -0.004 0.287 
20.414 1.399 1.957 22.628 . 3.528 12.448 
Earnings 
OP 1.105 -0.031 0.265 0.152 -0.003 0.342 12.351 -3.347 11.200 20.740 4.012 16.093 
ORD -0.015 -0.076 0.563 0.087 0.000 0.056 
-0.131 -6.325 40.007 28.001 . 1.360 1.850 
EARN -0.771 -0.094 0.626 0.110 0.000 0.014 
-6.213 -7.204 51.900 26.577 0,665 
0.443 
Accruals 
. dWCAP 0.134 -0.031 0.261 0.162 -0.004 
0.407 
1.530 -3.306 10.932 21.715 4.614 21.289 
AWCUP components: 
of which ADebtors 1.635 -0.028 0.012 0.169 -0.004 0.363 
3.665 -0-607 0.369 19.519 4.206 17.689 
of whichdStock 0.934 0.018 0.013 0.155 -0.004 0-355 
3.457 0.647 0.419 16.384 4.135 17.097 
of whichdCreditors -1.656 0.028 0.018 0.193 -0.004 0.286 
4.677 0.759 0.575 16.756 -3.526 12.434 
DEP -2.624 -0.030 0.156 0.071 -0.001 0.124 
-21.617 -2.389 5.709 24.208 -2.093 4.391 
SPEC -1.597 -0.052 0.254 0.069 0.001 0.076 
-IOA74 -3.249 10.553 19.975 1.601 2.563 
Relatives 
ORDIOCF -0.022 -0.048 0.536 0.404 0.005 0.620 
-0.290 -5.890 35.760 58-870 7.113 50.580 
EARNIOCF -0.533 -0.054 0.531 0.516 0.011 0.831 
-6-091 -5.921 35.061 62.093 12.327 151.959 
AWCAPIOCF 0.123 -0.020 0.231 0.721 -0.005 0.461 
2.005 -3.055 9.330 78.622 -5.152 26.550 
SPECIOCF -1.079 -0.025 0.150 0321 0.009 0.808 
-10.771 -2.336 5.460 44.097 IIA17 130.330 
Notes. The estimated regressions are: est(statisticu, )- TO+t2o T+ý#t where statistiq, is either the cross-sectional skewness 
or the standard deviation statistic denoted by J. i is one of the ten dependent variables and four relatives of these 
variables and T denotes technical time T- (-16,... 0, +16). Below each of the rju and r2U coefficients is the time-trend t- 
statistics and below the R 2S is the F-statistic. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better (critical values are 
k. -oo5(31 d. f)= 2.040 and Faw(l d. f., 31 d. f. )= 4.160. Relatives are defined as Relative- statisticy4variableAY 
statisticu, (variableocF). 
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The table also includes some of the more important relative skewness and standard 
deviations measures discussed above. 
Overall, the time-series changes in cross-sectional estimates of the 
parameters in the contemporaneous model and some descriptive statistics provide 
some supporting evidence consistent with increasing ex-post accounting 
conservatism through time. In particular, the sensitivity of earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) and of the accruals associated most with 
accounting conservatism (SPEC) to bad news is increasing. Time-series changes in 
some of the descriptive statistics of accounting variables 'and in particular the 
relatives of most of the cum-accruals accounting variables are also consistent with 
increasing accounting conservatism through time. Most notably, there is a significant 
trend in increasing skewness of AWCAP and SPEC, the two main types of accruals 
used in this study, relative to skewness in OCF (and also in the absolute sense). This 
is complemented by increasing variability of SPEC, either in the absolute or relative 
sense. However, there is some evidence of decreasing variability (e. g., of the 
A WCAP variable). Thus, while the evidence presented above supports the conclusion 
of increasing conservatism through time, the evidence is much less persuasive than 
in the comparable US research indicates (e. g., Klein and Marquardt, 2002; Givoly 
and Hayn, 2000). 
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4.6 , LAGGED MODELS OF ACCOETNTXNG CONSERVATXSM 
Pope and Walker (1999) extend their contemporaneous model of accounting 
conservatism to study the speed with which prior periods' news flow through to 
earnings. The number of previous periods is limited to three lags. This is because 
existing research has shown that prices lead earnings by up to three periods (e. g., 
Kothari and Sloan, 1992) and Donnelly and Walker (1995) for the UK indicate that it 
might be shorter. In this section, accounting earnings is decomposed, as in the 
contemporaneous models, into its operating cash flows and accruals components and 
use each of these variables in deflated, per share form as dependent variables in 
lagged Pope and Walker (1999) models of accounting conservatism. The model 
presentpd in scction 3.4 is opcrationaliscd as follows: 
33 Xt 
=a, +a2D, -,, t-, -, +I j6r+l 
PET, 
-,. t-, -, +E 
PET, 
-,,, -, -, + e, 
(4-19) 
PI-4 
T. 0 r-O 
A Under conservative accounting, the estimated good news coefficientsA to 
ft4 are expected to increase monotonically towards the cost of capital (Ilk), while 
the coefficient P, should immediately capture the effect of current-period bad news, IV, 
but the estimated incremental bad news coefficients P to P, should all equal zero Y2 Y4 
(or are at least expected to decay towards zero relatively quickly). As with the 
contemporaneous versions, the total response to bad news in period (t-r, 
t-r-I) is given by the sum (ftr+l +P, +, ) and abs(p, +, +P, +, )>abs(ft, +, )>0. 
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All models are shown in both restricted and unrestricted versions, the 
restrictions referring, as earlier, to whether the models allow for the incremental 
effects between bad and good (lagged) economic news. In the restricted version, the 
a2and vj to y4are restricted to zero. If asymmetric timeliness is an important feature 
of a particular accounting figure, the difference in R2s between the two versions will 
be significant. The significance is formally tested by employing, the F-test (see 
section 4.5.1, equation (4-7)). Aggregate results for these F-tests are shown in 
Appendix G. 
As in previous tables, the leftmost column of Table 4-11 shows the main 
components of earnings and different definitions of earnings. For each of these 
accounting variables, first the restricted version is presented followed by the 
73 
unrestricted versions. All coefficients' estimates shown are cross-sectional 
averages of the estimates of 33 individual yearly regressions. The t-statistics are 
calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The second column 
in Table 4-11 shows the average number of observations. Given the outlier-removal 
criteria (see section 4.2), the average number of observations is in all ten cases 622.3 
firms per year, but the actual number of observations ranges from a minimum of 276 
firms in 1969 to a maximum of 777 firms in 1995 and 663 firms in year 2001, the 
last year included in the sample. The results are discussed by groups of variables. 
Operating cash flows. The good news coefficients for the operating cash 
flows (OCF) ft, to P^, 4 increase monotonically through time, as expected. There is no 
asymmetric timeliness in OCF in respect to bad news either in the current period or 
73 The restricted versions are not commented separately and are presented only to provide 
comparability with other results in this thesis and other exsiting literature. 
196 
at any of the three lags, consistent with conservatism being an accruals rather than a 
cash flow phenomenon. Also consistent with contemporaneous results is the much 
lower R2 compared to the earnings' equations. Further confirmation that asymmetric 
timeliness is not a feature of operating cash flows is that the F-test indicates 
statistically significant differences only in 9 out of 33 years. Appendix F (Table F-3) 
also presents results for the net change in cash (ACASH) variable with the 
differences entirely in the spirit of the contemporaneous models. 
Earnings. Starting with the earnings after extraordinary and exceptional 
items (EARN) and good economic news, the results show that the estimated good 
news coefficients A to ft, increase monotonically towards the cost of equity capital 
as the lag increases. More and more of the original good news is realised and 
incorporated into financial statements, the coefficients increase towards the cost of 
capital and the difference between reported and pennanent earnings due to 
conservative accounting gradually decreases to zero. The incremental coefficients on 
bad news, on the other hand, decay monotonically towards zero and by lag three the 
incremental coefficient j, is statistically insignificantly different from zero, as 
expected - bad news originating from previous periods has already been fully 
impounded in accounting earnings. This is consistent with most of the effects of bad 
news being incorporated in earnings in the period they occur. The R2 for the 
unrestricted model is higher than for the restricted model and the difference is 
statistically significant in 26 individual cross-sections, indicating the importance of 
the asymmetric-timeliness effect in EARN. Very similar results are also obtained for 
the ORD earnings measure, except that the R2 is higher, indicating less transitory 
elements are likely being present in this measure than in EARN, as in 
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contemporaneous, models. One important difference between these results and the 
UK cross-sectional results obtained by Pope and Walker (1999, Table 6) is that they 
obtain statistical significance on the bad news coefficients only up to and including 
lag one (i. e., two periods) for both their ORD and EARN variables, while here 
statistical significance for the current period and two lags is obtained. Their results 
are more in line with expectations under conservative accounting. This might be due 
to different sample coverage in terms of years covered and in terms of sample 
composition in terms of descriptive statistic, but might also be due to a partial 
overlap of sample years. It must be reiterated that the length of a particular 
accounting year is allowed to differ from one calendar year by up to ±3 months, thus 
causing partial overlap in adjacent calendar years. Even without this difference, 
another important contribution to this difference might be the fact that non- 
December year-ends are allowed in the sample, thus automatically causing one 
accounting year to extend over two calendar years. 
Regarding operating profit (OP), the results for good news are consistent 
with the results for the other two earnings measures, i. e., the good news coefficients 
increase monotonically towards the cost of capital, while for the bad news only the 
current-period bad news coefficient ý, is statistically significant, indicating that to Y, 
the extent that the accruals' components in this measure capture (some of) the effect 
of bad news, it is incorporated immediately in the period it occurs. This measure is 
least likely to include any non-operating accruals. This should be mirrored by 
working capital accruals (, dWCAP) (see below). Also, of the three earnings 
measures, the unrestricted versions differ in statistical terms in only 17 years, as 
opposed to the EARN regressions (26 years). 
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Accruals. The asymmetric timeliness exhibited by the earnings figures is 
thus ascribed to the accruals components of earnings, given that the cash flows 
measures indicate no asymmetry in recognition of good and bad news in these 
74 figures. As an aggregate measure, working capital accruals (, dWCAP), captures the 
effects of current bad news within the period it occurs and no further lags are 
statistically significant, consistent with predictions under conservative accounting. 
Further decomposition of AWCAP into its constituent parts reveals that this 
asymmetry is in a significant part due to the AStock component (also see Thomas and 
Zhang, 2002). Inconsistent with the requirement of conservatism that all bad news 
must be impounded immediately in the earnings figure, both the current (y^, ) and lag 
one ( ý2) incremental bad news coefficients on this component are statistically 
significant. Again, the caveat is that this might be a consequence, at least in part, of 
sample construction. The incremental coefficients on current bad news (P, ) on the Y, 
other two AWCAP components are not statistically significant. For completeness, 
A 
note that the lag-one good news coefficient . 
8, is the highest of all four good news 
coefficients in aggregate working capital accruals as well as in its debtors and 
creditors components. This finding is inconsistent with the expectations derived from 
the model that the coefficients on good news should increase monotonically towards 
the cost of capital. Additional checks have been perfonned to ensure this is not a 
result of data or programming irregularities. 
The good news coefficients in the depreciation and mnortisation expense (DEP) 
equation increase monotonically and none of the bad news coefficients are 
74 Basu (1997) and Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) do not study these accruals explicitly and this 
thesis thus represents an important extension of these two studies. 
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statistically significant, consistent with expectations regarding this type of accruals 
(the exception is the last incremental coefficient Y^41which is marginally statistically 
significant, but this significance would be hard to explain in economic terms). In this 
respect it is interesting to note that the current-period good news coefficientAis not 
statistically significant, suggesting a delay in incorporating the effects of good news 
in earnings via depreciation. This suggests that the "implementation" of good news 
via investments in the stock of tangible and intangible fixed assets takes some time 
to be realised - the results obtained suggest an approximately one-year delay 
between the arrival of good economic news, an increase in the stock of fixed assets 
and a consequent increase in the depreciation and amortisation charge. 
Perhaps the most interesting result from the lagged analysis of accruals 
components comes from the special items (SPEC). Only the estimated current-period 
good news coefficient A is statistically significant. It is relatively small compared to 
other accruals and earnings components and of the negative sign, suggesting that a 
unit of current-period good news results in a slight decrease in current-period 
earnings, consistent with the result obtained for the contemporaneous model. 
However, the effect does not persist beyond the current period, indicating that 
earnings-increasing SPECs effect on earnings is entirely transitory. On the other 
hand, the current-period, lag-one and lag-two incremental bad news coefficients are 
statistically significant, suggesting that firms exercise some discretion in recognising 
the effect of bad news in concurrent financial statements. 
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This is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the models of conservatism that "require" 
immediate and full incorporation of bad news in the current period (and allow for 
possible over-incorporation). It is also inconsistent with regulatory calls for more 
(earnings) timeliness, in particular regarding bad economic news (Levitt, 1998). 
They would, however, fit with the earnings management literature. For example, it is 
not inconceivable that management would spread the effect of a bad news over two 
adjacent accounting periods to smooth earnings (e. g., Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 
2003; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Elliott and Waymire, 1988) or they might 
reflect some industry-speciflc circumstances or managers, auditors and legal advisers 
financial reporting preferences (Francis, Hanna and Vincent, 1996; Elliott and 
Hanna, 1996). Also, the significance of these lags exactly corresponds with 
significance of the bad news coefficients in the ORD and EARN measures. Thus, 
while these statistical significances might be due to sample properties, they are also 
consistent with other explanations, earnings management among them. 
To sum up, lagged analysis shows that there is no asymmetry in operating 
cash flows at any lag. The asymmetric timeliness of earnings in respect to bad news 
extends over more lags with increasing content of accruals. In particular, while 
working capital accruals exhibit asymmetric timeliness in incorporating current- 
period bad news, current-period special items reflect bad news from up to two lags. 
While the statistical significance of lagged coefficients is, 'strictly speaking, not 
consistent with conservatism, the statistical insignificance of lag-three bad news 
coefficients show that any deviations are limited in time. 
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4.7 THE EFFECTS OF PERSXSTENCE ON THE 
CONTEMPORANEOUS MODELS OF CONSERVATXSM 
The effect of persistence on contemporaneous models of conservative 
accounting is studied empirically by estimating the following operationalisation of 
the model presented in section 3.8: 
Xt 
=al+a2D,,, -I+ARET#, t-i + yD,,, -, 
RET,,, 
-, Pt-I 
J xt-l +8 
x t- 2 Pt-I 34-1 Pt-I 
(4-20) 
At least three observations regarding the inclusion of persistence tenns that 
help model the Vrtenn in the Pope and Walker (1999) model can be made. First, if 
the inclusion of differential profit/loss or any positive/negative accounting figure 
persistence represents an (imperfect) attempt to model the VI-terin in equation (3-9) 
and this effect of previous periods' news through conservative accounting on current 
accounting numbers is significant, the average estimated regression constants from 
the two models should differ materially between the two sets of results. In particular, 
the estimated regression constants from augmented regressions should be lower on 
average, as these past effects are separated from the cost of capital (and, potentially, 
other unaccounted-for systematic effects). Second, the estimated A and 
P, coefficients that capture the incorporation of current period news into current 
period accounting numbers should not be materially affected. By definition, current- 
period news is not correlated with previous periods' news (all are proxied for by ex- 
dividend returns). This also implies that the interpretations of the conservatism 
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measures based on the model in equation (4-20) are identical to interpretations 
elsewhere in this study. Third, the R 2S in these models should increase either because 
of (a successful) modelling of the Vt term or because the inclusion of these A-83 
terms captures factors, described by the accounting losses literature (e. g., Jan and 
Ou, 1995; Hayn, 1995; Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996; Freeman and Tse, "1992; 
Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998; Burgstahler and Dichev; 1997; etc. ). 
The results are presented below. Both the variant where the LI., variable is 
defined by earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) for all 
different dependent variables and the variant where the Lt-I indicator (as well as the 
persistence variables) are redefined separately for each of the main variables used in 
this study are shown. Table 4-12 shows the results for the first variant. The three 
expectations presented above are supported. Regression constants appear to be 
materially lower, on average, compared to models that do not allow for persistence - 
i. e., that do not model the Vt term. The only exception is the constant in the SPEC 
regression, but even this exception is an exception in statistical, rather than economic 
terms. The coefficients on good and bad news in all ten regressions are not 
materially affected. On average, both the estimated good news coefficientsA and 
the incremental bad news coefficients P, appear to be marginally lower. This might 
be a consequence of imperfect modelling of the V, term that would introduce the 
errors-in-variables problem and bias all regression coefficients towards zero. The 
average R2s are significantly higher (almost double) the size of R2s in regressions 
without the gj-tý tenns. 
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Overall, operating cash flows (OCT) capture news symmetrically. All three 
earnings measures capture bad news significantly faster than good news and the 
asymmetry is highest for the EARN measure, followed by the OP measure and by 
ordinary earnings (ORD). The analysis of accruals shows that most of the asymmetry 
exhibited by earnings can be attributed to working capital accruals (A WCAP) and 
special items (SPEC). The observations on the relative values of the R 2S in accruals 
versus cash flows specifications apply, too. These results are thus in line with the 
contemporaneous results presented in section 4.5. 
The second variant (Table 4-13), where both the Lt-I indicator and the 
(lagged) persistence variables are defined separately for each earnings and earnings' 
components variable, are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to the "bottom- 
line" variant. Operating cash flows (OCF) capture news symmetrically, all three 
earnings measures exhibit a significant asymmetry in capturing bad news and the 
asymmetry is highest for the EARN measure, followed by the OP measure and by 
ordinary earnings (ORD), as in a number of previous analyses. The analysis of 
accruals shows that most of the asymmetry in earnings can be attributed to working 
capital accruals (AWCAP) and special items (SPEC). The effects of deprecation 
accruals (DEP) cannot be studied in this variant, but it is unlikely given previous 
results that it would affect the asymmetric timeliness of earnings significantly. 
An alternative modelling of the Vt term is to include past periods' economic 
news (i. e., price-differences deflated by Pt-1) into the contemporaneous model of 
conservatism in place of the 81-83 terms above. Pope and Walker (1999) include 
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news from three lags, obtaining a variant of the lagged model presented in section 
4.6. The principal expectations from this formulation is that the estimated regression 
coefficients should not be materially affected by this inclusion given that news 
should be uncorrelated across time and that the R 2S should increase, given that the 
regression error term contains the deflated Vt term. However, recently, Ryan and 
Zarowin (2003) ascribe differences between lagged models deflated by Pt-I 
compared to models deflated by Pj-4 to interest rates. This issue is not studied here, 
but some related results are presented in Appendix D (Table D-2). While the results 
are sensitive to the choice of deflators (in particular the coefficients on lagged good 
A 
news . 82 to P4), the principal conclusions regarding contemporaneous terms 
(represented by coefficients ft, and ý, ) are the following. IV, 
Operating cash flows (OCF) does not exhibit asymmetric timeliness in 
incorporating bad news. Of the earnings figures, EARN exhibits the highest 
asymmetric timeliness, followed by OP and by ORD. Compared to the 
contemporaneous results without the VI-term. modelling, the P coefficients on the Y, 
latter two figures are lower, while for the EARN figure the estimated bad news 
coefficient is higher than in the contemporaneous versions (compare with Table 4-8). 
This asymmetry is clearly reflected in working capital accruals (AWCAP) and its 
three components. All coefficients are of expected magnitudes and signs. The other 
important accruals component reflecting news in an asymmetric manner is the 
special items variable (SPEC). Results on the total accruals variable reinforce the 
conclusion reached in earlier sections. The modelling of the V, term thus does not 
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affect qualitatively the current-period coefficients A and y^, and the R 2S increase 
compared to contemporaneous models. 75 
4.8 A COMPARISON OF LOSS AND PROFIT 
OBSERVATIONS 
4.8.1 A short introduction 
Empirical studies on earnings response coefficients have documented that the 
relationship between accounting earnings and market values is different for firms 
with current-period positive earnings relative to finns with current-period negative 
earnings. Taking a somewhat different perspective than in section 2.2.4, the earnings 
response coefficients for observations with positive earnings were found to be much 
higher than earnings response coefficients for observations with negative earnings. 
Jan and Ou (1995) argue that this difference is due to losses being more transitory 
than profits, since losses cannot persist indefinitely. Losses are either reversed or 
shareholders exercise the put option they implicitly have in the firm and eliminate 
the firm's operations (Hayn, 1995; Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996; Collins, Pincus 
and Xie, 1999). This put option can take the form of the liquidation of assets, 
reorganisation of the firm or the assets might be merged with or acquired by another 
firm. These differences between profit and loss observations cannot be explained by 
firm-specific factors or by observed non-linearities in extremities of earnings, but 
75 It is unclear whether lagged bad news coefficients may be interpreteded in the same way as in the 
lagged model of conservatism, but with a different deflator. If this were the case, the significance and 
magnitude of lagged bad news coefficients in earnings and SPEC regressions are consistent with findings from section 4.5.1 (see the effects of deflation by varying deflators in Appendix B, Table B- 
3). 
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represent a distinct factor in the returns-earnings relation (Freeman and Tse, 1992; 
Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998) The existing literature does not provide a definite 
guidance towards whether the difference occurs at exactly zero earnings level or at 
some other level of earnings. This relates in particular to contractual effects of 
accounting numbers: it is, for example, conceivable that pre-managed negative 
earnings are inflated by management adopting income-increasing accounting policies 
or that low levels of positive earnings are sufficiently low such that the abandomnent 
option becomes "in the money" (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Regardless of the 
view taken/explanation accepted, these findings are consistent in suggesting that the 
nature (and with it the estimated regression slope) of the returns-eamings 
relationship changes significantly around the break-even level of earnings. A further 
layer is added in this analysis by Beaver, McAnally and Stinson (1997) who show in 
a simultaneous-regression approach, that both returns determine changes in earnings 
and changes in earnings detennine returns. 
In an attempt to show and capture possible differences between profit and 
loss firms in terms of accounting conservatism, the main descriptive statistics and 
correlations separately for profit and loss observations and test fonnally for the 
differences between the two groups are shown first. Next, the Pope and Walker 
(1999) model of conservatism is expanded by additional terms that allow the 
differentiation between good and bad economic news as well as between profit and 
loss observations. Third, the contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models of 
earnings conservatism are estimated separately for profit and loss observations. 
Moreover, the EARN-regressions are estimated separately for positive and negative 
levels of operating cash flows and positive and negative levels of accruals. Fourth, 
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the results of the direct tests of the absolute-value extension of Pope and Walker 
(1999) are 'presented. The section concludes with a condensed discussion of 
econometric problems associated with these direct tests that partially help to explain 
the observed results and, more generally, that help motivate the structure of and tests 
taken in this section. 
4.8.2 General properties of loss and profit 
observations 
This section presents some descriptive statistics about observations with 
negative and positive earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN). It 
also presents fonnal tests of the differences in tenns of descriptives for the two 
groups. Table 4-14 shows the contemporaneous incidence of both good/bad 
economic news and profit/loss obseryations. 
Table 4-14: Incidence of good and bad economic news and positive and negative earnings (EARN), 
contemporaneous sample, 1969-2001 
Economic news 
Good (RETr--O) Bad (RETI-<O) Total 
Positive 
Reported (EARNr>O, Li=O) 13,481 52.07% 9,170 35.42% 22,651 87.50% 
earnings Negative 974 3.76% 2,263 8.74% 3,237 12.50% 
_(EARN,: 
50, Li=l) 
- 
Total 14,455 55.84% 11,433 44.16% 25,888 100.00% 
Notes. EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, returns are defined as RET,.,., - (PrP#. IYP#.,. Percentages shown are oftotal number of observations. EARN and RET relate tothe same (current) period. i. e., cam ings 
are not lagged. 
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Overall, 12.5% of observations in the contemporaneous sample have negative 
76 
earnings EARN and 44.16% exhibit negative returns RET A mere 6.74% of firms 
with positive RET exhibit a loss (only 3.76% of all observations). In contrast, almost 
20% of firms with negative RET also show a loss. These data suggest that while 
negative accounting earnings (an alternative nomenclature might be "accounting bad 
news") are a distinct phenomenon from negative economic earnings, the two 
phenomena overlap in a significant number of cases. This is consistent with the 
observation that both "types" of earnings reflect the same underlying economic 
event. Indeed, a more general statement that might be derived directly from 
accounting conservatism literature is that bad news cause accounting losses in, that 
they must be recognised in the current accounting period and in full amount rather 
than gradually over time and in small amounts. 
Table 4-15 reports Pearson's bivariate correlation coefficients separately for 
the current-period profit observations and current-period accounting loss 
observations, the profit and loss observations being separated according to the sign 
earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN), i. e., the figure that 
resembles most closely the "bottom-line" earnings. Some of the main points are the - 
following. First, the higher the operating cash flows OCF, the lower (possibly more 
negative) the total accruals (Accruals (tot. )). The correlation coefficient is stronger in 
magnitude for loss observations, indicating the important role of accruals for loss 
firms in particular. This relation also holds for certain individual components of 
accruals (A WCAP, ADebtors, AStock and SPEC), except for the depreciation charge 
76 Section 4.2 presents details on contemporaneous sample formation. 
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(DEP), where the correlation coefficients are similar between the two groups, and 
ACreditors. 
Second, the relation between OCF and EARN appears to be fundamentally 
different for the two groups of observations. For the profit group, there is a strong 
and positive linear correlation between all three earnings figures and operating cash 
flows - the higher the OCF component, the higher the earnings. The relation 
between EARN and OCF is somewhat weaker than the correlation between the 
ordinary earnings figure ORD and OCF, likely a consequence of the presence of 
more transitory (accrual) items in EARN than in ORD. The relation is strongest for 
the OP measure of earnings that likely contains the least amount of non-operating 
accruals. For the loss group, however, these relations are different. While there is a 
strong correlation between OCF and operating profit (OP), the correlation is much 
weaker with ordinary earnings (ORD) and, finally, the sign of the correlation 
changes when the EARN measure is considered. Thus, the higher the operating cash 
flow component of earnings, the lower the "bottom-line" earnings figure. This 
should be reflected in a strong and negative correlation between OCF and special 
items (SPEC) and other accruals that possibly contain items that cause a lowering of 
earnings. The correlation coefficients between OCF and SPEC as well as other 
accruals are all relatively strong and negative, particularly for the loss group. 
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Finally, the correlation between current-period returns (RE7) and all three 
earnings measures is lower in magnitude for the loss group than for the profit group, 
albeit the correlation coefficients are of equal sign in both groups. This is consistent 
with empirical observations that loss firms exhibit lower earnings response 
coefficients than profit firms for a variety of reasons, including transitory elements 
and abandonment options (e. g., Jan and Ou, 1995; Hayn, 1995). Additionally, 
assuming Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) view that operating cash flow is merely a 
noisier measure of performance than earnings (see section 3.5), the "operating cash 
flow" response coefficient as well as the correlation between returns and operating 
cash flows should be lower for loss firms. Table 4-15 confinns this expectation. The 
correlation is relatively low for both profit and loss finns, but the difference in 
magnitude between the two groups of firms appears to be material. 
Table 4-16 shows the descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples and 
provides two formal tests of the differences in mean values of these variables. For 
each deflated accounting figure for the two sub-samples, the following hypothesis 
stated in alternative form is tested: 
H4: 
where Y4 -0 and 
YL, 
-1 represent mean values of 
deflated accounting variables listed in 
the leftmost column of Table 4-16. The hypothesis indicates that firms with non- 
negative and firms with negative earnings exhibit different values of different 
deflated accounting variables. A particularly interesting question in the conservatism 
framework is whether accounting profit and loss firms differ in terms of the accruals 
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and operating cash flow components. The two sub-samples split by EARNt are 
assumed to be independent. The test statistics is (adapted from Anderson, Sweeney 
and Williams, 1993, pp. 347-352; also see section 4.3 above): 
(YL,. O - YLIJ 
(4-21) 
(nL, -O - I)ar2,,.. + (nL,. l - I)ar2L,.. +I (n,,. o + 1) + (n,,., + 1) nL,.,, nL,., 
distributed with (nL, -O + nL, -l - 
2) degrees of freedom, where, additionally, nL,.,, and 
nL, -, are the numbers of observations affected 
by good and bad news respectively 
and ay, and cr' are the variances of deflated accounting variables for the two 4-- Y4 -1 
sub-samples. 
Additionally, the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon non-parametric test is employed 
(adapted from Anderson, Sweeney, Williams, 1993, pp. 721-727; Stata Reference 
Manual, 2001, pp. 219-220). The hypothesis in alternative from is: 
H'4: YWo populations are not identical. 
and the test statistics is: 
T-E[TI 
(4-22) 
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R 
where T RL, -OJ 
is the sum of ranks RL, -O. l 
for positive earnings observations, 
E[Tl=nL, 
-O, I(nL,. OnL, -, +1)/2 and var(T)=(n.,., _, 
n,,,., a') I(nL, -O +nL, -I) and cý 
is the 
variance of the full contemporaneous sample ranks r, : a' =ýI 
-I 
Dr, -F), 1-1 
Both tests provide qualitatively equal conclusions regarding the differences in 
the two sub-samples of earnings. Firms with positive accounting earnings (EARN) 
have, on average, higher deflated operating cash flows (OCF) and also higher 
operating profit (OP) (note that both OCF and OP are positive for both profit and 
loss finns). However, ordinary earnings (ORD) are already negative, on average, for 
the "bottom-line" loss (Lj= 1) sub-sample. This is reflected by earnings-decreasing 
working capital accruals (AWCAP) and its components (except for Wreditors that 
are, on average, earnings-decreasing for both sub-samples, as is the depreciation 
charge DEP). However, in a significant part, the difference between profit and loss 
firms is due to special items (SPEC), the component associated with write-offs and 
similar one-time items. The mean (median) of these deflated special items for the 
loss sub-sample is a full -0.087 (-0.049) and for the profit sub-sample 0.000 (0.000). 
The difference is highly statistically significant using either test. A similar 
conclusion applies in terms of differences in total accruals (Accruals (tot. )). While 
overall and on average total accruals should be negative (i. e., earnings-decreasing), 
the average level of accruals for the loss firms is significantly more negative than 
that for the profit firms: -0.232 versus -0.018 for the means and -0.175 versus 
-0.017 for the medians of these variables. 
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Finally, consistent with conclusions presented above in the comments to 
Table 4-14 and Table 4-15, the loss sub-sample of firms exhibit significantly more 
negative returns (i. e., bad news) on average than the profit sub-sample measured by 
either the mean or the median. 
Taken together, the correlation matrix and descriptive evidence presented 
"-b-ove indicates that there are important differences between profit and loss firms in 
terms of operating cash flow and accruals components of earnings as well as in terms 
of market values associated with the two groups of firms. These differences appear 
to relate much more strongly to (or, originate from) differences in the accruals 
component(s) of earnings than to the operating cash flow component. Such an 
observation represents and indication that incidence of losses and accounting 
conservatism as an accruals phenomenon are related. Negative accounting earnings 
after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARNt: 50) and negative economic 
earnings (RETtt-1: 50) appear to overlap at least partially. In the context of 
conservatism, the regressions of EARN on RET run on the loss-observations sub- 
sample only should exhibit a stronger timeliness of earnings if only because they are 
more often hit by bad economic news than profit firms. However, controlling for 
good and bad news within profit/loss observations should lead to similar coefficients 
on both good and bad news. The next two sections 4.8.3 and 4.8.4 attempt to provide 
an answer to this question. 
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4.8.3 A generalised model of losses 
To allow for possible differences between two different accounting 
conservatism regimes for profit and loss firms within the contemporaneous Pope and 
Walker (1999) model, the relationship between reported and permanent earnings is 
allowed to be different for two different "regimee', separated, in this case, by an 
arbitrary level of permanent eamings. The first regime is descriptive of firms with 
permanent earnings above a certain threshold A, xt>A and the second regime for 
firms where permanent earnings are below or equal to the threshold level, xj: 5A: 
, -O"e, 
"+y*e, -+V, if x, >A xt = 
X, -0-e, +y-e, -+V, if xt: 5A 
(4-23) 
where, analogously to the model in equation (3-5), the parameters 0' and 0- 
measure the degree of under-recognition of current good news e, * and parameters 
and y- measure the degree of over-recognition of current bad news e, - for the 
two different regimes of permanent earnings defined by the threshold level A. 
Generally, the parameters for the two regimes are allowed to (but not required to) 
differ: 0" * 0- and y* # y-. The primary motivation for such a differentiation of 
loss-making observations is that, on the one hand, there are no a priori reasons why 
there should be any differences between profit and loss observations in tenns of cx- 
post conservatism as both set of firms must follow the same accounting conventions, 
while at the same time the body of empirical literature presented in section 4.8.1 
consistently suggests that there may be some differences between the two groups of 
firms. While the model in equation (4-23) does not in itself constitute a new 
221 
theoretical model, it at least allows - at least in principle - for any incremental 
effects of loss-making observations. Within the model it is further assumed that the 
nature of economic news e, ' and e, - is equal for all firms. It must be stressed that the 
reported earnings Xt for each of the two regimes may be positive, negative or zero 
without any reference to the value of permanent earnings xt. 
Similarly to the steps taken in Pope and Walker (1999), each of the two 
relations in (4-23) is deflated by the opening price p, -, , the 
dummy variable for bad 
economic news D, reintroduced, and the two good and bad news equations resulting 
for each of the two regimes xj>A and xj: 5A merged. The equations for both regimes 
are straightforward analogues to (3-9): 
x( 
=1+ 
1-o+ Rt +7 
++o+ D(Ri + 
Vf 
pt-, kkk Pi-i 
and for the second regime equation (4-23) becomes 
1 
+l-o- Rt +y 
+0- Di R, + 
V' 
kkk Po-i 
(4-24a) 
(4-24b) 
As in the good/bad news contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) model 
presented in section 3.3, the coefficient (1-0o)lk in either regime captures the 
proportion of current period good news captured by current period accounting 
earnings Xj. Under conservative accounting, this coefficient is expected to be less 
than the cost of equity capital (1-0o)lk<llk in either regime. The incremental 
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coefficient (7t+6b)/k captures the incremental -proportion of current period bad 
economic news captured by current period accounting earnings. Under conservative 
accounting, the incremental coefficient is expected to be greater than zero (the total 
response to bad news is given by (1-A)lk). 
For estimation purposes, an exogenous indicator variable that distinguishes 
between the two regimes of pen-nanent earnings in (4-24a) and (4-24b) is defined 
such that the dummy variable A, =0 if xt>A and At=I if x,: 5A. Multiplying (4-24a) 
with (I-A, ) and (4-24b) with A,, summing the resulting equations, collecting tenns 
and rearranging the following expansion of the contemporaneous Pope and ýValker 
(1999) is obtained: 
xt 
=i+I-o+ Ri+r 
++o+ 
DiR, + 
pl-, kkk (4-25) 
1-0, - 1-0- v 
+- +L-ýL AiRt +-+ DAtRi +' kk)kk pi-1 
where, in addition to the variables already defined, A, represents the identification of 
the two permanent earnings regimes. To discuss the properties of the model in 
equation (4-25), it is useful to construct a hypothetical empirical form of (4-25) with 
the intention that this empirical form would have a similar role as Pope and Walker's 
(1999) theoretical model when they explain Basu's (1997) empirical equation. In 
particular, in their empirical models, both Basu (1997) and Pope and Walker (1999) 
include the term with the bad news indicator Dt in the regression equation (see 
equation (3-10) in section 3.3 - the second term on the right-hand side including the 
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coefficient q2), even though this term does not follow from theoretical derivations in 
the paper. A similar approach to show the properties of equation (4-25) is taken: 77 
Xt-=a, 
+a2D, +a3A, +a4DA, + ARt + rDR, +* fl2AtR$ + r2DtAR, +c$ (4-26) 
ps-I 
While the discussion of a possible operationalisation of At is deferred until 
later in the section, some explanations of (4-26) can be provided. First, because (4- 
26) incorporates four different states of the world, the terms with coefflicients aj and 
a4 are introduced in addition to the q2 coefficient that appears already in the original 
Pope and Walker (1999) model. These coefficients appear in equation (4-26) to 
avoid the correlated omitted variables problem and the resulting biases. However, 
the expected values of the tenns q2, q3 and c4 are all zero - the cost of capital 
together with any cumulative effects of past conservative accounting should be, on 
average, equal for all firms: those that exhibit positive or negative economic, news 
and those that are in either regime designated by the Ap In other words, given the 
cost of capital (Ilk), the expectation is that all finns confonn to the same accounting 
rules. Second, while the fl, and yj terns in (4-26) are equivalent to Pope and 
Walker's (1999) model and capture the effects of under (over) recognition of good 
(bad) news, there are now two additional incremental coefficients 82 and72 that 
would capture any possible incremental effects for the (second) regime defined by 
the At =I variable. Again, the expectation is that these terms should all be equal to 
zero, if the same conservatism regime applies for the loss and profit firms. 
77 For reasons described below, equation (4-26) represents only a hypothetical form and is not 
estimated in this form. 
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Therefore, for the regime defined by A, =I and given the cost of capital (Ilk), 
the proportion of good news not recognised in current-period reported earnings can 
be estimated as 0- =I - k(, 81+#82) *If there was no difference between the two At 
regimes regarding the incorporation of good economic news, then ft2=0 and 
0- = 0" . The parameter r- in equation (4-9) reflects the (over)incorporation of 
current-period bad news into current-period reported earnings X, for a firm in the 
At== 1 regime where permanent earnings are below or equal to an arbitrary threshold 
level of permanent earnings xt: 5A. Given the cost of ciýital, the'parameter's estimate 
equals y- k(A+Pl +P2 +P2)-'* If there was no difference between the two A, 
regimes regarding the incorporation of bad economic news thenP2= 0 and y- = y*. 
However, a major drawback of the model in equation (4-25) and the entire 
discussion in this section is that At, just as the level of permanent earnings xi, and, 
consequently, the threshold level At are not observable to the researcher. Thus, the 
threshold level and the indicator must be operationalised - i. e., certain "sensible" 
reference points must be chosen if (4-2S) is to be empirically tractable. An 
interesting case obtains when As is operationalised in the following manner: a new 
indicator variable L, is introduced as an empirical equivalent of A,, defined so that 
I if reported (rather than permanent) eamings Xj: 50 and L? = 0 if reported earnings 
Xt>O. However, in this case, the indicator variable L, is not exogenous and thus the 
linear correlation between the dependent variable and the indicator variable based on 
this same variable must be broken (see below for a discussion). It is thus attempted 
to operationalise (4-26)) by employing an absolute-value transformation of (4-25): 
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X D, +a3L, +a +ARET, + yDRET, + =a, +a2 4DILI (4-27) 
+, 82L, RET, + r2DLRET, + c, 
The absolute-value empirical version in (4- 27) has two important properties. 
First, it removes the linear correlation between the reported earnings Xt and the 
indicator variable L, based on this same reported earnings figure. Therefore, the 
information on the origins of an observation is preserved (i. e., profit/loss 
observation). A similar effect can be achieved by other transformations, for example 
a quadratic transformation. Second, the transformation preserves the information on 
the degree of extremity of reported earnings. These two properties are important 
features of the model - for example, it is possible that an abandonment option is in 
the money when a firm reports negative earnings (Hayn, 1995; Jan and Ou, 1995) 
and in particular when these negative earnings are large. 78 
The interpretation of the four regimes in (4-27) differs slightly from the 
interpretation of (4-26) because of the absolute value transformation. While the 
interpretation of good and bad news coefficients for the Li=: 0 segment remains the 
same regardless of the absolute-value transformation, the signs of the coefficients of 
the Lj= I segment must be inverted. Geometrically, this arises because the absolute 
value transformation acts as a mirror over the horizontal axis in the (RETt. t. 1, XWPt. l)- 
space, thereby resetting the originally positive slope to a negative slope. Therefore, 
the average cost of capital together with any previous-periods conservative 
accounting effect is captured by the following estimated regression coefficients: a) 
78 Tthe concept of abandonment options is not discussed in this thesis, although it is acknowledge that 
different definitions may have implications for this work. 
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for the reported profit observations and good economic news (positive returns) eq; 
b) for the reported profit observations and bad economic news (positive returns) 
a, +a2; C) for the reported loss observations and good economic news 
a, +a, +(-a3); and for the reported loss observations and bad economic news 
A 
a, +a2 +(-a3)+(-64) . Again, the expected values of estimated coefficients 
62 to 
A a, are all zero. 
The interpretations of news-related total coefficients are surnmarised below: 
Economic news 
Good (RETr>O) Good (RETt<-O) 
Reported earnings 
Positive (Xr>O, Li=O) A4, 
Negative (X,: 50, L, =1) 
ftjq, +(-ft2)+(-P) 
Although the expected values of the ý, and P, coefficients are 
ft, >P, >O, 
there is no reason to expect any difference between the two Lt regimes in terms of 
A accounting conservatism so that E[P21=0 and E[P2 0' If, however, empirically 
there is some (empirical) reason to believe that these expectations are different so 
that P'-O and/or ^2# 0 then this may indicate systematic effects that are present r 
only when a firm is in the Lt== I regime, i. e., when it is a loss observation. 79 
79 The term "may indicate" is used because there are some econometric properties that might seriously 
affect the ability to make inferences using this model (some are presented in section 4.8.5). While this 
is acknowledged, it must also be noted that there are no solutions available in the existing literature to 
solve this problem. 
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4.8.4 Direct signed tests and estimates of the 
generalised losses model 
This section presents empirical estimates of the model presented in the 
preceding section. Apart from the issues that arise from the discussion in that 
section, there are at least two empirical issues that must be considered when 
estimating the losses model in equation (4-27) above. The first issue is the method of 
estimation. In this thesis, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach is generally followed. 
This involves estimating 33 individual-year regressions. However, to estimate (4- 
27), it must be noted that there are only 3,7,5,1 and 18 observations in the early 
sample years 1969-1973 respectively that have been hit by bad economic news 
(RET1.1-1: 50) and have simultaneously reported negative contemporaneous earnings 
after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARNt5O). This effectively precludes the 
estimation of yearly regressions and the inclusion of these years' coefficients in the 
calculation of cross-sectional averages. Consequently, the results presented below in 
Table 4-18 are cross-sectional averages for the period 1974-2001 only (28 cross- 
sections). 80 
The second issue relates to the segments that define the four groups of firms. 
While the bad economic news indicator is treated as being exogenous to the model, 
given that managers presumably cannot influence the stock returns in an efficient 
market, the Lt indicator is subject to a number of possible influences (e. g., timing of 
asset sales (e. g., Bartov, 1993) and other earnings management techniques (e. g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). The indicator might therefore "bundle" together 
80 The differences between the Farna-MacBeth (1973) and pooled method are shown in the sensitivity 
analyses section. 
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observations that have reported negative earnings after extraordinary and exceptional 
items for different reasons. If these factors would have opposite directions with 
respect to market values, then the resulting coefficients on losses might be 
attenuated. Moreover, the imprecise separation of two pennanent earnings-levels 
regimes introduces the errors-in-variables problem. 
With these caveats, Table 4-17 first presents the results of a precursor to the 
absolute-value extension of the contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) model of 
accounting conservatism that differentiates between the two Le= 0 and Lt== I groups 
developed in the preceding section. The dependent variable in these two regressions 
is the EARNt variable, the same variable in the same time period that is used to 
define the indicator Ll. This is followed by further estimations of the 
contemporaneous model of accounting conservatism using EARN$ as the dependent 
variable, but where for each cross-section the sample is partitioned and the 
definitions of L, reformed by the sign of one of the following main components of 
earnings: operating cash flows OCF and accruals AWCAP, SPEC and total accruals 
Accnials (tot. ), rather than the earnings itsel . 
A formal test of the statistical differences between each group of partitions is 
also provided. For each partition and each independent variable, 28 pairs of 
regression coefficients are generated (one for each partition within each year) under 
the same set of GAAP rules regardless of the sign of any variable these accounting 
rules produce. A similar approach to test statistics is used by Mramor and 
Valentincic (2003). They use a similar matched-pair approach to compare the 
efficiency in classification of failing versus non-failing firms in terms of short-term 
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liquidity where the common factor defining the pairs is the industry firms belong to. 
The efficiency rates in classifications of failing and non-failing firins are calculated 
with three different methods of estimation and are then compared in pairs by 
industries. In the context of the present study, the pairs of estimated regression 
coefficients for each of the 28 years are treated as matched pairs and a formal I-test 
of the differences in cross-sectional means is provided. The two-tailed test 
hypothesis stated in alternative form is (Anderson, Sweeney and Williams, 1993): 
H4: The mean difference between the values of coefficients for the two partitions 
does not equal 0. 
and the corresponding test statistics is: 
d 
; 
d7-Nfn- 
(4-28) 
where d is the mean difference between the values of the two coefflicients within a 
2001 A 2001 
pair: d =(I/ 28). 4-1 - 06jr (Pjf4 -1 - 
PIT 
.. d 
(fil. 
. 4-0) or 
d= (1/ 28) ad is the 
r-1974 r-1974 
standard deviation of the difference, and n is the number of observations (i. e., pairs) 
n= 28. The test statistic is t-distributed with n= 28-1= 27 degrees of freedom. The 
difference d between the two coefficients constituting a pair is always calculated so 
that the "positive" partition is subtracted from the negative partition. 
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Table 4-17: Response of earnings to good and bad news by sign of earnings, operating cash flows 
and accruals, 1974-2001 
Match- Match- 
Partitioning variables: avg. n Oil e12 A ed-pair it ed-pair avg. R2 
t-stat. t-stat. 
Partition by: EARN, 
EA RN, 50 114.1 -0.136 0.027 0.059 0.016 0.056 
-11.139 1.657 0.669 0 004 
0.169 
-0.259 
5.009 
EARNr>O 728.4 0.110 -0.003 0.059 . 0.040 0.164 
14.760 -1.153 9.898 4A33 11.976 
Partition by: OCF, 
OCF, 50 77.2 0.056 -0.007 0.022 0.180 0.149 
5.104 -0.511 1.304 
-2.391 
3.528 0.665 
9.143 
OCF, >0 765.4 0.097 0.003 0.059 0.176 0.167 
12.048 1.068 11.498 12.622 14.934 
Partition by: A WCAP, 
AWCAP,: 50 303.4 0.079 -0.001 0.059 0.227 0.191 
10.988 -0.215 7.010 
-0.025 
10.957 3.884 
12.484 
AWCAP, >O 539.1 0.101 0.002 0.059 0.127 0.155 
12.208 0.366 5.059 6.798 11.930 
Partition by: SPEC, 
SPEC, 50 461.0 0.072 0.002 0.050 0.211 0.175 
8.606 0.608 5.956 
-0.468 
12.772 4.719 
13.089 
SPECs>O 381.5 0.121 -0.003 0.054 0.116 0.160 
14.496 -1.226 7.056 9.357 11.130 
Partition by: Accruals (tot. ) 
Accruals (tol. ),. 50 539.1 0.080 0.003 0.055 0.209 0.172 
11.293 0.877 8.101 
-0.402 
IIA29 4.234 
12.794 
Accruals (tot. ) >0 303.5 0.117 -0-001 0.061 0.092 0.158 
14.510 -0.290 3.679 4.020 9.071 
Notes. Estimated models are: EARNIP,., - a, +a2D,,., +ARET,.,, +, slDl,,. IRETi,,,, +A and, for each of the variables EARN, 
OCF. AWCAP, SPEC and Accruals (lot. ). separated separately for negative and positive values of these variables. These 
variables are deflated. per share: EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, OCF is operating cash flow, 
JWCAP is working capital accruals, SPEC is special items, Accruals (lot. ) are Accruals (tot. )-, dWCAP+DEP+SPEC (DEP 
is depreciation and amortisation charge), returns RET,.,. i-(PrPjP,. t and D,.,., - (I if RET,. t. 1: 50; 0 otherwise). All variables 
are deflated by opening share price Pi. t. Avg. n is the average number of observations per year. All coefficients'estimates 
and R 2S are cross-sectional averages for the period 1974-2001 and associated t-statistics are calculated according to the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 29-1- 27 dt, the critical value 
of the t-statistic is ltd>2.0518. Boldfaced matched-pair $-statistic indicates significant differences between cross-sectional 
averages of the corresponding coefficients and partitions. I'lie critical value of the I-statistic is ltd>2.051 8. 
Partitionin g- by the sign of contemporaneous earnings EARN reveals that 
firms do not differ 'in terms of incorporation of good economic news in 
contemporaneous earnings, i. e., there is no difference in the magnitude of the 
estimated A coefficient between profit and loss observations. While the 
coefficient for loss observations is not statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
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coefficient is the same as for profit observations. A possible explanation (or at least a 
contributing factor) of the non-significance of theAcoefficient is that the average 
number of observations used to calculate these regressions is only 114.1 per year, 
much lower than for the profit observations (728.4 firms per year). The response of 
contemporaneous earnings to bad news reveals that both groups of observations 
exhibit an asymmetric response to bad news, but again the coefficient P, for the loss Y, 
observations is not statistically different from zero, although of the expected sign and 
economically reasonable magnitude. 81 Again, the statistical insignificance may be 
due to the low number of observations used to estimate the 28 yearly regressions. 
Formal tests of the average difference between profit and loss observations for both 
the ý, and j coefficients reveal that the differences between the two groups are not Y, 
statistically significant. Also, the R2 is lower for the losses partition - losses cannot 
persist (e. g., shareholders can always liquidate the finn), are not a good indicator of 
expected future earnings and therefore the association between earnings and market 
values will be lower (Sin and Watts, 2000). 
Table 4-17 also presents the results of estimating the contemporaneous Pope 
and Walker (1999) model using earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items 
EARN as the dependent variable, but estimated separately for the positive and 
negative contemporaneous values of some of the main earnings components: 
operating cash flows OCF and accruals AWCAP, SPEC and -total Accruals (tot. ). 
Partitioning by the sign of contemporaneous OCF reveals that, overall, bothAand 
j, coefficients are roughly of the expected magnitude and sign: there is a partial 
81 Especially so because of potential existence of the sample truncation bias, presented below in 
section 4.8.5. 
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delayed response of earnings to current-period good news for both positive and 
negative OCF-partitions and there is a strong asymmetric response to bad news for 
both groups of firms. Formal tests indicate that the response to good news is on 
average less pronounced for loss observations (I-statistic -2.391, statistically 
significant), but that the difference in terms of response to bad news between the two 
groups of firms is not statistically significant. 
Partitions by the sign of all three accruals' variables reveal that there is a 
delayed response to good news and, generally, a high asymmetric response to bad 
news for all accruals' variables. Moreira (2002, p. 120) cites similar results for his 
US sample. Strikingly, the differences among estimated ft, coefficients across 
different partitioning variables and partitions are remarkably small and very similar 
in magnitude to the respective earnings and operating cash flow partitions. However, 
in all three cases the estimated bad news coefficients ý for the negative-accruals Y, 
partitions are statistically significantly higher (almost double) than for the positive 
accruals partition. 
These results emphasize the role of the accruals component in reflecting bad 
I 
economic news. In all partitions that might be associated with reflecting bad news 
timely, the estimated P, coefficient is very high and statistically significant. The Y, 
evidence presented is consistent with the notion that accounting conservatism is an 
accruals phenomenon and that it is independent of the sign of earnings and the 
operating cash flows and accruals components - all firms must obey the same GAAP 
rules. However, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings EARN is stronger for 
partitions where accruals are negative. 
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An alternative technique that explicitly accounts for any possible differences 
between loss and profit observations as well as helping to avoid the relatively low 
number of observations in some partitions, is to estimate the absolute value model on 
contemporaneous earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items EARN, 
developed in the preceding section. The results are presented in Table 4-18. In 
explaining this model, it must again be noted that all signs on the coefficients related 
to loss observations( et3 , a4 I 
ft2andP2 
)must be inverted. For example, in the case 
of ft2and P the minus sign indicates more, not less, asymmetry. Y2 
Table 4-18: Absolute-value extension of Pope and Walker (1999), 1974-2001 
avg. al et2 "3 64 R2 
n 
Profit obs. Loss obs. (incr. ) 
842.5 0.110 -0.003 0.025 -0.024 0.059 0.040 -0.118 -0.056 0.150 15.021 -1.174 1.808 -1.561 10.074 4.512 -1.377 -0.597 12.992 
Notes. Dependent variable is EARN, Estimated models are: EARNIP1.1- ai+a2D,,, I+a3L, +a4LD,,,., +PIRET,,, + 
+y, D 4,. iRET,,., +ALRET,,. I+nLD,.,. IRETI,,. I+r, where EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, returns 
are RET,.,., - (P, -PIyp,.,, D,,,., - 11 ifRET,. j. j: 50; 0 otherwise), L, -j I ifEARN, _-M; 
0 otherwise). Avg. n is the average number 
Of Observations per year. All coefficients' estimates and R's are cross-sectional averages for the period 1974-2001 and 
associated I-statistics are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are 
-significant 
at 5% or better at 28-1-27 d. f., the critical value of the I-statistic is ltd>2.0518. 
Consistent with other evidence presented in other parts of this thesis, Table 
4-18 reveals that there is a delayed response to good news for profit observations, the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient A= 0.059 being close to magnitudes 
presented above in Table 4-17 as well as in the main results (see Table 4-8 above). 
The estimated coefficient on bad news is positive and statistically significantly 
different from zero, consistent with asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Also, it is of 
a similar magnitude to the corresponding coefficient in Table 4-17. Incremental 
results for loss observations reveal that there is no statistically significant difference 
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between profit and loss observations, at least not when using this model. There are 
some (slight) indications that loss observations tend to incorporate both good and 
bad news faster than profit observations, but they are all statistically insignificant. 
However, these inferences are possibly affected by several biases that result from the 
construction of the empirical version of the initial model in equation (4-27): the 
attenuation bias that arises as the result of imperfect measurement of the two 
pennanent earnings-levels (presented in section 2.3.1), the effects of sample 
truncation bias (Hausman and Wise, 1977) that arises because of the truncation by 
the dependent variable (presented below) and, possibly, the correlated omitted 
variable problems because some possibly (empirically) important variables are 
excluded from the model, the book value of equity in particular (e. g., Collins, Pincus 
and Xie, 1999). 
4.8.5 The effect of truncation by sign of 
earnings 
Both previous attempts at distinguishing the incorporation of good and bad 
news separately for profit and loss firms are conceptually equivalent in that they 
require partitioning of the sample by the value (or the sign) of the contemporaneous 
dependent variable. This requires previous knowledge of the endogenous variable by 
the researcher. For example, estimating the loss partition of firms using the Li= I 
indicator variable in Table 4-17 is equivalent, in practical terms, to eliminating all 
observations that have EARN, >O from the sample. Equivalently, observations with 
EARNt>O may be assumed not to be observable. This introduces the sample- 
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truncation bias in the estimation process, first explained by Hausman and Wise 
(1977), presented in, for example, Baltagi (1998, pp. 351-353) and more recently 
discussed in the context of this research as a possible explanation of the limitations 
of Basu (1997) and Pope and Walker (1999) results by Muller and Riedl (2001). 
Figure 4-1 is an illustration adapted from Ahese sources. -It shows a 
hypothetical estimated regression line resulting from a simple bivariate regression of 
generic accounting earnings EARN, on returns RET6. i for a full sample (i. e., a 
sample containing observations where EARNt: 50 and EARNt>O) (dark blue line) of 
the following form: 82 
.. 
P. A,, RNt= a+PRET,,, - I +rt 
(4-29) 
where 8 is the estimated slope coefficient of a hypothetical regression line of a form 
A 
such as the form described by equation (4-29). The figure also contains a 
hypothetical regression line (turquoise-coloured) resulting from the same model as in 
(4-29), but estimated from a sample containing only observations where EARN650 
and thus Li= 1. These points are shown in green colour. The slope of such a 
regression is less than the slope estimated from the full sample. In other words, 
estimating (4-29) for loss firms only reduces the magnitude of the relationship 
between earnings and returns. 83 This is precisely the problem that precludes a clear 
discrimination between two possible explanations of the results of the absolute-value 
model above in Table 4-17: a) that there are in reality no differences between profit 
82 For the purposes of this presentation, both EARN and RET are be assumed to be generic names, not 
necessarily defined as in this study. 83 Note that the model in equation (4-29) is a restricted version of contemporaneous models of 
conservatism. 
236 
and loss observations in terms of accounting conservatism; and b) that there are 
differences between the two groups of firms, but that these cannot be inferred 
because of the sample truncation bias (among other problems). Moreover, the lower 
the truncation level of EARN that defines the L, indicator, the more severe the sample 
truncation bias and the smaller the slope coefficient. 84 Generally, the sample 
truncation bias depends also on the nature of the relationship between EARN and 
RET (if only as a result of the way accounting conservatism is modelled in Basu, 
1997, and Pope and Walker, 1999), the variance of the error term and values of the 
independent variable RET (Hausman and Wise, 1977). 
Figure 4-6: Illustration of the sample truncation bias 
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ýImiatcd rcgi-cssion Imc tjýmy, 
(I// obscrý at imis 
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Source: adapted from Hausman and Wise, 1977; Baltagi, 1998; Muller and Riedl, 2003. 
Figure 4-1 might help to provide an alternative explanation as to why the bad 
news coefficient j, for the EARN, <-O partition in the preceding section is lower than 
84 The definition of the L, dummy variable need not be exactly at EARN, = 0 level, but could generally be defined for any level of EARN. 
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the j, coefficient for EARNt>O partition (see Table 4-17 in section 4.8.4. ). However, 
it must be noted that the good news coefficients are of similar magnitudes in both 
cases, thus suggesting that the effects of sample truncation bias might not be 
significant. It is not possible to discriminate formally between these explanations in 
this study, but a possible solution constitutes an area of further research. 
4.9 EFFECTS OF ASSET RECOGNXTXON RULES ON EX- 
POST CONSERVATXSM 
4.9.1 Book-to-market ratio as a proxy for 
pervasive conservatism 
Pope and Walker (2003) and other empirical work, e. g., Giner and Rees 
(2001), presented in section 3.6, predict that the likelihood of observing an 
asymmetric relation of earnings to the arrival of bad news decreases with increasing 
levels of ex-ante conservatism applied to investment projects undertaken in a firm. If 
a firm writes off the entire amount invested at the time the investment is made, future 
bad economic news will not have an impact on financial statements, given that there 
is no asset recorded in the balance sheet to which that bad news would relate. The 
main prediction of the ex-ante conservatism literature therefore is that the more 
unrecognised assets a firm has, the less likely it is to observe asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings with respect to bad news. As in the case of news-driven conservatism, 
the arrival of bad news should be reflected relatively quickly in the accruals 
component of earnings. 
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To test for the effects of asset-recognition rules, the contemporaneous 
versions of ex-post conservatism models is estimated by tertiles of the opening value 
of the book-to-market ratio. The sub-division into tertiles is re-calculated at the 
beginning of every fiscal year from 1969 to 2001 to mimic as closely as possible the 
Pope and Walker (2003) method. However, this research is expected to be less 
44precise" in the sense that that they use deciles rather than tertiles of opening value 
of book-to-market ratio. Using deciles calculated within each of the 33 years is 
unfeasible using this particular UK sample as the number of firms within each decile 
within each year would be (is) too small to ensure appropriate estimations of 
regressions and inferences based on them. The dilemma was either to exclude some 
(a significant number oo years from the analysis or divide firms within each year 
into tertiles rather than deciles. Representativeness concerns lead me to choose the 
latter option. Thus, the predictions regarding the influence of the level of ex-ante 
conservatism by the main groups of accounting variables are the following: 
- Of the earnings components, the operating cash flows (0CF) figure should not 
exhibit asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad news overall and asymmetric 
timeliness of OCF should not change with the amount of recognised assets on the 
balance sheet relative to "total"' (i. e., including non-recorded) assets that are 
expected to generate future cash flows. OCF should be an accruals-free 
accounting figure and thus not subject to effects of conservative accounting 
practices. 
- Earnings should exhibit asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad news overall; 
the asymmetry should be increasing from low book-to-market firms (i. e., ex-ante 
relatively conservative firms) to high book-to-market finns (i. e., ex-ante 
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relatively liberal or aggressive firms). Also, the asymmetry should increase from 
operating profit (OP) to earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items 
(EARN), given that the latter figure should always contain more accruals 
components that capture the reaction of earnings to bad news. 
- The accruals component(s) of earnings should reflect the effects of the arrival of 
bad news on the capital market and make earnings more timely than cash flows 
in reflecting bad news. Of the different accruals components, the type of accrual 
most discussed or referred to in the literature are the special items (SPEC). 
Evidence regarding the ex-post conservatism presented mainly in section 4.5, but 
also in other sections in this research, indicates that an important role in the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings should also be given to A WCAP. Therefore, it 
is predicted that the higher the amount of assets on the balance sheet as opposed 
to unrecognised assets, the higher the likelihood of observing an asymmetric 
reaction to bad news and the. higher the coefficient on bad news. Likewise, 
following from the results obtained in this research and theoretical expectations, 
the depreciation and amortisation expense (DEP) should not exhibit asymmetric 
timeliness with respect to bad news. 
The results are presented in Table 4-19. As in other parts of this research, the 
statistics presented are Farna-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional averages and the total 
and relative total coefficients are calculated from the estimated ft, and Py, 
coefficients. 
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Table 4-19: Contemporaneous models of accounting conservatism by opening book-to-market 
tertiles, 1969-2001 
Dependent Opening j, R2 
( 
variable B/M rank 
avg. n a, 
62 A A+Y^, 
Smallest 237.6 0.161 0.006 0.041 0.084 0.063 0.125 3.072 
14.327 1.302 2-587 3.759 8.320 
OCF Middle 237.3 0.209 0.007 0.198 -0.091 0.065 0.108 0.542 
8.170 0.342 1 A61 -0.635 6.665 
Highest 236.9 0.293 -0.001 0.130 -0.050 0.061 0.080 0.616 
12.986 -0.076 7.513 -0.884 8.651 
Smallest 237.6 0.167 0.004 0.022 0.157 0.190 0.179 8.138 
10.110 0.800 0.476 3.358 13.063 
OP Middle 237.3 0.205 0.008 0.142 0.111 0.209 0.254 1.782 
10.132 0.959 2.586 1.819 13.321 
Highest 236.9 0.251 -0.006 0.128 0.141 0.190 0.269 2.099 
11.024 -0.645 9.746 4.219 13.607 
Smallest 237.6 0.085 0.005 0.020 0.110 0.223 0.130 6.414 
13.502 2.480 1.097 5.880 13.394 
ORD Middle 237.3 0.101 0.007 0.077 0.136 0.268 0.213 2.754 
13.839 1.679 2.953 4.056 IS. 405 
Highest 236.9 0.107 0.000 0.081 0.143 0.236 0.225 2.759 
13.627 -0.045 10.432 7.306 15.608 
Smallest 237.6 0.083 0.009 0.037 0.129 0.202 0.166, 4.470 
13.945 3.057 5.612 10.372 13.422 
EARN Middle 237.3 0.100 0.012 0.079 0.202 0.237 0.281 3.566 
13.170 2.252 2.738 5.019 14.378 
Highest 236.9 0.099 0.005 0.083 0.224 0.194 0.307 3.697 
11.125 0.633 12.530 9.587 13.611 
Smallest 237.6 0.052 -0.001 -0.026 0.081 0.029 0.054 -2.069 
4.653 -0.209, -0.544 1.562 6.769 
AWCAP Middle 237.3 0.061 0.003 0.006 0.110 0.039 0.116 20.032 
4.563 0.423 0.235 2.821 7.260 
Highest 236.9 0.058 -0.004 0.019 0.156 0.034 0.175 9.317 
5.187 -0.347 1.665 3.037 7.803 
Smallest 237.6 0.053 0.006 0.004 0.068 0.052 0.072 18.364 
5.729 0.897 0.086 1.355 7A45 
- of which Middle 237.3 0.070 -0.005 -0.008 0.133 0.043 0.125 . 15.806 
ADebtors 6.047 -0.574 -0.185 2.274 11.168 
Highest 236.9 0.065 0.006 0.029 0.138 0.034 0.167 5.762 
5398 0.408 2A57 1.726 6.038 
Smallest 237.6 0.048 0.000 0.013 0.027 0.039 0.040 3.084 
5.168 -0-062 0.580 1.066 7.155 
- of which Middle 237.3 0.063 -0.006 0.001 0.048 0.034 0.050 42.673 
AStock 4.738 -0.928 0.050 1.242 7.045 
Highest 236.9 0.062 0.008 0.040 0.139 0.034 0.179 4.490 
4.970 0.747 3.737 3.537 7.161 
Smallest 237.6 -0.048 -0.007 -0.043 -0.014 0.043 -0.057 1.326 
-6-317 -1.575 -2.098 -0.556 7.055 
of which Middle 237.3 -0.072 0.014 0.013 -0.071 0.031 -0.058 -4.664 ACreditors -5.881 1.584 0.296 -1.309 8.339 
Highest 236.9 -0.069 -0.019 -0.050 -0.121 0.033 -0.171 3.419 
-5.606 -1.472 -3.582 -1.692 6.441 
Cont. 
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Dependent 
variable 
Opening 
B/M rank avg. n 
a, 62 A it 2 R A+ 
A (A + 
A 
Smallest 237.6 -0.048 0.000 0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.002 0.349 
-13.775 0.028 0.524 -0.315 6.619 
DEP Middle 237.3 -0.068 *-0.004 -0.064 0.084 0.028 0.021 -0.330 
-8.906 -0.580 -1.044 1347 4.001 
Highest 236.9 -0.105 -0.001 -0.022 0.038 0.030 0.016 -0.714 
-14.819 -0.327 4.484 2.270 5.603 
Smallest 237.6 -0.005 0.004 0.014 0.015 0.034 0.029 2.062 
-1.948 1.322 0.950 0.900 6.227 
SPEC Middle 237.3 -0.004 0.007 -0.002 0.070 0.038 0.068 -27.956 
-1.749 3.337 -0.389 4.048 , 5.381 
Highest 236.9 -0.007 0.004 -0.010 0.080 0.042 0.070 -6.748 
-2.155 0.947 -1.739 5.405 6.673 
Notes. Estimated models are: XIP,., = at+a2D,., -, +PIRET,.,, +ýiD,,,. IRET,, I+e, where X, is an undeflated, per share dependent 
variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional itcms,, dWCAP is 
working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, AStock is change in stock, Xredilors is change in creditors 
accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RET,.,., - (Pr-P,. IYP,., and 
D,,,, = 11 if RET,: 90; 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price P1.1. Avg. n is the average number of 
observations per year. All coefficients' estimates and R 2s are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and associated 
I-statistics are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or 
better at 33-1 - 32 U, i. e., ltl>2.0369. The value of the opening book-to-market is re-calculated every year and tertiles re- 
formed accordingly. 
Starting from the EARN measure of earnings and the incremental bad news 
coefficient, the asymmetric timeliness of EARN to bad news is statistically 
significant in all three book-to-market tertiles and the asymmetry in response is 
increasing from the low to the high book-to market tertile as evidenced by increasing 
estimated P coefficients across the tertiles. This is consistent with expectations; the Y, 
likelihood of observing asymmetric timeliness of earnings should increase with the 
book-to-market ratio. Given the evidence presented in section 4.5.1, the asymmetric 
timeliness should be observed in all tertiles and generally for any firm at any time 
interval. The total. response to bad news also increases across the tertiles. The 
sensitivity of EARN to good news is also increasing with the amount of assets 
recorded on the balance sheet -low book-to-market firms delay the recognition of 
good news in EARN by more than the high book-to-market firms (Pope and Walker, 
2003). Interestingly, the R2 is highest for the middle tertile. That the R2 in the lower 
tertile is lower than the R2 in the middle tertile is not surprising given previous 
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results - the lower R2 indicates that accounting numbers play a lesser role in 
valuation of the low book-to-market firms, assuming the R2 as an indicator of 
association between accounting numbers and market values (e. g., Francis and 
Schipper, 1999). In addition, an on-average lower R2 may also be a consequence of a 
higher content of transitory items at the extremity of the sample. While Pope and 
Walker (2003) do not provide in their tables R 2S that would be directly comparable, 
those reported from lagged versions by book-to-market deciles (Table 5) exhibit an 
inverted U-shape pattern, consistent with the results presented in this research. On 
the other hand, Giner and Rees (2001, Table 7) show that the R2s are decreasing 
monotonically with the increasing book-to-market ratio. 
The results for ordinary earnings (ORD) repeat the same pattern in terms of 
asymmetric timeliness, total response to bad news, response to good news and R2s 
across tertiles. The results for operating profit (OP) are more mixed and there are no 
clear patterns to movements of these statistics across the tertiles. Asymmetric 
timeliness is only statistically, significant in the two extreme tertiles and even 
ignoring statistical significance, there is no clear pattern of incremental response to 
bad news across the tertiles. Moreover, the asymmetry is highest in the lowest book- 
to-market tertiles. However, the total response to bad news increases across tertiles 
as would be expected. 
The results for the OP figure resemble perhaps more the operating cash now 
(OCF) results than the earnings results. This would not be, empirically, entirely 
inconceivable given that OP should contain the least accruals components of all 
three earnings measures used in this research. It is surprising and inconsistent with 
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expectations that OCF exhibits a significant asymmetry in response to bad news 
(both in statistical and economic sense relative to other results presented) in the 
lowest book-to-market tertile. Another unexpected result is that the total response to 
bad news is decreasing across tcrtiles, although given the method used, the statistical 
significance of these total coefficients cannot be inferred. A possible factor in 
explaining these results is that the empirical estimate of OCF is not entirely accruals- 
free. Even so, however, the asymmetry would be expected at the other end of the 
tertiles-partitioning (high book-to-market). 
Regarding the accruals components, special items SPEC are discussed first. 
Consistent with expectations and results presented for the earnings figures, SPEC 
exhibits increasing asymmetric timeliness to bad news across the three book-to- 
market tertiles, both in incremental and total terms. Moreover, the R2s are increasing 
consistently across the tertiles. The three good news coefficients are generally not 
statistically significant, which suggests that good news is not passed through 
extraordinary and/or exceptional items but rather as a part of the "ordinary" 
components of earnings. This result is consistent with both the observations in the 
literature and the results from this research presented in earlier sections (in particular 
Figure 4-1). Also, in the highest book-to-market tertile, the estimated values of the 
A and P coefficients are consistent with values observed for the basic set of results 71 
(compared with Table 4-8). In particular, the asymmetric timeliness is strong and 
statistically significant, and the response to good news indicates that good news 
results in an earnings-decreasing charge through these special items. This last 
inference is not statistically significant at the level usually employed in this research 
using the Fama-MacBeth (1973), method (cc--5%) but would be significant assuming 
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the exact level of significance a-- 9.165% (at t-- -1.739) would be considered 
acceptable. Very similar results, compared with the basic set of results in section 
4.5.1, are also obtained when AWCAP acts as the dependent variable. The 
asymmetric timeliness of AWCAP, as well as the total response to bad news, 
increases as the book-to-market increases. Note that the net current asset is a 
85 
component of the book-to-market ratio. The results on individual components of 
AWCAP are generally not statistically significant. A clear exception is again the 
AStOck component, which exhibits a strong asymmetric response to bad news. 
Ignoring the statistical significance, however, asymmetric timeliness with respect to 
bad news increases across tertiles for all three individual components studied, using 
either the incremental or the total coefficient on bad news. 
To sum up, the results presented in this section are consistent with Pope and 
Walker's (2003) prediction that the asymmetry in response to bad news should 
increase with the amount of assets recorded on the balance sheet. As an extension to 
their findings, the evidence presented shows that the asymmetric timeliness is 
reflected and, more importantly, increases with the two main components of 
accruals, the working capital accruals (AWCAP) and special items (SPEC). Overall, 
the results are consistent with other results presented in this thesis. 
85 This represents one of the starting points for section 4.9.2, where asset-specific ex-ante recognition 
rules are considered. 
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4.9.2 Asset-specIfIc measures of pervasive 
conservatism 
Pope and Walker (2003) extend their model of ex-post accounting 
conservatism to allow for the differences in levels of ex-ante conservatism. As an 
extension of their work, the preceding section shows regressions on cash flow and 
accruals components of earnings as well as various earnings figures by tertiles of the 
book-to-market ratio. In this section, previous results are further extended. First, 
accounting earnings are again decomposed into its operating cash flows and accruals 
components. Next, given the results presented in section 4.9.1 above, the 
contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models using each of the accruals 
components of earnings as dependent variables are re-estimated, but the regressions 
are conditioned on the values of deflated opening stock (balance-sheet) variable with 
which a particular earnings (or earnings component) figure likely relates. Given the 
extremely stringent data requirements to perform such an analysis and requirements 
conditional on the method of estimation (Fama and MacBeth, 1973), the 
conditioning stock variables are divided in tertiles within each individual fiscal year. 
It must be noted that Pope and Walker (2003) divide the observations in yearly 
deciles rather than tertiles, but their US sample is much larger and dividing into 
deciles would not be feasible in the case of the UK sample employed in this study. 
The partitions and the corresponding predictions resulting from the 
extensions of the general -analysis of the effects of asset-recognition rules are as 
follows: 
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- AWCAP originates from the net change in current assets and current liabilities 
(net current asset) from the balance sheet; the higher the opening stock of net 
current assets per share relative to the opening price per share, the more likely it 
is that a particular bad news will be reflected in working capital accruals during 
the period t. The asymmetric timeliness of AWCAP is expected to increase from 
the lowest tertile to the highest tertile of net current assets per share' deflated by 
opening share price; 
- ADebtors originates from the change in the amount of debtors' accounts a firm 
carries on the balance sheet; the higher the opening stock of net debtors per share 
relative to the opening price per share, the more likely it is that a particular bad 
news will be reflected in the debtors' accruals during the period t. The 
asymmetric timeliness of ADebtors is expected to increase from the lowest tertile 
to the highest tertile; 
- AStock originates from the change in the amount of stock and work in progress a 
firm carries on the balance sheet; the higher the opening stock of stock and work 
in progress per share relative to the opening price per share, the more likely it is 
that a particular bad news will be reflected in the stock and work in progress 
accruals during the period t. The asymmetric timeliness of AStock is expected to 
increase from the lowest tertile to the highest tertile; 
- Wreditors originates from the amount of creditors' accounts a firm carries on 
the balance sheet; the higher the opening stock of net creditors per share relative 
to the opening price per share, the more likely it is that a particular bad news will 
be reflected in the creditors' accruals during the period t. The asymmetric 
timeliness of ACreditors is expected to increase from the lowest tertile to the 
highest tertile; 
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- The depreciation and amortisation charge (DEP) normally originates 
from the 
stock of tangible and intangible fixed assets consumed within a period. In 
principle, the higher the opening stock of fixed tangible and intangible assets a 
firm carries on the balance sheet, the more likely it is that a particular bad news 
will be reflected in the depreciation charge. However, unlike in the previous 
examples of accruals, bad news and the corresponding adjustments of the 
carrying value of asset (that equal to the depreciation basis) is not expected to 
change asymmetricall Y. 86 Therefore, regardless of the amount of fixed and 
intangible assets per share relative to the opening price per share, bad news will 
not result in an asymmetric depreciation charge. However, given that some firms 
carry more assets (both tangible and intangible) on the balance sheet than others, 
the timeliness of DEP with respect to good news will increase. 
- Special items (SPEC) capture in great majority the effect of extraordinary and/or 
exceptional items. At least some of these items should result from impairments 
of assets and related items. Given that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact source 
of this type of accruals, again the opening stock of fixed tangible and intangible 
assets relative to share price is used as the stock variable. It is to be expected that 
at least some of the effects of bad news will result in write-offs of fixed tangible 
and intangible assets that will then be captured by the SPEC variable. Therefore, 
the higher the opening amount of fixed and intangible assets per share relative to 
the opening price per share, the more likely it is that a particular bad news will 
result in some asset write-offs and a corresponding increase in the SPEC charge. 
86 See also the expectations regarding the time-series behaviour of depreciation and amortisation 
charge (DEP) presented in section 3.2. 
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The results presented in Table 4-20 are generally consistent with these 
predictions. The asymmetric timeliness of AWCAP to bad news is highest in the 
tertile with the highest opening net current assets per share relative to the opening 
share price. This ratio represents an attempt to use only the portion of the book-to- 
market ratio that is relevant to this particular type of accruals. While the asymmetry 
reflected by the incremental coefficient ; between the first and second tertile 71 
decreases, the total response to bad news increases monotonically. Also, the 
magnitude of the response to bad news relative to good news increases 
monotonically with the relative amount of net assets on the balance sheet. The R2 
also increases with tertiles of net working capital. Finally, the response of A WCAP to 
good news increases with the relative amount of these items on the balance sheet. 
Similar conclusions can also be drawn for the individual components of 
AWCAP. In the case of ADebtors and AStock, the results are qualitatively identical: 
the response to good news measured byA, the incremental response to bad news 
measured by P, the total response to bad news, the R2 and the total response to bad Y, 
news all increase monotonically with increasing amounts of respective opening 
values of assets per share recorded in the balance sheet relative to the opening price. 
The results are weaker for the ACreditors variable. The asymmetric and total 
response is only significant for the highest tertile of the relevant balance-sheet item 
relative to the opening share price, but the R2 is lowest for this tertile, contrary to 
expectations. In particular, the positive signs of the P coefficient in the first two Y, 
tertiles of ACreditors per share relative to opening price per share are interesting 
(indicating that the more negative the returns, the less creditors a firm has). 
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In the case of the depreciation and amortisation expense (DEP), the response 
to good news measured by A, increase with increasing amount of fixed tangible and 
intangible assets per share on the balance sheet relative to the opening price, in line 
with expectations. Given that the definitions and/or classifications of fixed assets in 
the DataStream database differs somewhat across years, two other measures were 
employed in preliminary analyses as a measure of the conditioning opening "stock" 
variable: the opening stock of only fixed tangible rather than total fixed assets per 
share (DataStream item #339), deflated by the opening share price, and an "indirect" 
measure of total long-term assets per share, calculated as total opening assets 
(DataStream item #392) per share less total opening current assets (DataStream item 
#376) per share. The results and conclusions were quantitatively and qualitatively 
almost identical to those presented in Table 4-20 and are accordingly not presented. 
The results for special charges (SPEC) are also generally in line with 
expectations regarding asset-specific rules of recognition: the asymmetric timeliness 
of SPEC to bad news, the R2s and the total response to bad news all increase with the 
amount of fixed tangible and intangible assets on the balance sheet relative to 
opening market value, which, it is assumed, most likely "create" this accruals item. 
The results are also consistent with the expectation that a major part of the construct 
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SPEC is in fact formed from long-lived assets write-offs and/or adjustments in 
expected lives and/or residual values of these assets. 87 
To conclude, the asset-specific measures of pervasive conservatism reinforce 
the basic results obtained by dividing firin-year observations by the opening book-to- 
market ratio. The higher the opening stock of a particular asset relative to the share 
price, the more of the specific asset the firm carries on the balance sheet and the 
more likely it is that an asymmetric response to bad news will be observed. The 
results for all six dependent variables are consistent with these expectations for most 
of ex-post conservatism indicators. Moreover, the sensitivity to good news increases 
with the opening stock of these variables. 
4.10 SEMOMY OF. FINDINGS I 
This chapter presented the main empirical findings of the thesis. First, time- 
series properties of accounting figures that are consistent with predictions under 
conservative accounting. Operating cash flows are strongly mean-reverting and 
respond symmetrically to good and bad news. Earnings-decreases are strongly mean- 
reverting and earnings-increases are permanent, with the asymmetry more 
pronounced for earnings figures containing more accruals. Accruals on average 
mean-revert and the rate of I reversal 
is higher for earnings-decreasing accruals, 
particularly for working capital accruals and special items. Changes in the 
97 The term "consistent with" must be particularly stressed at this point, given that direct supporting 
evidence of the statement cannot be shown due to lack of data. 
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depreciation charge are permanent. Overall, these results are consistent with 
predictions under conservative accounting. 
Second, direct tests using Pope and Walker (1999) model present 
corroborating evidence - the more accruals an accounting figure contains (including 
certain types of accruals themselves), the more pronounced is its asymmetric 
timeliness in respect to incorporation of economic losses. Given that operating cash 
flows do not contain accruals, they respond to bad news symmetrically. The low 
observed R2 in accruals regressions is consistent with accruals making cash flows 
more timely in incorporating economic news to form accounting earnings. Lagged 
models show clearly that good news is incorporated in earnings with a lag, while bad 
news is (mostly) incorporated within the time period it occurs. There are some slight, 
but persistent deviations from this general finding in terms of special items (and the 
earnings figure containing special items) in that some bad news is incorporated in 
these items over a number of periods, rather than immediately. Depreciation reflects 
news symmetrically. Conservatism also appears to be increasing over time, albeit 
evidence is not as strong as in comparable papers. In terms of controls for previous 
penods' conservatism, the results are robust. 
Third, the investigation of loss versus profit observations reveal that 
differences between the two groups ý are important when the accruals and, the 
operating cash flow components are considered. In particular, the earnings of the 
group of observations with negative accruals exhibit significantly more asymmetric CW- - 
timeliness than the group with positive accruals, consistent with conservatism being 
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an accruals phenomenon. Separation by the sign of the cash flow component as well 
as earnings themselves does not produce differing results. 
Fourth, the ex-ante application of conservatism principle limits the effects of 
ex-post conservatism on accounting figures that respond to conservatism (i. e., 
earnings figures and certain types of accruals). The more ex-ante conservative a firm 
is, the less likely it is to observe an asymmetric response of accounting measures to 
good and bad news. This is found to hold both generally and on an asset-specific 
basis. 
The chapter also highlights a number of issues related to the research 
methods. In particular, variable construction and sample formation procedure are 
influenced by the length of time period covered in this study. This is important both 
in terms of empirical definitions of variables as well as issues regarding 
survivorship. The chapter also shows that distributional properties and correlations 
are important indicators of the effects of conservative accounting. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypotheses formulated in section 
3.9. While the results appear robust, certain firm attributes and methods of 
estimation and controls might have an impact on the results presented. Therefore, it 
is necessary to execute additional sensitivity analyses to provide additional support 
for the findings presented in this chapter. These analyses are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
5.1 XNTORDUCTXON TO SENSXTXVXTY ANALYSES 
The contemporaneous and lagged samples employed in the main analyses in 
Chapter 4 consist of firms with different attributes. Firms differ in terms of size, 
industry membership, choice of accounting year-end, differing year ends both across 
different firms, changing year ends for some firms and varying lengths of accounting 
period. While the conservatism principle should apply equally across all firms 
regardless of their differing attributes, it is possible that these attributes induce 
systematic differences among certain groups of firms. For example, the nature of the 
link between accounting figures and market values might differ between smaller 
firms and large firms. Similarly, firms in a particular industry differ in terms of the 
underlying economics of the firms from firms in a different industry. These 
differences might be, in part, reflected in the choice firms make regarding their 
accounting year-end. In the analyses in Chapter 4 these differences are implicitly 
assumed not to have an important impact on particular ways the conservatism 
principle is reflected in accounting figures used in these analyses. Therefore, the first 
purpose of the sensitivity analyses is to explore if there are any indications that the 
application of conservative accounting might differ across firms with differing 
attributes. 
The second purpose of the sensitivity analyses is to control for issues 
surrounding the estimation methods used in the main analyses in Chapter 4. First, the 
sample covers periods of differing economic environment. For example, the inflation 
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rate varied from as high as almost 27% (monthly data, annualised) in 1975 to as low 
as 0.7% in 2001. These differing conditions might affect the relations between 
accounting and market values. Second, the both the method of estimation of the 
models of conservatism and the sample selection procedures bear upon the results 
presented in Chapter 4. Third, because the sample extends over a relatively long time 
period in which accounting regulation has been changing, the choice of particular 
accounting figures published under differing accounting regimes might affect the 
results. 
The subsequent sections present additional analyses that show the effect of 
differing attributes across'firms on the main results as well as specific methods of 
estimation. The attributes explored are: the effect of firm size, possible industry 
differences and systematic differences between December and non-Deccmber year- 
end firms. In terms of methods used and sample selection procedures, the effects of 
alternative measures of ex-ante conservatism, alternative outliers removal 
procedures, alternative methods of estimating regression models and issues regarding 
constructed versus published figures are shown. 
5.2 FXRM SXZE AND CONSERVATXSM 
Several studies in the capital market-based accounting research study the 
influence of size on the relation between earnings and returns. For example, Collins, 
Kothari and Rayburn (1987) hypothesize and find that price-based forecasts of future 
earnings outperform univariate time-series forecasts by a greater margin for larger 
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than for smaller firms. Finn size acts as a proxy for the amount of information about 
a firm and the number of analysts and traders that process that information. 
Specifically, they find that the R 2S in the relations between forecasted -percentage 
changes in earnings per share and current period cumulative abnormal returns at the 
portfolio level increases (from 0.18 to 0.41), while the earnings response coefficient 
decreases with size. Consistent with this, Shores and Shevlin (1993) find that if 
unexpected earnings are, positivethen the response to unexpected quarterly earnings 
is smaller for larger than for smaller firms (note that the unexpected earnings and 
cumulative abnormal returns are equally singed). On the other, hand, if the 
unexpected earnings is negative the response to unexpected, earnings is larger for 
larger firms than for smaller firms. Freeman's (1987) earlier study shows that the 
magnitude of reaction to good and bad news decreases with size and that prices lead 
eamings of large firms by more than for small firms. A related UK study is Charitou, 
Clubb and Andreou (2001). - 
In relating these findings to the accounting conservatism literature, at least 
three hypotheses may be formulated. First, given that the same accounting rules 
apply to all firms, small, medium or large, the coefficients in contemporaneous Pope 
and Walker (1999) models using any earnings or earnings component figure as the 
dependent variable, should be very similar in magnitude, sign and statistical 
significance within each variable regardless of firm size. However, based on Collins, 
Kothari and Rayburn (1987), Freeman (1987), Shores and Shevlin (1993) as well as 
Donnelly and Walker (1995), it is possible that the estimated regression coefficients 
on good news will decrease with size, while the incremental coefficient on bad news 
will increase with size. Second, if the amount of information and the number of 
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analysts and traders are important factors that significantly affect the relation 
between accounting numbers and market values, the A should increase with firm 
size. Firm size in this case proxies for-the number of analysts following the firm 
and/or for the liquidity of the share, i. e., the infbimation enviromnent of the firm. 
Presumably, for larger firms more information is available, the lesser is the 
uncertainty surrounding the present value of future cash flows leading to higher R 2s 
than for smaller firms. Third, based on Freeman (1987), larger firms' share prices 
should lead accounting figures by more. Thus, longer lags might be significant, 
although opposite expectations might be formed. For example, smaller firms are 
more likely to write-off assets (see a summary of the relevant parts of Basu, 2001, 
below). 
The size of the sample used in this study and the relatively large number of 
different accounting models influences the choice of (perhaps only) three size 
groups, consistent with similar analyses in the main chapter of the thesis. Size ranks 
and tertiles are re-formed at the beginning of each accounting period ending in 
sample years 1969-2001 by the opening value of market capitalisation. For each year 
and each size tertile, the contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) cross-sectional 
models are estimated, the results averaged, appropriate Fama-MacBeth (1973) 1- 
statistics calculated and all inferences are made on this basis. The results are 
presented in Table 5-1. They are thus directly comparable to the basic set of 
contemporaneous results presented in Table 4-8. 
Overall, the results show that the coefficients of both good news and bad 
news do not change monotonically across the three size tertiles and across all the 
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accounting variables, studied. Similarly, the R2s across'size tertiles do not change 
monotonically and in some cases and certain measures appear to follow an (inverse) 
U-shaped pattern across tertiles. A possible explanation consistent with this 
observation is that accounting figures at either end of size distributions contain more 
transitory items than firms in the middle of size distributions (e. g., Freeman and Tse, 
1992; Das and Lev, 1994). This would cause the observed results regarding the R 2S 
without necessarily affecting the regression coefficients (albeit issues regarding 
persistence might be important). 
Some of the other more interesting findings are the following. The sensitivity 
of all three measures of earnings OP, ORD and EARN to good news measured by the 
estimated regression coefficient A decreases with size tertiles, as expected. 
However, the asymmetric timeliness of the three earnings m easures, measured by the 
incremental regression coefficient P' is also highest for the smallest tertile and Y, 
lowest for the largest size tertile. Also, the total sensitivity of these earnings 
measures to bad news is higher for smaller firms than for large firms. While contrary 
to expectations based on Shores and Shevlin (1993), these last results arc broadly in 
line with those reported by Basu, Hwang and Jan (2000). 
A consistent pattern can be found in working capital accruals AWCAP, 
though not unequivocally in its individual components. In the case of AWCAP, the 
response to good news, the incremental response to bad news and the total response 
to bad news decrease monotonically with size. Thus, the smaller the firm, the larger 
the response of AWCAP to both good and bad news. The R 2S exhibit an opposite 
pattern (an inverted U-shape) to earnings' regressions. The results on special items 
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(SPEC) are less clear. While the response to good news is not statistically 
significant, the lowest and the; highest tertiles exhibit a high and statistically 
significant asymmetric timeliness to bad news, and the R 2S increase across the 
tertiles. Other results show that operating cash flows (OCF) in the smallest and 
largest tertile are strongly related to good news (more for the smaller firms), while 
the middle tertile exhibits a strong and statistically significant asymmetric timeliness 
with respect to bad news, a result not expected under conservative accounting. 
The equivalent results of lagged models are presented in Appendix H. 
Overall, the results are weaker, a possible consequence of the relatively small 
average number of observations, in particular in the smallest-firms tertile. Two 
results are perhaps worth stressing. First, in the ORD regressions, the asymmetric 
timeliness to current and lag-one bad news is highest for the smallest firms and 
smallest for the largest firms, consistent with Basu (2001). Moreover, the lag-two 
cocfficient on bad news r3 is significant, consistent with Freeman (1987). Also, 
there is some indication that large firms recognise bad news in special items (SPEC) 
more smoothly over more time periods than small firms. 
Another way to study the influence of size would be by excluding the 
smallest 25% of observations by opening market value and, additionally, those 
observations where RET, equals exactly zero. The results from these direct tests are 
quantitatively affected very little compared to the results in Table 4-8 and are thus 
not reported. Generally, however, the asymmetric timeliness of all three earnings 
measures decreases slightly; most of the asymmetry is still captured by AWCAP and 
SPEC. 
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To sum up, while size does appear to be a factor that introduces some 
incremental effects in the relation between market values and accounting figures 
under conservative accounting, the direction and magnitude are somewhat 
arnbiguous. 88 Basu (2001) provides some explanations that might help explain the 
results observed in this research. First, smaller firms tend to be riskier. Holding 
future expected cash flows constant, this should lead to smaller market values - i. e., 
size is a proxy for (or a consequence of) risk (Rubinstein, 2001). Broadly in line with 
this observation, the variability of returns (RE7), measured by O'RET, increases from 
the smallest to the largest firms: 0.485,0.481 and 0.425 respectively, albeit these 
decreases appear to be very small. 89 Smaller firms are thus (very slightly) more 
likely to be affected by bad news, required to write down assets more often, which 
would expose the firm to legal-liability risk (Basu, 2001). 
Second, small firms might be less diversified, which makes write-downs 
more likely for these firms. Broadly consistent with this observation, the mean 
(average) values of deflated special items (SPEC) increase from -0.073 (-0.041) for 
the lowest tertile, to -0-001 (0.000) for the middle size-tertile and, switching sip, to 
+0.041 (+0.021) for the largest finns. 
$a There are studies that present arguments against the "size effecf' in stock returns (e. g., Wang, 
2000). 
89 Caution must be exercised, however, that these descriptivcs are calculated on a pooled, cnd-of- 
period basis instead of year-by-year, opening values used to form tertiles by size and are therefore not 
the exact equivalent of size classifications. 
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A third and related possible explanation might be the coexistence of "big 
bath" accounting (e. g., Elliott and Hanna; Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Waymire, 1988) 
and earnings smoothing. A very rough adaptation/simplification of Kirschenheiter 
and Melumad's (2002) theoretical predictions might be the following. The more 
good the news is, the higher the degree of under-reporting in financial statements. 
For moderately bad news, they make no clear predictions (managers might either 
slightly over-report or slightly under-report). On the other hand, if news is very bad, 
managers will choose "big batW' accounting, while for moderately bad news, they 
will likely attempt to smooth earnings (likely adopt earnings-increasing accounting 
policies). Note at this point that size, measured as market capitalisation, directly 
affects these statements through the definition of news used in this study. In a very 
condensated approach to this analysis, it is first assumed all such earnings- 
influencing activities are passed through SPEC While this is likely for "big bath" 
procedures, managerial implementations of other activities are less clear. Second, 
observations are separated into four partitions according to the magnitude and sign of 
returns RETt. j. j: a) RETt. 1-1<---0.245 (worst news, the number being the median return 
of all bad news firms); b) -0.245<RETt, 1.1: 50 (moderate bad news); c) O>RET,. t. 
1ý: 0.423 (moderate good news) and d) RETt. 1.1>0.423 (very good news, the number 
being the median return of all good news firms). Third, for each of these partitions a 
simple, bivariate, pooled regression of SPEC, on RETt. t. 1 is run: 
SPEC,, = a, +ARETi,,, -, + el, (5-1) 
While this partitioning as well as the method of estimation are certainlY very 
rudimentary, the expectations are that for bad news, the estimated regression 
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coefficientAwill be very high and positive for the worst bad news, causing thus for 
a given unit of bad news the highest decrease of earnings via making SPEC most 
negative. For moderately bad news, the estimated regression coefficient will be 
positive, but smaller than in the case of worst-news group. Under conservative 
accounting, firms are required to recognise bad news in current financial statements, 
but under Kirschenheiter and Melumad's (2002) they are less likely to choose "big 
bath" accounting methods. Part of bad news is thus still expected to be recognised 
through SPEC and consequently decrease earnings. On the other hand, for 
moderately good news and given that there are no clear theoretical predictions, the 
estimated A coefficient will likely be statistically insignificantly different from zero 
if the two effects are mixing, on average. The degree of under-reporting should be 
highest for the very good-news group. To obtain under-reporting, such policies must 
be chosen so as to reduce slightly the earnings that would otherwise be reported. In 
the simple context presented here, a unit of very good news should cause, in part, the 
creation of negative SPEC. The estimatedA coefficient for this partition is thus 
expected to be negative (and likely not very large in magnitude). 
The results are remarkably supportive of all four expectations. In the worst 
bad news-group the estimated regression coefficient is Aý 0-055 (pooled t-statistics 
t-- 6.03), for the moderately bad news-group ft, = 0.030 (t-- 2.49), for the moderately 
A 
-0 1 good news A= -0.008 (t-- -1.25) and for the very good news-grouP A= -0 0 
(t-- -3.73). Also note that the R2, albeit comparable in magnitude to the main results 
of this research - i. e., relatively small (also see explanation in section 4.5.2), the R2 
is highest in the worst bad news-group, as would be expected (pooled R 2= 0.007, 
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pooled F1,6,449= 6.220). There also should not be any difference in tenns of R2 
between the two bad news groups, yet in the moderate bad news it is several times 
lower (albeit still significant). These results are also consistent with the main results 
(see Table 4-8) regarding the SPEC regressions, where it has been shown that good 
news result in a slight earnings-decreasing change in special items (SPEC). These 
results are taken as indicative only. To provide a full explanation of these relations, 
more advanced methods would have to be used as well as a study of possible biases 
included. 
Overall, therefore, while there are some indications of systematic differences 
in application of the conservatism principle across size tertiles, there are no clear-cut 
results for the overall sample. At least some of the observed differences might relate 
more to transitory components of accounting numbers as evidenced by an inverted 
U-shaped pattern in R2s across the tree size tertiles for eight out of ten accounting 
variables studied than to any systematic differences resulting from different 
applications of accounting conservatism, on average. Given that all firms must 
conform to the same set of accounting rules this is to be expected. 
5.3 XNDUSTRY DXFFERENCES 
The contemporaneous sample used in this study includes 85 different 
industries defined by DataStream industry codes (DataStream item INDM 
(excluding financial services and similar industries), with the number of observations 
within each industry in the pooled sample ranging from a high of 2,106 for 
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"Engineering, general" to as low as 9 ("Cable+Satellite" and "Retailers e- 
commerce") and 7 C'Gold mining"). The number of observations in some industries 
precludes the use of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions within industries and would 
likely make pooled estimates unreliable for some of these industries. One alternative 
to solve both these problems would be to aggregate "similar" industries together, as 
for example in Barth, Cram and Nelson (2001) for US firms to obtain 13 aggregate 
industries. However, attempts to mimic their aggregations for the UK market 
produce groups that again, as in their study, differ greatly in number of observations 
and differing results that may be due to imprecise aggregation. 90 Even so, 
aggregation may in some case be infeasible, as certain member industries would still 
be treated separately. An (early) example is the oil and gas industry, characterised as 
early as 1958 by Brock (1958) to be "ultra-conservative". An alternative approach is 
taken here accordingly. I 
Absent any other objective criteria on selection of industries, rive DataStream 
INDM industries have been selected that contain at least 1,000 observations in the 
entire pooled 1969-2001 period. These industries are (number of observations and 
median opening book-to-market ratio in parentheses): "Building materials" (1,005; 
0.954). "Business support" (1,485; 0.685), "Electrical equipment" (1,210; 0.637), 
"Engineering, general" (2,106; 1.18 1) and "Food processing" (1,0 11; 1.032). Other 
industries contain less than 1,000 observations in total. For these five industries, 
pooled contemporaneous-model regressions have been estimated for the entire 1969- 
2001 period. Results are presented graphically in Figure 5-1 for the main earnings 
90 In Barth, Cram and Nelson's (2001, notes to Table 6) study, the minimum number of observations 
is 47 (agriculture) for a sample spanning the years 1987-1996. The maximum number in their 
industry-specific sub-sample is 1,365 (retail). 
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figure and the main components for parsimony. In the figure, the estimated pooled 
good news coefficient ý, (blue) and the estimated incremental bad news coefficient 
(j, ) are shown and the sum of the two coefficients yields the total response to bad 
news. 
Figure 5-1: Pooled contemporaneous models of conservatism by industry on main accounting 
variables for the largest five industries by number of observations, 1969-2001 
0.30 
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0.10 
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Notes to Figure 5-1. Estimated models are: XIP, I= aj+a2D,, _j+#jRET,, j+yID_IRl- ,J,, I+c, where X, is an undellatcd, per 
share dependent variable listed in the leftmost column of' the table. OCE is operating cash flow, EARN is earnings ullcr 
extraordinary and exceptional items, JWCAP is working capital accruals, SPECis special items and Accruals (lot. ) JW( , All + 
DEP + SPEC. RET,, _j= (PP,., 
)IP,., and D,.,., = jI it'REII, I: ýO, 0 othcrwiscý. All variables are deflated by opening share price 
P, 
. Ail coefficients' estimates are pooled cross-sectional time series Ior the period 1969-2(X)I. Industries (as of' DataStreani item INDM) are: Building materials, Business support, Electronic equipment, Engineering, general, and I-otid processors. 
The results show that for all five industries, operating cash flows (OCF) 
reflect a portion of current-penod good economic news. The A coefficient is 
statistically significant for all five industries (pooled t-statistics are: 8.709,7.443, 
3.604,9.586 and 4.738 respectively). There is no asymmetric timeliness of OCF 
with respect to bad news, except for the industry "Food processing" where the j, 
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coefficient is Oust) statistically significantly different from zero (pooled t-statistic: 
2.049). 
Earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) exhibit clear 
asymmetric timeliness with respect to bad economic news, except for the industry 
"Building materials" where the pooled t-statistic on P is not statistically different 71 
from zero. Also, the total response to bad news is highest for the industry where'the 
median opening book-to-market ratio is highest ("Engineering, general"), consistent 
with ex-ante conservatism and results obtained and presented in sections 4.9.1 and 
4.9.2. The ft, coefficient on good economic news is statistically significant for all 
five industries shown (pooled t-statistics are: 7.084,5.037,6.973,5.436 and 3.805 
respectively). 
The asymmetric timeliness exhibited by EARN for the five industries shown 
appears not to originate from working capital accruals (AWCAP). The bad news 
coefficient P, is not statistically different from zero in any of the five cases. Also, 
the good news coefficient Ais not statistically different from zero for the "Building 
materials" and "Business support" industries. However, special items (SPEC) show 
high asymmetric timeliness of these items in respect to bad news. In four out of five 
industries (the exception being "Building materials"), the P coefficient is 71 
statistically significant (pooled t-statistics are: 1.245,4.727,2.730o 5.745 and 2.004 
respectively). Similar results are obtained if the total accruals Accruals (tot. ) figure is 
considered, again the exception being the "Food processing" industry. 
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Overall, the pooled results by industry are consistent with the results obtained 
by cross-sectional estimations of the contemporaneous model of accounting 
conservatism: there is no asymmetry in reflecting good and bad economic news in 
operating cash flow, earnings exhibit high asymmetric timeliness in earnings. This 
asymmetry is clearly reflected in the accruals component of earnings, although 
results presented in Figure 5-1 differ from the general results regarding the source of 
this asymmetry - AWCAP appear not to play a significant role in these industries, as 
opposed to the general results (see, for example, Table 4-8)'. However, the results 
reinforce the notion that accruals overall and special items (SPEC) make earnings 
more timely than cash flows in reflecting bad economic news. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this industry-specific analysis of 
conservatism (in particular, the industry selection), An analysis of industry-specific 
ex-post conservatism after controlling for industry-specific levels of cx-ante 
conservatism is also provided. This is achieved by separating observations within an 
industry by pooled low/high opening book-to-market ratio. Such an analysis should 
yield very precise results in terms of controlling for effects such as conditions on 
input and output markets, technology and business risk (Martikainen, 1997). 
As in section 4.9.1, it is predicted that the higher the book-to-market ratios 
within an industry, the more assets are recognised on the balance sheet, the more 
likely it is that news relates to these items and the more asymmetric the response to 
bad news. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 5-2 for the earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN) as the dependent variable only. 
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Table 5-2: Industry-specific asymmetric response of earnings, controlled by the industry-specific 
levels of ex-ante conservatism, pooled, 1969-2001 
Opening 
2 Industry B/M n et, et2 R 
rank A 
Low 501 0.087 0.004 0.027 0.117 0.129 0.144 5.303 
Building 14.569 0.469 2.067 4.054 24.432 
materials High 500 0.086 -0.024 0.104 -0.055 0.136 0.049 0.471 
7.550 -1.265 5.583 -0.959 25.922 
Low 733 0.067 0.005 0.027 0.107 0.183 0.134 4.941 
Business 16.471 0.709 3.740 5.727 54.531 
support High 732 0.086 0.020 0.071 0.128 0.121 0.199 2.798 
10.656 1.396 5.569 2.942 33.410 
Low 598 0.064 0.013 0.019 0.143 0.183 0.162 8.327 
Electronic 11.713 1.597 1.939 6.652 44.471 
equipment High 598 0.075 0.006 0.058 0.213 0.215 0.271 4.676 
8.329 0.409 4.503 5.107 54.264 
Low 1,046 0.098 -0.001 -0.015 0.193 0.114 0.178 -12.044 
Engineering, 17.425 -0.080 -1.249 8.086 44.575 
general High 1,045 0.103 -0.009, 0.113 0.160 0.194 0.273 2.409 
11.152 -0.577 7.264 3.468 83.621 
Low 500 0.091 -0.013 0.017 0.110 0.161 0.127 7.511 
Food 15.552 -1.328 1.431 3.949 31.762 
processing High 499 0.119 0.010 0.104 0.141 0.170 0.244 2.357 
12.235 0.620 5.982 2.416 33.829 
Notes. Estimated models are: EARNWP, -i - aj+aýD,., j+fljRETj.,. j+p D,,. jRET,,. j+i; where EARN is undeflated per share 
earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, RET,,,, - (Pr-P,. IYP,., and Dl.,., 'C 11 if RET,: 50; 0 otherwise). All 
variables are deflated by opening share price AI. All coefficients' estimates are pooled cross-sectional time &cries for the 
_period 
1969-2001. Opening book-to-market value is calculated within each industry on a pooled basis. 
In the industries "Business support", "Electronic equipment" and "Food 
processing" the good news coefficientft, the bad news coefficient P and the total Y, 
response to bad news A+j, is higher for the high book-to-market group than for 
the low book-to-market group. The response to good news is delayed and in all cases 
the asymmetric timeliness of EARN to bad news is significant. 
Similar results also hold for the other industries with two exceptions. First, in 
the high book-to-market group within "Building materials" the bad news coefficient 
P, is of the wrong sign and statistically insignificant. Second, in the "Engineering, 
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general" industry, the low book-to-market group shows a smaller asymmetric 
timeliness as evidenced by the size of the incremental bad news coefficient. 
However, the total bad news coefficient A+A is higher for this group, consistent 
with expectations. Also, the relative bad news coefficients are not higher for the high 
book-to-market group within any of the five industries, an observation consistent 
with the overall results in Table 4-19 and asset-specific measures of ex-ante 
conservatism in Table 4-20. 
There are at least three reservations that might be put forward against such a 
method to study industry differences. First, in some cases ("Electrical equipmenf') 
and some years, the number of observations is small (in particular in the 1969-1972 
period). While the pooled method of estimation should help to reduce this problem, 
it cannot by itself eliminate it. Moreover, it also re-introduces other problems in 
interpretation of the regression results that the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method 
reduces. Second, the selection of industries is arbitrary and might not be descriptive 
of the entire UK sample of publicly-quoted companies. It is also likely that a 
selection of more contrasting industries in terms of operating characteristics and 
levels of ex-ante conservatism may yield a clearer picture of industry differences. 
Third, other alternatives might be developed to study inter-industry differences - for 
example, Platt and Platt (1990) suggest standardisation by dividing af inn's financial 
ratio with a corresponding mean of industry-wide ratios. In the context of this study, 
this might be done by dividing each return and each dependent variable with an 
industry mean. However, again, there are issues regarding the dependent variables in 
non-December fiscal year-end firms. While these limitations are acknowledged, the 
results appear sufficiently robust to provide an overview of some of the industry 
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differences and the generality of the asymmetric timeliness relations presented in the 
main part of this thesis. 
5.4 THE XSSUE OF NON-DECEMBER YEAR-END 
OBSERVATXONS 
The two main samples used in this study include significant proportions of 
non-December fiscal year-end firms. Since the ex-dividend returns are cumulated 
over fiscal periods rather than . over periods 
designated to capture the full 
impoundment of information from the market into accounting numbers, this implies 
that the estimated regression coefficients are not independent over time. Cross- 
sections from adjacent years are likely to contain at least some common influences 
from both the current and the preceding calendar year. For example, for a firm whose 
accounting year ends on the 31/03/2001 and has not switched the year end during the 
last year, the returns are cumulated starting on the 31/03/2000, i. e., the preceding 
calendar year. The cross-section for year 2001 would therefore contain some general 
effects that stem from the year 2000. To avoid this problem, both Basu (1997) and 
Pope and Walker (1999) use only December 31" firms and, in addition, Basu (1997) 
corrects not only the returns, but also the accounting earnings (i. e., dependent) 
variables for market-wide effects. 
In the case of the samples employed in this study, this is not feasible. An 
attempt to control for possible differences between December and non-December 
year-end observations is made by introducing incremental and interactive dummy 
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variables for each independent variable (i. e., returns and returns multiplied by the 
bad news dummy) in each of the models using different earnings and earnings 
components as dependent variables. The contemporaneous version of the models can 
therefore be augmented as follows: 
Xf 
=a, +a2D,,, -, +, 
81 RET,, t-l + yD,,, -, 
RET,,, 
-, + 
8, NONDECYE 
Pt-I 
+432NONDECYE-D,,, -, +83NONDECYE - 
RETt, t-, + 
(5-2) 
+84NONDECYE-D,., -, -RET,,, -, +u, 
where the dummy variable NONDECYE assumes the value of one if the accounting 
year-end is not on the 31" of December and zero otherwise. If there are any 
systematic effects that relate in particular to non-December fiscal year-ends, some of 
the estimated coefficients (5, to S4 will be statistically significant, although it is not 
possible to fonn a priori expectations as to the magnitude and sign of these 
estimated coefficients. A compounding factor is that NONDECYE factors capture 
different year-ends, ranging from January up to the 30'h of December. 
The results of estimating the above equation (5-2) are presented in Table 5-3. 
This table is intended to be compared directly with the unrestricted results in Table 
4-8 and to be indicative of the effects of non-December year-end firms on lagged 
results presented in Table 4-11. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the 
overall results are unaffected by controls for non-December fiscal year-ends. This is 
evidenced by the statistical insignificance of the estimated regression coefficients of 
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additive and interactive NONDECYE-dummies 8, to 54 . In particular, operating 
cash flows (OCF) reflect news symmetrically, bad news is reflected in all three 
earnings figures significantly faster than good news. The asymmetric timeliness is 
highest for the EARN figure, as expected, followed by the OP and ORD figures, as in 
the main results. Most of this asymmetric timeliness is captured by working capital 
accruals (AWCAP) and special items (SPEC). If anything, the asymmetry is 
strengthened with the introduction of the NONDECYE dummy (e. g., in the case of 
ORD and EARN). The only marginally significant exception is the Wreditors 
accruals component, where the statistical significance decreases to just below 5%. 
The average R 2S increase marginally with the introduction of these dummy variables 
in the conservatism models. 
5.5 MARKET-ADJUSTED RETURNS, YXELD CURVES AND 
CONSERVATISM 
Basu (1997) provides additional sensitivity analyses in estimating the 
contemporaneous models on earnings by excluding market-wide effects. He 
subtracts the equally-weighted CRSP index from finn-spccific ex-dividcnd returns 
(the independent variable) and an equally-weighted index of earnings-to-price ratios 
from a firm's earnings-to-price ratio (the dependent variable). The second 
adjustment in particular is possible because he uses only December 3 I't observations 
in his sample and this allows various market-wide forms of earnings-to-price ratios 
to be formed. In the sample in this study it would be difficult to calculate a 
representative average XtIPI-I ratio for all firms. There are a large number of non- 
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December year-ends in the sample and, in addition, the lengths and "positions" of 
returns-accumulation periods vary significantly (section 4.2 contains a detailed 
description of the sample in this respect). However, an attempt to adjust the ex- 
dividend returns for market-wide influences is made on an individual-observation 
basis. From the return RETit, -I each 
firm i and each fiscal period (t, t-1), the 
percentage change in the FTSE All Share index is subtracted: 
MRET =RET. -A%FTSEAllShare,,, -, Iti-I Iti-I 
(5-3) 
where A016FTSE All Share is the percentage change in the FTSE All Share index over 
the corresponding fiscal period (t, t-1). Given that the lengths of accounting periods 
are allowed to vary by 365±91 days, the percentage changes in the index level are 
calculated separately for every finn and every fiscal year-end (subscripts in equation 
(5-3) are used in full to emphasise this particular "individual-treatment" procedure). 
Similarly, for the lagged model, the marked-adjusted returns MRETs are defined as: 
A%FTSE All Sharei, 
-,, -, -, 
(5-4) 
wherez- 0,..., 3. All MRETt-rj-r-, variables are deflated by P" and each periodic 
change of the index is also deflated by the level of the index at time t-4 to maintain 
deflator-period consistency. 
In addition to market-adjusted returns, the yields on 91 -day UK Treasury bill 
and the average gross redemption yield on 10-year UK gilts collected on the latest 
date available immediately prior to the balance sheet date are also included. 
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Effectively, the inclusion of these two rates of return is an attempt to incorporate a 
proxy for the expected economic environment as reflected by the (partial) yield 
curve. This concept has been presented and used in related literature by, for example, 
Fama and French (1989) and McCown (1999) and has been found to correlate with 
the probability of an increasing/decreasing stock market (Resnick and Shoesmith, 
2002). Alternatively, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) use the inflation rate and GNP 
growth (the former is used in this study for illustrative purposes, although it must be 
noted that its effect should also be reflected both in returns and in bond yields). It is 
acknowledged there are at least two problems related to this approach. First, there 
are no strict theoretical derivations that would model the incorporation of either the 
index return or the yield curve in variants of the Pope and Walker (1999) model. 
Second, it is possible that noise is introduced due to imperfect measurements of 
these economic constructs and in particular timing differences. This latter problem 
results from an imperfect matching of the balance sheet date and the date on which 
(or the period for which) the goverriment securities' data is collected. This might 
introduce the errors-in-variables problem described in section 2.3.1 and introduce the 
attenuation bias in all regression coefficients. Given the data structure and the 
methods used in this thesis, however, these problems cannot be dealt with and thus 
represent a caveat in interpreting the results presented below. 
The empirical versions of the contemporaneous and lagged models are: 
X'- 
= ao + aDM,,, -, +AMRET$,, -, 
+ yDM,,, -, 
MRET,,, 
-, + V, 
UKTRSBL, + P$-, (5-5a) 
V12UKMEDYLD, + e, 
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and, for the lagged version: 
33 
Xf 
= ao + aDM, -,., -, -, +I6, +, 
MPET, 
-,. t-, -, +Z yMPET, -,,, -, -, 
DM, 
-,., -, -, + (5-5b) pt-4 T. 0 r-O 
ylUKTRSBL, + V2 UKMED YLD, +, cs 
where the bad-news indicator variables DMI-,., -,, are 
defined according to the sign of 
the respective MPETI-,, t-, -, adjusted returns. 
The main difference between market- 
adjusted returns models with MRETIMPET independent variables and the unadjusted 
returns models with RETIPET as independent variables is that the estimated 
regression constant a,, and, if significant, the incremental regression constant for 
bad news a,, should be higher, but the estimated regression slopes should not be 
affected significantly (the 8 and y^ coefficients in both versions of the models). 
Geometrically, this should be the case, because from the same unadjusted dependent 
variable, a "constanf' is subtracted from the explanatory variable, effectively 
switching the regression line to the left, causing it to cross the y-axis at a higher level 
than with the unadjusted explanatory variables. 91 If the yield-curve variables capture 
some of the correlated omitted factors from regressions (5-5a) and (5-5b), then the 
ft and j coefficients should increase in absolute value. If, on the other hand, the 
yield-curve variables capture some un-correlated omitted factors from then the 
and j coefficients should remain un-changed, but the R 2S should increase. 
91 The term "constant" is in quotes because individual values of the index are subtracted from firm- 
time-specific returns. The term would, however, be a strict constant should all firms end the fiscal 
year at the same time and all have equal fiscal-period lengths. 
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The results presented in Table 5-4 are a mixture of these -effects. First, in all 
ten regressions, the R 2S increase compared to the basic set of results in Table 4-8, 
which would suggest that the combined effect of adjustment to capital market 
movements and short- and long-term interest rates represent at least to a certain 
extent some uncorrelated factors omitted from analyses in the main part of this 
research. The contribution is, however, modest, in line with the fact that only two 
individual 0 coefficients are statistically significant out of a total 
10*01+10*02= 20 0 coefficients. Second, while the iesponse to good news 
increases for measures OCF, OP, ORD and EARN the asymmetry in response to bad 
news decreases. The relations among the respective good and bad news coefficients 
remain unchanged from the main analyses. For example, the asymmetric timeliness 
is highest for the EARN variable, followed by OP and ORD, while the expectation is 
I ORD first and then OP. Third, similar conclusions apply also to the accruals 
components. For example, the estimated coefficient on good news in the SPEC 
regression becomes higher in absolute value (i. e., more eamings-decreasing) than in 
the basic analyses, which re-confinns and strengthens the result obtained previously 
that the arrival of good economic news coincides with firms employing some 
earnings-decreasing methods to reduce reported earnings in the current period. 
A final note that relates to the market-adjusted contemporaneous sample 
relates to the average number of firms per year. Compared to the unadjusted 
contemporaneous sample, the average number of observations is slightly higher: 
784.7 compared to 784.5 for the un-adjusted sample, the number being higher in 12 
out of 33 years. Thus, it would appear that the adjustments made also have the effect 
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of reducing the "degree of extremity"'of the sample that possibly arises also as a 
consequence of the sample-construction/outlier-removaI procedures employed. 
Table 54: Contemporaneous models of ex-post accounting conservatism by earnings and earnings 
components, adjusted for general market movements and short and long-term interest 
rates, 1969-2001 
AAAA2 
Dependent variable avg. n eti 62 VI V2 R 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 784.7 0333 0.003 0.105 0.008 -0.082 -0.999 0.065 4368 0.733 6A68 0.313 -0-074 -1.529 8.722 
Ean-dngs 
OP 
ORD 
EARN 
Accruals 
AWCAP 
AWCAP components: 
- of which ADebtors 
- of whichdSlock 
784.7 0.242 0.003 0.119 
4.222 0.920 7.635 
784.7 0.115 0.002 0.063 
3.349 0.919 8.201 
784.7 0.096 0.005 0.061 
2.462 1.493 7.657 
784.7 -0.015 0.003 0.034 0.065 -0.076 0.741 0.032 
-0.356 0.757 4.300 4.019 -0.253 1.638 6.9" 
784.7 -0.050 0.001 0.051 0.051 0.150 0.928 0.041 
-0.970 0.467 6.954 2.774 0.477 2.026 8.304 
784.7 -0.088 -0.003 0.035 0.061 0.088 1.340 0.035 
-2.202 -0.726 4.389 3.619 0.264 3.172 9.369 
0.092 -0.218 -0.173 0.170 
5.588 -0.249 -0.300 16.407 
0.089 -0.150 -0.029 0.206 
8.274 -0.348 -0-084 17.796 
0.135 -0.036 0.057 0.177 
8.669 -0.073 0.136 16.719 
-of which Wreditors 784.7 0.123 0.004 -0.052 -0.046 -0.315 -1.527 0.036 
2.029 1.179 -6.389 . 2.190 -0.807 -2.475 9.219 
DEP 784.7 -0.079 -0.003 -0.023 0.021 -0.103 0.125 0.028 
-3.785 -1.962 -5.421 2.997 -0.374 0.636 7.362 
SPEC 784.7 -0.023 0.003 -0.011 0.049 0.164 0.063 0.028 
-1.495 2.037 ' . 3.019 6.578 1.008 0.318 7.085 
Notes. Estimated models are: XWP,., - ai+a2DMI. I. I+AMRET,,., +, siDM,,,. IMRETt.,., +VAUKTRSBL, +OUKMEDYLDI+e, 
where X, is an undeflated, per share dependent variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash 
flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN Is earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items,, dWCAP is working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, ASlock is 
change in stock, ACreditors is change in creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is 
special items, MRET,,,, - (Pr-P, _1)1P,. 1 - 
%AME All Share,,., and DM,,,., = (I if RET,: 5D; 0 otherwise). All variables are 
deflated by opening share price P,. 1. Avg. n is the average number of observations per year. All coefficients' esti mates and 
R's are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and associated I-statistics are calculated according to the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 33-1 - 32 d. f., i. e., 14>2.0369. 
The results obtained from market- and yield-adjusted lagged models 
(presented below in Table 5-5) are also consistent with the un-adjusted results 
presented in Table 4-11. The good news coefficients on earnings increase 
monotonically for all three earnings measures, as expected. The incremental bad 
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news coefficients decrease monotonically toward zero and are significant up to two 
lags (three periods) for the ORD and EARN measures and up to one lag (two periods) 
for the OP measure. This result is qualitatively identical to the unadjusted results. 
Ilie estimated cocfficients on good news in the operating cash flows (OCF) equation 
also increase, albeit with a slight unexplained deviation at lag one. Regarding the 
working capital accruals dIVCAP, the good news coefficients generally increase and 
it exhibits asymmetric timeliness in respect to current-period bad news. There is no 
asymmetry for further lags, consistent with current-period bad news being 
impounded through A TVCAP in current-period earnings. Of the individual A WCAP 
components, interestingly, none exhibits asymmetric timeliness in the current period 
(the P, coefficient). However, the P. coefficient at lag one in the AStock equation is 
statistically significant, consistent with the un-adjusted results (see Table 4-11). 
Also, if the exact significance level of 0.079 (corresponding to the test statistic of t-- 
1.813) were acceptable, the results for bad news would be qualitatively identical to 
the un-adjusted results. 
Overall and bearing in mind the difficulties related to adjustments made in 
this section, the correction for the general return on the market, measured by the 
percentage change in the FTSE All Share index and the inclusion of short- and long- 
tenn interest rates does not appear to have a material effect on the results in the main 
part of this research. The results thus appear to be robust to changing general 
economic conditions as proxied. for with the adjustments for index return and 
government bond yields. 
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5.6 AN ALTERNATXVE PROXY FOR EX-ANTE 
CONSERVATXSM 
The book-to-market ratio is used in section 4.9.1 to capture the overall levels 
of ex-ante conservatism, based on Pope and Walker (2003). In section 4.9.2, this is 
developed further by including asset-specific measures of ex-ante conservatism. In 
both versions, a highly ex-ante conservative finn expenses a high proportion of 
assets at the time the investment is made. Accordingly, the proportion of recorded 
assets (i. e., book value of assets) relative to total economic assets (i. e., cash- 
generating assets, the market value) should be low. However, there are at least two 
additional observations that can be made about the book-to-market ratio as a measure 
of ex-ante levels of conservatism. 
First, the value of the ratio depends, among other things, also on leverage. 
Kim and Ritter (1999) show that the effects of leverage are important in certain 
applications of valuations with relatives. Second, in the context of the scale issues 
presented in section 2.3.2, the market value of a firrn's, equity used to calculate the 
ratio can be viewed merely as one of the many possible size deflators with which to 
deflate the book value of equity. Easton and Sommers (2000, Figures 5 and 6) show 
that deflation by lagged market value and deflation by current-period sales produce 
very similar scale-reduction effect. Accordingly, the (lagged) market, value of a 
firm's equity used as a deflator might be substituted with some other measure of 
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size. 92 This represents a "technical" rationale to decompose the book-to-market ratio, 
and other measure of scale (i. e., other deflators) might be used. 
Garrod and Valentincic (2001) present one such generic decomposition of the 
book-to-market ratio: 
(BVI P) = (S / P) - (BVI S) (5-6) 
where S is the total sales per share, BV is the book value of equity per share and P is 
the share price. Stock variables used to capture the levels of ex-ante conservatism 
would generally refer to their opening values at time Q-1). Likely, the use of any 
flow variables in these measure should include lagged values of these flow variables 
i. e., in time interval (t-1, t-2). However, the decomposition is more general and in 
principle valid regardless of whether closing or opening values are used. 
Ranking observations by the book-to-sales ratio, BVIS, should produce 
similar results as with the book-to-market ranking, given that both the B VIP ratio and 
the BVIS ratios represent measures of assets in place that were subjected to ex-ante 
accounting practices at the time the investment was made and the original cost 
recorded in the balance sheet. The two ratios differ, given the "technical" 
background presented above, only by the type of size deflator. On the other hand, the 
sales-to-price ratio SIP can be viewed as a proxy measure of future growth potential 
92 It must be stressed that the book-to-market ratio used in this research is the "opening" book-to- 
rnarket ratio, i. e., lagged book value per share is divided by the adjusted price per share at the 
previous balance-sheet date. 
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- dividing the inverse of the SIP ratio, the PIS ratio, by the net profit margin EIS 
yields the price-earnings ratio: 
(P1S)1(E1S)=(P1E) (5-7) 
A low PIS ratio (or, equivalently, a high SIP ratio) is viewed by "contrarian" 
investors as a good investment opportunity given that future improvement in profit 
margins improves earnings and increases future PIE ratios (Siva, Kumar and 
Jayaraman, 2001; Chou and Liao, 1996; Senchack and Martin, 1987). 
Literature also states that an important advantage of using the PIS ratio 
instead of the PIE ratio is that the PIS ratio is less open to manipulation given that it 
can only be managed by varying the revenue recognition methods (Siva, Kumar and 
Jayaraman, 2001). 93 This implies that most of the accounting effects should be 
captured via the other component of book-to-market ratio, the book value of equity 
BV relative to sales S, where the sales figure acts technically as a deflator. The 
existence of growth opportunities should not be timely incorporated in earnings, 
since these options must first be realised and only then can they be included in 
financial statements. Market values, on the other hand, recognise the value of these 
options immediately and the lag between market values and financial statements may 
be significant (Beekes, Pope and Young, 2003). 
To test for possible effects of changing the proxy for the level of ex-ante 
conservatism on the effects of ex-post conservatism, the following procedure is 
93 The actual term used in the source is ))manipulatedo rather than managed. 
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applied. As in sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 and following the decomposition in (5-6), the 
opening values of book-to-market, book-to-sales and sales-to-price are calculated at 
the beginning of each sample year 1969-2001. Firms are then sorted for each of the 
three sorting variables into tertiles and the contemporaneous versions of the Pope 
and Walker (1999) model are run for each accounting variable to avoid the errors in 
variables problem. Finally, the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method is applied to calculate 
the average values of the coefficients, the t-statistics and determine the statistical 
significance of results presented in Table 5-6.94 
Starting from the earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items (EARN), 
the results show that the asymmetric sensitivity of EARN to bad news (and good 
news) increases as the book-to-market ratio increases, i. e., as more and more assets 
are recognised on the balance sheet, the asymmetry measured by either the 
incremental P, or the total bad news coefficient A+^' Y,, increases also. 
Quantitatively almost identical and qualitatively identical results are obtained by 
sorting the observations by the sales-to-price ratio. Therefore, the BVIP and SIP 
ratios appear to capture the same underlying factor. The asymmetry is highest for the 
high S/P-ratio values, consistent with the ratio capturing growth opportunities - 
where the SIP is high, there should be fewer opportunities for future growth, more 
timeliness and more asymmetric timeliness. Interestingly, the sort by the BVIS ratio 
does not produce consistent results and, taking the total bad news coefficient, it can 
be observed that the response to bad news is in fact decreasing across tertiles. 
94 The significance is not detennined for the total bad news coefficient ft, + P, as these are sums of 
average coefficients and not averages of sums of coefficients. 
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Similar conclusions apply also to ORD and OP earnings measures. Overall, however, 
the results agree in that asynunetric timelin6ss in recognition of bad news is 
prevalent in all but one sub-partitions where one of the earnings measures is used as 
the dependent variable. 
The asymmetric sensitivity to bad news for the A WCAP and SPEC accruals 
increases from lowest to highest book-to-market value and consistent results are also 
obtained with the S/P-sort. Again, the sort by the BVIS ratio does not produce 
consistent results. In terms of the difference between the total and incremental bad 
news coefficients the interpretation is difficult, given that the incremental coefficient 
is increasing and the total coefficient is decreasing as book-to-sales increases. The 
partitions where the SIP ratio is high, serve to emphasize the results obtained in 
earnings. Where there are a lot of value-relevant factors that are not yet included in 
financial statements (i. e., where the SIP is low) there should be more opportunities 
for future growth, but because these are not yet included in financial statements, 
accruals as well as earnings should exhibit less timeliness and less asymmetric 
timeliness than in partitions with high SIP values. 
The operating cash flow equation OCF does not produce consistent results, 
but there are indications of asymmetric timeliness being present in the lowest book- 
to-market and sales-to-price tertile, both in contrast to expectations under 
conservative accounting. 
To sum up, the asymmetric timeliness of earnings and its main accruals 
component increases as the level of ex-ante conservatism decreases, as measured by 
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the book-to-market ratio. Identical results are also obtained by the sales-to-price 
ratio, but not, interestingly, by the book-to-sales ratio, contrary to expectations. This 
implies that the choice of the measure of ex-ante conservatism is important, but 
whether the variation in results is due to underlying economic factors or simply to 
bad proxies is a question that requires further research and is beyond the scope of 
this study. It must also be noted that other ex-ante conservatism measures are used in 
the literature. For example, Ahmed, Morton and Schaeffer (2000) use, on a firm- 
specific basis in the US, one minus the depreciation and amortisation over 
(essentially) fixed assets (tangible and intangible), R&D and advertising expenses 
over total sales and a LIFO inventory valuation indicator. Using the present sample 
in this study, only the first of these measures could have been used due to data 
availability. 
5.7 EFFECTS OF METHOD OF ESTZMATXON AND METHOD 
OF OUTLIER REMOVAL 
5.7.1 Pooled regressions 
The main advantage of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions that are 
employed elsewhere in this study to make inferences is that the standard errors of the 
average regression coefficients include estimation errors due to the correlation of 
regression residuals across firms, producing larger standard errors and lower t- 
statistics as opposed to pooled cross-section time-series regressions (Fama and 
French, 2000; also Pope and Walker, 1999, Bernard, 1987, Christie, 1986). To show 
explicitly the differences of using the cross-sectional approach as opposed to the 
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pooled method, the contemporaneous models are re-estimated. by pooling all 
observations across time and space in a single regression and disregard any 
differences that may be due to these two dimensions (Gujarati, 2003, p. 64 1). 
The pooled results of the contemporaneous model are presented below in 
Table 5-7. It must be stressed again that the gains from using the cross-sectional 
Table 5-7: Pooled estimates of contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models, 1969-2001 
Dependent 
A 
R2+A (A + " a Y variable , 2 , 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 0.212 0.003 0.117 0.013 0.051 0.130 1.111 
74.510 0.721 24.092 0.988 461.121 10.590 
Earnings 
OP 0.188 -0.003 0.118 0.049 0.110 0.167 1.415 
88.267 -0.929 32.644 4.979 1.070.973 18.270 
ORD 0.092 -0.002 0.059 0.072 0.151 0.131 2.224 
85.582 -1.161 32.114 14.458 1,534.749 29.250 
EARN 0.089 0.000 0.058 0.125 0.133 0.183 3.157 
64.953 0.167 24.994 19.828 1,321.021 31.210 
Accruals 
AWCAP 0.045 -0-005 0.024 0.030 0.010 0.054 2.285 
22.001 -1.341 6.755 3.192 83.793 6.100 
,d WCA P compon en ts: 
- of which ADebtors 0.056 -0.003 0.033 0.039 0.015 0.073 
2.186 
26346 -0.949 9.182 4.007 133.388 7.940 
- of which AStock 0.048 -0.007 0.031 0.002 0.010 0.033 
1.081 
23.411 -2.135 8.826 0.263 89.825 3.770 
-of whichdCreditors -0.059 0.006 -0.040 -0.012 0.012 -0.052 1.286 
-23.749 1 A67 -9.591 -1.011 103.091 4.880 
DEP -0.072 -0.003 -0.024 0.005 0.017 -0-019 0.812 
-79.433 -1.788 -15.553 1.078 145.359 4. "0 
SPEC -0.005 0.003 -0.009 0.054 0.008 0.045 -4.973 
-5.941 1.898 -5.991 13.164 65.845 11.790 
NoteL Estimated models are: XIP,. i = ai+a2D,., I+flRET,,., +, olD,,,. IRET,,,., +A where X, is an undeflatcd, per share dependent 
variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: Off is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items,, dWCAP is 
working capital accruals, Mebiors is change in debtors accounts, dStock is change in stock, ACreditors is change in 
creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RET,,., -(Pe-P,. IYP,,, and 
Di. t. 1- (I if RETAO; 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price P,. I. Ile total number of observations in 
the sample is 25,888. All coefficients' estimates and R's are pooled cross-sectional time series for the period 1969-2001 and 
associated t-statistics are White's (1980). Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better It1>1.960. 
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approach in this study are likely smaller as they would otherwise be due to the 
sample composition that includes non-December fiscal-year ends and a degree of 
overlap results. Accordingly, the differences between Table 5-7 and the basic Table 
4-8 above are likely smaller than they would otherwise be. 
Overall, the results agree with the results from cross-sectional regressions. 
There is no asymmetry in operating cash flows (OCF), the asymmetric timeliness 
measured by the estimated incremental coefficient J; is increasing from OP to 71 
EARN and most asymmetry is reflected in working capital accruals, in particular in 
the ADebtors component, and in special items (SPEC). To a degree, the results 
presented here are surprising, given that they appear to be weaker than the cross- 
sectional results. For example, the t-statistics on AWCAP is weaker in the pooled 
than in the cross-sectional regressions. However, the conclusions are unaffected by 
the choice of this estimation method. 
5.7.2 LSDV method - incorporating the effects 
of time 
Another possibility is to estimate a pooled cross-section time-series with 
yearly non-interactive dununy variables (Gujarati, 2003,642-647; Greene, 2000, pp. 
560-566; Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, pp. 389-411): the least squares dummy 
variable -'LSDV method whereby the original contemporaneous model of 
accounting conservatism is expanded by the introduction of yearly additive dummy 
variables. These relax the second part of the assumption that the regression constant 
oc 
. If F 
is fixed both across cross-sectional units and in time. In the case of the 
contemporaneous model, the regression equation is: 
X, 2001 
=ao+a, D, +PIRETt+y, DtP, ET Zi; rTr+--, Pt-I r 1970 
(5-8) 
where, in addition to variables already defined earlier in this study, there are 
r-- 33-1= 32 dummy variables T, taking the value of one if a firm's accounting 
year-end is in yearr. Compared to the basic formulation of the contemporaneous 
model in equation (3-10) in section 3.3, the latter can be viewed as a restricted 
version of the former, the restriction being the assumption that the regression 
constant is'equal for all firms and all time periods (the regression constant reflects 
both the cost of capital and the Vj-term). Note that equation (5-8) is estimated for all 
the main earnings and earnings components variables and, accordingly, the following 
exposition applies to all the different regressions using all the different accounting 
variables Xt. 
Figure 5-2 compares the good news coefficients and the incremental bad 
news coefficient estimated using the unrestricted (LSDV) method and the two other 
methods used previously (pooled and Farna and MacBeth, 1973) for the main 
accounting variables. The main overall conclusion is that the results shown in the 
main body of this research are robust to estimation method: all three yield very 
similar y^, and A coefficients and significance levels. Specifically, using either 
method, the results indicate there is no asymmetry in reflecting bad economic news 
in operating cash flows, the asymmetry of earnings is high and most of this 
296 
asymmetry is reflected in working capital (AWCAP) and special items (SPEC) 
accruals. The results for variables that are omitted from Figure 5-2 are qualitatively 
very similar to both pooled results and cross-sectional averages. Therefore, the main 
conclusions regarding accounting conservatism presented in the main body of the 
research are not sensitive to method of estimation. 
Figure 5-2: A comparison of the LSDV, pooled and Fama-MacBeth (1973) methods on the 
contemporaneous model of conservatism, 1969-2001 
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Notes to Figure 5-2. Estimated models are: X/P, ,=a, +a2D,, i+, 8, RET,, I+ yD,,, IRE7;, 1+c, where X, is an undellated. per 
share dependent variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: O(Tis operating cash flow. OP is adjusted operating prolit, 
ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items. 
AWCAP is working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, AStock is change in stock, Wredilors is change in 
creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPECis special items, RET,, =(Pf-P, Y11, and/),,, 11 
if RET,.,. I! W, 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price P, ý. "ISM" is estimation using yearly dummies. 
"Pooled" indicates pooled regressions and - Fama-Mac Beth" indicates coefficients calculated as cross-sectional averages 
according to Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. 
Formally, the differences between the pooled estimation and the LSDV 
estimation with time effects can be tested using the F-test - the restricted least 
squares (Gujarati, 2003, pp. 266-273,640-644). The restrictions in the pooled (i. e., 
restricted) version are that ý1970 to 4-2()ol are equal to 0. 
EARN 
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u 
The test hypothesis stated in alternative form is: 
H4: At least one of the coefficients 1ý1970 to 1ý2001 is differentfrom zero. 
The test statistic is: 
22 (RýR-RR) m lm. 
n-k (I - Ru2R) 1(n - k) 
(5-9) 
222 
where R UR denotes the R from the LSDV (i. e., unrestricted) model and RR denotes 
the R2 from the pooled (i. e., restricted) regression, m is the degrees of freedom in the 
restricted model and equals to the number of linear restrictions imposed on the 
pooled versions or, equivalently, the number of independent (dummy) variables 
omitted from the restricted version relative to the unrestricted model, and (n-k) is the 
number of degrees of freedom in the unrestricted version, n is the number of 
observations and k is the number of independent variables. 
Table 5-8 shows the results of formal tests of differences between the 
unrestricted (LSDV) estimates and restricted (pooled) estimates of the 
contemporaneous model of accounting conservatism by earnings and earnings 
components. For all ten main variables, the R2 UR>R 
2R and the differences are 
statistically significant in all ten cases as indicated by high values of the test statistic 
F. Also, the number of times individual year-dummies are statistically different from 
zero is approximately two thirds and does not fall below twenty. It can be concluded 
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from these tests that time effects regarding the regression constant are significant 
through time. 
Table 5-8: Pooled versus LSDV estimates of the contemporaneous model - formal tests of 
differences, 1968-2001 
Dependent variable R2 UR (tiMe dununies) R2 It (pooled) No. of significant 
F-statistic 
OCF 0.181 0.051 22 128.059 
OP 0.424 0.110 27 439.401 
ORD 0.326 0.151 28 209.848 
EARN 0.273 0.133 28 155.766 
AWCAP 0.103 0.010 27 84.049 
ADebtors 0.075 0.015 27 52.478 
AStock 0.128 0.010 26 109.520 
Wreditors 0.071 0.012 22 51.163 
DEP 0.116 0.017 20 91.179 
SPEC 0.051 0.008 23 36.993 
NoteL Estimated unrestricted models are: XIP, -, -ai+a2D,,, +, 
6, RETI.,., +; iD,,,. IREToi+;, 97oT, +... + 1; 2ool T, +4 where 
X, is an undeflated, per share dependent variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, 
OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items, AWCAP is working capital accruals, Webtors is change in debtors accounts. 
ASIock is change in stock, ACreditors is change in creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and 
SPEC is special items, RET,,, =(Pr-P#. IYPi and D,,. I-tl if RET,,. 1: 50-. 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by 
opening share price PI. Restricted models am estimated without the Iigo to ý, ooi terms. Ile test statistic is evaluated at 
. 
F(33-1-32ý 23,898-35-25,953) degrees of freedom, the statistic is significant at the 1% level for all ten accounting variables X,. 
This conclusion is potentially particularly important within the context of this 
study in that the estimated regression constant et, contains both the term resulting 
from the effects of past economic news and applications of conservative accounting 
Vilpt-1 as well as an estimate of the cost of capital (Ilk). The movements of the 
regression constant through time are presented in Figure 5-3 below plotted against 
the rate of inflation in the same period. 
With the base year in 1969 and yearly dummies T1970 to T2ool, the conclusions 
presented above remain therefore essentially unchanged. It is acknowledged the 
possibility that interacting yearly dummies with RET,., -, and Djj. j-RET,. j. j might 
affect the results. However, introducing independent variables that interact with 
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yearly dummies may introduce other problems in estimation and interpretation of the 
results (Greene, 2000, p. 560, footnote 5), apart from reducing the degrees of 
freedom. 
Figure 5-3: Regression constants from the unrestricted model and the UK rate of inflation, 1969-2001 
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Notes to Figure 5-3: Off. EARN and JWCAP denote the regression constant t, rom the LSDV niodel plus yearly dunimics lot 
each year 1969-2001 
5.7.3 The effect of the method of outliers' 
removal 
Given that there are several possibilities to remove outliers From the sample 
and little empirical guidance towards the appropriate procedure to remove outliers in 
this type of research exists, this section presents the effects of the method ofouthers' 
removal from the sample. First, observations are excluded from the sample it' the 
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values of deflated, per share accounting variables OCF, OP, ORD, EARN, AWCAP, 
DEP, SPEC and market variable RET,, t., are outside the ±3 standard deviations from 
the respective individual variables means calculated on a pooled basis, rather than 
the top/bottom one percentile on these variables. In order to enter the sample, an 
observation's main variables must all simultaneously lay within the ±3 standard 
deviations interval. Second, the main results are re-estimated on a sample where the 
only requirement is that all required variables are reported by the company and 
available in the database - outliers are not removed. Implicitly, this assumes that 
extreme values are descriptive of the processes studied in this thesis and that these 
extreme values are not due to errors in the database and manipulation of these data. 
Rees (1996, p. 94-95) discusses briefly the issue of negative numbers and small 
divisors in particular, a problem that possibly results from the aforementioned 
factors. 
The first effect of the ±3 standard deviations method of outliers' removal on 
results presented in Table 5-9 compared with the basic set of estimates of 
contemporaneous models presented in Table 4-8, is the higher average number of 
observations. Therefore, fewer observations are eliminated, on average, using this 
method of outliers' removal than using the top/bottom I percentile method employed 
in the main body of this study. This implies a sample with more extrcme 
observations. Given that in order to be entered in the sample all observations must 
simultaneously have all main variables within the respective ±3 standard deviations, 
the average number of observations does not change across the dependent variables. 
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Second, a more extreme sample is likely to reduce the average explanatory 
power of models due to greater variability of the dependent variable. Ceteris paribus, 
this implies a reduction in the R2 of any regression. Economically, more extreme 
observations are consistent with more transitory items present in each of the main 
variables. Overall, the results presented are in accordance with expectations. Also, in 
a simple bivariate regression context, there are no a priori grounds that would 
suggest the relation between earnings or earnings components and returns is any 
different for extreme observations. The results show that at least for OCF and the 
earnings variables most coefficients in fact increase (which per se would imply an 
increase in R2 s), reinforcing thus the validity of the ceteris paribus assumption. 
Third, the relations among the magnitude of the coefficients on different 
measures of earnings are preserved. The response to good news is strongest for 
operating profit OP, followed by EARN and by ORD. These coefficients also do not 
differ materially from those presented in Table 4-8. The asymmetric response to bad 
news follows a similar pattern, as well as the R 2S, the total response to bad news and 
the relative response to bad news. 
Fourth, regarding the results for accruals,, dWCAP and its components overall 
are that the response to good and bad news increases marginally. Perhaps the single 
most important result is that the estimated coefficient on good news in the SPEC 
regression A becomes statistically insignificant, while still being negative -a sign 
that would be consistent with earnings management to decrease earnings if the 
returns are positive. Also, the incremental bad news coefficient in this specification 
302 
is higher than the corresponding coefficient in the basic contemporaneous results. 
Table 5-9: Contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models of ex-post accounting conservatism, 
1969-2001, observations within ±3 standard deviations from individual means only 
Dependent variable avg' et, "2 R2 A+A n 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 
Earnings 
OP 
ORD 
EARN 
Accruals 
, dWCAP 
, dWCAP components: 
- of which ADebtors 
819.8 0.228 -0.003 0.089 0.057 0.046 0.146 1.637 
15.301 -0.491 6.514 1.762 7.216 
819.8 0.208 -0.003 0.101 0.152 0.163 0.253 2.510 
10.880 -0.580 7.646 6.749 14.637 
819.8 0.098 0.000 0.057 0.135 0.187 0.193 3.374 
14.311 0.137 8.888 10.467 16.145 
819.8 0.095 0.003 0.059 0.193 0.162 0.252 4.256 
13.036 0.715 9.825 10.723 17.729 
819.8 0.052 0.001 0.028 
5.034 0.350 3.289 
0.087 0.017 0.115 4.129 
3A30 9.381 
819.8 0.059 0.002 0.045 
7.071 0.408 6.234 
0.064 0.025 0.109 2.411 
2.382 10.458 
- of which ASlock 819.8 0.055 0.001 0.039 0.064 0.023 0.103 2.041 4.846 0.142 5.051 2.509 8.901 
-of which ACreditors 819.8 -0.061 -0-001 -0.057 -0.041 0.023 -0.097 1.722 
-6.828 -0.291 -7.963 -1.619 9.535 
DEP 819.8 -0.075 -0.001 -0.017 0.007 0.022 -0.010 0.584 
-17.675 -0.584 -5.144 0.948 S. 930 
SPEC 819.8 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.059 0.024 0.054 -10.255 
-1-252 1.282 -1.398 6.414 6.653 
Notes. Estin-ated models are: XIP,,, = al+a2D,.,., +ARET,,,, +, nD,,. IRET,.,., +CI where X, is an undcnatcd, per share 
dependent variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, 
ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, E4RN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, 
MCAP is working capital accruals, Mebtors is change in debtors accounts, Xwk is change in stock, Wreditors is 
change in creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RETOI-(PrP,,. IYPl 
and Dt,., = II if RET,, 1! 50; 0 otherwise). All variables are dcflated by opening share price P,.,. A q. n is the average number 
of observations per year. All coefficients' estimates and A are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and 
associated t-statistics are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are 
-significant at 
5% or better at 33-1 - 32 d. f., i. e., ltl>2.0369. 
Overall, the effect of changing the outliers' removal procedures does not 
affect the inferences in statistically and economically important ways. Without 
(over-)stressing the result, it must be noted that the coefficient on good news in the 
SPEC regression that becomes statistically insignificantly different from zero, thus at 
least statistically affecting the conclusion that good news result on average in a slight 
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decrease in earnings (specifically, earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items 
EARN). However, the sign and magnitude of the ý coefficient in this regression Y, 
remain. 
Omitting completely the controls of outliers represents a further step in 
sensitivity analyses. The main results are presented below in Table 4-1, but a 
complete set of results including additional variables as well as the lagged version of 
the models is presented in Appendix C, Table C-1 and C-2. The single most 
interesting result that emerges from this sensitivity analysis is due to working capital 
accruals. Both the coefficient on good news and the incremental coefficient on bad 
news become statistically insignificantly different from zero, as opposed to findings 
in the basic set of results that indicates an important role of this type of accruals in 
reflecting bad economic news. Moreover, the R2 in the AWCAP regression does not 
change from the basic results. The role of the component AStock now appears to be 
much more important in reflecting bad news. Consistent with the change in 
significance of the asymmetric response of AWCAP to bad news is the fact that the 
asymmetric response of special items (SPEC) to bad news now appears to be 
economically much stronger, on average - the estimated incremental coefficient P, 
more than doubles from 0.056 to 0.118, but also more variable - the Fama-MacBcth 
(1973) t-statistic decreases from 6.957 to 5.208. Also, the incremental sensitivity of 
the depreciation expense DEP becomes statistically significant (albeit just). There 
are no obvious explanations of this result. 
Overall, the effects of controls for outliers employed do not appear to 
materially affect the results presented in this thesis, including omitting these controls 
304 
Table 5-10: Contemporaneous Pope and Walker (1999) models of ex-post accounting conservatisni, 
1969-2001, outliers not removed 
Dependent variable avg. n al t2 R2+A 
Operating cash flows 
OCF 860.1 0.263 0.016 0.103 0.163 0.045 0.266 2.593 
12.714 0.442 4.901 1.503 5.693 
Eamings 
OP 863.8 0.238 -0.018 0.098 0.208 0.089 0.306 3.112 
10.516 -2.314 5.248 7.934 9A97 
ORD 863.8 0.112 -0.008 0.046 0.208 0.086 0.254 5.463 
13.695 -1.449 5.288 8.718 11.111 
EARN 863.8 0.106 -0.001 0.052 0.321 0.069 0.373 7.181 11.541 -0-158 5.195 8.215 13.327 
Accmals 
, dwclp 861.1 0.057 -0.035 0.022 0.014 0.023 0.037 1.650 5.052 -1.005 1.750 0.150 4.279 
AWCAP components: 
- of which ADebtors 861.1 0.070 -0.042 0.045 -0.031 0.030 0.014 0.301 6.911 -1.087 4.137 -0.300 3.959 
- of which AStock 861.2 0.056 0.002 0.041 0.086 0.021 0.127 3.106 
4.787 0.233 2.871 3.028 5.034 
-of whichdCreditors 861.2 -0.068 0.005 -0-064 -0.040 0.030 -0.104 1.629 
-6.368 0.453 4.655 -1.713 5.629 
DEP 860.9 -0.085 0.001 -0.028 0.028 0.029 0.000 -0.016 
-14.556 0.282 -5.663 3.079 5.258 
SPEC 859.4 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.118 0.017 0.116 -56.171 
-1.609 1.820 -0,405 5.208 6.809 
Notes. Estimated models are: XVP,., - al+a2D,.,., +PIRET,,. 1+7, D,,, IRETI.,. I+r, where X, is an undeflated, per share dependent 
variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional itcms,, dWCAP is 
working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, ARock is change in stock, ACreditors is change in 
creditors accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RET,,. ý (PrP,. IYP,,, and 
Du-i= V if RET,,.,: 50; 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price PI. I. Avg. n is the average number of 
observations per year. All coefficients' estimates and A are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and 
associated t-statistics are calculated according to the Farna and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are 
significant at 5% or better at 33-1 - 32 d. f., i. e., ltl>2.0369. 
altogether. Other methods might have been employed. An overview of some of these 
alternative methods is presented for example in Dillon and Goldstein (1984, p. 252- 
270). However, on the basis of the results presented in this section, it is concluded 
that these would not materially affect any inferences. 
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5.8 THE EFFECT OF PUBLISHED OPERATING CASH 
FLOW AND BOTTOM-LXNE EARNXNGS FXGURES 
The sample used in this study covers one of the longest (if not the longest) 
time-series of UK accounting data to date. The content of particular data items thus 
covers different periods in terms of regulatory regimes that have governed the 
creation of these figures. While there are many issues that may be of interest 
regarding the changes in regulatory regimes and their influence on the accounting 
numbers, at least one such change is important in terms of the results obtained in this 
research - the introduction of the FRS I- Cash flow statements in September 1991 
and subsequently revised in 1996 (valid for financial years ending on or after 23d 
March, 1997). FRS I superseded the previous SSAP 10 - Statements of source and 
application offunds issued in July 1975 (e. g., Lewis and Pendrill, 1996, pp. 315- 
95 318). The "net cash flow from operating activities" figure is generally available for 
financial years ending in 1992 or later (828 firms out of a total 848 in the 
contemporaneous sample in 1992 report this figure), although some firms apparently 
adopted the standard earlier or have published comparable figures for previous years 
according to this standard. While Table 4-9 shows that the association between the 
operating cash flow figure and good economic news is slightly declining and that 
there is no discernible time trend in terms of asymmetric sensitivity to bad news, the 
question regarding any possible effects of using the published cash flow figure as 
opposed to the estimated figure remains. The question is particularly important given 
that since Basu's (1997, p. 17, Table 2) influential paper, a number of papers have 
"A historic perspective of funds-statements developments up to late 1960s can be found in Rosen 
and DeCoster (1969). They state that the Assam Company in England prepared a funds-like statemet 
already for the financial year ending on March 31", 1862. Collins (1946) also provides illustrations of 
various early funds statements. 
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consistently reported a rather puzzling result that is not consistent with accounting 
conservatism being an accruals phenomenon - the asymmetric timeliness of 
operating cash flows to bad news for the US sample (e. g., Ball, Kothari and Robin, 
2000, pp. 36-37, Table 6, and Garrod, Pope and Valentincic, 2004; both for 
respective US swnples). 
The questions regarding the comparability of published and constructed 
figures can also be studied in the case of the earnings figure. The constructed 
"bottom-line" earnings number in this research is earnings after extraordinary and 
exceptional items (EARN). The issues surrounding the construction of a "bottom- 
line" earnings figure that Would be comparable through such a long time period has 
been described in section 4.2 (in particular, see Figure 4-1). DataStrearn provides a 
bottom-line earnings figure for financial years ending in 1987 or after (DataStream 
item #625 - Earned for ordinary), presumably to reflect the introduction of SSAP 6 
(Revised) in 1986. Davies, Paterson and Wilson (1999, pp. 1481-1484) provide a 
summary of historical developments of the FRS 3 and its precedents. 
The analysis for both figures is performed in the following steps. In both 
cases, the samples used are a sub-set of the basic contemporaneous sample with both 
the estimated and published figures available. This is to ensure that the sampics are 
comparable in terms of descriptives. The procedure produces the following two sub- 
samples. For the operating cash flow figure, the sample includes 9,352 firm-ycars 
with both the estimated and published figures available with year-ends in the period 
1992-2001. The descriptives of the'published versus estimated figures sub-sample 
are comparable, although the range of the deflated published figures is slightly wider 
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(-0.504 to 1.578) than the range of the estimated figures sub-sample (-0.380 to 
1.6867). The correlation coefficient for pooled observations in this sub-sample is 
very high, 0.963. For the "bottom-line" earnings, the sample includes 14,112 firm- 
years with year-ends in the period 1987-2001. The descriptives of the published 
versus estimated figures are very similar, although the range of published figures is 
slightly wider (-0.740 to 0.673) than the range of estimated figures sub-sample 
(-0.740 to 0.704). 96 The correlation coefficient for the pooled observations in this 
sub-sample is very high, 0.955. 
Table 5-11 shows the results of contemporaneous models of accounting 
conservatism for the two figures where a published alternative is available. To 
maintain comparability, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method is used, although a 
Table 5-11: Estimated versus published operating cash flow figures (1992-2001) and estimated 
versus published "bottom-line" earnings (1997-2001) 
Dependent variable avg. n et, e12 R2 
+ 
A 
Operating cash flows 
Estimated (OCF) 935.2 0.164 0.005 0.061 0.072 0.071 0.133 2.171 
24.874 0.676 2.597 1.772 4.452 
Published 935.2 0.159 0.006 0.059 0.112 0.082 0.170 2.892 
27.182 0.719 2.629 3.586 5.217 
"Bottom/line" eamings 
Estimated (EARN) 940.8 0.073 0.002 0.034 0.192 0.162 0.226 6.701 
16.102 0.648 5.544 14.709 9.752 
Published 940.8 0.075 0.003 0.035 0.182 0.170 0.217 6.216 
16.629 0.831 5.623 14-871 10.329 
Notes. Estimated models are: XWPI- al+a2D,.,., +, 6, RET, &, +, *ID,.,. IRET,,. I+c, where Xj is an undeflatcd, per share 
dependent variable: OCF is operating cash flow and EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional iterm, both as 
defined in section 4.2. The published figures are taken directly from Datastrcam: published operating cash flows - data 
item #1015 and published "bottom-line" earnings - data item #625. RET, &t- (Pr-P,. iYP&i and D,., I-l I if RETO#SO; 0 
otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price AI. Avg. n is the average number of observations per year. 
All coefficients' estimates and Ies are cross-sectional averages for the period 1992-2001 (operating cash flow) and 
1987-2001 (earnings). Associated t-statistics are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. 
Boldfaced estimates are significLnt at 5% or better at 10-1 -9M., i. e., 111>2.2622 and at 15-1- 14 d. f., i. e., 14>2.1448. 
96 The minimums of both estimated and published deflated "bottom-line" earnings figures coincide 
exactly at -0.7403315. 
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degree of caution must be exercised in interpreting the results given that the 
inferences are made on just 9 and 14 degrees of freedom for operating cash flows 
and eamings figures respectively. 
Turning first to the earnings figure, the results show a delayed response of 
both estimated and published figure to good economic news. Both coefficients are 
very similar in magnitude and significance. Both earnings figures exhibit significant 
asymmetric timeliness to bad economic news, measured by the incremental, the total 
or the relative total bad news coefficients. These results are thus very similar to the 
basic set of results presented in section 4.5. 
In the case of operating cash flows, however, the results obtained by using 
the published figure differ qualitatively from those using the estimated figure. While 
both figures exhibit a delayed response to good news, the published figure also 
exhibits statistically significant asymmetric timeliness to bad economic news 
measured by the incremental bad news coefficient and emphasized by the magnitude 
of the total and relative total bad news coefficients. This result is not consistent with 
accounting conservatism being an accruals phenomenon. Further, Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) do not report asymmetric timeliness of operating cash flows in respect 
to bad news for their UK sample, although a direct comparison of the result is 
difficult given that they use a cash flow figure constructed from data from a different 
database rather than take the published figures (as is the case in this thesis, too). 
Additional analyses (not reported) also reveal that the asymmetry in operating cash 
flows cannot be ascribed to either tax or net interest charges, as these adjustments do 
not affect the results qualitatively and affect them quantitatively only marginally. 
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To sum up, the results obtained elsewhere in this work regarding the effects 
of conservatism on the earnings figure are not sensitive to whether the published or 
the estimated figure is used. However, the results obtained for the operating cash 
flows change significantly if the published figure is used rather than the estimated 
figure within the same time period and for the same firms. Published operating cash 
flows exhibit a statistically significant asymmetric response to bad news. This result 
is not consistent with accounting conservatism. A comprehensive explanation as to 
why this occurs is left for future research. 
5.9 SUMMARY OF FXNDXNGS FROM SENSXTXVXTY 
ANALYSES 
Overall, the results of various sensitivity analyses show that the main results 
obtained in Chapter 4, are generally robust both in tenns of differing rin-n attributes 
and in terms of methods used to estimate the models. While there are some (minor) 
differences in terms of firms of different sizes, industries and different accounting 
year-ends in responding to good and bad economic news, these differences do not 
affect qualitatively the conclusions from the main analyses. 
Various adjustments to reflect varying general economic conditions across 
the sample period also do not affect the main results qualitatively and affect them 
quantitatively only very marginally. A similar conclusion applies to the choices of 
estimation methods and sample selection procedures, too. The construction of 
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alternative proxies of ex-ante conservatism shows some deviations from 
expectations. However, because this area is empirically relatively under-researched, 
this is viewed as an indication of the need for further research rather. Another 
potentially important exception to expectations is the difference between the 
constructed and published cash flow figures in the post-FRS 3 period. 
Generally, however, a delayed response to good economic news and an 
asymmetric response to bad economic news can be observed in all groups of firms in 
earnings figures. This asymmetric timeliness of earnings results from the accruals 
component (more specifically, the working capital accruals and special items, while 
deprecation does not have an important role in this asymmetry). The operating cash 
flow component does not, generally, reflect the arrival of economic news 
asymmetrically. The sensitivity analyses thus suggest that the results obtained in the 
main analyses are robust. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Background and principal findings. This study builds from and extends the 
existing literature on accounting conservatism, one of the dominant explanations of 
observed differences between market values and accounting performance measures, 
on a large sample of publicly-quoted UK companies operating in the United 
Kingdom at any point in the 1969-2001 period. The study provides additional, more 
detailed and new empirical evidence 
_ 
on different aspects of accounting 
conservatism. First, the persistence properties of accounting figures are shown (e. g., 
Giner and Rees, 2001). Second, direct tests of conservatism as reflected in 
accounting earnings, cash flows and, in particular, accruals (Pope and Walker, 1999; 
Basu, 1997) are presented, including changing time-series properties of accounting 
numbers due to conservatism (e. g., Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Givoly and Hayn, 
2000; Francis and Schipper, 1999) and the effects of previous periods news and of 
previous accounting practices (Pope and Walker, 1999; Giner and Rees, 2001). 
Third, influence of the sign of "bottom-line" earnings (e. g., Berger, Ofek and Swary, 
1996; Hayn, 1995) is studied, both directly by expanding the Pope and Walker 
(1999) model and indirectly through separate estimation of the basic model by the 
sign of earnings or various earnings components. Fourth, the effects of general (Pope 
and Walker, 2003) and asset-specific recognition rules are studied. Finally, in the 
sensitivity analyses, other controls, some of them sample-spccific (e. g., adjustments 
for general economic conditions) and the effects of other characteristics (e. g., firm 
size, fiscal year-end) are studied. The main findings are the following. 
312 
First, the study provides evidence on mean-reversion and/or persistence 
properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals induced by accounting conservatism. 
From a time-series perspective, a performance measure reflecting the realised 
proportion of good economic news will tend to be persistent. On the other hand, 
accounting conservatism requires immediate and complete recognition of economic 
losses (decreases in market value). This will be reflected in financial statements as a 
large, one-time earnings-decreasing change in an accounting figure. This study 
shows explicitly which accounting figures reflect/are affected by accounting 
conservatism and in what precise way to the level of detail allowed by the data. To 
allow a detailed exposition, accounting earnings are decomposed in its two main 
components: operating cash flows and accruals. The latter is further subdivided into 
three distinct categories: working capital accruals (and its three main components - 
changes in debtors, stock and creditors), depreciation and amortisation charge, and 
64special iteme'. 
Operating cash flows do not contain any accruals. It is only expected to 
reflect the realisation of operations. In doing so, the operating cash flows arc 
expected and found to be strongly, albeit not completely (Dechow, Kothari and 
Watts, 1998), mean-reverting - periods of high cash outflows (e. g., to buy stock of 
raw material) are followed by periods of high cash inflows (e. g., as sales arc 
collected). There is no difference between eamings-increasing and earnings. 
decreasing changes in the operating cash flows. The inclusion of the consequences of 
financing and investment activities in the cash flows measure yields similar results. 
Moreover, given that cash flows only reflect the economic reality of the firm, there is 
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no difference between profit and loss firms and finns that exhibit decreases in share 
prices. 
Accounting earnings, a performance measure that includes accruals, on the 
other hand, exhibits different time-series properties. The partial realisation of an 
economic gain implies an earnings increase. This increase will be followed in the 
next period by another earnings increase as a consequence of a similar partial 
realisation of an original economic gain. Therefore, earnings increases are predicted 
and found to be persistent. On the other hand, economic losses under conservative 
accounting cause large, complete one-time adjustments to assets recorded in the 
balance sheet. This implies that a corresponding earnings decrease will appear only 
once in the profit and loss account. In other words, earnings decreases are fully 
transitory (mean-reverting). The more accruals components a particular measure of 
earnings includes, the more mean-reverting are the earnings decreases. 
Given that earnings is a simple sum of operating cash flows and accruals 
components and, as theory indicates and evidence shows, the cash flows are not the 
component affected by accounting conservatism, the observed asymmetric 
persistence of earnings must be clearly reflected in various accruals components. 
This study hypothesises and finds that working capital accruals and its thrcc main 
components are on average strongly mean-reverting, as is expected, given that the 
operating accruals are intended to counteract the negative serial correlation in 
operating cash flow to arrive at a more smooth performance measure (earnings). 
However, the results show that eamings-decreasing changes in working capital 
accruals reverse about 50% faster than earnings-increasing changes in working 
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capital accruals, a result consistent with accounting conservatism. Another (or 
perhaps the principal) accruals component that is expected to reverse fast if it reflects 
an economic loss under conservative accounting, is the "special items", a collection 
of various extraordinary, exceptional and other similar items. The results confirm 
this expectation. Moreover, both working capital accruals and special items mean- 
revert more if a firm exhibits a "bottom-line" accounting loss and/or it exhibits bad 
economic news. Interestingly, the mean-reversion rates in both working capital 
accruals and special items are very similar, even though existing literature typically 
explores in more detail the effects of special items on persistence of earnings. On the 
other hand, the depreciation and amortisation charge is typically not associated with 
accounting conservatism. The results show that both increases (i. e., earnings- 
decreasing changes) and decreases (i. e., eamings-increasing change) in the 
deprecation charge are permanent. 
Second, the study extends Pope and Walker (1999) empirical results by 
providing tests of ex-post accounting conservatism using their model. The model is 
built around the asymmetric-timeliness property of earnings that results under 
conservative accounting. Good economic news is reflected in earnings only partially, 
as it meets the criteria of recognition, resulting in relatively low timeliness of 
earnings. Bad economic news, on the other hand, must be recognised in earnings 
immediately, resulting in strong timeliness of earnings. Given that this study uses 
various earnings figures that differ chiefly in the amounts and types of accruals 
components included in them and given that the operating cash flow component is 
also constructed, comparing the differential asymmetric timeliness between the cash 
flow and various earnings models allows indirect inferences about the role of 
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accruals in the observed asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In, a general 
confirniation of existing (US) empirical evidence, operating cash flows generally 
exhibit low timeliness and, given that they contain no accruals, exhibit no 
asymmetric timeliness in reflecting bad news. Earnings, on the other hand, show 
increasingly more asymmetry in reflecting bad news as more and more accruals arc 
added from operating profit to ordinary earnings to earnings after extraordinary and 
exceptional items. While these are ascribed to the effect of accruals neither Basu 
(1997) nor any other existing similar study provides direct evidence on the 
asymmetric timeliness property of various types of accruals. 
This study provides direct tests of the different roles various types of accruals 
have in the observed asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Of the total asymmetric 
timeliness observed in earnings, an important part results from the asymmetric 
timeliness of working capital accruals. Moreover, the results show that all of its three 
individual components reflect bad news asymmetrically. Special items are the other 
important type of accruals that reflects bad news asymmetrically. The depreciation 
charge, on the other hand, does not have an important role in the observcd 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. This analysis also produces an interesting "side" 
result - good news results in a small, but statistically significant eamings-decrcasing 
change in special items, a result consistent with earnings smoothing. Thus the results 
of this analysis also impinge upon other areas of capital market-based accounting 
research. Accruals results show that even though accruals is the component that 
makes cash flows more timely in reflecting economic news, the criterion by which 
the overall timeliness is judged - the R2_ is very low in the accruals regressions. A 
simplified explanation is provided that this is in fact to be expected if accruals have 
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the role in making cash flows timely to arrive at a timely accounting performance 
measure - the accounting earnings. 
Regarding the changes in conservatism through time, this study finds some 
evidence that conservatism is in fact increasing in the UK as well, but the evidence is 
much less persuasive than the US evidence (e. g., Givoly and Hayn, 2000). The 
evidence, consistent with US results, shows that the sensitivity of earnings to good 
news has decreased from 1969 to 2001. The evidence on increasing conservatism 
can directly be inferred through slight increases over time in the incremental bad 
news coefficient either directly in earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items 
or in special items, or indirectly through relative skewness and variability of earnings 
measures, standardised by respective operating cash flow measures. 
The lagged analysis provides corroborating evidence to the results from the 
contemporaneous models. Operating cash flows do not exhibit any asymmetric 
timeliness, the three earnings figures exhibit a pronounced contemporaneous 
asymmetry to bad news and ordinary earnings and earnings after extraordinary and 
exceptional items'also exhibit decreasing asymmetry at lag one and lag two. This 
result is, theoretically, not entirely expected under conservative accounting, but has 
been shown in Pope and Walker (1999) up to and including lag one and is consistent 
with prices-lead-earnifigs phenomenon in the UK (Donnelly and Walker, 1995). The 
significance of lag two incremental bad news coefficient is, perhaps, due to the 
sample composition that includes varying accounting-period lengths. However, lag 
three asymmetry is statistically insignificantly different from zero. Direct lagged 
tests on accruals reveal,, again, that contemporaneous asymmetric timeliness of 
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earnings is due to both working capital accruals and special items, but that the two 
significant bad news lags are likely due to special items. This result thus suggests 
that some types of bad news are not recognised in earnings immediately, but its 
effect spread over up to three years. Of the working capital accruals, only the change 
in stock and work in process now exhibits asymmetric timeliness with the current 
and lag-one coefficients being significant. 
The levels and sign of "bottom-line" earnings as well as other accounting 
variables may represent a control for previous periods' application of conservative 
accounting. It thus helps in modelling the Vrterm within the Pope and Walker (1999) 
model (Giner and Rees, 2001). However, it might also serve as a proxy for other, 
perhaps incremental, explanations of the differences between the accounting figures 
and market values (e. g., the existence of abandonment options "in the money" - e. g., 
Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996). The results shown here are consistent with both 
these explanations in that the R 2S increase sharply, while the coefficients on good 
and bad economic news remain essentially unchanged relative to the basic set of 
results. These findings are valid if lagged levels of the dependent variables are 
included rather than levels of earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items. 
Third, the analysis of earnings components by the sign of "bottom-line" 
earnings shows that the two groups of finns exhibit different average values of 
operating cash flows and accruals components, and that the correlations between 
these variables are fundamentally different for the'two groups of finns, as is 
suggested by existing literature (e. g., Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998; Collins, 
Pincus and Xie, 1997; Jan and Ou, 1995; Hayn, 1995). However, differences in 
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terms of application of ex-post accounting conservatism are not expected. Direct 
tests of ex-post conservatism do, in fact, show no differences in reflecting good and 
bad news for the "bottom-line" profit and loss firms and neither does the developed 
absolute-value model. Moreover, separating the observations by the sign of the 
operating cash flow component reveals that in both groups earnings exhibit levels of 
asymmetric timeliness that is statistically indistinguishably different from one 
another. In contrast, separating observations by the sign of either working capital 
accruals, special items or total accruals, reliably shows that the asymmetric 
timeliness is statistically significantly higher in negative accruals groups, as expected 
under conservative accounting. Immediate, timely and complete recognition of bad 
news results in large, eamings-decreasing changes in accruals, possibly, but not 
necessarily leading to a "bottom-line" loss. In either case, the accruals components 
determines this asymmetric timeliness, rather than ý the operating cash flow (or, 
earnings itselo. 
Fourth, the ex-post application of accounting conservatism has been shown 
both theoretically and empirically (Pope and Walker, 2003) to be limited by the 
application of ex-ante conservatism. The higher the ex-ante conservatism, the less 
likely it is that earnings will reflect asymmetric timeliness in reflecting bad news 
(and timeliness in reflecting good news). As earlier, the component of earnings that 
should be affected by these rules, is the accruals component. As expected given 
previous results and the predictions of ex-ante literature, the asymmetric timeliness 
of earnings increases with decreasing application of ex-ante conservatism and is 
higher for earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items than for ordinary 
earnings (and, with some deviations, operating profit). This asymmetry across 
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different levels of ex-ante conservatism is reflected most clearly through the working 
capital accruals and special items. Newly-developed asset-specific measures of 
"sources" of ex-ante conservatism - reinforce these findings. Some individual 
components in some tertiles are of the correct signs and consistent magnitudes but 
statistically insignificant (albeit, not at entirely prohibitive levels to allow at least 
some comparative inferences). The results do, however, show one puzzling result - 
operating cash flows reveal a statistically and economically significant asymmetric 
response to bad news in the group of observations where it is least-likely to be 
observed (low book to market). This result is not expected under conservative 
accounting. However, this puzzle persists ever since the influential Basu (1997) 
paper. 
Finally, a selection of other results and respective conclusions include the 
following. Smaller firms' earnings tend to exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness in 
incorporating bad news, nonetheless because their size precludes the risk-dispersion 
at the operating level (Basu, 2001). There is some preliminary evidence that 
extremely bad news firms tend to apply more conservative accounting, while very 
good news firms apply earnings-reducing accounting reflected via special items. On 
the one hand, this is consistent with "big bath" accounting, while on the other with 
earnings smoothing (Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). Accounting conservatism 
appears to be a phenomenon that governs the relation between accounting numbers 
and financial statements regardless of the industry in which a firm operates, albeit 
these characteristics are reflected in industry book-to-market ratios that in turn proxy 
for varying levels of ex-ante conservatism. Various adjustments, including market- 
wide index returns, yields on short- and long-term government bonds, December 31 st 
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versus non-Dccembcr fiscal year-ýends, extremities and methods of inference, not 
only provide corroborating evidence for previous results, but in a majority of cases 
have the effect of moving the results more towards hypothesized results. 
Some Innovations and specificities of this study. While building on existing 
literature, this study expands it. at least in the following important aspects (or groups 
of aspects). First, it employs a UK sample that is large both in cross-sectional and in 
time-series terms as it includes both live and dead companies and covers, to the best 
of my knowledge, the longest UK sample covering 1969-2001. Notwithstanding 
technical issues of constructing such a sample, its properties lead to several 
developments that are both necessary in such a context while at the same time being 
complementary to existing studies. These include: construction, indirect and direct 
tests of different earnings, operating cash flow and certain accruals figurcs that 
ensure the highest-possible ý level of comparability through time as well as 
internationally. Some of these measures are complemented by more detailed 
measures (e. g., operating cash flows are complemented with the "total cash flow" 
figure in appendices). These issues are particularly pressing given that the study 
requires relatively detailed accounting data that, furthen-nore, originates from periods 
with different levels and types of accounting regulation. 
The second extension of existing literature that this study provides is related 
to issues of controls for various market-wide effects and controls for fiscal-year ends 
in an UK context, while at the same time ensuring maximum caution in inferences 
by using consistently the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method throughout the thesis, 
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including persistence models. They also determine certain sub-divisions necessary to 
allow for ex-ante conservatism (e. g., the tertiles versus deciles issue). 
Third, some particular innovations relating to methods used in this study 
include the aforementioned market-wide controls that are performed on an individual 
observation basis (i. e., firm plus time) in conditions of varying accounting-period 
lengths. An attempt to form an aggregate test of expected values of coefficients in 
persistence regressions estimated cross-sectionally is also made. New time-series 
measures are developed - in particular, some relative earnings and accruals skewness 
and variability measures standardised by respective statistics for the operating cash 
flow figures. A formal test between pairs of coefficients resulting from different 
partitions (e. g., profit versus loss firms) is applied to issues studied in capital market- 
based accounting research. To the extent that issues surrounding the measurement of 
levels of ex-ante conservatism, asset-specific measures are developed. 
Fourth, in terms of modelling, the absolute-value model developed hcrc 
incorporates directly (allows for) the effects of varying signs of the dependcnt 
variable C'bottom-line" earnings), albeit with some econometric difficulties. 
Fifth, within the sensitivity analyses, comparative results are presented for 
published versus constructed figures used in this text. The issue is potentially 
important to investors, researchers, and standard-setters. Moreover, it provides some 
preliminary evidence on coexistence of "big batlf ' and earnings-smoothing 
accoun ing. 
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Weaknesses and suggestions for further research. Several weaknesses 
appear in this thesis. These issues represent in a great majority of cases potential 
areas of future research. Some of these areas include the following. First, the study 
includes only certain types of accounting performance measures as well as only 
some proxies for ex-ante conservatism. Both might be improved upon/expanded 
using the respective post-FRS figures. One such issue that might be related more to 
ex-post accounting conservatism are the financing and taxation accruals and cash 
flows (Garrod and Hadi, 1998), the effects of which could not be removed entirely 
from or study adequately in this study. Moreover, additional ex-ante conservatism 
measures might be introduced. Given such a long time-series, the "bias and lags" 
measure in Beaver and Ryan (2003) might be feasible. Other studies suggest one 
minus depreciation expense relative to the appropriate asset-base, R&D and 
advertising expenses relative to total assets (Ahmed, Morton and Schaeffer, 2000). A 
related issue conditioned by data availability is that neither Basu (1997) nor Pope 
and Walker (1999) include dividends in the calculation of returns. However, all these 
extensions are data-intensive so they will invariably involve the trade-off between 
the method of inference (determined by the time-series length) and richness of data 
(post-FRS figures). 
Second, in terms of methods used, an econometric resolution to the sample- 
truncation bias and the need to accommodate the sign of the dependent (accounting) 
variable as well as the sign of the independent (market) variable following Hausman 
and Wise (1977) would be an important addition to the study. Other proxies for the 
"loss effect" might be important. 
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Moreover, given that the thesis uses methods that are the standard in related 
research and that these methods account for two principal problems (scale and errors 
in variables), relatively little emphasis has been given on "technical" (econometric) 
checks. Existing literature also suggests further developments in the real-options area 
(e. g. Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996) and issues of simultaneity (e. g., Beaver, 
McAnally and Stinson, 1997) within the conservatism framework may be important. 
Third, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional method of inferences 
used in this paper allows incorporating other potential economic determinants 
(Kothari, 2001; Farna and French, 2000) in the relations under conservative 
accounting. Some of these include (Ahmed et al., 2002): operating variability as 
measured by the variability of the return on assets, dividends (and dividend-payouts), 
leverage, potential growth, impact of R&D and advertising expenses (in particular in 
the UK context) or controls for varying legal-liability periods (e. g., Basu 1997). 
Similar structural breaks are also potentially caused by introduction of new 
accounting regulations. Similarly, cross-sectional estimates might be related to other 
economic factors (e. g., Klein and Marquardt, 2002). 
Fourth, one particular issue affects additional insights that might be obtained 
in studying the models used in this study estimated from a constant sample of UK 
firms. While this would certainly raise potentially serious survivorship-bias issues, it 
might provide additional results that would help to reinforce/refute the findings of 
this study. However, the construction of such a sample might prove very difficult in 
that both the accounting year-ends and the length of accounting period are allowed to 
vary. A related question is the estimation assuming panel data structure (e. g., 
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Greene, 2000). Another related question is the firm-specific estimation that might 
yield additional benefits (Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998; Teets and Wasley, 1996). 
Fifth, one particular sensitivity check that has been omitted from this study is 
the aggregation of both the dependent and the independent variable (Easton, Harris 
and OhIson, 1992). The time-series aggregation in this study should lead to 
increasingly smaller proportions of (principally good) economic news being 
excluded from the accounting performance measures. This would result in higher 
R2S, the coefficient on good news being closer to the cost of capital and the 
incremental coefficient on aggregate bad news being statistically insignificantly 
different from zero (Basu, 1997). 
Sixth, in the context of interactions between persistence and conservatism (as 
in Giner and Rees., 2001), a division of this measure into its cash flow and accruals 
components might prove useful. However, this will likely have to involve resolutions 
of measurement errors potentially involving some of the techniques listed in the 
introductory chapter (e. g., Dagenais and Dagenais, 1997; Lewbell, 1997; Dagenais; 
1994). 
Seventh, some of the results presented in this thesis, particularly the laggcd 
models, appear to be affected by the choice of deflators. The selection of appropriate 
deflators in studies of conservative accounting might constitute an important area of 
future research (Ryan and Zarowin, 2003; Akbar and Stark, 2003; Easton and 
Sommers, 2003; Easton, 1999). 
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Finally, given the large proportion of non-December 31" fiscal year-end 
firms, a formal test of systematic differences would be required. Smith and Pourciau 
(1994) shows that December and non-December year end firms differ systematically 
in terms of size (see section 5.2) and market risk. This latter in particular represents a 
formidable task using such a large sample and the database employed in this study. 
The list of potential areas of future research does not attempt to be 
exhaustive, but rather indicative of the issues that are still to be explored in this area 
of capital market-based accounting research (in particular, contractual aspects have 
not been discussed in this thesis). To conclude, it must be noted that the literature 
reviewed does not represent a complete set of research papers in this area. The 
selection is heavily influenced by the course of studies taken. Howeveran attempt to 
provide as complete a review as possible of this large area has been made. 
Furthermore, given that accounting conservatism is a rapidly expanding area, the 
bibliography likely does not include all the most recent developments. 
Some potential users of the results presented In this thesis. The results 
from this thesis potentially affect several stakeholders. Perhaps the most pressing 
issue at this moment is defined by the formal endorsement of International Financial 
RePorting Standards by the European Union (Commission Regulation No. 
1727/2003, Official Journal of the European Communities, 29/9/2003, in accordance 
with Commission Regulation 1606/2002, Official Journal of The European 
Communities, 11/9/2002) to be applied throughout the EU beginning 2005. Both in 
the EU and in the US and other regions, is the need for a "high quality" set of 
accounting standards, providing timely value-relevant inforination to (equity) 
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investors. Timeliness and particularly asymmetric timeliness is thus viewed as a 
desirable characteristic of financial statements (performance measures). This study 
shows some detailed aspects of the timeliness property of accounting perfon-nance 
measures. The findings might be helpful in the standard-convergence process on a 
global scale, for example by comparing the UK GAAP/IAS(IFRS) standards with 
US GAAP (e. g. Ashbaugh and Olsson, 2002) and cross-listings (e. g., Hujigen and 
Lubbering, 2001). In particular, the (asymmetric) timeliness of special items would 
likely play an important role in this debate. Perhaps an issue immediately related is 
the link of conservatism with auditors' incentives (e. g., Jeong-Bon, Chung and Firth, 
2003; Basu, Hwang and Jan, 2001). 
Given that the existence of accounting conservatism induces differences 
between accounting and market value, these findings also affect investors and 
financial analysts, who need to adjust their estimates for the effects of both current 
and past conservative accounting practices. Properties of conservative accounting are 
important also in contractual terms. Conservatism has been shown to affect both the 
dividend policy and debt covenants (e. g., Ahmed el aL, 2002), there are indications 
also shown in this study that it varies according to managerial incentives (following 
Kirschenheiter and Melumad, 2002). Conservatism is also shown to be affected by 
board composition (Beekes, Pope and Young, 2003) and influence board 
composition and incentives (Bushman et A, 2004). related to and may have other 
contractual uses. 
Finally, future researchers in the area of capital market-based accounting 
research might find some sections of this thesis informative. One such topics might 
327 
be the variable definitions and sample construction sections, an area particularly 
scarce of detail in existing literature. This research also affects international 
variations in applications of accounting conservatism that differs not in accounting 
standards, but rather in tenns of legal incentives and infrastructure. This has been 
explored in a number of settings recently, starting from the Pope and Walker (1999) 
model (e. g., Basu, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Basu, Kothari and Wu, 2002; Raonic, 
McLeay and Asimakopoulos, 2004). Recent applications also include properties of 
accounting earnings of private finns (Ball and Shivakurnar, 2004), a particularly 
scarcely researched area, at least in part due to lack of appropriate data and 
databases. 
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APPENDICES 
A. LIST OF MAIN VARXABLES AND ASSOCXATHD 
DATASTREAM CODES 
Table A-1: List of the main variables used in the empirical study and associated Datastream codes 
(deflinitions) 
Variable label Name Datastream codes (construction formula) 
OP Operating prof it = #137 
ORD Ordinary earnings =#182 
EARN Earnings after extraordinary = #182 + #193 + #194 
and exceptional items 
AWCAP Net change in debtors, stock = #448 + #445 - #417 
and work-in-progress and 
creditors 
ADebtors Change in debtors 
AStock Change in stock and work in 
progress 
ACreditors Change in creditors 
DEP Depreciation and amortisation 
SPEC Special items 
OCF Operating cash flow 
ACASH Net change in cash 
Accruals (tot. ) Total accruals 
BV Book value of equity 
S Turnover 
P Share price 
RET,.,, Ex-dividend return (deflated by 
lag one price P, -, 
) 
PET,,,, 
-, 
Ex-dividend return (deflated by 
price four periods back P, 4) 
Current/lagged loss indicator 
Current/lagged bad news 
indicator 
FTSE All Share FrSE All Share index 
UKTRSBL 91 -day UK TB discount UKMEDYLD 10-year UK gilt yield 
Inflation rate UK inflation rate 
MRETI., 
-, Market-adjusted ex-dividend 
return 
MPE Tt. r,, - y- I 
Market-adjusted ex-dividend 
return 
DMt. l. 1, DM, -,;, -,, 
Current/lagged market-adjusted 
bad news indicator 
NONDECYEI, Financial year-end indicator 
#448 
#445 
= #417 
= #402 + #562 
= -(OP-ORD) +# 181 + (# 153-# 143) + 
(# 160-# 162+# 169+# 16 1 -# 164) 
= OP + DEP -A WCAP + #404 
= #457 pre-FRS I (Rev. 1996) and# 1134 
post-FRS I (Rev. 1996) 
=AWCAP+DEP+SPEC 
= #305 
= #104 
=P 
n/a 
n/a 
I if EARN,: 5 0 or 
EARM., :50 and zero otherwise 
I if RETI. t. 1: 5 0 or 
PET,,,, 
-1: 5 0 and zero otherwise 
= FTALLSH 
= UKTRSBL% 
= UKUEDYLD 
= UKRPANNL 
= RET#.,, - A%FTSE All Share, 'j-, 
= PETt-,: I-r-l - A%FTSE All Share 
I if MRETII-1: 5 0 or MPET,.,.,. 1: 5 0 and 
zero otherwise 
I if firm i's accounting-year end in year is not on the 3 111 December and zero 
otherwise 
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B. CONTFMPORANEOUS AND ZAGGED POPE AND WAZKER 
(1999) MODEZS ON NET CHANGE XM CASH AND 
TOTAZ ACCRUAZS 
Table B-1: Descriptive statistics - net change in cash and total accruals, 1969-2001 
Variable Defl. Mean St Dev Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Skew n 
ACASH P', 0.006 0.207 -1.909 -0.067 0.000 0.064 3.228 1.217 25,880 
Accruals PI. -I -0.045 0.205 -1.459 -0.108 -0.026 0.037 1.001 (tot. ) -0.833 25,888 
ACASH P14 0.000 0.271 -3.036 -0.082 0.001 0.082 5.021 0.261 20,530 
Accruals P14 -0.041 0.260 -1.601 -0.134 -0.036 0.048 1.627 0.132 20,536 
- 
(tot. ) 
Notes. Variables are defined as follows: ACASH is the net change in cash, Accruals (lot. ) is total accruals. Both variables are 
per share and scaled by P, -, 
in the contemporaneous and P" in the lagged sample. n is the total number of observations. Note 
that the number of observations is lower in the ACUSH variable because reporting this figure is not a requirement to enter the 
samples. In the case of total accruals, the number of observations is equal to the respective numbers in contemporaneous and 
lagged samples. 
Table B-2: Persistence of net change in cash and total accruals, 1969-2001 
Panel A: ACASH avg. n ; r, ; r2 
62 R2 
No partition 693.6 0.013 -0.451 0.216 
1.713 -21A89 18.725 
Mm partition 693.6 -0.003 0.030 -0.417 -0.008 0.224 
-0.390 6.780 -16.891 -0.201 19.153 
EARNrlevel partition 693.6 0.005 0.115 -0.439 -0.070 0.237 
0.601 6.805 -20.344 -1.348 19.789 
Lag RET, 13-2 partition 693.6 -0.007 0.040 -0.387 -0.187 0.236 
. 1.133 4.875 -18.626 -7.876 20.162 
Panel B: Mccruals (tot) avg. n irt 'r2 A 0)2 R2 
No partition 689.1 -0.004 -0.421 0.200 
-0.526 -14S64 8.166 
Mm partition 689.1 -0.032 0.027 -0.308 -0.196 0.231 
-4.477 6.136 -6.685 -3.047 9.538 
EARNrlevel partition 689.1 -0.018 0.077 -0.366 -0.174 0.240 
-2.402 3.046 -IIA31 -3.901 10.020 
Lag RETt-1.1-2 partition 689.1 0.004 -0.016 -0.337 -0.249 0.223 
0.738 -1.711 -10.967 -10.173 9.026 
Notes. Estimated regressions are: (AX1P,. j)-xj + jr2, C, _i + 4h'(AX_i/P, -2) + M'C, -r(AX#-i1P, -2) + rjj where AX; = Xr-X, -, and AXI-I= X14-41-2 and X, is an un-deflated, per share dependent variable listed at the top of 
each panel. Dummy variables C,. 1 are defined as follows: partitioning byA. X,.,: C,., -(l if AX,., _<O; 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged level of earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items EARN, 
i: Cti= II if EARN,., -_'0; 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged returns RET. ij. 2: C,. I- (I if RETj, #. 2_<O. 0 
otherwise). All estimates are cross-sectional averages for the period t-1969-2001 and associated i. 
statistics are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are 
significant at 5% or better at 33-1= 32 d. f. Values are restricted to top/bottom 1% of distribution or 
variables used in the contemporaneous sample as well as to toP/bottom 1% of distribution or relevant 
deflated change variables AXIP,., and AX, -IIP,. 2 
(i. e., the samples used in this table are sub-samples of 
the contemporaneous sample). 
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C. SENSITXVXTY OF LAGGED MODELS TO DXPFERENT 
DEFLATORS 
Table C-1: Descriptive statistics for lagged samples deflated by P, _1 and by opening price at each lag, 
1969-2001 
Panel A: Deflated by pl Mean St Dev Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Skew 
Cash flows 
ACASH 0.007 0.206 -1.717 -0.066 0.000 0.065 3.228 0.978 
OCF 0.241 0.244 -0.393 0.102 0.185 0.317 1.895 1.832 
Eamings 
OP 0.209 0.189 -0.304 0.101 0.161 0.270 1.439 1.719 
ORD 0.097 0.096 -0.422 0.056 0.087 0.131 0.615 0.341 
EARN 0.088 0.121 -0.740 0.049 0.085 0.134 0.673 -0.755 
Accruals 
, dWC. 4P 0.045 0.176 -0.780 -0.018 
0.022 0.099 1.010 0.539 
- of which ADebtors 0.056 0.182 -3.545 -0.004 0.026 0.095 4.766 2.402 
- of whichdStock 0.051 0.176 -3.184 -0.004 0.014 0.085 2.890 1.070 
- of whichdCreditors -0.062 0.210 -5.863 -0-099 -0.025 0.008 3.164 -2.761 
DEP . 0.081 0.077 -0.602 -0.102 -0.058 -0.032 -0.002 -2.520 
SPEC -0.011 0.076 -0.567 -0.022 0.000 0.011 0.314 -1.736 
, 4ccruals (tot. ) -0.047 0.209 -1.459 -0.113 -0.028 0.036 1.001 -0.824 
Retums 
PET,,,, 0.127 0.446 -0.735 -0.164 0.061 0.339 2.422 1.219 
PET, 
-,., 2 
0.027 0.394 -2.389 -0.140 0.093 0.284 0.732 -1.557 
PET#-2.1-3 0.011 0.424 -2.857 -0.133 0.080 0.252 1.034 -1.856 
PET, 3., -4 0.008 0.440 -3.036 -0.125 0.060 0.224 1.461 -1.631 
Dij-1 0.435 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.261 
D,,., 2 0.391 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.449 
D 
t--Zt-3 0.392 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.442 
---Pt-3. t-4 
0.404 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.393 
Cont. 
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Panel B: Varying 
deflators Mean St Dev Min Q25 Median Q75 Max Skew 
Cash flows 
ACASH 0.014 0.247 -4.230 -0.063 0.001 0.068 4.754 2.555 
OCF 0.252 0.296 -2.007 0.104 0.186 0.318 4.216 3.212 
Earnings 
Op 0.209 0.226 -2.566 0.099 0.158 0.264 4.389 3.165 
ORD 0.094 0.119 -2.346 0.055 0.085 0.128 1.829 -0.320 
EARN 0.079 0.164 -2.848 0.048 0.083 0.131 1.836 -3.005 
Accruals 
AWCAP 0.039 0.207 -2.643 -0.020 0.020 0.093 2.813 0.596 
- of which ADebtors 0.053 0.199 -3.545 -0.005 0.024 0.091 4.766 2.098 
- of whichdStock 0.045 0.202 4.637 -0.005 0.013 0.078 3.176 0.071 
- of whichdCreditors -0.059 0.229 -5.863 -0.094 -0.023 0.009 3.591 -2.338 
DEP -0.085 0.093 -1.715 -0.104 -0.059 -0.033 -0.001 4.141 
SPEC -0.016 0.105 -2.601 -0.022 0.000 0.011 1.419 4.923 
Accruals (tot. ) -0.063 0.260 4.171 -0.117 -0.030 0.032 2.587 -2.082 
Rctums 
PETt.,, 0.128 0.450 -0.735 -0.164 0.059 0.337 2.422 1.248 
PET,,., 2 0.143 0.453 -0.705 -0.152 0.071 0.354 2.467 1.272 
PET141-3 0.143 0.448 -0.703 -0.153 0.074 0.357 2.345 1.179 
PET$-3.1-4 0.137 0.439 -0.698 -0.153 0.070 0.351 2.259 1.147 
D,.,, 0.437 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.255 
D t-I. P-2 0.422 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.315 
D Z, 3 0.420 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.323 
Df-lf-4 0.424 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.307 
Notes. Variables are defined as follows: JC4SH is the net change in cash, OCF is operating cash flow, Op is adjusted 
operating profit, ORD is earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items (ordinary earnings), EARM is earnings aficr 
extraordinary and exceptional items,, MCAP is working capital accruals, ADebtors is the change in creditors, ASIock is the 
change in stock and work in progress, ACredilors is the change in creditors, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense, 
SPEC is special items and Accruals (tot. ) are total accruals defined as Accruals (tot. )- dWCAP+DEP+SPEC. All dependent 
variables are per share and scaled by P#.,, but the definitions of independent variables change across the two panels. in Panel 
A, lagged adjusted price differences are scaled by lag-one price P,,, so that PET#.,.,., t- (P, -r8-, -iYA. I, but in Panel B the deflators of adjusted price differences vary with lags so that PET,, v-, -i= (8., -8-. iYP,. r+ D,.,,.. i are dummy variables defined as if RET,, 150,0 otherwise). The definitions of dummy variables are independent of the choice of dcflators. The 
number of observations in sample in Panel A is 20,993 (20,987 for the ACASH variable) and in Panel 13: 20,137 (20,131 for 
the WASH variable). The table includes descriptive statistics of the AG4SH and Accruals (tot. ) variables for reason or 
completeness, but samples are not formed according to these two variables, analogously to formations of the 
-contemporaneous and 
lagged samples. 
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D. DETAILS ON PERSISTENCE COEFFXCXENT TESTS 
Table D-1: Persistenced tests - number of times coefficients equal the expected value, 1969-2001 
PANEL A: Operating cash 
flows (OCF) 
61 62 4+62 61=-0.35 e92 = 0-00 61 + 62 = -0.35 
No partition -0.345 22 
-12.046 
, d0CF, j partition -0.305 -0.001 -0.306 15 12 20 
-9.145 -0-013 
EARN,., -level partition -0332 -0.107 -0.438 15 15 20 
. 12.660 -1.074 
RET,,., 2 partition -0.260 -0.230 -0.490 18 20 19 
. 11.318 -6.353 
PANEL B: Operating profit 
(OP) 
61 62 + 62 61ý0,00 62ý-0,50 61+62: 2-0,50 
No partition -0.058 20 
-2.594 
JOPs., partition 0.063 -0.503 -0.441 13 14 18 
2.996 -9.711 
EARN, 
-, -level partition 0.033 -0.271 -0.237 11 21 26 1.822 -6.226 
RET-1,12 partition 0.009 -0.183 -0.174 9 21 26 
0.400 -6.139 
PANEL C: Ordinary 
earnings (ORD) 
61 62 + 62 61 = 0,00 
" 62 = -0*50 ^+ 62 : -, -0150 (01 
No partition -0.067 18 
-2.925 
, dORDt., partition 0.101 -0.690 -0.589 18 21 19 4.613 -11.750 
EARNt. 1-level partition 0.046 -0.312 -0.266 18 24 25 
2.294 4.972 
RETI. I. 1-2 partition 0.029 -0.233 -0.204 18 24 27 1.347 -7.103 
PANEL D: Earnings after 
ex'ord. and ex! nal. items 
(EARN) 
0), W2 0ý + 0)2 
61: __ 0,00 62=-0,50 61+62,2-0*50 
No partition -0.234 31 
-7.307 
AEARN,. 1 partition -0.054 -0.696 -0.750 12 25 27 
-1.529 -9.681 
EARN,., -level partition -0.069 -0397 -0.467 19 24 22 
-2.739 -3.460 
RET, 
-I. t-2 partition -0.121 -0300 -0.422 25 20 23 
4.003 -6.521 
Cont. 
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PANEL E: Working capital 
accruals (A JYCAP) 
61 62 61+62 61 = -0*50 
62 = 0'00 61 + 62 = -0,50 
No partition -0.407 21 
-20.117 
A(AIYCAP, 
-, ) partition -0.296 -0.147 -0.443 23 17 12 
-6.964 -2.362 
E, 4RN, I-Ievel partition -0390 -0.118 -0.508 24 11 18 
-19.190 -2.206 
RET,,,., 2 partition -0.337 -0.204 -0.541 25 19 10 
-19.212 -8.873 
PANEL E-I:, dWCAP 
component - ADebtors 
W, W2 clý+CO2 61=-0.50 62=0.00 61+62=-0.50 
No partition -0.423 24 
. 17.369 
ADebtors, j partition -0344 -0.117 -0.461 20 20 12 
-9.498 -2.969 
EARN, 
_, -level partition -0.417 -0-099 -0.516 
23 13 16 
-1 7A44 -1.167 
RET, 
_U-2 partition -0-353 -0.220 -0.573 
25 21 18 
-16.240 -7.081 
PANEL E-2:, dWCAP 
component - AStock 
W, W2 0ý + W2 61 = -0,50 
61 + 62 = -0,50 
62 0,00 
No partition -0.392 28 
-11.608 
, dStock,., partition -0.334 -0.152 -0.486 26 23 19 
-6.986 -1.847 
EARN., -level partition -0.380 -0.151 -0.532 28 9 17 
-10.567 -1-234 
RET, 
-,,, 2 partition -0.339 -0.181 -0.519 26 17 17 
-9.429 -6.403 
PANEL E-3: A WCAP 
component -, dCreditors 
0), W2 WI + W2 -0*50 
62 
ý 0*00 61 + 62 m -0,50 
No partition -0.451 24 
-15.881 
Wreditors,., partition -0.415 -0.002 -0.417 16 13 25 
-14.515 -0.039 
EARN-, -level partition -0.440 -0.061 -0.501 23 16 15 
-15.206 -1.211 
RET, 
-,,, 2 partition -0.405 -0.153 -0.558 24 12 16 
-14.078 -5.288 
PANEL F: Depreciation 
. 
and amortisation (DEP) W, 
W2 ctý + W2 61 0,00 Cý2 ý 0*00 61 + 62 "ý 0,00 
No partition 0.001 7 
0.031 
ADEP, 
_1 partition -0.001 0.490 0.489 811 
-0.038 0.274 
EARN,., -level partition -0.036 -0.452 -0.488 566 
-1.424 -1.086 
RET, 
-I. t-2 partition -0.024 -0.080 -0.104 59 12 
-0.945 -0.344 
ConL 
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PANEL G: Special items 
(SPEC) 
W, W2 dý+69, 6, =-0.50 62=0,00 61+62=-0,50 
No partition -0.413 22 
-12.246 
ASPEC, j partition -0.288 -0.292 -0.580 27 26 24 
-7.178 -3-U4 
EARN,, -level partition -0.271 -0.422 -0.693 29 26 17 
. 9.501 4.536 
RET, 
-I., -2 partition -0.256 -0.337 -0.594 
28 24 17 
-10310 -6.262 
PANEL H: Net change in 
cash (ACASM 
W, A W2 A OA+CO2 'ýDl=-0.50 62=0.00 61+62=-0.50 
No partition -0.451 19 
-21.489 
A (. dCASH,., ) partition -OA17 -0.008 -0.426 17 10 17 
-16.891 -0.201 
EARN, 
-, -level partition -0.439 -0.070 -0.509 
20 10 13 
-20.344 -1.349 
RET, 
-1,12 partition -0.388 -0.025 -0.412 
23 21 14 
-20.473 -0.146 
PANEL 1: Total accruals 
(Accruals (tot. )) 
61 e92 4+62 e5l = -0.50 
62 = 0.00 61 + 62 = -0.50 
No partition -0.421 22 
-14.564 
A(Accruals (tot. ),, ) part. -0308 -0.196 -0.505 25 19 15 
-6.685 -3.047 
EARN, 
-, -level partition -0366 -0.174 -0.540 
27 14 15 
-IIA31 -3.901 
RET, 
-I., -2 partition -0337 -0.249 -0.586 
29 24 19 
-10.967 -10.173 
Notes. Estimated regressions are: (AXIP, -i)= m, + MCI + ah(AX-11PI-2) 
+ MCI-KAXIIIPI-2) + q, where AX, -Xr-Xl and 
AXý, =X,. r-X, 2 and X, is an un-deflated, per share dependent variable listed at the top of each panel. Dummy variables Cj are 
defined as follows: partitioning by &YýI: C, -i= 
11 if 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged level of earnings after 
extraordinary and exceptional items EARN,.,: C, -, = 
It if EARN,., 50; 0 otherwise); partitioning by lagged returns 
, RET, L, ýz: C, j- II if RET,.,., 24-: O; 0 otherwise). 
All estimates are cross-sectional averages for the period t--1969-2001 and associated t-statistics are calculated according to the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 33-1- 32 d. f. Values are restricted 
to top/bottom 1% of distribution of variables used in the contemporaneous sample as well as to top/bottom 1% of distribution 
of relevant deflated change variables AXIPl and AXIIP, -2 
(i. e., the samples used in this table are sub-sampics of the 
contemporaneous sample). 
The test statistics of equality of coefficients to those listed in Table 3-11 in section 3.4 are t-statistics calculated for each year 
and for each coefficient(linear combination of coefficients. The numbers in the table indicate the number of times the 
estimated coefficient is equal to the expected value listed in the head of each panel. 
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E. FORMAL TESTS OF DXFFERENCES BETWEEN 
RESTRICTED AND UNRESTRICTED VERXSONS OF 
CONTEMPORANEOUS AND LAGGED MODELS 
Table E-1: Formal tests of differences between restricted and urestricted versions 
of contemporaneous and lagged models, 1969-2001 
Number of times differences between 
restricted and unrestricted cross-sections 
are significant 
Dependent variable Contemporaneous Lagged 
Cash flows 
WASH 58 
OCF 11 9 
Earnings 
OP 23 17 
ORD 27 26 
E, IRN 28 26 
Accruals 
AWC4P 10 10 
- of which ADeblorrs 59 
- of whichdStock 5 12 
- of whichdCreditors 36 
DEP 66 
SPEC 15 18 
Accruals (tot. ) 16 16 
Notes. Estimated models are either XýPI= ai+a2D,, -, +, 6, RET, #., +, nD,,. IRET,.,. I+si (contemporaneous models) or XIP, -, - ao+aD,.,, +, 6, PET,,. -, +APETi-l, v2+fljPET, ý. 2., -j+ +fl4PET,., jj-. d+? ID,, IPET,, -, +, %-D, -I. v2PET,. -i. #--2+7. rD, -z"PETv2. f-j+y, (Dt-j, i-XETvj. "+& (lagged models) where X, is a dcpendendt variable defined as follows: ACASH is the net change in cash, 
OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is earnings before 
extraordinary and exceptional items (ordinary earnings), EARN is earnings after extraordinary 
and exceptional items,, dWC. 4P is working capital accruals, ADeblors is the change in creditors, 
ASIock is the change in stock Wreditors is the change in creditors, DEP is depreciation and 
amortisation expense, SPEC is special items and the measure of total accruals is 
AccruaIs=, dWCAP+DEP+SPEC. All variables are per share and scaled by &I for the 
contemporaneous models and by P, 4for the lagged models, returns variable are defined either 
as RET,,, ýI=(PrP,. IYP,, I Or as PETr-TI-T-Im(PI-rPI-r-IYPf-4 in the extended versions. 
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CONTEMPORANEOUS AND LAGGED REGRESSIONS 
INCLUDING OUTLIERS 
Table F-1: Contemporaneous models of accounting conservatism by earnings components, including 
additional variables, and including all outliers, 1969-2001 
2 + 
Dependent vafiables avg. n eil 
a2 R A A+A A 
Cash flows 
ACASH 861.2 -0.003 0.030 0.096 0.062 0.024 0.158 1.650 
-0.477 0.877 5.387 0.602 5.957 
OCF 860.1 0.263 0.016 0.103 0.163 0.045 0.266 2.593 
12.714 0.442 4.901 1.503 5.693 
Eamings 
OP 863.8 0.238 -0.018 0.098 0.208 0.089 0.306 3.112 
10.516 -2.314 5.248 7.934 9A97 
ORD 863.8 0.112 -0.008 0.046 0.208 0.086 0.254 5.463 
13.695 -1.449 5.288 8.718 11.111 
EA RN 863.8 0.106 -0.001 0.052 0.321 0.069 0.373 7.181 
11.541 -0.158 5.195 8.215 13.327 
Accruals 
, dWCAP 861.1 0.057 -0.035 
0.022 0.014 0.023 0.037, 1.650 
5.052 -1-005 1.750 0.150 4.279 
AWCAP components: 
of which ADebtors 861.1 0.070 -0.042 0.045 -0.031 0.030 0.014 0.301 
6.911 -1.087 4.137 -0.300 3.959 
of whichdStock 861.2 0.056 0.002 0.041 0.086 0.021 0.127 3.106 
4.787 0.233 2.871 3.028 5.034 
-of whichdCreditors 861.2 -0.068 
0.005 -0.064 -0.040 0.030 -0.104 1.629 
-6.368 0.453 4.655 -1.713 5.629 
DEP 860.9 -0.085 0.001 -0.028 0.028 0.029 0.000 -0.016 
-14.556 0.282 -5.663 3.079 5.258 
SPEC 859.4 -0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.118 0.017 0.116 -56.171 
-1.609 1.820 -0.405 5.208 6.808 
Accruals (tot. ) 855.8 -0.033 -0.027 -0-008 0.162 0.020 0.154 -19.644 
-2.753 -0.729 -0.639 1.544 5.848 
Notes. Estimated models are: XIP,., = ai+a2D,.,., +ARET,,. t+ýiD,. t. iRETti-i+ci where X, is an undeflated, per share dependent 
variable listed in the leftmost column of the table: OCF is operating cash flow, OP is adjusted operating profit, ORD is 
earnings before extraordinary and exceptional items, EARN is earnings after extraordinary and exceptional items, JWCAP is 
working capital accruals, ADebtors is change in debtors accounts, AStock is change in stock, ACredifors is change in creditors 
accounts, DEP is depreciation and amortisation expense and SPEC is special items, RET,,., - (Pr-PIypl and D,.,., - (I if 
RET,,.. 150; 0 otherwise). All variables are deflated by opening share price P,.,. Avg. n is the average number of observations 
per year. All coefficients' estimates and R2s are cross-sectional averages for the period 1969-2001 and associated t-statistics 
are calculated according to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Boldfaced estimates are significant at 5% or better at 33. 
1- 32 d. f., i. e., JtJ>2.0369. Regressions include all observations that have the non-missing values separately by each variable 
(the average number of observations changes accordingly) 
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G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON TIME-SERIES 
TRENDS IN SPECIAL ITEMS (SPEC) 
Figure G-I: I'I'CqLICIICICS of'positive and negative special items (SPEC) per year, 1969-2001 
80' 
70% 
2 
= Wo u 
500o 
4(r o 
2(f) 
il 
1000 
00 00 00 00 00 00 cý CY, cý 0, CY, oý C> cl <71 CD <D 
0,01 Z, Z, 01 Z, 01 el cl Z, cl Z, all 0,01 0,0,0,0,0, al c71 C> cl (Y, 0,0,0,0,0, CPI CD ýO 
---------------------------- (14 ri 
Notes. SPECare special iterns. Shomi are percentages oftotal number of firms within each year. The terni "large" denotes 
observations Ahere ISPEC,, )12! I% of special iterns relative to the opening book value oftotal assets A,, (c. g Flliott and Shaw, 
19M Flliott and Hanna, 1996). 
'Fable G-1: Time-trend regressions of percentages of firms reporting positve and negative special 
items (SPEO, 1969-2001 
Percentages of firms reportingu: 
2 
adj. R 
Negative SPEC 0.474 0.003 0.022 
20.695 1.307 0.201 
Large negative SPEC 0.271 0.004 0.047 
10.174 1.605 0.119 
Positive SPEC 0.477 -0.003 0.039 
24.488 -1-511 0.141 
Large posltl\ e SPh'(' 0.253 -0.004 0.367 
30.039 4.421 0.000 
Zero SPEC 0.049 0.000 -0.032 
11.264 -0.116 0.909 
Notes. L-stimated are T, + T2 T+ ýT denotes 
the technical time 1 16,... 0, +161 . 
Below each ofthe estimated i, and 
T2coeti-icients is the time-trend t-statistics and below the adjusted R2s are the 
exact levels of significance based on the F-statistic. Bold faced cstiniates are 
_significant at 
5". or better (critical values arc i, ý oo5(31 d. f. )= 2.040. 
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